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          Despite taking place in the mid-nineteenth century the U.S. Civil War still 
offers numerous crucial insights into modern armed conflicts. A current or 
future federation or new ‘nation’ may face fundamental political differences, 
even irreconcilable difficulties, which can only be settled by force. In future 
states will inevitably face both separatist issues and polarised argument over 
the political development of their nation. It is probable that a civil war may 
again occur where the world may watch and consider forms of intervention, 
including military force, but be unwilling to do so decisively. This type of Civil 
War therefore remains historically significant, offering lessons for approaching 
the problems of strategy in a politically complex environment. Equally it offers 
insights into civil-military relations in highly complex conflicts where loyalties 
are not always clear. 
           
          Success and ultimate triumph in the U.S. Civil War relied a great deal on 
the efficiency of civil-military relations and a willingness to approach each in a 
flexible, innovative manner. Within grand strategically vital regions where 
loyalties were uncertain and political complexity was very high, success in the 
realm of civil-military relations became the decisive factor in securing political 
control. Success in this dynamic and fluid realm of civil-military relations 
directly enabled military potential to be maximised, accelerating the 
implementation of the initial stages of a war winning strategy. This strategy 
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would ultimately preserve the Union and propel the United States towards 
world power status. 
          Theories of civil-military relations from and based around the thoughts 
and methods of Samuel Huntington argue for the separation of the professional 
military and their political leadership. Huntington’s theories as first laid out in 
‘The Soldier and the State’1, developed from the American historical 
experience, with the United States’ civil-military relationships present and 
future in mind, often ignored the complex and unique nature of some conflicts. 
Huntington at times ignored what the he considered to be historical factual 
anomalies in favour of theoretical framework. It would be unwise to analyse 
civil wars and complex conflict in this manner, these are often fought out on 
many levels with local and regional conflicts tied up in the wider struggle. What 
may be appear to be a very clearly defined conflict at this wider level can be in 
fact be far more complex regionally and indeed locally. 
 
          Complex conflicts and multi-layered civil wars of varying intensities have 
been present in many eras and, in the post-Napoleonic age, have tended to 
occur following large scale multi-national conflicts, be they ‘Hot’ or ‘Cold’. The 
American Civil War has been utilised by Huntington to help develop his 
theoretical framework for efficient civil-military relations. However key aspects 
of this war exist where Huntington’s theories and others within the discipline 
are unsuitable or too imprecise for suitable analysis. These aspects also exist in 
other complex civil wars. The complexities of such conflicts render historical 
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detail more important and therefore more resistant to overarching theoretical 
analysis.  
 
          This thesis will therefore demonstrate key, but less widely covered, 
aspects of the U.S. Civil War can serve as more useful models for civil-military 
relations in complex conflicts; introducing concepts and rare occurrences 
directly affecting theoretical analysis. These concepts and occurrences can be 
found in the decisive Western Theatre of the U.S. Civil War. A more focussed 
examination of the decisive Western Theatre of the U.S. Civil War and the role 
played by the states of Kentucky and Missouri therein can prove useful in 
examining Samuel Huntington’s interpretation of the conflict and its effect on 
civil-military relations. Huntington’s lifetime assertion that the struggle served 
as a dividing line in the development of the United States in general and her 
civil-military relations in particular justifies this further examination.2 
 
          The war in general functioned in much the way Huntington identified; 
with the United States adapting to the conflict, both militarily and politically, in 
the fashion of a war against an external enemy. However much of that which 
did not function in the traditional manner or cannot be clearly defined by 
Huntington takes place in the Western Theatre; a theatre in fact defined by the 
struggle for Kentucky and Missouri. The 1860/61 struggle for these two states 
introduces pivotal actions/reactions, organisational developments and highly 
irregular/unorthodox instances of civil-military relationships vital to the 
outcome of the war but cannot be confidently defined by Huntington’s 
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theories. The complexities of the Border State conflict can then be used as the 
basis for an examination of other intra-state conflicts with similar 
characteristics.            
          At a wider level examining the Border State conflict addresses the need 
for a more suitable model to assess complex conflicts; this thesis being most 
relevant to the analysis of intra-state conflict fought after the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars. These civil wars involving numbers of competing groups of 
local, regional or national origin with geographical, cultural or ideological 
objectives not always in accordance with the two major protagonists.3 Each war 
likely involving foreign intervention, either overtly or covertly to ensure an 
outcome beneficial to their own political objectives or wider world view. 
However these external powers were never prepared to decisively intervene 
regardless of cost or with the risk of widening the war. In each conflict the role 
of one or more of these smaller regional grouping4 were arguably crucial and 
indeed certainly a recognizable major factor in that conflict’s outcome and 
direction. 
          This work will show the overall outcome of such a complex conflict is 
dependent on the successful formation of official or unofficial coalitions to 
create effective civil-military relations. It will show the need for the 
manipulation of, or co-operation from, strategically vital but lesser partners to 
achieve a successful end to the conflict.  It will highlight the importance both of 
the role of the national leader and his relationships with local spheres of 
political power. This thesis will also note how these roles are more difficult and 
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important in multi-layered conflict. It will also demonstrate a local or regional 
leadership can at times have a pivotal role to play in a civil war which, although 
this role may be brief, can have the potential to be decisive. It will be argued 
that ignoring such regions and their importance in a complex civil war can be 
highly damaging to the chances of ultimate victory.  
          This work will argue that a flexible, unorthodox and occasionally unlawful 
approach is necessary to triumph in the environment of complex civil war. It 
will highlight a correct balance of both political leverage and military force is 
required to secure a positive outcome thus achieving the stated political 
objective. It will argue the higher level of complexity common to this type of 
war places a higher premium on an efficient chain of command and on civil-
military relations at all levels. Importantly this thesis will show that traditional 
chains of command and established civil-military relationships may be 
completely unsuitable for this type of conflict; thus requiring either their 
amendment or removal. 
          Successful revolutions are rare; a national government directly challenged 
by revolution would tend to the use of extremes due to the high political stakes 
involved. Even when norms of warfare are observed by all combatants political 
expediency may require the setting aside of certain ‘rights’ whether codified or 
un-codified in law. This thesis will argue that setting aside both the law and 
tradition at the right time is necessary to triumph in complex intra-state 
conflict. However putting aside legal and traditional rights, especially doing so 
at the wrong time without full consideration, can undermine political objectives 
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and military cohesion. Conversely, in a complex civil war, autonomous legal and 
cultural traditions can be a serious obstacle to successful coalition building. This 
thesis will argue that autonomy, where it cannot be manipulated, may have to 
be set aside to ensure ultimate success and when this is done can have a 
decisive effect on the chances of victory. It will be demonstrated that it is 
within these complex issues that too simplified theoretical analysis may be 
unsuitable.     
          References will be regularly made to historical omission, revolving around 
the use of and ignorance of historical occurrence in complex civil conflict. 
However in addressing Huntington’s subordination of historical fact to the 
functioning of theory and the analysis of American civil-military relations this 
thesis does not seek to create in any way a whole new theory. This thesis does 
however seek to address complex conflict and civil wars by challenging 
Huntington’s historical omissions and use of history where they can be shown 
as being important in validating or otherwise his ideas. Furthermore it can be 
very strongly argued that the complex nature of the Civil War in Kentucky and 
Missouri provides strong tests to any approach or theory of civil-military 
relations.  
 
Why examine the American Civil War? 
          Within this thesis it is intended to illustrate the outcome of the American 
Civil War was largely dependent on the role of the states of Kentucky and 
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Missouri and the political and military struggle fought around them from the 
end of 1860 to the end of 1862. This study will demonstrate this struggle 
remained undecided until the autumn of 1862 and was for practical purposes 
symbolically settled by the Emancipation Proclamation taking effect on January 




Map1.  The United States of America, December 1860. 
 
             Just a brief glance at any map of the United States in 1860 reveals the 




implementation of this proclamation, great influenced by and heavily affecting 
both, signalling Union dominance over the political future and military 
resources of both states.5 As such a number of case studies will be used to 
illustrate the crucial influence these two ‘Border’ states projected on both the 
political direction of the war and its strategic and grand strategic development.  
          This thesis will strongly argue that only when Kentucky and Missouri were 
securely under the control of the Federal Government was a Union military 
victory assured and fundamental social and political changes possible in the 
United States. Conversely it will also argue Confederate failure to both 
understand and even partially triumph in the contest for both states fatally 
compromised any hope of victory. In the period covered by this thesis for 
practical purposes Confederate victory would have been formal recognition 
either by the United States Government or the European powers.  
          This work will identify the superior use of both political and military 
resources inside and outside of these two states, when organised in effective 
civil-military relationships, consistently proved successful in the Western 
Theatre. Victory here, it will be argued, directly aiding success in the wider war. 
The several examples of these successful ad-hoc and unconventional civil-
military relationships, dictated by the nature of the Border State conflict, will 
demonstrate the dangers of subordinating actual historical occurrence to a 




The importance of Kentucky and Missouri in the study of the American Civil 
War. 
          In 1960 Bruce Catton wrote, “St.Louis is not merely in the center of the 
great Middle West, in the heart of America itself; it is also in the middle of the 
great decisive theatre of the Civil War.”6 Kentucky and Missouri were the 
pivotal states of the Western Theatre of the American Civil War, providing the 
battleground for both the initial political and military contests in what was the 
truly divided region of the United States; the Border Region.  
         Within this Border region the complexities of conflict were far greater than 
any other state or region, the influence of local political power was more crucial 
as were the loyalties of each man as they might be enough to tip the balance. 
The ability to forge effective civil-military relationships, the ability to utilise all 
resources to achieve political objectives and to exercise decisive or subtle 
leadership as the situation required was absolutely essential. Triumph in these 
states decisively altered the course of the war.   
          Study of the American Civil War has now generally agreed that the conflict 
was won and lost in the Western Theatre.7 Recent study has also convincingly 
argued that, militarily, the outcome was effectively decided much earlier than 
had been conventionally accepted, principally instigated by the collapse of the 
Confederate defence of southern Kentucky in early 1862.8 The crushing 
victories at Forts Henry and Donelson in February 1862 were however only 
possible following the successful campaign waged by Abraham Lincoln and his 
administration (supported by various political allies) to prevent the secession of 
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both Kentucky and Missouri from the Union, starting with the securing of 
St.Louis, Missouri in spring 1861. These successes effectively restricted the 
contribution to the Confederate war effort made by the Border States to a 
reasonably significant but in no way decisive level. 
          Politically, it was Lincoln’s handling of the situation in the Border States, 
principally over the future of slavery, which paved the way for the fundamental 
change in the direction of the conflict during 1862. Lincoln’s successes here 
allowed the initial, essentially politically conservative, goal of the restoration of 
the pre-1860 Union to fundamentally shift towards the goal of the destruction 
of slavery in the South.9 The destruction of slavery was to remove the South’s 
historical political dominance of the nation’s direction and development, going 
on to transform the United States from a collection of individual states or 
regions to a more centralised nation.  
          In Kentucky and Missouri Lincoln, in states where he had little 
unconditional support, secured both political control and control over the bulk 
of military resources. In a crucial departure from United States’ tradition 
Lincoln had successfully transferred the question of the future of slavery from 
state or regional to national level, destroying the near century of fudged 
consensus. 
          It will be argued Lincoln’s successes in the Border States were down to his 
correct identification and use of the necessary civil-military relationships to 
achieve the political goals of the Union and ultimately prevent its permanent 
separation. In contrast to Lincoln’s overall success, a consistent failure by the 
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Confederacy to co-operate with pro-southern/secessionist factions in both 
Kentucky and Missouri in identifying common objectives or establishing 
effective civil-military partnerships fatally undermined any long term prospects 
of independence. Lincoln’s active and co-ordinated use of local pro-Union 
forces and Republican politicians in both states created an effective ad-hoc 
coalition. Lincoln’s ad-hoc coalition was matched against the traditional and 
legalistic approach championed by Confederate President Jefferson Davis. This 
approach hampered co-operation, co-ordination and direction all consistently 
being found wanting against Lincoln’s more flexible approach.  
            Historians have been divided on the practicality or possibility of 
secession for either Kentucky or Missouri. Perhaps the most accurate 
assessment for the prospect of Missouri’s secession is Albert Castel’s, who 
regards the likelihood as being dependent on the actions of both warring 
parties, especially on Lincoln’s determination to maintain the Union.10  
Throughout both the political crisis following the 1860 Presidential Election and 
the immediate months following the bombardment of Fort Sumter, in April 
1861, opportunities for one or both states to leave the Union were present.  
          Opportunities for secession rose and fell in direct response to covert and 
overt political and military actions by both the Union and Confederacy, never to 
be entirely in the hands of either state’s politicians or populace. Lincoln’s grasp 
of this dynamic was a distinct advantage over a less flexible southern 
leadership. Christopher Phillips sums up Missouri’s overall feeling that she 
regarded herself as, “...Neither above nor below the Union.”11Again the chance 
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of secession rested on the adverse reaction by the bulk of Missouri’s population 
to a mistake by Lincoln. Objectively for Kentucky similar sentiments prevailed, 
the prospect of secession depended on a rash move by either side and 
especially on Lincoln should he pursue or allow a threat to slavery in Kentucky 
to develop. There can be no doubt that effective secession by either state 
would have fundamentally changed the character of the war and as such 
prevention or facilitation of such a move became (or should have become) a 
primary objective. 
          Historically a trend initially developed where scholars of the war were 
fixated with the conflict around Virginia which still continued into the 1950s 
and 1960s. Whilst eventually recognising the decisive nature of the Western 
Theatre the majority still dismiss any decisive influence on the conflict from the 
Trans-Mississippi region. Even today there is a wider ignorance of the war in 
the Border States and the Trans-Mississippi. National Park librarian Jeff Patrick 
regarding the relative isolation of Missouri, a lack of ‘personalities’ such as a 
Grant and absence from Civil War syllabuses as being some of the reasons.12He 
does however recognise the gradual improvement in scholastic interest in 
recent years.13    
          This thesis therefore will contend that the influence on the direction of 
the American Civil War by the state of Missouri was very high in the early 
months of 1861 and in conjunction with that of Kentucky decisive. The two 
states considered together contained a notably different vision for how the 
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United States should develop, and for that reason gave both sides cause to 
hope and expect their support. 
          The interdependence of Kentucky and Missouri has often been 
underplayed or even ignored despite the cultural similarities and common 
heritage of the two states; it will be further contended that they should be 
treated as a single entity in all aspects of the political crisis from secession to 
outbreak of war and beyond.14 This clearly needs to be the case over the future 
of slavery but also in regard to the genuine widespread loyalty felt toward the 
Union across both states as well as a general mistrust of Lincoln and the 
Republican Party.15   
          Viewing the Border States as one is also crucial in the understanding of 
the reasons for the success of the early Union offensives and the failure of the 
Confederacy to develop a coherent strategy in the region and the Western 
Theatre as a whole. The strategic influence of Missouri faded as the war 
progressed, but it is this declining influence which highlights the general 
strategic success of the Union within the state and in the wider Trans-
Mississippi. The overall Union success in Missouri was achieved without, 
initially, resorting to heavy handed measures of civil control which were to 
appear from 1862, allowing a military dominant position to be reached before 
harsh restrictions on public life were inevitable.16   
          Civil-military relations and how they were perceived by the population of 
Kentucky and Missouri were central to the struggle for Border States. This 
thesis will argue that civil-military relationships are both more complicated and 
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more important to the outcome of the war in 1861-62 Missouri and Kentucky 
than in the remaining states. This level of importance is indeed greater than in 
Tennessee and Virginia where similar tensions arose over secession and where 
a much large percentage of battlefield confrontations took place. The 
continued doubt over the eventual allegiance of both Kentucky and Missouri 
gave each an initially high level of influence in the direction of the war. This 
indecision was an expression of the lack of desire by the majority of either state 
to fight against or in support of either protagonist. These complexities are 
heightened by the need for both combatants to operate cautiously in both 
states, with the sure knowledge that any serious political blunder against the 
perceived interests of one state would almost certainly also create a setback in 
the other. This situation is one which is incredibly difficult to define and as such 
defies easy analysis in any given theoretical framework.   
          The nature of the mid-nineteenth century United States was also a major 
factor in the complexity of the Border States as was the nature of the non-
committal stance adopted by both Kentucky and Missouri on the outbreak of 
war.  It will be demonstrated that the form of alliance warfare existing in the 
Border States for much of 1861 and arguably into 1862 was vital in the eventual 
outcome of the war as a whole. This served to increase the influence of both 
political and military leaders from the Border States until their respective 
allegiance was no longer in doubt. This complex and sometimes shifting pattern 
of alliances is a crucial characteristic of this type of war; this thesis will argue 
that both identifying and mastering its complexity is one of the keys to victory, 
putting the onus on flexible civil-military relationships to do this. This work will 
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identify just how important it is to recognise just when and how a regional 
‘entity’ can impact on the civil-military relationships of the wider conflict.    
          Along with civil-military relationships existing on a number of levels this 
thesis will argue that the concepts of Southern Unionism and Southern 
Nationalism, while widely studied in the context of the Civil War, massively 
impacted on these relationships and are vital throughout the period of study. 
These are the political viewpoints which clash most obviously in the Border 
States and neighbouring areas. The importance of the Border States to the 
conflict is all the more crucial when it is considered that many contentious 
issues collided directly in these states, indeed more than anywhere else in the 
nation. These contentious issues are also much clearer geographically in the 
rest of the United States than they are in either Kentucky or Missouri. Those in 
the ‘Cotton Belt’ of the Deep South or indeed the ‘Abolitionists’ of New England 
unquestionably enthusiastically fought for their respective sides whilst  in the 
‘Border States’ the majority were initially undecided. Southern Unionism and 
Southern Nationalism will be shown to be examples of specific national 
historical trends which hinder the validity of any attempt to create an 
overarching political theory however applied.      
          This thesis will strongly argue that Lincoln’s handling of the overall Border 
State crisis and subsequent military and political developments was a show of 
superior leadership perhaps equal to any displayed during the war at arguably 
the most crucial time. It will also illustrate that when Lincoln did misjudge, 
mismanage or misread events in the Border States the Confederacy or the pro-
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southern groupings therein failed to capitalise for a range of fundamental 
reasons which will be discussed.  
          For any work investigating the complex nature of civil wars, Kentucky and 
Missouri during 1860-2 offer a highly dynamic grand strategically and 
strategically vital theatre of war in one of history’s most important conflicts; in 
fact this thesis will argue that victory in both led to victory in the wider war. It 
will demonstrate that effective leadership coupled with innovative civil-military 
relationships constantly adapted to the dynamic conditions extent in the 
Border States were major factors in Union success. By contrast this thesis will 
argue failure to identify these factors led to Confederate and pro-southern 





          The remainder of this introduction will be used to give a brief summary of 
the four case studies of this thesis followed by a Methodology section. Further 
relevant topics, including the historical background of Kentucky and Missouri 
leading up to the secession crisis, will be discussed. A brief outline of the 
concepts of Southern Unionism and Southern Nationalism will also be included. 
Basic definitions of terminology and factual explanations etc. will conclude this 
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introduction. It being recognised that a basic understanding of Civil War 
military organisation is helpful for this thesis.              
          Following this Introduction a Literary Review will discuss civil-military 
relations theory with regard to Samuel Huntington’s ‘The Soldier and the State’ 
and its relevance to this thesis. It will then discuss Huntington’s supporters and 
critics and the continued relevance of Huntington’s theories today. This review 
will also look at literature specific to the American Civil War where that pertains 
to civil-military relations or complex conflict. It will discuss Huntington’s wider 
use of history, his focus on American history and that of the mid-nineteenth 
century in particular to form a theoretical framework on civil-military relations. 
Trends in the study of the Civil War will also be discussed along with specialist 
volumes on the war in the Border States and how the discipline of civil-military 
relations plays an increasing part in this study.  
          
           Before the four case studies and Conclusion this thesis will include a 
chapter discussing the history of the Secession Crisis from November 1860 to 
April 1861, detailing how that crisis developed in Kentucky and Missouri and 
their respective roles at the national level. The handling of this crisis in both 
states dictated to a large degree each state’s response to the outbreak of 
hostilities, their attitudes to each side and the approach of both the Union and 
the Confederacy to the political stance of the Border States.  
 
          This chapter will also explain and discuss the genuine opportunities for 
secession presented to each state and the attempts to find a compromise 
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peace, driven in large part by Kentucky. The attitudes displayed to the search 
for peace were to impact directly on each state once hostilities began. The 
secession crisis in the Border States demonstrates the need for, and the 
benefits reaped by, President Lincoln in forming unofficial even unlawful 
relationships with politicians in Missouri and the early manipulation of those in 
Kentucky even before his inauguration.  
 
          The overview ends with the Confederate bombardment of Fort Sumter 
and Lincoln’s call for volunteers to suppress the rebellion. This call for 
voulnteers leads to four more states seceding but also to a situation which 
simply is very hard to fit into a Huntington type or any theoretical framework of 
civil-military relations; how can a given state, as part of a federation, neither 
fight for or against that federation but legally exist within it?          
 
          The chapter on the secession crisis will introduce points which will 
continually occur and develop in the case studies. The crisis will demonstrate 
again the complex political nature of the Border Sates and their role in the 
increasing tensions between North and South. The chapter will discuss the 
inevitability of war due to the near impossibility of any lasting agreement 
between the Deep South and the Republican Party. It will explore the genuine 






Case Study Outlines 
          The four case studies selected for this thesis will cover not only the highly 
complex nature of the war in Kentucky and Missouri from April 1861 but also 
their impact on the political objectives of the Union and Confederacy and their 
respective military strategy. The dynamic changes in civil-military relationships 
and command disputes will also be highlighted. These case studies will show 
the gradual weakening of the strategic and political link between the two states 
but also the continuing influence of Kentucky held on the political direction of 
the war towards the end of 1862. It will be continually argued that ignorance of 
the situation in the Border States was detrimental to overall success in the war 
for both sides.   
            Each case study will investigate the relationship between professional 
military desirability and political necessity within the dynamic setting of mid-
nineteenth century America. All will show the highly complex nature of Border 
State politics to be an enhanced test for leadership at all levels and a severe 
strain on not just civil-military relations but also the military command chain in 
a varied and expansive geographical setting, providing both multiple strategic 
challenges and opportunities. 
            Each case study will show the complex nature of Kentucky and Missouri 
still required the defeat, destruction or negation of the enemy’s armed forces 
to achieve a given political objective. Each will show the enhanced demand on 
military leadership to display both political awareness and understanding of the 
local populace, often at odds with a given general’s own political views and 
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strategic outlook. Each chapter provides several examples of severe 
examinations of the professional standards and abilities of the officer corps of 
both sides, many of whom were in no way military professionals.  
          Each chapter will show how important a rational command structure and 
responsive civil-military relationship is to success in a complex civil war but also 
identifying the required balance between military and political objectives is 
vital. Each will show a different emphasis on the way to success and failure in 
the Border States during 1861-62 and therefore in a complex civil war of the 
nineteenth to mid-twentieth century and beyond. 
          The four case studies will cover four distinct areas where different 
approaches were necessary to achieve success within the varying political 
backgrounds and military pressures of intrastate conflict. In turn these are: the 
use of unauthorised/unlawful military forces to secure political objectives; the 
subversion of regional political power by the national government without the 
overt use of military power; identification of the correct balance between 
military strategy and political objectives and an examination of the dangers of 
too much or too little political supervision in major offensive operations. 
 
Case Study One 
          This case study will cover the secession crisis in Missouri, April-September 
1861. It will in part examine the use of military force to prevent secession by 
units not initially in the national military organisation (in this case neither 
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United States Army or legally established state units) nor wholly under 
established channels of political direction. It will also argue the use of flexible 
and unorthodox civil-military relationships can be necessary to do this.  
         Missouri in early 1861 was a volatile tinderbox of competing political 
groupings in conflict over their respective visions of the future of the United 
States and of Missouri’s role either inside or out. With a recent history of low-
level warfare between pro-slavery and ‘Free-soil’ settlers Missouri was the first 
where the outcome of any state’s ultimate direction in the event of war was 
uncertain. This chapter will highlight the need for unorthodox and unlawful 
approaches to the highly complex nature of intrastate conflict with the need for 
insightful and decisive leadership at all levels. 
           The United States Constitution and its division of war powers, along with 
the role of President as Commander-in-Chief, will be commented on in regard 
to Abraham Lincoln’s flexible use of his defined powers, implied authority and 
political influence in 1861 Missouri. This case study will argue that in this form 
of conflict; flexibility, the identification and use of resources and selection of 
determined and ideologically motivated subordinates is vital. It will 
demonstrate that traditional peacetime models of civil-military relationship and 
orthodox command and control may be ill-suited to multi-party intrastate 
conflict. 
 
Case Study Two 
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          This case study will cover the secession crisis in Kentucky, also April-
September 1861. It will look at the manipulation of Kentucky’s political 
machinery and traditional leadership by President Lincoln and the Republican 
Party in their goal of preventing secession. It will also examine the covert build-
up of military strength within the state by the Federal Government and the 
overt raising of local forces by state organisations to support both the Union 
and the Confederacy.  
        This chapter covers what is, in essence, an excellent example of the steady 
covert subordination of regional political independence to national government 
control. It will cover key political relationships and the actions of the local 
political leadership, principally Governor Beriah Magoffin, within Kentucky’s 
self proclaimed period of ‘Neutrality’. The ‘Neutrality’ period is an example of 
the complex nature of this type of conflict, characterised by the absence of an 
immediate outbreak of fighting. This period of uneasy ‘peace’ will be used to 
highlight the changing political objectives of local leaders as they react to 
pressures from both their own populace, expressed in Kentucky through three 
elections, and from outsiders including radical leaders from North and South. It 
will also identify how a covert system of civil-military relations can be created 
ready for an inevitable conflict that a majority of the people are firmly against. 
         This case study will highlight the failings of the Confederacy in its approach 
to a complex conflict. The Confederacy’s ill-defined command relationship and 
failure to indentify a set of common political objectives within its leadership will 
be contrasted to the more effective approach used by Lincoln. This chapter 
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concludes with the invasion of Kentucky by Confederate forces in the first week 
of September 1861. This decision, made by a general on the ground, crucially 
without political authorisation, had a critical effect on the development of the 
war in the Western Theatre and illustrates clearly the folly of a poorly 
established command structure. 
Case Study Three 
          This case study will cover the period October 1861-March 1862 in both 
Kentucky and Missouri. It will be an examination of the relationship between 
political objectives and ‘correct’ military strategy and the identification and 
selection of the military leadership required to facilitate this relationship.  
          This chapter will highlight the changing strategic relationship between 
Kentucky and Missouri, along with the changing balance between political 
objectives and the aims of the military ‘professional’. It will examine the build 
up to, and the execution of, the first major Union offensive in the Western 
Theatre. This offensive opened with the seizure of Forts Henry and Donelson by 
General Grant in February 1862, thus collapsing all Confederate defensive 
positions in southern Kentucky. This study will cover the Confederate response 
to both the build up and actual offensive and highlight the added pressure of 
operating in Missouri and Kentucky in terms of the political significance of 
being seen to withdraw or advance into either state.  
          This period will also be used to look at the perception of an army of 
‘liberation’ or ‘occupation’ in the Border States and how this affects the stance 
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of the military in regard to its relationship with the civilian population and the 
development of an offensive. It will also discuss the problem of troops from 
different regions and ideologies being moulded into an armed force with a 
common objective i.e. the role of troops from states led by radical Republican 
Governors. The difficulties of regional politicians in the formation of a ‘national’ 
army and an effective strategy for its use and their impact on the efficiency of 
civil-military relations will also be investigated in this case study.    
 
Case Study Four 
           The final case study will cover the period June-December 1862 and will 
be based around the Confederate offensive striking into Kentucky between July 
and October led by General Braxton Bragg. This chapter will consider how the 
pursuit of regional political objectives before the destruction of an opponent’s 
army can have serious repercussions and how a successful offensive can be 
undone by lax or too rigid political supervision.  
          This chapter will discuss the repercussions of Confederate defeat at 
Perryville, Kentucky in October within the context on the war situation as a 
whole at that time. The announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation 
before this battle was fought, but after the Confederate defeat at Antietam in 
Maryland in September, will be discussed in the context of this offensive and 
the Union response to it. 
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        The international dimension of intrastate conflict will be briefly discussed 
in relation to this case study. The period of July to October 1862 being the 
period of greatest discussion over possible intervention by various European 
powers in the conflict, principally Britain and France. One of the aims of the 
Emancipation Proclamation being to deter intervention as any major victory by 
the Confederacy in the Border States would have served to encourage such a 
move.  
          This chapter will note that while some of the uncertainties regarding the 
Border States had been resolved by this time, due to Union successes covered 
by previous case studies, the influence on the whole conflict of Kentucky had 
not diminished however and still directly impacted on both grand strategy and 
the general political direction of the war. This case study will highlight the 
desire to destroy the opponent’s army, if possible, is still the ideal and should 
be facilitated by an efficient civil-military command relationship. It however 
also demonstrates that the realities of the complex U.S. Civil War in the Border 
region still dictated an appreciation of political reality to be necessary in 
directing and leading an army.   
          The overall war situation at the close of 1862 will be commented on in 
regard to the Border States, looking at the measure of success achieved by the 
Union in securing their control and preparing for a largely victorious 1863 with 






           
          This thesis utilises primary and secondary historical sources to support the 
argument that complexity and the unique nature of any given conflict can 
unsettle the validity of too widely targeted theoretical frameworks. Samuel 
Huntington’s use of the American national experience as the basis for his 
theoretical ideals on civil-military relationships can be tested with assessments 
on just how such relationships did function in pivotal periods identified by 
Huntington himself.  Huntington identified the U.S. Civil War as the major pre-
World War II turning point in American civil-military relations.17 This thesis will 
assess key aspects of the U.S. Civil War in Kentucky and Missouri 1860-62 in 
terms of civil-military relationships and Huntington’s theoretical framework.  
            
          Central to the thesis is the use of four cases studies to explore the key 
aspects of the fight for the Border States. As described above together all four 
cases studies discuss crucial periods in the struggle for Kentucky and Missouri, 
the success and failure of civil-military relationships in each period being of 
fundamental import. That each case study demonstrates different approaches 
to successful civil-military relations serves to counter the need for history to ‘fit’ 
a theoretical framework. Together they demonstrate that Huntington did not 
always explain the successful practice of civil-military relations and within a 




          The use of case studies, following on from the relevant introductory 
sections and the chapter on Secession, also helps to establish the historical 
context of the war in Kentucky and Missouri along with arguing forcibly their 
pivotal role in the direction and prosecution of the conflict. Along with 
highlighting the crucial role of these two states in the eventual fate of slavery in 
the United States these case studies support the clear view continually held by 
Huntington of the supreme importance of the war to the direction of the 
nation. In holding this view, as repeated a number of times in this thesis, 
Huntington leaves open the chance to use historical study to look much more 
closely at civil military relationships and how they are successful.  By making 
this challenge the historical fact and resources must be as compelling and 
detailed as possible.  
           
          The major primary sources cited in this thesis are the Official Records of 
the War of the Rebellion (OR); the 128 Volume Army records being cited in this 
case.18 Other sources regarded as primary sources include 1850s/60s Kentucky 
and Missouri official state documentation/records and contemporary or near 
contemporary accounts by participants etc. Use of the OR shines the best 
possible light on the actual functioning of civil-military relations in a wartime 
situation. The OR demonstrates readily the practical differences between the 
theoretical and actual functioning of civil-military relations and the command 




          The highly complex nature of the Civil War in the Border States provided 
varied day to day challenges for both political and military leaders at all levels. 
The contest for these two states and their environs also provided a stern test 
for any system of civil-military relations and indeed for any theoretical 
framework applied to it. Within all case studies the pivotal importance of the 
two states to the outcome of this major conflict is argued and serves to 
reinforce how important the complex and unorthodox nature of the civil-
military relationships are. Throughout the thesis quotations from contemporary 
communications highlighting the sheer complexity of this regional struggle will 
be regularly utilised.   
 
          Within each case study correspondence from both Union, Confederate 
and State leaderships gives an accurate insight into the effectiveness and 
otherwise of all combatants civil-military arrangements. It also gives both 
directly and indirectly a view on unofficial arrangements and more specifically 
just how important both Kentucky and Missouri were to the course of the war 
in the Western Theatre and the wider conflict. Overall this thesis seeks to 
demonstrate why Kentucky and Missouri’s civil-military relationships impacted 
so vitally on the conflict and therefore become so problematic to wider 
theoretical frameworks principally to a Huntington type. Although not an 
historical study per-se, in that the argument for the role of the Border States is 
one of strategic importance and not just chronology, the use of historical 
record to test a theory based in large part on national development is valid.    
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          As stated above the use of historical record, in the structured form of case 
studies, within this thesis is aimed at addressing the subordination or 
reordering of fact to theoretical framework. This subordination should not 
happen when a high level of factual detail is available. If a theoretical 
framework is sound then historical fact should support it if, however, a 
framework is challenged by historical fact then a new approach may be in order 
under certain circumstances.   
 
 
Brief History of Kentucky and Missouri in the first half of the 19th Century 
          Many of the characteristics of civil-military relations in Civil War Kentucky 
and Missouri were formed by the cultural history of both states and by the 
continued demographic and economic changes visited on both in the lead up to 
war. Being, in effect, the fault line of conflict each state had ties to both sides 
and therefore neither unanimous nor resigned support for one side from the 
bulk of the population could be relied upon.  
          The problem for an efficient system of civil-military relations would then 
be to utilise all available supporters within this region without alienating those 
who are neutral or conceding political advantage to the opponent. This brief 
history explains how what was once a culturally homogenous region slowly 
changed and how this change created tensions which were only largely 
resolved after an often very bloody conflict in both states. The pre-war history 
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of both these states led to two, three and more views on the future role of each 
in the Union, introducing a complexity in political outlook of each state which 
remained dynamic. These separate views on the future of the United States led 
in the end to more ‘sides’ to the civil war in both states. These differing views 
created the very difficulties in civil-military relations encountered by the 
protagonists once the conflict developed. Understanding these complexities 
became the key to success in each state.          
          The history of Kentucky and Missouri, principally their political and 
economic development, in the decades preceding the outbreak of civil war had 
a direct impact on the causes of that conflict and the preceding secession 
crisis.19 As war approached, the cultural and political outlook of the populace in 
the Border States hugely influenced decision making within both states and to a 
high degree within their neighbouring states. However equally important was 
the perception in New England and the Deep South of both Kentucky and 
Missouri and their allegiances. Although unmistakably southern on their 
admittance to the Union each had experienced significant change, some of it 
quite dramatic, in the intervening years.  
          By the late 1850s Kentucky, while still largely culturally southern, was 
strongly supportive of the idea of one indivisible United States while Missouri 
had become an even more dynamically changing state with an increasingly 
western outlook.20 Understanding these basic changes had occurred, and that 
these had been major catalysts in the conflict, became essential for success in 
the early months of the Civil War in both states. Understanding these changes 
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and their impact on the Border State Civil War required a perceptive and 
flexible leadership which, as will be shown, was sometimes decisively lacking. 
          From the early nineteenth century Kentucky and Missouri, along with 
Maryland and Delaware, had formed the boundary between North and South in 
the United States. The perception of ‘North’ and ‘South’ had developed before 
the Revolution, even arguably from the mid-seventeenth century, but it was 
independence which confirmed its existence. The failure to address slavery 
either following independence or as part of a constitutional solution was, of 
course, the major divisive political issue throughout the early and mid-
nineteenth century.  
         Kentucky and Missouri were the two northernmost states to be admitted 
to the Union where slavery was established, and therefore formed the border 
between ‘Slave’ and ‘Free’ states during this period of rapid territorial 
expansion for the United States. Their place within the Union would always be 
defined by the role and future of slavery and their relationship with fellow 
states, both north and south. In this way a distinct identity can be seen to have 
formed over time, which both questioned their position in the nation but also 
heightened the consequences of any social change be it cultural or economic. 
          Kentucky territorially developed directly from Virginia, the vast majority 
of land originally titled either by or to the latter state. From admittance as a 
state in 1792 until the late 1840s Kentucky was almost exclusively populated by 
Virginians, settlers from other southern states and a smaller number of Anglo-
Saxon immigrants. Mirroring Virginia, Kentucky developed both a slave based 
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agricultural economy and a political and settler class largely made up of 
influential (mainly Virginian) families or their offshoots.21 However unlike the 
vast majority of the slave dominated tidewater eastern Virginia22 most of these 
settlers were from the western areas of that state and were Baptist, Methodist 
or Presbyterian as opposed to Episcopalian. This religious difference was not an 
inconsiderable fact when political tensions arose, as blind loyalty to Virginia had 
steadily, if slowly weakened, characterised in part by this less conformist and 
different religious outlook.23 Generally, however, Kentucky developed primarily 
as a frontier state with a firmly southern based culture, much in the fashion of 
western Virginia, and as a result was inherently socially conservative. 
           Over time a peculiar Kentuckian loyalty to the Union, or more accurately 
a loyalty to the ideals of the Union, developed along with other political 
traditions unique to the state. Secession itself, as a political concept, largely 
developed in Kentucky in the so-called 1798-99 Kentucky Resolutions24. 
Kentuckians however constantly proved themselves quick to volunteer for the 
various wars fought by the United States25 and put themselves forward as 
arbiters of political compromise in issues of national disagreement. In dealing 
with the slavery issue the legacy of Henry Clay26 led to a widespread belief in 
Kentucky that both this issue and any political dispute between North and 
South could be settled by Kentucky’s good offices and positive example, 
without resort to arms. The personage of John J. Crittenden became the figure 
with which compromise was most associated throughout the 1850s and into 
the secession crisis.27   
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          The biggest change experienced by Kentucky between the 1790s and the 
1850s was the steady reversal in the orientation of its economy. Economic 
development grew steadily away from its southern dominated origins replaced 
by much stronger links to the North. This new economic direction was fuelled 
by the steady increase in railroad as opposed to river traffic, which favoured 
states north of the Ohio River as compared to those in the Cotton Belt served 
by the Mississippi and its tributaries. This economic development was the chief 
catalyst for an increase in immigration, largely from the North, causing a rapid 
growth in urban populations at once both reducing the relative size of the slave 
population and, although more slowly, the hitherto dominance of Southern 
culture in the state. That these changes were still ongoing as the Presidential 
campaign of 1860 developed only heightens their importance by sharpening 
the debate over the political future of the state and its role within the Union. 
          Missouri’s progression from territory to state is remarkably similar to 
Kentucky’s in many respects. This similarity is not surprising as almost 100,00028 
of those early immigrants who triggered Missouri’s move to statehood were 
natives of Kentucky. The vast majority of immigrants not from Kentucky were 
from other southern states, again many from Virginia. Therefore the cultural 
identification with the South was established very early on, crucially the 
majority of Missouri’s political leadership in 1860 still came from this 
background, regarding themselves as guardians of southern tradition against 
those of the newer immigrant communities. 
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          Missouri’s development from her admission into the Union was however 
much more rapid than Kentucky’s whilst taking place increasingly under the 
national eye. The slavery issue had become much more divisive in a national 
political sense by the time of Missouri’s admission as a slave state in 1820. 
Missouri’s admittance to the Union was the cornerstone of the ‘Missouri 
Compromise’, Henry Clay’s29 greatest triumph as a statesman. However this 
‘Compromise’ underlined how the slavery issue was handled throughout the 
period; by delay, postponement and uneasy agreement. 
          A clear difference between Kentucky and Missouri was, however, the 
numerically and proportionally greater scale of immigration from the late 1840s 
principally from northern Europe, mostly from Germany and to a lesser extent 
Ireland. This European immigration, along with increased migration from 
northern states, soon far exceeding traditional southern immigration, drove the 
population beyond that of Kentucky by 1860.30 This dilution of the original 
‘Southern stock’ was the main cause and effect of an increasing economic 
orientation towards the North and an urbanising industrial economy which 
fuelled the rapid expansion of St.Louis.31By 1860 Missouri was in fact a 
dynamic, industrialising, frontier state and was gradually changing from a 
southern to a western cultural orientation. This gradual change raised tensions 
throughout the state, especially in and around St.Louis. 
           
          The Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 was the catalyst which was to engulf 
Missouri and paradoxically not only end slavery in that state but also in the 
whole country. The very theory of ‘Popular Sovereignty’, embodied in the Act,32 
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gave pro-slavery politicians in Missouri a chance to end the feeling that they 
were surrounded by free-states by settling and organising Kansas as a fellow 
slave state. Of course this also offered ‘Free-Soil’ settlers, backed in part by 
northern abolitionists and the more extreme Republican Party elements, a clear 
chance to prevent the spread of an institution they abhorred. Removing the 
Missouri Compromise of 1820 in a special provision of the very same Act 
effectively removed the barriers to direct action in the realm of the slavery 
issue and both sides grabbed this chance.33 
           The economic and demographic developments in Missouri would 
themselves have created tensions in any state but were exacerbated following 
clashes over the form westward expansion would take, principally the status of 
the territory of Kansas.34 The failure by the southern political establishment to 
secure the entry of Kansas into the Union as a slave state led to a hardening of 
the attitudes of those in Missouri who regarded themselves as southern.  This 
in turn bred a simmering low-level conflict between free-state Kansans and the 
pro-slavery western counties of Missouri. This hostility ran from the early 1850s 
and throughout the Civil War until its very end, becoming ever more brutal as 
time went on. 
 
            The Kansas Nebraska Act then was a key turning point for Missouri 
making it increasingly difficult for the pro-slavery elements of that state to 
control the dynamic of the situation. The passage of this Act ironically led to the 
one thing that pro-slavery Missourians most feared, a free state of Kansas 
which proved to be an aggressive anti-southern and anti-slavery force 
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throughout the coming conflict. As a catalyst for civil war, which it clearly was, 
the important fact is that it was over the nature of future western expansion 
and by default the role of southern culture in both Missouri and the wider 
nation.    
 
          For the purposes of this thesis ‘Bleeding Kansas’ is relevant only in so 
much as it was the breeding ground for many of the disputes played out in the 
much larger conflict. Indeed many of the personalities of the ‘Unrest’ would 
quickly re-appear on the wider stage provided by Civil War. For Missouri the 
outbreak of irregular warfare on the border with Kansas was a foretaste of an 
even more violent guerrilla conflict in the Civil War itself.  It also fostered a 
distrust of the United States Army by pro-southern Missourians misinterpreting 
the (only marginally successful) ‘peace-keeping’ role it was forced to play, this 
animosity was retained and indeed was to grow in the larger conflict.  
          Both Kentucky and Missouri would develop a desire for a form of 
‘Neutrality’ in the coming conflict. Both had a history as frontier states and both 
had a tradition of southern heritage which had been steadily eroded. The 
different pace in their development and geographical location led to the crucial 
difference of how this desire for a neutral stance would develop. It would also 
affect how the national government might view this desire for neutrality and 
how it would react. The tendency toward dialogue in Kentucky and the 
acceptance of a culture of ‘political violence’ in Missouri are characteristics 
which need to be noted and will impact directly on the case studies covered in 
this thesis. These two forms of political ‘tradition’ did and certainly should have 
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influenced just what form any political or military action should take in each 
state. 
          In Kentucky there were factors present which made it a much less volatile 
state than Missouri. These factors made it apparently more Southern with an 
overall feeling of there being something special about Kentucky’s place within 
the Union and how it saw itself within the nation. Geographically pro-southern 
Kentuckians felt less isolated than those in Missouri. The Ohio River provided a 
convenient border to the north and the proximity of three slave states to the 
south, east and west gave a sense of security for those who regarded 
themselves as southern. Whereas parts of Missouri were identified as being 
‘Southern’ and pro-slavery in character35 Kentuckians as a whole were regarded 
as ‘Southern’ by those in non-slave states and indeed largely feeling themselves 
as embodying a southern tradition. Kentucky also regarded herself, and was 
regarded by both North and South, as a vessel for compromise and agreement 
with regard to sectional political conflict. The 1850s did see however an 
increasing dialogue within Kentucky over the future of slavery but crucially at 
no time did this include any desire for outside i.e. Federal Government 
intervention, much less legislation over the issue.           
          In many ways the Civil War was for Kentucky the point at which it was 
forced to answer the question of whether it was truly southern or national in 
outlook. For Missouri the Civil War was the move to all out war in a struggle 
that had been underway for almost a decade and always looked like a potential 
time-bomb. For both states, where the similarities far outweighed the 
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differences, any major decision over each state’s respective future would very 
likely decisively influence the other. The influence Kentucky had on Missouri 
and vice-versa was at least equal to any action by the Deep South or perceived 




Southern Unionism and Southern Nationalism 
          David Potter has observed, “There was no time throughout that period 
[the secession crisis] when the Republican leaders did not look to Southern 
Unionism as the factor by which they would save the Union.”36The concepts of 
both Southern Nationalism and Southern Unionism play a large part in all case 
studies in this thesis, reflecting the constant influence they exerted on the 
Border States in 1860-62.  
          Southern Nationalism may be regarded as the loyalty by those of 
‘southern heritage’ to an individual southern state and to the South as a whole 
before that of the Union. The support of slavery, the ‘peculiar institution’, was 
also regarded as part of southern identity and therefore part of this Southern 
Nationalism. Southern Unionism on the other hand would be regarded as 
loyalty by an individual to the United States before any state or region. Dislike 
of both the institution of slavery and the political influence it had over a given 
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state may also be included in this simple definition. Both these concepts could 
then be relatively straight-forward, especially from the perspective of the 
political classes of the Deep South and from the ideologues of the Republican 
Party. However simple definitions proved to be far more complex when played 
out in the Border States and their immediate neighbours.  
          It was assumed by those advocating secession that the shared background 
of slavery, cultural heritage and political conservatism would ensure, in time, 
the 15 slave states (perhaps without Delaware) would all support and join 
Southern secessionist movements. This belief in slave solidarity and a unified 
secession was held to be more certain should secession be ‘forced’ on the 
South by the election of a Republican President. From a wider perspective this 
concept of Southern Nationalism includes a simple question of whether enough 
inhabitants of these states saw themselves sufficiently culturally different from 
the rest of the country to fully support  a move for ‘nationhood’ as opposed to 
fighting for their ‘rights’ within the Union.  
        Broadly speaking the vast majority of people in the seven states that 
seceded before the outbreak of war were in favour of this action. In the 
remaining eight more northerly slave states support for secession was much 
more mixed. This uncertain reaction highlights the task facing politicians from 
the cotton belt of the Deep South in persuading the remaining slave states that 
the Confederacy could exist as a nation and was now, in fact, a reality. 
Persuading these states that secession was the only option following Lincoln’s 
election was the test of the existence of Southern Nationalism and required 
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political tact, flexibility and common purpose. Southern nationalists from 
Kentucky and Missouri formed vocal lobby groups in the Confederate capitol of 
Richmond, Virginia, from mid-1861 which helped to sour President Jefferson 
Davis’ attitudes to their respective states, a factor which reoccurred time and 
again at critical points in the struggle.37 
          As a concept Southern Unionism was in many ways a reaction to 
secession but had always existed on the basis of a widespread belief that 
(outside perhaps of South Carolina, Georgia and Mississippi) a silent majority, 
or at worst a large minority, existed in the South whose opinions could not be 
heard over the loud voices of the so-called ‘Planter Aristocracy’. This 
‘disenfranchised’ large group was believed to be basically loyal and devoted to 
the Union and only waiting for a chance to voice its opinion. In peacetime this 
would be a political candidate who would express their views, in wartime; of 
course, the protection of the United States Army was required for Southern 
Unionism to flourish.38  A distinction was eventually made between 
‘Unconditional Unionists’ and those who were basically unionist but had come 
to mistrust the direction the national government was taking. These 
‘Conditional Unionists’, in both Kentucky and Missouri, were part of the 
political battleground as this group did not dismiss secession out of hand, 
seeing it as a last resort should every other option for compromise be 
exhausted.   
          Following the outbreak of hostilities those in the North were encouraged, 
where possible, to fully support active Southern Unionists in states who had 
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already seceded; Tennessee and Virginia very quickly attracted much attention. 
Republican Party pressure, much of it from the Governors of the mid-western 
states, played a strong part in this support further encouraged by Lincoln’s 
strong belief in Southern Unionism.39  
          However Southern Unionism, as Southern Nationalism, was a concept 
which became much more delicate in Kentucky and Missouri and, as such, 
influenced decision making at all levels. Whilst geographically tied to slavery in 
a number of ways, especially to the density of slavery in a given area, it was 
certainly not uncommon for a large slaveholder to be fully supportive of the 
Union for calculating economic reasons. The Union as it stood protected his 
slaves or ‘property’ within the Fugitive Slave law which allowed any escaped 
slave to be recaptured in the North with the help of local authorities if required. 
Even in a peacefully seceded Confederacy this would not be possible.  
          By contrast it was not uncommon for an individual with no economic or 
close cultural ties to the South to live in a Border State and be a Southern 
Nationalist. This outlook was often driven by distrust towards a Republican 
Party supportive of ‘foreign immigrants’ or for purely racist reasons; a fear of 
large numbers of freed slaves competing in the labour market being 
widespread amongst European immigrants who were generally no less racist 
than the whites already living there. This racism was also a strong part of the 
makeup of the mid-Western States who were, despite the absence of slavery, 
more restrictive on the rights of African-Americans than the southern states 
were to so-called ‘Free-Blacks’.40   
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          This thesis will show that the forces of Southern Nationalism and 
Southern Unionism had to be handled pragmatically, and certainly not 
overlooked or underestimated. It will also show any dogmatic approach to 
these twin concepts unsettled civil-military relations and at times subordinated 
military objectives to political ones. Eastern Tennessee (and to a lesser extent 
north-western Arkansas) was a recurring blind spot for Lincoln’s firm belief in 
Southern Unionism as was President Davis’ initial belief that both Missouri and 
Kentucky would inevitably secede due to their perceived strong Southern 
cultural ties. It is only with the change in the Union’s political objectives, with 
regard to slavery, that the influence of both Southern Nationalism and 
Unionism begins to slowly fade. This fading influence being due to the 
increasing control exerted by the Lincoln Administration over both states from 
the middle of 1862 onwards. The paradox of this situation being only once 
Union political control was assured could fundamental changes to slavery be 
contemplated. 
           At no time, when the loyalty of either Kentucky or Missouri was believed 
to be in the balance, could any form of emancipation within these states be 
openly discussed. This thesis will argue that the conditions required to remove 
slavery in the Border States came about because both Lincoln, and tacitly 
Jefferson Davis, recognised that political control in both Kentucky and Missouri 
was securely in Union hands by the end of 1862. This new condition was 
symbolically announced by the implementation of the Emancipation 
Proclamation on 1st January 1863.  
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          It perhaps should be expressed clearly that in effect each undecided 
southern nationalist or southern unionist was being asked a simple question, 
“Are you prepared to join a revolution or defend the integrity of your nation?” 
and in many cases individual circumstances would dictate when and how this 
would be answered. It should also be made clear that any attempt by Lincoln or 
the Republican Party in 1861 to implement any form of change to the status of 
slavery in either Border State, as declared policy, would have seen the majority 
of both southern unionists and southern nationalists enthusiastically side with 
the Confederacy.  
Levels of the Conduct of War 
 
          It is intended to use within this thesis the following definitions of warfare, 
which may be regarded as contemporary. Based on those to be found in 
‘Understanding Modern Warfare’41, 
 
 Grand Strategic Level: The application of all national resources (or those 
of an alliance) to achieve national (or allied) policy objectives. 
 
 Military Strategic level: The application of military resources to help 
achieve grand strategic objectives. 
 
 Operational level: The level at which campaigns and major operations 
are planned, sequenced and directed. This level both links together 
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tactical actions to serve the military strategy and takes place in a 
definable geographical area or theatre of operations.42 
 
 Tactics:  The art of fighting battles; the level at battles and engagements 
are planned and fought.43    
 
          For the purposes of this thesis, within the Civil War for the Border States, 
the conceptual hierarchy of the levels of warfare are straightforward, at least 
on paper. The Union and the Confederacy had near identical forms of 
government with each President deciding policy with the input of congress and 
important state politicians. Each administration, alongside both senior military 
and naval commanders, deciding on the grand strategy used to achieve their 
objectives. As the levels of warfare get lower the direct influence of Lincoln and 
Davis should reduce. Of course since there are instances of ‘strategic meddling’ 
by both these men neat theoretical definitions are blurred, this thesis will 
discuss where appropriate. 
 
          Returning to the Operational level, the theatre(s) of operations within this 
thesis will effectively at times centre on both Kentucky and Missouri together 
and later separated, to mirror the thinking of both combatants at the time. As 
1862 progressed Missouri slowly became part of the separate and less 
important Far Western or Trans-Mississippi Theatre. In contrast to Missouri, 
throughout 1862, Kentucky continued to play a central role in the Western 




          It would also be helpful to point out, as argued by Donald Stoker,44  that 
many Civil War commanders, instructed in Jominian aspects of warfare, 
thought in “Operational Level” terms and only the better commanders thought 
in what would be regarded as the modern way; that is all levels consciously 
planning  with the higher levels in mind. Stoker also noted that much of the 
correspondence of Civil War commanders included Jominian terminology45, to 
him instructive on the application and substance of much of Civil War strategy.     
 
         A final point regarding levels of warfare is the changing of organisational 
structure carried out by all sides. As will be continually referred to in this thesis, 
the re-naming and redefining of military departments and districts at once aids 
strategic understanding but also confuses due to the varying troop numbers 
and command structure. The varied objectives assigned to each department or 
district is just one reason for this. At times a key to understanding the complex 
patterns of civil-military relations in the Border States, this often constant 
organisational changing can add another layer of complexity to what is already 
a highly complex multi-dimensional struggle.   
 
        
The Strategic Potential of the Border States 
          Abraham Lincoln expressed privately, in response to General John C. 
Fremont’s proclamation of August 31st regarding the seizure of slaves of the 
‘disloyal’ and the threat of summary executions under martial law in Missouri,  
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           I think to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game, we 
cannot hold Missouri, nor, as I think, Maryland. These all against us and the job 
on our hands is too large.... I understand [summary execution] to be within 
military law; but I also think that it is impolitic...46 
           
          Lincoln’s short letter encapsulates the value of the Border States and their 
crucial role in the outcome of the Civil War. At once politically, economically 
and geographically their pivotal importance to the outcome of the conflict 
cannot be downplayed. Whilst Maryland can be regarded as being very 
different from both Kentucky and Missouri in most key areas, largely due to its 
close proximity to Washington DC, the latter two were an entirely different 
matter. 
          In regard to their overall impact on the course of the Civil War in many 
ways Kentucky and Missouri can be regarded as interdependent. Politically the 
issue of slavery and a shared southern heritage created a cultural bond 
between the two states. Strategically the Mississippi flowed between them and 
economically their respective development became more and more dependent 
on links to the North. However throughout the conflict, and this will be 
highlighted in each case study, the dynamic of interdependence weakened as 
time went by steadily reducing the strategic influence of Missouri on the war, 
but not removing it entirely.  
           
          The combined population of Kentucky and Missouri amounted to over 
two million people in 186047 with their collective economic strength not far 
short of half that of the entire Confederacy and individually both were stronger 
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than all eleven Confederate States except Virginia.48 Unique strengths of 
incalculable value to the South included Kentucky’s large horse breeding 
capacity and Missouri’s, especially St.Louis’, manufacturing base. 
 
          From the point of view of military strategic value the geographical 
advantages to both combatants of either Border State were huge. Holding 
Missouri offered control over the river of the same name and of the west bank 
of the Mississippi, providing the Union with invasion routes into Arkansas. 
Conversely a solidly Confederate Missouri threatened to interrupt Union 
communications to the West and increased the mid-western states’ 
vulnerability to pro-southern raids or even formal Confederate invasion. 
Missouri’s secession would at once have fixed the minds of the Republican 
Governors of these mid-western states on defence rather than on visions of an 
invasion of the Deep South and the overthrow of ‘slave power’. 
 
          Secure possession of Kentucky for the Confederacy offered the Ohio River 
as a stronger northern boundary, guaranteed navigation of the Cumberland 
and Tennessee rivers and control of the east bank of the Mississippi. A strong 
permanent military presence in Kentucky would have enabled the Confederacy 
to protect Tennessee and her potentially relatively large strategic resources, 
allowing these to be exploited fully. For the Union a secure Kentucky provided 
invasion routes along all three major rivers into Tennessee and the Deep South 
and control over the Louisville & Nashville Railroad providing another direct 
route into that state. Holding Kentucky would also threaten Virginia’s south 
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western counties with their scarce and vulnerable mineral resources. Federal 
controlled Kentucky would all but remove any danger of conventional or 
unconventional military action against Ohio, Indiana and probably Illinois. 
 
           It is however reasonable to say the North needed to have both states 
securely under control to benefit fully, at least offensively, whilst the 
Confederacy would have preferred to have a strong permanent presence in 
both States. However to have had permanent control of the bulk of just one 
would have been disproportionately strategically advantageous for the 
Confederates. Any offensive launched by the north from Kentucky into 
Tennessee for example would have been vulnerable on its right flank if a strong 
Confederate force was operating in the St.Louis area or in southeast Missouri. 
As will be discussed in case study three even an inadequately organised 
Confederate force in Missouri became a worrying diversion for the Union 
commanders.     
 
          Politically however each state was a battleground for pro-Union and pro-
southern influence and crudely speaking the battle was for those undecided, 
perhaps the majority, who needed to be won over to secure the economic and 
military advantages available. Success in these states relied, in part, on the 
realisation that the outcome was not inevitable one way or the other. Success 
in both Kentucky and Missouri would rely on each national and regional leader 




          Grand strategically the Confederacy needed only to successfully defend 
the bulk of its territory to survive, and therefore win the Civil War by having its 
independence recognised. If the calculation by the Lincoln Administration 
(which was tacitly admitted by Lincoln that it would have been) was that a 
securely seceded Kentucky and Missouri would have made the Confederacy too 
difficult an opponent to defeat in a reasonable time, then peaceful secession by 
either might well have avoided large scale conflict and led to permanent 
separation.  
 
          Grand strategically, regardless of the specific political objective, the Union 
had to either conquer the Confederacy or render her armies incapable of 
sustained conventional resistance. For this the Confederate ‘Heartland’ of 
Tennessee and adjoining areas had to be assailed directly and her armies 
brought to battle on unfavourable terms and defeated within a reasonable time 
frame (two to four years at the outside, mirroring the pattern of election in the 
United States). Given the relative strength of the Confederacy in the 
Virginia/Eastern Theatre this victory was more likely in the Western Theatre 
between the Mississippi and the Appalachians. In order to reach this 
‘Heartland’ Kentucky, and therefore Missouri, needed to be secured quickly.   
 
             We can use Lincoln’s recognition that Missouri and Kentucky fighting 
firmly with the Confederacy would at the very least, with hindsight, have 
granted the one strategic asset vital to its survival; time. For all sides time was a 
crucial factor, each month of uncertainty in the Border States directly impacted 
on all aspects of the American Civil War’s development and therefore outcome. 
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Crucial to both sides these states could not be bypassed by the Union, nor 
could the Union allow ‘Neutrality’ to last in either for any length of time. To 
greatly increase her chance of lasting independence the Confederacy had to 
have a measure of control in either state sufficient to make the Western 
Theatre practicably defensible.  
 
          At this point it is helpful to mention the importance placed by Colin Gray 
on time as a dimension of strategy once conflict has commenced49. Many of the 
strategic advantages bestowed by control of Kentucky and Missouri discussed 
in this section either gain or save time dependent on which side is considered. 
Gray ties time in with another dimension of strategy, geography, again as 
discussed in this section. The advantages of controlling both states are clear, 
even allowing for a certain amount of conjecture over division of resources and 
how much time would have been gained or lost. These advantages are crucial 
when we consider how decisive the war in the west in fact was.        
 
          The war in the Western theatre, in many ways, pitted the Union’s most 
effective military effort against the Confederacy’s weakest. The manpower 
imbalance of roughly five to two overall was greater in the west and therefore 
nothing like the near parity often achieved by General Robert E. Lee in some of 
his 1862 battles in Virginia. Kentucky and Missouri supporting the Confederacy 
would have altered this balance in three ways: The numbers fighting for the 
south from Kentucky and Missouri, estimated at around 70,00050 as against 
185,000 for the Union51 would have been reversed; Tennessee, Arkansas and 
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allied Indian units would have been mobilised, equipped and trained much 
more adequately rather than committed too early in order to halt successful 
Union offensives in 1862. Also Southern Unionist forces in eastern Tennessee, 
western Virginia and Arkansas, along with pro-Union Indian units would have 
been greatly curtailed or prevented from forming. For the Confederacy her 
ability to conduct a prolonged ‘modern’ war would have been enhanced by 
additional scientific, industrial and economic multipliers more widely available 
in the Border State region and further protected those developing to the south.    
 
          Industrial and economic multipliers were part of a Civil War which was 
remarkable for the innovation shown by both sides, indeed the Confederacy 
created, eventually, in the east an adequate military industrial base which 
enabled it to survive, with the help of blockade running, for four years. In the 
west the story is one of near success but ultimate failure due to inadequate 
time and underexploited resources. A perfectly feasible six month delay in the 
launching of the first major Union offensive in the west from late winter to late 
summer 1862 would have prevented the early fall of Tennessee’s war 
industries centred on Nashville and Memphis. Nashville would have produced 
the full range of equipment for the large infantry force being raised in the state 
and cast a useful number of cannon in its significant range of foundries. 
Memphis, despite sundry delays, was slowly constructing iron-clad river 
gunboats essential to defend the Mississippi. Six more months of successful 
defence in southern Kentucky and south-eastern Missouri would have 
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prevented both these cities and New Orleans with its financial and industrial 
centres from falling.  
 
          The capture of New Orleans in April 186252 to a relatively small Union 
expedition was largely due to as yet incomplete, although technically advanced, 
warships and the absence of a garrison which was rushed to Tennessee to halt 
the successful Union offensive of spring 1862. This and subsequent Union 
successes in riverine warfare was directly aided by the securing of both 
Kentucky and Missouri, proving vital to final victory. 
 
          The key weapon in this riverine warfare in the Western Theatre was the 
Union gunboat, whether ironclad or not. Many of these boats were rapidly 
designed and constructed in St.Louis from mid-1861 onwards. Although almost 
certainly these shipyards would have been heavily damaged or destroyed by 
pro-Union forces in the event of the city falling to the South this alone would 
have delayed the combined operations launched by the Union from late 1861 
onwards by at least several months. These force multipliers enabled the Union 
to nullify, to a degree, the large size of the western theatre, enabling offensive 
warfare to be viably sustained.       
           
          The war in the Western Theatre was characterised by its shear 
geographical scale, many times larger than the Virginia theatre which also 
boasted a relatively better and denser road network and much more complete 
railroad network. The west, as noted above, had a network of navigable rivers 
whose control dictated the practicability of sustained offensives with regard to 
53 
 
logistic support when railroads were inadequate and could be severed by 
determined use of regular or irregular cavalry forces. Logistical independence 
from rivers or railroads always required a large number of draft animals. 
Kentucky had these in plenty and to the Confederacy, whose offensive 
capability was gradually reduced throughout the war due to a lack of these 
animals as much as manpower, control of the bluegrass for a few months 
would have restored at least a measure of offensive capability for a longer 
period. This enhanced potential mobility would have allowed the Confederacy 
to defend its long western border with a more cost-effective and practicable re-
active or offensive-defence.  
 
          After February 1862, strategically, the Confederacy was never able to 
defensively shut down the Western Theatre in the fashion that it did in Virginia 
for large periods up to May 1864. At all times, save one, the Lincoln 
Administration could point to some form of victory in the West to negate 
stalemate or defeat in the East. The exception, as will be shown in the final case 
study, was the Confederate offensive into Kentucky of summer 1862. While 
successful on a number of levels, it could not recover what had been lost in 
Kentucky earlier in the year because paradoxically it lacked what only Kentucky 
could have provided: additional manpower, additional provisions and animals 
to move them.    
 
          Relative Confederate failure in Kentucky in the close of 1862 left the 
Union strategically well placed to resume the offensive at any point along the 
front line of the western theatre in 1863 when they felt they were ready, 
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           The U.S. Civil War led to the organisation on the American Continent of 
armed forces at least 20 times larger than any previously seen, over 1 million in 
arms by the end of 1863.53 In contrast the organisation of the pre-war United 
States Regular Army consisted of just 16,000 men54, with many regiments 
broken down into detachments to form garrisons. The states’ military 
contribution consisted of the militia which on paper should have exceeded a 
million but in reality was far less. Most states effectively having a few thousand 
men with barely adequate training although in the South they were 
proportionally stronger and better trained. In order to meet the unprecedented 
need for a large army in 1861 both the Union and Confederacy decided to call 
for volunteers, very quickly in multiples of 100,000, to be organised by 
individual states on a quota type basis. This American tradition of voluntary 
military service, along with the vagaries of militia organisation, provided many 
of the major difficulties in creating an effective civil-military organisation in the 
early phase of the war. 
 
          With the victorious Mexican War of 1846-48 as the model initially both 
sides organised their field armies into brigades consisting of 4-6 regiments55 
and then divisions made up of a similar number of brigades. The building blocks 
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for each brigade, the regiments, being raised by the states which in reality 
often included providing the bulk of any initial equipment as both War 
Departments struggled to buy, import or produce to meet the sudden 
demand.56 These regiments at once provided political leverage to each state, 
offering the respective Governor a chance to influence military strategy and, to 
a degree, command appointments. The resulting arguments included whether 
to brigade regiments from each state together or keep them apart and whether 
to appoint a local politician to command or a West Pointer from another state? 
As will be covered in the relevant case studies both Kentucky and Missouri also 
operated military organisations at times independent of and theoretically 
opposed to both combatants during 1861.    
 
          This thesis explores the war in 1861 and 1862. In this period field armies 
expanded from a few thousand to numbers often approaching 100,000 men by 
mid 1862 with military organisation changed to reflect this. Some divisions 
were grouped together to form Corps57 and occasionally field armies whether 
organised with or without a corps structure would co-operate in an ad-hoc 
army group fashion. Each case study will cover the difficulties presented to civil-
military relations by this evolving organisational system. In addition it must be 
noted that both the United States and Confederate Congress had men of 
military rank in their number, often moving back and forward between the 
armies and Congress. It should also be noted that both Congresses approved 
appointments to, decided how many should hold them and how many grades 




          The myriad of different general officers will be discussed below. For both 
combatants simply deciding on what structure the army should adopt and who 
would command created political disagreements between each administration, 
Congress and respective states; a recipe even in peacetime for uncertain civil-
military relations let alone for a war where great change was about to take 





A Complex Rank Structure 
 
           This thesis will refer to the highly complex and duplicated ranking 
structure used in the conflict. While occasionally complex the Confederate and 
pro-southern structure is simple compared to that in use by the Union, which 
consistently hampered efficiency, especially in the early period of the war. Their 
impact on the nature of civil-military relations in Civil War Kentucky and 
Missouri is both obvious and marked. A tradition of early American wars it was 
tolerably complicating in the Mexican War of 1846-48 but had become 
inhibiting to the development of military efficiency well into the Civil War. The 
growing number and the expansion of the various military forces in the two 
Border States is a problem for historians but for practical reasons can be 




          In the pre-war regular United States Army there was already a tradition of 
dual rank. A substantive rank, for example Captain, could also include a Brevet 
rank of Major or indeed higher. These Brevets could be awarded for bravery, 
meritorious service or for temporary assignments etc. For example numerous 
officers in the Mexican War were awarded Brevets for bravery, often of several 
grades .General Winfield Scott, while styled Lieutenant General, was in fact 
only a Brevet at this rank as Congress refused to re-instate a substantive rank 
only ever held by George Washington59. Scott as senior soldier in 1860 was in 
fact only a Major General in the Regular Army. 
 
          Lincoln’s call for volunteers in April 1861 led to a massive expansion in 
United States forces but only a relatively modest increase in regular forces. 
These volunteer troops were raised, and regimental officers appointed by, their 
respective states. General officers, however, were still appointed by the 
President. All officers in these formations were regarded as United States 
Volunteers but would still hold any regular substantive and Brevet rank should 
they be current or past serving officers. A further complication was the 
awarding of Brevet rank in the Volunteer army, creating the ludicrous situation 
of one man holding four ranks, a very difficult and complex situation where 
questions of seniority occurred (and they very often did). Finally it was also 
possible to hold rank in the various state militias up to that of General. When 
these militias were called into action under federal direction more command 
problems often occurred, often with the political interference of that state’s 




          The Confederate Army had no Brevet rank system but did include a 
regular and volunteer (actually later conscript) army. This regular army was 
only very small and in practical terms the Provisional Army of the Confederate 
States (PACS) was the Confederate army. However due to the enhanced role of 
the state within the Confederacy the State Militia was more influential than its 
counterpart in the North. This thesis will also demonstrate officers in the 
Kentucky State Guard, Missouri State Guard and Provisional State Army of 
Tennessee have a complicating effect on Confederate command and control 
due to the de facto alliance warfare fighting alongside them required.61The 
civil-military difficulties of this ‘Alliance’ warfare will also not be overlooked due 
to their often negative effect on Confederate fortunes. 
 
 
Maryland and Delaware 
 
          Maryland and Delaware are mentioned a number of times in this thesis. 
The former largely over Lincoln’s approach to fears of her secession and civil 
unrest in the spring of 1861, and the latter much less so due to her small slave 
population and geographical isolation. The best explanation for distancing 
these two states from Kentucky and Missouri can be found in Edward Conrad 
Smith’s ‘The Borderland in the Civil War.’62His argument that culturally they 
were different from Kentucky and Missouri, were strategically far less 
important and crucially, in the case of Maryland, too close to the nation’s 
capitol to be allowed to secede are very compelling. As such no detailed study 
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of either state was considered. Maryland’s inclusion as required will both 
demonstrate President Lincoln’s flexibility and purpose in tackling problems 
and illustrate the unique challenges posed by Kentucky and Missouri and their 
much greater importance to the war. Both Maryland and Delaware will also be 






















Literary Review  
 
          The post-1945 discipline and study of civil-military relationships is 
recognised to have been developed from the experience of the United States. 
The history of the United States and its emergence as a world power being 
used to analyse the effectiveness of civil-military relationships in a country 
founded on republican constitutional democratic principles. Broadly the 
American experience and model has subsequently been used to measure the 
effectiveness of civil-military relationships elsewhere, including those of non-
democracies, both throughout and beyond the Cold War. Since the 1990s, 
even more so than the Cold War period, the discipline has broadened to serve 
as a template for the foundation of civil-military relationships in new states 
and nations re-emerging in the post-Cold War world.  
           
Although the discipline has evolved since the early 1990s many of the 
basic tenets have remained the same thanks in part to these new states 
looking back for guidance. Many of these states and nations have and are 
aspiring to follow the American ‘way’ when approaching the vital challenge of 
establishing effective civil-military relations. Samuel P. Huntington’s deserves 
much credit for both the foundation of this discipline and its continued 
evolution.  
           
The creation of the discipline of Civil-Military relations has been largely 
credited to Samuel P. Huntington following his 1957 work, ‘The Soldier and the 
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State’.63 Within this volume Huntington made use of a newly developed 
methodological approach creating a detailed theoretical framework for 
analysing civil-military relationships. Huntington’s new framework was based on 
the historical experience of the United States and to a lesser extent other 
nations. Huntington fundamentally improved on the mainly historical based 
works by earlier authors who had begun to address the subject of civil-military 
relations by the early 1950s. In doing so Huntington produced a benchmark 
volume which has retained its influence within the discipline throughout the 
Cold War period and beyond.  
           
          By its continued recognition of as a ground-breaking work ‘The Soldier 
and the State’ has ensured its longevity and relevance within the field of civil-
military relations. This recognition has continually generated a variety of 
criticism along with much support for Huntington’s theoretical analysis and 
approach. These two groups have served to drive the study of civil-military 
relations onwards impacting upon other disciplines along the way, that of 
military history for one, as well as generally widening the influence of political 
science.      
 
          Huntington’s contribution has been identified as one of enhanced 
methodology; helping to separate social and political science from traditional 
historic study by using social scientific methodology to create, in effect, what 
was a new sub-discipline of civil-military relations.64 It is now almost unthinkable 
that any purely theoretical work on civil-military relationships can avoid any 
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reference to the work of Huntington. Over time an increasing number of military 
and military historical studies began to refer to Huntington’s views on the 
functioning of civil-military relations in actual conflict.   
          
 Writing just after Huntington’s death, in 2008, James Kurth argues that 
he was, “One American political scientist who did produce great ideas,” 65who 
argued in ‘The Soldier and the State’ the need for the correct balance of civilian 
control to military professionalism, “I.e. the proper relationship between 
elected political leaders and professional military officers.”66This longevity was 
boosted by Huntington’s continued writings over the next nearly 50 years.  
            
          Huntington’s subsequent writings allowed the author to develop his 
theories in parallel with the Cold War and the United States’ role within that 
conflict. Huntington also continually sought to understand the American 
political and historic character, publishing a number of volumes analysing the 
development of the United States, its role in the world and where that nation 
was heading. It is clear Samuel Huntington maintained throughout his academic 
career a sense that historic change, both evolutionary and through decisive 
events, along with understanding those changes, are vital factors in both 
analysis and assessment within the political sciences. 
           
Huntington’s post Cold-War works tended to concentrate on methods 
and reasons for various political changes, often analysed in the form of global 
scale development, events, evolution and trends. Huntington’s continued 
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writings include contributions in volumes such as, ‘Civil-Military Relations and 
Democracy’67 and a first major post-cold war work, ‘The Clash of Civilisations’. 
Published in 1993 this book, although not a work on civil-military relations per-
se, serves to underline the importance in Huntington’s mind of military power 
and direction and its impact on political developments on the global scale.  
           
Merle Maigre, writing from Estonia, sums up Huntington’s contemporary 
international reach arguing Huntington’s thoughts, “Have largely dominated 
civil-military discussions in the West,”68 importantly Maigre cites ‘The Soldier 
and the State’ as maintaining this influence on the discipline rather than 
Huntington’s later works. Again the publication of, ‘American Civil-Military 
Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era’69 is testament to the 
enduring impact of Huntington’s 1957 work. While noting the constant criticism 
Huntington has received Peter D. Feaver and Erika Seeler simply say, “[The 
Soldier and the State] remains an influential benchmark for all civil-military 
studies.”70Huntington’s later works and the continuing role his theories still 
play in the discipline of Civil-Military relations therefore fully justify further 
investigation into his theoretical findings. 
  
          ‘The Soldier and the State’ ensured Huntington’s longevity, allowing him 
to both build on and diversify his thoughts. It is this belief that military power 
and its direction impacts on political change which is of most relevance to this 
thesis rather than Huntington’s subsequent works. However Huntington’s final 
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works illustrate his American-centric approach and his concern for the future 
path of the United States. 
           
           Huntington’s final 2004 book, ‘Who are We ?’,71 addresses his concerns 
over the future of the United States and her sense of national identity, once 
more using history to illustrate the American journey. His belief that dramatic 
turning points in America’s history have shaped the United States as much as 
evolutionary changes remain very clear. Huntington’s belief in the impact of the 
American Civil War as a watershed in his nation’s development is also very 
marked. In ‘Who are We?’72 Huntington notes the much repeated but 
essentially profound line that before the war the United States was universally 
referred to in the plural but at the end of hostilities exclusively in the singular.73 
It is, however, ‘The Soldier and the State’ which was the foundation for 
Huntington’s theoretical and historical approaches and therefore the greatest 
reference will be made to this work. 
 
          It is intended within this literature review therefore to address ‘The 
Soldier and the State’ as the basis of Huntington’s theoretical framework, 
principally addressing his use of the American historical experience within this 
work. Specifically Huntington’s identification and use of the Civil War as a major 
catalyst/turning point in the development of American civil-military relations 
will be investigated in regard to the utility of his theories when applied to that 
conflict. Because Huntington, his supporters and opponents have all regarded 
‘The Soldier and the State’ as central to his ideas and to the discipline itself his 
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other works will be referred to only in so much as they serve to highlight his 
views on the American experience, the Civil War period, civil-military relations 
and the application of political science.  
 
          In ‘The Soldier and the State’ Huntington makes clear from the outset his 
intention to create a theoretical framework for an ideal of civil-military 
relations. This intention alone being a fundamental departure from the 
previous American historically dominated approach to civil-military relations. 
Huntington’s approach to the discipline has ensured his theories have remained 
central to the debate throughout. Huntington’s contemporaries, even in 
disagreement, acknowledging the impact of his theoretical approach. 
    
          Near contemporary  responses to ‘The Soldier and the State’ in the 1960s 
by thinkers such as Samuel Finer and Morris Janowitz,74 directly addressed 
Huntington’s fundamental theoretical impact in their opening pages. Recently 
Peter D. Feaver has developed an “Agency Theory” of civil-military relations 
building on a number of Huntington’s ideas; Feaver acknowledging a, “Deep 
intellectual debt” to Huntington.75Feaver has also picked up on the role of the 
Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the Civil War, as did Huntington, as 
with the author’s mention of General McClellan, a Huntington favourite.76 
These brief referrals indicate Huntington’s views on the Civil War and its impact 




          Therefore continued responses within the discipline of civil-military 
relations have reinforced the value of ‘The Soldier and the State’ and that 
work’s lasting impact up to and including the new millennium. Huntington’s 
book’s continued reference in major works on civil-military relations ensures 
both its relevance and justification for any critique.  
           
          Along with a summary of Huntington’s theoretical framework, as laid out 
in ‘The Soldier and the State’, this review will briefly discuss the use of the Civil 
War in Huntington’s historical analysis within that volume. Why the contest for 
the Border States is important to this historical analysis and therefore relevant 
to areas of the ‘Soldier and the State’ will then be addressed. Within these 
subject areas Huntington’s views on the professionalism of the nineteenth 
century United States military and the role of the Commander-in-Chief in her 
system of civil-military relations will be featured. 
 
         This review will then look closer at Huntington’s thoughts on 
professionalism and the influence of the South on United States military 
development in the pre-war Civil War years. In respect of ‘The Soldier and the 
State’, important aspects of the Border State contest which were only briefly 
touched on or omitted by Huntington will then be discussed. 
     
          The review will then look at selected critics and supporters of Huntington; 
broadly these supporters and critics will cover the discipline of civil-military 
relations over time but will also pertain to the American Civil War and to the 
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case studies of this thesis. Important works on the Civil War which address in 
part civil-military relations and related topics will also be covered, including 
those relevant to the critical Border State contest.  
           
          This chapter will also address the gradual change in approach to the 
military historical study on the Civil War and indeed how the discipline of civil-
military relations, and therefore Huntington, has impacted on this trend. This 
chapter will also argue that while aiding the study of the Civil War, a broader 
historical approach to the discipline of civil-military relations provides a much 
sterner test for theoretical frameworks in the realm of complex conflict. 
  
          Many of the sources reviewed here will help then to show that omissions 
were made by Huntington in his use of the Civil War to analyse civil-military 
relations. However these sources will also show that the discipline of civil-
military relations helped to expand the way the Civil War is examined and as 
result the conflict can now provide a more exacting test for civil-military 
relations theory.      
 
The Theoretical Framework of ‘The Soldier and the State’ 
           
          ‘The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations’, includes, as the author notes in his introduction, “Much historical 
material...” primarily centred on the United States.77 Huntington also states 
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that it was his intention to develop a theoretical framework for thinking about 
civil-military relations. 
          
Huntington’s view of the need to think about civil-military relations in a 
new way led to his belief that the vagaries of the real world could hamper 
understanding, which was his primary goal, “Understanding requires theory; 
theory requires abstraction; and abstraction requires the simplification and 
ordering of reality.”78This makes clear Huntington’s willingness to subordinate 
certain historical events to the formation of theoretical framework. The 
ordering of reality therefore was the price Huntington felt was necessary to 
vastly improve on the way civil-military relations had been addressed. 
Huntington is clear that he believed effective theory to be generally more 
important than presenting simple historical facts, 
 
          One measure of a theory is the degree it encompasses and explains 
the relevant facts. Another measure, and the more important one, is the 
degree to which it encompasses and explains those facts better than any other 
theory. The study of civil-military relations has suffered from too little 
theorizing.  79 
 
          Huntington recognised that he would face criticism for this approach 
addressing the point in his introduction, conceding that the reader may feel, 
“That its concepts and distinctions are drawn too sharply and precisely and are 
too far removed from reality.”80However it remains clear he intended to 
fundamentally change the way civil-military relations were viewed and would 




            Huntington targeted what he believed to be a, “Confused and 
unsystematic” theory of civil-military relations in 1950s America based on the 
premises of ill-defined liberalism approached mostly from an historical 
perspective. Huntington intended to replace this ‘confusion’ with a more useful 
framework based on the needs of the United States in the early Cold War era.  
           
Huntington’s first, of two, key methodological assumptions argue systems 
of civil-military relations are composed of interdependent elements forming an, 
“Equilibrium”, and secondly it is assumed these abstract types of ‘Equilibria’ can 
be defined.81 From these abstracts it being then possible to analyse a given 
system of civil-military relations against both its efficiency, in terms of civilian 
control, and how effective it is in providing for that nation’s security needs.  
           
          Huntington recognised that within United States, and indeed in 
seventeenth century English liberal philosophical thought forming the origins of 
American liberalism, constitutionally the military must be firmly subordinated 
to civilian control. Huntington named this concept “Objective civilian control”82 
, much of his theorising focussed on how this can most effectively be achieved 
in his contemporary world. 
  
          However it is Huntington’s use of history to identify evolutionary change, 
his observations on the development of professionalism in the United States 
military and the practical workings of civil-military relationships which will be 
mostly referred to in relation to the Civil War in the Border States.  
70 
 
The Role of the Civil War in ‘The Soldier and the State 
           
           Huntington, not needing to cover the flow of the U.S.Civil War in ‘The 
Soldier and the State’, chose to utilise the war as the culmination of an 
evolutionary era and a catalyst for the next. Whilst conducting a theoretical 
analysis of the evolution of civil-military relations and the nature of officer 
corps within the United States from 1789-1940, Huntington noted and 
discussed certain aspects of and occurrences from the Secession/Civil War 
period where he felt appropriate.83Huntington making clear a number of times 
he considered 1865 to be a key watershed in civil-military relations within the 
United States.  
           
Huntington’s analysis of the period includes reference to the professional 
dilemma of the breakup of the Union for long service career officers in the 
United States Army.  For Huntington this professional dilemma seemingly 
symbolising the end of one era and the beginning of another for the United 
States officer, the author using the example of General Lee’s decision in 1861 to 
resign his commission and fight for Virginia to illustrate the point.84Huntington 
retains this interest in both the role of the military professional in the conflict 
and the wider influence of the West Point. The changing role of the military 
professional and the attitude to the war of the west pointer feature throughout 
this thesis.  
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Simply then, by the structure and layout of ‘The Soldier and the State’, 
Huntington identified the U.S. Civil War as being the great dividing line in the 
evolution of civil-military relations only would World War II, “Begin a new era in 
American civil-military relations”. 85 This observation on the impact of the Civil 
War alone justifies a more historically detailed application of his theories to 
pivotal aspects of civil-military relations in that conflict, especially in relation to 
its outbreak and early stages.  
           
The three part layout of ‘The Soldier and the State’ actually serves to 
emphasise the important role of the Civil War in the development of civil-
military relations by its relevance to two of these parts and especially by its 
varied citation in the second. Both parts impact on this thesis, although the 
second part with its greater use of historical example is of greater relevance; 
the actual functioning of civil-military relations being a clearer test of 
theoretical application. 
          
Firstly, within the context of the American Civil War in the Border States, 
Huntington’s devotion of the second part of his book to the historical 
experience of military power in the United States, 1789-1940, is important. 
Huntington’s view of the Civil War as the fundamental dividing line in this 
period only serves to elevate any coverage of an important aspect of this 
conflict. By utilising the Civil War in various chapters of this second part of his 
work Huntington identified the conflict as historically crucial to the 
development of his civil-military relations theories.           
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          The functional foundation for the second part of ‘The Soldier and the 
State’ is undoubtedly the role played by the Constitution in the evolution of the 
American military tradition. Huntington arguing strongly the Constitution, “Does 
not permit the objective civilian control compatible with a high level of military 
professionalism.”86The basis of this incompatibility being the division of powers 
sacrosanct to the founding fathers; these divisions found at state, national 
legislative and in the executive branches of government. Conflict in the Border 
States would introduce whole new levels of complexity to these divisions and 
therefore to their interaction in civil-military relations 
            
Secondly Huntington’s devotion of the first part of ‘The Soldier and the 
State’ to military institutions and the state, principally the role of the officer 
corps and its evolving professionalism is relevant to the general nature of this 
thesis.          Early in ‘The Soldier and The State’ Huntington observes, “The 
principle focus of civil-military relations is the relation of the officer corps to the 
state,”87this relationship defining, of course, the nature of the officer corps. 
Huntington demonstrates clearly in the United States this relationship was 
dominated by civilian authority (if divided by the Constitution) until the 
secession crisis.  All the while this relationship existed in a country ideologically 
hostile to the military, except in parts of the increasingly conservative south. 
This “Ideological constant”88 of free-market liberalism in an isolationist 
society89led to “Objective civilian control dependent upon the virtual total 
exclusion of the military from political power.”90  
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          ‘The Soldier and The State’ then regards the relative professionalism of 
the officer corps as the second pillar on which the efficiency of any civil-military 
relationship rests; once again the situation in the Border States complicates 
Huntington’s views on what role it should play. At a wider level Huntington’s 
analysis fits Kentucky and Missouri as much as any other state of the Union. 
There is a distrust of the professional regular army in both states as in the 
country as a whole, Huntington points out a traditional distaste for standing 
armies in the fashion of the European continent is an expression of the 
liberalism defining American society. Large military forces in particular being 
seen as a threat to democracy, prosperity and peace.91 Huntington regarded 
liberalism as both distrusting the professional officer as well as defining the 
nature of his professionalism. 
           
However as the case studies following this review will demonstrate 
historical events and the nature of society in the Border States interact strongly 
with some of Huntington’s observations and conclusions but in such a way as to 
challenge some of their simplifications.     
 










The Theoretical Challenge of Specialist History: The Border State War. 
 
         
It can be very strongly argued the environment of Kentucky and Missouri 
from the late 1850s and throughout the war was effectively an atypical sphere 
of civil-military relationships within a traditionally conservative yet evolving 
national arena. Leaders from and interacting with this Border region creating 
new types of ad-hoc command arrangements in legally ill-defined or 
unforeseen situations, not just the informal relationships discussed by 
Huntington. However because of the pivotal nature of the war in the Border 
States they should not be overlooked. 
            
          Informal civil-military relationships had formed part of the American 
tradition which had seen, from the Revolution onwards, high instances of 
‘civilians in uniform’ with state militias seeing active service under federal 
direction. The use of state troops and political appointees therefore are very 
consistent with Huntington’s observations; however when both sides attempt 
to do so in the same geographical area then it is most unusual, and very difficult 
to analyse; a situation in fact wholly unforeseen in the Constitution.   
           
Any case of competing militias raised within the same state presents 
difficulties for Huntington’s analysis, this form of competition not being an 
uncommon aspect of civil wars and ill-defined complex conflict. The first case 
study of this thesis will demonstrate that 1860/61 Missouri is an environment 
so fluid that whole new approaches become necessary, dependent on the 
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situation on the ground and not on Constitutional framework to achieve policy 
goals. Lincoln’s primary successes being down to local political influence and a 
political zealot who happened to be a West Point trained army officer.  
           
          However, because of this confusion, the Commander-in-Chief clause 
identified by Huntington as allowing the President additional power and 
influence in wartime plays a more significant role in civil war Kentucky and 
Missouri than difficulties over the separation of powers. Huntington notes that 
Lincoln used the vagaries of this clause on numerous occasions during the civil 
war calling these, “An extraordinarily broad range of non-military presidential 
actions.”92However by not looking closely at Lincoln’s range of actions 
Huntington risks overlooking the specific nature of these actions. The context of 
some of Lincoln’s most crucial interventions is different than the broader sweep 
of the war as a whole.  
           
All four case studies within this thesis highlight Lincoln’s non-military and 
military actions to be very subtle and pivotal in both Kentucky and Missouri.  
However because of the situation in the politically divided Border States, many 
of Lincoln’s interventions in this volatile region are of a very different nature to 
those in other geographical areas of the war, easy definition within any wider 
theoretical framework.  
           
However three factors complicate this relatively straightforward 
observation in the Border States particularly in Missouri. Missouri shared the 
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distaste for national troops seeing them as a threat to peace in the state, 
however pro-slavery Missourians directly regarded federal troops in 1850s 
Kansas as a threat to the future of slavery and this feeling had not gone away. 
This characteristic of hostility created an unforeseen challenge to the military 
professional of active divided loyalties in notionally ‘home’ territory. Two 
competing sets of paramilitary forces in the same area is a serious problem for 
the military professional. 
  
          This problem of competing forces leads to the second factor: the role of 
the military professional in a potentially hostile but legally ‘loyal’ state; what 
stance then should the professional take? Finally both Kentucky and Missouri 
were founded precisely by the same culture from which Huntington noted the 
United States embryonic military professionalism was most greatly influenced; 
the conservative South. Overall Huntington’s observations do not fully reflect 
society in the Border States, a pivotal region in the approach, formation and 
progress of the war.       
           
          If he did consider these two states at all Huntington probably regarded 
both as being part of the South; having indirectly identified Kentucky alongside 
other slave states in her military ideology.93 Huntington therefore probably 
failed to consider the possibility of any separate Border State identity, 
regarding both states as part of the continuing southern influence in American 
military development; this southern influence vital in his assessment of the 
evolution of military professionalism in the United States.  
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Huntington defines Professionalism: Conservative and Southern? 
           
          According to Huntington in the pre-Civil War United States growing 
military professionalism was embodied in the technical capabilities of the army, 
in the form of civil engineering for example, as opposed to the war fighting 
capabilities of an armed force with a clear external military threat.  Huntington 
defines this “Technism” as being one of the three strands of American 
militarism94 evolving from the foundation of the United States to the outbreak 
of the Civil War. Huntington defined the second strand, “Populism”, as being an 
idea which rose and fell in influence but remained significant throughout this 
same period. This belief in “Populism”, a legacy of the Revolution and indeed 
from colonial times, was the belief that every American had the intrinsic ability 
to be a ‘citizen’ soldier every bit as effective as a long service regular. 
“Populism” was officially embodied in the State Militia system, and practically 
demonstrated in the small number of external and internal (against Native 
Americans) conflicts involving the United States. It was however the third 
strand; “Professionalism”, which was to Huntington the dynamic strand of 
American militarism.  
           
          Huntington’s examination of “Professionalism” is directly related to the 
situation in the Border States and while supporting in a number of ways his 
arguments also opens them up to questioning. “Professionalism” was much 
more divisive than the other two strands and therefore took on a sectional 
feel. Huntington identifies an “American Military Enlightenment” from the 
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early 1830s until the outbreak of the Mexican War in 1846; Huntington 
deeming it predominately Southern in intellectual source.95Huntington noting 
the steady increase in the number of military academies in the South96 was a 
result of this ‘Enlightenment’, also leading to debate over the nature of the 
curriculum at West Point.  
           
Although Huntington deems this ‘Enlightenment’ to have ended with the 
Mexican War its consequences, and the conflict itself, impact specifically on 
both Border States and indirectly their role in the Civil War. By partly fuelling 
the expansionist nature of the United States, which culminated in the huge land 
grab from Mexico in the war of 1846-48, the ‘Military Enlightenment’ helped 
provide the catalyst for renewed argument over the expansion of slavery. Any 
expansion of slavery involved the western territories and led ultimately to the 
1850s unrest of ‘Bleeding Kansas’ and the concurrent ‘Border War’ with 
Missouri.  
           
The disproportionate response by the southern states to the call for 
volunteers for the Mexican War also was marked; Kentucky could have filled 
her initial quota three times over.97Certainly the ‘Border War’ should have 
merited a brief mention by Huntington whilst the patterns of volunteering 
reinforce his ‘populist’ argument; they pose more problems when Kentucky 
does not initially secede in 1861 or rally to the Union.     
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          Huntington noted the disproportionate number of southerners at West 
Point, their much greater likelihood to remain in the army as careerists and 
their dominance of the senior positions in both the uniformed and civilian 
areas of military command.98This dominance Huntington puts down to the 
inherent nature of the South; conservatism, tradition and way of life all 
encouraging martial attributes and the practical requirement of a more 
efficient militia to help maintain slavery. 
  
          It also should be noted that from a Southern point of view the economic 
boom of the 1850s, due to the export success of slave production, made this 
section even more of a supporter of the free-market. This support very much 
explains the conservative desire to maintain slavery. Such support also explains 
the increasing professional nature of the southern dominated officer corps who 
recognised that the equilibrium of constitution and personal liberty (for the 
white man) would be best maintained by a military serving the nation through a 
democratically elected administration. Of course what form this 
professionalism should take also is a reflection of American society. Huntington 
identifies the paradox that Southern dominance of the military led to an 
enhanced professionalism originating from a conservative section of a generally 
liberal nation.99 This enhanced professionalism cultivated a belief that an officer 
should serve the nation not direct that nation’s policy.  
           
As noted above Huntington regarded Secession as a personal and 
professional dilemma for the southern officer. Those who resigned to join the 
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Confederacy did so for broadly similar reasons of sectional or state loyalty 
serving that new nation, ideally in a non-political fashion and therefore 
retaining their professional outlook. By contrast those southerners who 
remained in the U.S. Army (between 40 and 50% according to Huntington)100 
saw their duty as to the nation first but still remained professionally apolitical. 
Therefore when war breaks out it would seem that pro-southern regular 
officers are not a danger to the political objectivity of the U.S. Army but those 
with anti-southern or radical views in fact are. This form of politicised officer is 
not indentified by Huntington and is an important omission.    
           
Huntington recognises the early pressure coming from radical 
Republicans to prosecute the war more fully and that, by their West Point 
education, professional officers were indoctrinated to resist this form of overt 
political pressure. 101  Huntington also recognised the first 18 months of the war 
saw clashes between the ‘professionals’ and radicals over the direction of the 
war, which did lead to a change in Union war aims. What Huntington has 
perhaps overlooked is the danger of the radical professional West Pointer, 
theoretically improbable in the American tradition yet decisive to the outcome 
of the conflict in 1861 Missouri and also to a lesser degree in Kentucky. 
           
The Confederate and pro-southern response in 1861 Kentucky and 
Missouri can be traced directly to this indoctrinated view of the relationship 
between civilian authority and the military, complicated by the 
disproportionate obsession of the South with ‘rights’, both personal, state and 
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sectional. This favouring of the law and legal procedure is very much tied in 
with the role of the officer (if not the soldier) it being regarded as ‘Honourable’ 
to resign and fight for the south but not to demonstrate southern sympathies 
whilst remaining an officer in the Union Army. However, once more, actions in 
these two states bring into play atypical behaviours from the Huntington 
‘norm’. 
  
The Dangers of the Wider Historical View: What might be Missed? 
           
          Referred to above are some areas which should have been considered by 
Huntington or were only very partially covered by him in ‘The Soldier and the 
State’. Several times in this thesis the unorthodox actions of Captain Nathaniel 
Lyon are discussed. As a product of the system analysed by Huntington, Lyon is 
overlooked in ‘The Soldier and the State’ despite his decisive impact in the 
secession crisis in Missouri. 
 
           When examined in the context of the actions of other West Point trained 
officers in early 1861 Missouri, Lyon succeeds while more orthodox officers 
have little impact. A number of officers fail in Missouri despite acting entirely in 
the fashion of the evolved American tradition of civil-military relations. These 
other officers operate precisely within traditional boundaries of civil-military 
relations; that is within a written legal framework under duly elected civil 
control through a military hierarchy and as such failed to secure any lasting 
advantage for their respective causes. Had Missouri been of little or marginal 
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value then Lyon could be regarded as an aberration however Missouri was vital 
and Huntington needed to be aware of his importance.  
           
In discussing the relationship between the military and the state 
Huntington does point out difficulties which were to occur again and again in 
the U.S. Civil War, 
          A considerable area exists where strategy and policy overlap. In this realm 
the supreme military commander may make a decision on purely military 
grounds only to discover that it has political implications unknown to him. 
When this turns out to be the case, considerations of strategy must then give 
way to policy.102 
 
 
          This is a perfect description of the Confederate fiasco caused by General 
Polk’s unauthorised invasion of Kentucky for purely military reasons covered in 
the second case study of this thesis. What this description does not cover, 
however, is the whole concept of ‘neutrality’ in Kentucky during spring and 
summer of 1861. Huntington may have argued that this would be unnecessary 
however it is the very nature of how this bid for ‘neutrality’ is undermined that 
contradicts some of what Huntington has to say. Again if Kentucky had little or 
no impact on the outcome of the war then theoretical frameworks could pay it 
no heed, however Kentucky held extremely high value for each side and so 
should be exposed to the test of any theory. The creation of the Kentucky State 
Guard alone, organised by West Pointer Simon Bolivar Buckner103helps 
introduce the concept of the complicating third ‘neutral’ force in a civil war; 




          This ‘neutral’ force complicates any theory of civil-military relations but 
even more so one based on the experience of the United States. Aside from 
arguments over whether Kentucky has the right to declare neutrality, the 
undermining of that stance by Lincoln was carried out with the aid of 
professional military men acting at best questionably, in terms of American 
tradition and doctrine. The situation in Kentucky also introduces extra 
dimensions to the study of the ‘political general’ which Huntington may have 
considered.                  
           
In ‘The Soldier and the State’ Huntington does note that as Secretary of 
War in the 1850s Jefferson Davis had clashed with the professional head of the 
army, fellow southern Mexican war hero General Winfield Scott, over the 
direction of the military. Davis, regarded as a very successful Secretary of War 
won the argument in his defence of civilian control.104It is then unfortunate 
that Huntington did not cover Davis and his relationships with his many 
Confederate Secretaries of War, key relationships not just in the Border States 
but for the war as a whole and as examples of failed civil-military structures in 
actual conflicts. 
           
          One of Huntington’s failings then is to largely ignore the Confederacy, its 
significance in the application of his theories being its initially faithful 
adherence to the traditional American relationship between soldier and state. 
In effect, as its founders claimed, initially a return to the original spirit of the 
U.S. Constitution with more decentralisation and a smaller government. With 
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Davis as President the role of the Army (as opposed to the states) was as a 
servant of the Confederacy with, as Huntington has pointed out, a greater 
reliance on West Pointers than the Union Army.105 The sustained failure of 
orthodoxy in Kentucky and Missouri can be as useful as the success of 
unorthodoxy when analysing civil-military relations. The failure of the 
Confederacy and pro-southerners to align the military to the purposes of the 
state was crucial, and not just in the latter 30 months of the war.  
           
Again although Huntington traces the concept of the political general, 
noting that it had died out completely in the United States by the outbreak of 
World War One but that, “Until the middle of the nineteenth century no real 
distinction existed between political and military competence.”106 It can be very 
strongly argued that this very concept of the American ‘political general’ 
reached its zenith in 1861/2 Kentucky; both combatants recognising the 
symbolic importance of appointing senior Kentuckians, both political and 
military, to influential positions. The pattern of this trend vindicates Huntington 
on a wider level but because of the very unique nature of Kentucky’s role in the 
crisis a more in-depth analysis is warranted. Simply this is disproportionate 
influence by one or two states for a limited time over the overall direction of 
the war; again it should have been considered.               
            
Therefore the critique in this thesis centres on Huntington’s limited 
coverage of the earlier stages of the Civil War and the proceeding secession 
crisis.  This is of course an example of important historic omission which may 
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have    impacted on certain theoretical frameworks. Would Huntington’s 
interpretation of the years before the Civil War and during the conflict have 
been different had he considered these aspects?  
           
They can be no great argument with Huntington’s analysis of the overall 
impact of Civil War to the development of civil-military relations in the nation. 
Huntington’s referrals to success or failure in the actual function of civil-military 
relations is however largely limited to the eastern theatre. Huntington did 
recognise both Lincoln and the military professionals, Major General George B. 
McClellan the main target, were under constant pressure from Congress and 
the wider Republican Party to prosecute the war at a greater 
tempo.107However the pressure applied is arguably even more intense and 
varied in both Kentucky and Missouri, indeed more so due to the proximity of 
Southern Unionists in Arkansas and Tennessee.  
           
Huntington identifies the pressures coming from different political 
spectrums for strategies proposed by different generals. Highlighting the role of 
the congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War Huntington again is 
guilty of emphasising the eastern-centric attitude of many Civil War historians. 
This time Huntington ignored the equally influential role played by the 
Committee in the Western Theatre, it being far less forgiving to generals in the 
more successful Western Theatre. 
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          Much of Huntington’s analysis traces the changing role played by the 
president in civil-military relations throughout the history of the United States. 
His identification of the role of Lincoln as being the template for changes in the 
role of the President in terms of military direction is clear. In identifying 
Lincoln’s generally unsuccessful attempt to directly plan operations in the 
Valley Campaign of spring 1862 as being the last of its kind108 Huntington 
overlooks the successful role the President had played a few weeks earlier in 
facilitating the offensive against Fort Donelson,109 effectively standing in as 
General-in-Chief while McClellan was ill. Again here Huntington has used an 
example of ‘partial’ historical fact which may serve to mislead.  
 
The Varied Responses to Huntington: ‘The Soldier and the State’ Still at 
the Centre of the Debate 
           
Huntington’s role in the ‘creation’ of the modern discipline of civil-military 
relations theory has led to his work being responded to in different ways and 
equally importantly remaining very much part of the contemporary debate. 
Even though there have been many defences, updates and challenges to 
Huntington’s theorising, certain aspects have been overlooked by both 
Huntington himself and by his responders. 
 
            ‘The Soldier and the State’ has remained influential in the discipline of 
civil-military relations due to the changing nature of military professionalism 
and the changing nature of the threat to America’s national security. 
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Huntington’s theories still remain central to this debate, even if they are 
challenged or updated. By asking fundamental questions in 1957 Huntington’s 
observations and prescriptions still act as a starting point for the discipline. Real 
world relationships between politicians and the military continually still lead to 
comment and theorising over Huntington’s ideal of, “Objective Civilian 
Control”, Richard K. Betts asking the rhetorical question, “Are Civil-Military 
Relations still a problem?”110  
           
Huntington’s methodology and use of history have been greatly discussed 
the latter criticised much more, the former regarded as the stronger. Peter 
Feavor and Erika Seeler note that Huntington’s theories relied too much on the 
nation-state and also noting that perceptions of civilian control patterns were 
changing even during the Cold War.111 This thesis of course arguing different 
patterns of civilian control also existed in mid-nineteenth century America in 
key areas. 
           
Huntington’s historical interpretation of the development of military 
professionalism in the United States has, and is still, proving contentious. 
William B. Skelton’s, ‘An American Profession of Arms’112, is just one major 
example of Huntington’s influence on this historical topic which also affects this 
thesis. This subject area will be covered further where appropriate later in this 
review.  
           
88 
 
Richard H. Kohn has noted what he regards as Huntington’s general 
deficiencies in historical analysis including that of the United States 
Constitution, the nature of American professionalism and a tendency to 
generalise.113 However there still remain areas of Huntington’s theorising and 
historic example which have yet to be fully discussed or examined which are of 
importance to the discipline of civil-military relations.   
           
While the use of ‘The Soldier and the State’ as a template for studies of 
other nations is of a less value to this thesis, volumes such as Brian D.Taylor’s 
‘Politics and the Russian Army’114 are near contemporary works which cite 
Huntington on civilian supremacy and military professionalism. In Taylor’s case 
within the context of a study on the history of Russian civil-military relations, 
‘Politics and the Russian Army’ serving to illustrate Huntington’s continued 
influence but also the need for theoretical frameworks to be tailored to 
different historical contexts and experiences.115   
           
          Other categories of response are much more relevant. Volumes 
interacting civil-military relations with the American Civil War are rare but are 
slowly increasingly. It now being recognised that aspects of civil-military 
relations can be used to explore overlooked areas of that conflict. Indeed a 
small number of works have already tested certain aspects of civil-military 
relations theory with historical example from the Civil War, some will be 
discussed below. However by far the bulk of works on the Civil War relevant to 
civil-military relations deal with this subject in context of and as part of wider 
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studies, the extraordinary fascination with the subject, on a populist level at 
least, still being on battles, campaigns and of course the myriad studies extent 
on Lincoln!          
            
Coverage of civil-military relations in the study of the American Civil War 
tends to be within the context of leadership studies, biographies and high 
command relationships; purely theoretical study being very largely absent. 
Studies where civil-military relationships form part often examine the reasons 
for success or failure in a wide range of subject areas. These areas can range 
from the wider conflict down to individual campaigns or styles of leadership. 
The sheer numbers of studies on Lincoln have covered nearly every conceivable 
historical or political angle and indeed strategic assessment of his role in the 
war.  
           
          Huntington of course has also recognised Lincoln’s approach to the role of 
President as a watershed in the functioning of the United States Federal 
Government and wider Constitution. It would be fair to say the only debate 
over the successful influence of Abraham Lincoln on the conflict therefore is 
one of scale and aspect. In contrast studies on Jefferson Davis are much less 
widespread, but have increased in recent years, these often focussing on his 
relationships with generals and politicians and Davis strategic effectiveness. 
Reasons for Confederate defeat has now become a more popular scholarly 
topic leading to more focus on Davis and to the structure of the Confederate 
system of command allowing a greater examination of the Confederacy’s civil-
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military relations. Examining these topic areas is necessary when arguing that 
Huntington underplayed important areas of Lincoln’s civil-military relationships 
and nearly ignored the Confederacy entirely. 
 
Civil Military Relations, Huntington and Civil War Study 
           
A recent volume which has addressed Samuel Huntington and civil-
military relations in the context of the Civil War is Paul D. Escott’s ‘Military 
Necessity: Civil-Military Relations in the Confederacy.’116Escott questions but 
then cautiously supports Huntington’s assertion of a Southern dominance in 
United States military development and direction in the two or three decades 
before the outbreak of war.117 The real question posed by Escott being not was 
the South more pro-military but was it really as dominant? As with a number of 
studies118 Escott puts much emphasis on Jefferson Davis’ relationships with the 
Confederate Congress, State Governors and his Cabinet. His identification of 
Kentucky and Missouri’s ‘Secession’ as important in terms of new Congressmen 
from ‘Occupied’ states providing more potential opponents for Davis is valid.119   
           
However Escott is another who has downplayed the importance of civil-
military relationships while the fight for the Border States was undecided. His 
identification of Davis’ clash with Governors, including Jackson of Missouri, over 
Confederate control of state volunteers in late 1861120is important but much 
less so than Davis’ vacillation over Confederate aid to Missouri earlier in the 
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year. Again Escott did not intend to offer a new framework but to add to 
historical knowledge and discussion.121  
           
A rare, and recent, volume which addresses Samuel Huntington’s theories 
of civil-military relations and the Civil War highlighting aspects of the war in 
Missouri is, ‘John M. Schofield and the Politics of Generalship’ by Donald B. 
Connelly. Connelly uses Schofield’s career to argue the military can never be 
“Depoliticised” and therefore Huntington’s distinctions of “Subjective” and 
“Objective” control of the military are impossible. In fact Connelly strongly 
argues there cannot be purely military or political decision making, stating “The 
bright line between political and military policy assumed by many 
commentators seldom existed in American historical experience.” 122Connelly 
maps the career of Schofield to demonstrate the Civil War and subsequent 
reconstruction period prompted, “The greatest crises in American civil-military 
relations and reveal typically American patterns of civilian control.”123  
           
          Schofield’s experience is important, as a 29 year old Regular Army 
Lieutenant he was on leave of in St.Louis when the secession crisis erupted in 
early 1861, quickly aligning himself with fellow west pointer Captain Lyon. 
While this thesis’ first case study will cover this crisis it is important to note 
Connelly fully recognises the unlawful nature of Lyon’s actions and indeed 
Schofield’s part in them. Schofield’s unconstitutional actions in Missouri 
included the mustering of pro-Union Home Guard units in St.Louis into federal 
service; quite against any regulation or precedent. Lincoln’s role in 1861 
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Missouri is not neglected as Schofield’s political links and allies are fully 
explored throughout his career, the role played by the Republican Party and its 
supporters being of great interest. 
            
Necessarily Connelly, in covering Schofield’s entire career, is only 
relatively brief about 1861 Missouri; however his argument that the American 
Civil War and civil wars are special events remains clear. Connelly’s theoretical 
argument that the struggle for control is not between the civilians and the 
military but between groups of civilians is also strong. Connelly still however 
regards ‘The Soldier and the State’ as a classic,124 his argument is with the ideal 
of “Objective civilian control” and is in favour of an understanding of the 
political affairs of a nation by her officers whilst they remain subordinate to 
civilian authority. In noting Schofield’s 1892 belief that certain actions are 
“Right”125 Connelly squarely puts intervention in the form of Lyon, supported 
by Schofield, in 1861 as a historical stumbling block for Samuel Huntington and 
any other civil-military relations theorist.  
           
However Connelly, because of the pattern of Schofield’s career, does not 
look at the wider relationship between Missouri and her neighbour Kentucky.  
Because of Lyon’s successes Missouri actually gradually loses her influence over 
events while Kentucky remains central to the Western Theatre for a longer 
period of time. In contrast this thesis takes a wider geographical view and 
adopts a perspective from several points of view including more balanced 
coverage between the various parties’ approach to civil-military relations. That 
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Connelly’s volume exists is evidence that the war in 1861 Missouri is not an 
historical anomaly but that it did facilitate Union victory and did so through 
atypical actions from officers of the United States Army.      
 
Theorists from other Disciplines 
           
Authors from other disciplines have approached civil-military relations 
from the point of view of leadership studies; an excellent work by Eliot A. 
Cohen is of interest as his understanding and respect for Huntington’s theories 
is clear. Significantly, however, his background of Strategic Studies is broader 
and has enabled Cohen to build on the utility of ‘The Soldier and the State’ by 
addressing the role of civilian leadership in waging war. Cohen’s ‘Supreme 
Command’126 is highly useful in illustrating the use of historical study in 
approaching the discipline of civil-military relations; it is an example of 
generally pro-Huntington work with a movement away from Huntington’s 
absolute ideals. Cohen recognising the reality of democracies at war depends 
on the stance of the civilian leader as to how the war is directed and 
prosecuted. This role of leadership is relevant throughout this thesis, although 
Cohen is primarily concerned with the supreme war leader in a democracy.    
           
          Of the four leaders Cohen uses to illustrate his study of the requirements 
of wartime leadership within a democracy Lincoln is first chronologically and, 
with the author, probably foremost in admiration. Cohen regarded Lincoln’s 
role as commander in chief to be, “To some extent ‘normal’ ....”, therefore 
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fitting the ‘normative’ theory of civil-military relations.127 Cohen’s belief that 
leadership is more important than the notional system it operates in is also 
clear, the selection of Lincoln persuasively arguing that point.   
           
Cohen identifies five interlocking requirements for Union victory in the 
Civil War and therefore Lincoln’s political and military objectives.128The second 
requirement importantly is keeping the four Border slave states in the Union, 
Cohen regarding Kentucky and then Missouri as the most important in that 
quartet. However aside from noting Lincoln’s success in this second objective 
the intricacies of Lincoln’s machinations in 1861 Kentucky and Missouri are not 
covered. However as would be expected Cohen’s chapter on Lincoln discusses 
the nature of the Union officer and the nature of his professionalism or 
otherwise. Cohen’s general support for Huntington’s views on the pre-war 
nature of U.S. Army professionalism is clear with the narrow non-politicised 
professionalism based around engineering stressed. Unlike Huntington the 
chance to compare Lincoln to Jefferson Davis is taken up, especially comparing 
Davis’ relationship with General Lee to that of Lincoln and his senior Generals. 
           
This thesis is supportive of Cohen in terms of the important role played by 
the respective heads of state in the Border States but unlike Cohen also regards 
the role of the regional leader as an extra dimension in complex conflict which 
may further examine the instinctive ability of any democratically elected 
supreme commander.  
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            In the Appendix to ‘Supreme Command’ Cohen, on the subject of “The 
Theory of Civilian Control,” describes ‘The Soldier and the State’ as a “Classic” 
with extraordinary influence.129 Cohen briefly summarises the parts of 
Huntington’s theories he regards as important once again referring to them as 
the ‘Normal’ theory. Cohen also addresses the critics of this ‘Normal’ theory 
importantly noting,  
           
Some of the most influential writings on civil-military relations criticizing 
Huntington barely mention warfare at all... In fact most of the civil-military 
relations literature, with the exception of Huntington, has somewhat oddly 
steered away from close examination of what happens during wartime. 130     
 
           
Morris Janowitz is mentioned amongst those critics avoiding discussing 
actual warfare however Cohen identifies Samuel E. Finer as a rare exception in 
those ranks of Huntington’s critics in his use of historical example. Finer’s use of 
actual conflict to argue against Huntington’s apolitical military as the norm to 
one of growing interventionist tendencies is clearly respected by Cohen. 
Regarding this thesis Finer provides a useful alternative to Huntington in 
explaining certain actions in the Border States, principally 1861 Missouri. 
 
Huntington’s Contemporaries 
           
The first case study below will describe and discuss the pivotal actions of 
Captain Nathaniel Lyon in the first four months of the war in 1861 Missouri. His 
name and actions are referred to a number of times in this thesis, not just 
because of his decisive influence on events but because of the atypical nature 
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of those actions in regard to the conduct of a United States, West Point 
instructed regular army officer. However a search in writings on purely civil-
military relations will struggle to find a mention of Lyon but his interventionism 
should not be overlooked. This interventionism cannot be easily explained by 
Huntington but sits more comfortably within the theoretical framework of 
Samuel E.Finer. 
           
Finer’s ‘The Man on Horseback’131is important because it is a near 
contemporary of ‘The Soldier and the State’, refers to that volume early on, and 
offers a genuine alternative theoretical framework for the workings of civil-
military relations, strongly supported by varied historical example. Finer’s 
reference to ‘The Soldier and the State’ as, “...a most important study of 
military intervention,”132is part of Finer’s identification of ‘Professionalism’ as 
being the core of Huntington’s theoretical framework. Finer’s use of historical 
example is wider than Huntington’s, in terms of nationalities and polities, 
allowing Finer to argue that military intervention is actually more likely due to 
the wide range of political cultures extent, coupled with the strength and 
political disposition of their respective militaries. 
           
          A mention must be made of Morris Janowitz and his work, ‘The 
Professional Soldier.’133  Although a contemporary social study on the U.S. Army 
from a period after the end of the Civil War it is a major example of addressing 
civil-military relations in a different way to Huntington134 but exploring a 
number of his points. In regard to this thesis Janowitz’ statement that the pre-
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1861 United States military system, “Collapsed with the outbreak of serious war 
and had almost to be built anew,”135 is as useful as his discussions on coalition 
warfare, political alliances and the social/political background of the officer 
corps. All of the above concepts can be utilised to examine the Civil War; 
coalition warfare being particularly relevant to the war in the Border States 
during 1861. However the thoroughness of Civil War historical research can still 
prove a more exacting test than an alternative theoretical framework. Just as in 
the social scientific approach historical effectiveness depends on what is 
researched and how it is used.     
 
Post-1945 Trends in Studying the Civil War 
           
Post 1945 Civil War historical study initially perpetuated the battles, 
campaigns and generals orientation which also tended to be pro-Confederate 
and pro-Eastern Theatre. This bias reflected the greater coverage given during 
the Civil War to this theatre, the successes of General Lee and the ‘Lost Cause’ 
mentality of the mostly southern historians writing on the conflict from the end 
of the nineteenth century until the Second World War. Indeed, returning to the 
studies of Janowitz,136 the southern overrepresentation in the military for most 
of these years was probably a small factor in this bias.  
            
An excellent example of the source material pertaining to the case studies 
of this thesis from pre-1945 is ‘The Army of Tennessee’ by Stanley F.Horn137. 
This 1941 work covers the campaigns of the major Confederate army in the 
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Western Theatre, the major southern military force in three of the four case 
studies. Horn does recognise the strategic advantages of the Border States and 
the initial uncertainty of their political allegiance. Horn too notes the 
personalities involved, Lyon and Blair amongst them, along with the militarily 
impractical nature of the pro-southern/Confederate command setup. Horn 
covers Kentucky and Missouri equally noting ‘neutrality’ in the former and the 
political complications surrounding it. Indeed it is the case that the first action 
of what would become the Army of Tennessee was to invade ‘neutral’ Kentucky 
and hand Lincoln a major political success.138 
           
The basic historical knowledge of the contest in the Border States was 
therefore present in this work however the rarity of this study should be noted; 
its subject matter was not exposed to another major work until 1967 with 
Thomas Connelly’s  ‘Army of the Heartland’.139On publication a work addressing 
a Confederate Army other than Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia was another 
extreme rarity as was the focus on the Western Theatre. The Civil War historical 
background that Huntington was theorising from was, therefore, underplaying 
the role of the Western Theatre and even more so the roles of Kentucky and 
Missouri.  As ‘The Soldier and the State’ was published this underplaying of the 
Western Theatre was only just beginning to be addressed, along with the 
widening of the focus of study away from largely just leaders, battles and 
campaigns.   
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Five years before ‘The Soldier and the State’, but ten years after ‘The 
Army of Tennessee’, T. Harry Williams published ‘Lincoln and His 
Generals.’140This work has been much revered by subsequent Civil War scholars 
and remains much quoted. Williams’ volume is ideal in showing the trends of 
Civil War scholarship current at the time of ‘The Soldier and the State.” 
Williams’ is intent on demonstrating Lincoln’s relationship with ‘difficult’ 
generals before an effective command structure is found at the end of 1863. 
The two most ‘difficult’ generals identified by Williams as McClellan and 
Fremont.141 Fremont’s role in Missouri is covered but when he is transferred 
east so is the focus of the work and so the Western Theatre’s coverage is 
necessarily subordinated for the rest of 1861.  
           
Williams’ coverage of Lincoln’s relationship with McClellan again is still 
symptomatic of an eastern-centric feel to the study of the Civil War in the 
1950s which of course is no fault of Huntington or others using then current 
Civil War research but not specialising in the subject . The historical irony being 
the Emancipation Proclamation and the removal of McClellan in September and 
October 1862 obscured the Confederate invasion of Kentucky and ignored the 
reality that slavery was still protected in this state although all knew it to be 
doomed; a price paid for loyalty and at the heart of the Border State problem.     
           
What T. Harry Williams did facilitate was to help move the study of the 
Civil War slowly away from campaign histories, and indeed from pure 
biography, to new considerations of leadership and the dynamic of command; 
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in fact the relationship between the political leader and his generals.  The 1950s 
and 1960s began a slow move in Civil War historiography toward a much wider 
look at the subject from a growing number of disciplines and perspectives. This 
wider investigation began to include works which granted a greater 
appreciation of the social aspects of the conflict but also began to include 
works dealing with all regions’ military activities. The wider investigation of the 
war also led to more examinations of the various military and political 
relationships at all levels.  
          
Gradually then the importance of the whole Western Theatre and even 
more gradually the role of the states of Kentucky and Missouri within that 
theatre began to be appreciated by a wider readership. Isolated volumes from 
the mid-twentieth century onwards emphasising the Western Theatre or 
aspects of it have and are being steadily joined by new works. It then goes 
without saying with the more complete historical picture available sterner tests 
can be applied to political scientists who use history as a theoretical tool.    
 
An Example of Evolved Study  
           
One major Civil War historian’s work can serve to illustrate the 
development of Civil War study. Archer Jones has been the source for a number 
of important volumes on the Civil War principally on the reasons for the 
respective sides’ victory and defeat.  His studies illustrate how certain areas of 
historical study, relating to the war in the Border States, can aid in the realm of 
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civil-military relations even if it was not their primary role. His individual and 
collaborative works illustrate in some way the changes in the influence of the 
Border States in considering the Civil War.  
           
In 1973, along with Thomas Connelly, Archer Jones in ‘The Politics of 
Command’142, discusses the strategic trends and ‘Blocs’ within the Confederate 
high command. Although written largely from the point of view of the 
Confederate military command and its effectiveness, in their volume Connelly 
and Jones identified an informal ‘Western Concentration Bloc’143. This ‘Bloc’ 
being in a struggle with those who argued that the Confederacy’s best chance 
for victory was by concentrating in Virginia and the East. This ‘Western Bloc’, 
associated through a number of means, including marriage and social circles, 
counted many of the senior Confederate generals within it. Importantly for the 
study of civil-military relations within this ‘Bloc’ the authors identified four sub-
groups of which the ‘Kentucky Bloc’ was third. This ‘Bloc’ counted Kentucky 
congressmen, the exiled ‘Governor’ and Generals.  
           
The existence of this ‘Bloc’ crystallised in 1862 and the authors discuss it 
in relation to the failure of the Confederate offensive into Kentucky in 1862 
covered in this thesis’ final case study. However the single ideal of the group, 
“To pressure the Confederates to attempt to regain Kentucky”144was a strategic 
objective pursued outside of formal civil-military relationships. For a study in 
civil-military relations this type of informal structure is of high value and for the 
historic importance of Kentucky in the Civil War very revealing. 
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           In 1983 Archer Jones, this time alongside Herman Hattaway, released 
‘How the North won.’145 Interestingly their first chapter is entitled “Civil and 
Military Leaders” describing in part Lincoln and Davis and their respective 
routes to the outbreak of war but also the role of West Point in both sides new 
armies and their obvious similarities. As a wider military history the authors 
cover, though in little detail, Missouri in 1861 but not the ‘neutrality’ period of 
Kentucky, presumably due to the lack of fighting but that is to miss the point. 
Lincoln’s machinations in Kentucky are as important for the study of strategy 
due to their unorthodox use of civil-military relations as to the discipline of 
political science. Again if all historical aspects are not covered then those 
developing theoretical frameworks will find it easier to fit history to their 
thinking.  
           
          Hattaway and Jones do cover fully Bragg’s Kentucky offensive146. Jones 
reinforcing his views from previous works that Bragg’s movements were 
decisive in prolonging the war in the West but also his failure to achieve 
decisive results exposed the highly inefficient Confederate command structure 
for what it was. Importantly the authors emphasise the fact that Bragg’s 
offensive coincided with Lee’s Maryland invasion and therefore reinforced the 
political symbolism of fighting in the Border States. This observation brings into 
discussion the question of how much were these actions part of a co-ordinated 
Confederate offensive? 
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Archer Jones nearly ten years later published, ‘Civil War Command and 
Strategy’.147While again featuring the importance he places on Bragg’s 1862 
offensive, or ‘Raid’ as Jones has constantly considered it, he covers the subject 
of professionalism more thoroughly in terms of the organisation of the 
respective armies, the role of the officer and his appointment. Jones again 
comparing the two Presidents and their near identical systems of government 
also notes the fractured nature of some Confederate states noting the pro-
unionist nature of East Tennessee.  
           
Importantly Jones noted the struggle for Kentucky and Missouri148, 
“Political and potential military conflicts marked these areas and would not 
wait for the governments or the armies to decide they were ready to begin the 
contest.”149  Although only briefly, Jones notes the roles of Lyon and Blair in 
Missouri and the ‘neutrality’ period in Kentucky he also relegates the strategic 
value of Maryland in comparison to the other two states pointing out 
geographic reality over political will. 
           
The use of the works of Archer Jones to illustrate the steady awakening of 
the vital strategic role played by the states of Kentucky and Missouri is 
illustrative of the influence of new historical study in works on strategy and 
command. Huntington can take some of the credit for the closer attention 
being paid to the role of West Point and professionalism in the Civil War, thus 
aiding a fuller investigation of many of its aspects. Huntington can perhaps take 
more credit for the steadily increasing importance given to civil-military 
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arrangements in Civil War campaign and wider strategic studies; indeed this has 
been a continuing trend. 
 
Newer Civil War Studies 
           
A one volume study ‘A Great Civil War’ by highly respected American 
military historian/strategist Russell F.Weigley150 is an example of the newer 
studies to emerge in the last ten years. ‘A Great Civil War’ being notable on the 
balanced coverage of all theatres, the overall conflict and the political 
objectives of both sides. More importantly Weigley acknowledges the role of 
the Border States and their unique nature. The concept of slavery within ‘Loyal’ 
states being one that had been downplayed or even ignored outside of 
specialist studies until relatively recently. Once this contradiction had been 
acknowledged and better understood then another dimension in civil-military 
relations could be addressed more fully.  
           
          Thomas J.Goss, in a newer study on Lincoln and his relationship with 
his generals, ‘The War within the Union High Command’,151identifies the special 
nature of the Border States in the appointment of ‘political’ generals by Lincoln. 
152 Often overlooked, this approach by Lincoln in itself illustrates the different 
approach to civil-military relations in the Border States where their 
preservation in the Union was seen as paramount. Goss quotes Huntington in 
‘The Soldier and the State’ in the first chapter of his book.  Discussing the dual 
military tradition of professional and political generals in the United States 
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Goss, in part, discuses Huntington’s views on the development of 
professionalism in the United States Army before concluding that 
professionalism was far from established by 1860 and therefore the ‘political’ 
general was inevitable when war broke out.153 Goss at once validates both 
Huntington’s assessment of professionalism but also the need to further 
examine the role of the Border States in the Civil War. 
            
A volume covering the careers of the eight full Confederate Generals, 
“Leaders of the Lost Cause”154manages to identify not just their successes or 
failure on the battlefield but also their record of co-operation with their 
political masters. Chapters on Braxton Bragg and Edmund Kirby Smith155 (case 
study 4) and A.S. Johnston (case study3) are of particular relevance to this 
thesis. Stephen Engle’s chapter on Johnston highlighting the general’s failure to 
convince Davis of the Union danger in the West is important.156Showing the 
popularity of the famous Civil War generals can illuminate thinking on civil-
military relations.  
            
Another recent volume by Donald Stoker, ‘The Grand Design: Strategy 
and the Civil War’157, has acknowledged the importance of the Border States to 
the strategic pattern of the war. Stoker devoting a small chapter to the 1861 
Border State struggle entitled, “The Border States: Policy, Strategy and Civil-
Military relations”.158 Including Maryland alongside Kentucky and Missouri 
Stoker goes into only limited detail but his recognition of the role of these 
states is important, as is his observation that the civil-military relationships 
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involved formed a vital area. What is also crucial is a book devoted to strategy 
in the Civil War has recognised not just the role of civil-military relations in 
developing successful strategy but that it needed to operate differently in 
certain regions. 
 
Civil War Literature on Kentucky and Missouri 
           
Specialist works pertaining to the war or aspects of the war in Kentucky 
and Missouri have been relatively rare; works on the war as a whole being 
measured in the tens of thousands as compared to a few hundred specialising 
in either state and indeed far fewer on the Border States as a whole. This 
dearth of specialist volumes largely explains why the authors of wider Civil War 
studies took some time to begin to acknowledge the role played by both 
Kentucky and Missouri in the conflict as a whole. However a number of 
landmark volumes have been produced on a regular basis, slowly developing a 
wider interest in the Civil War in these two states. 
            
          Important to this thesis is the desire to view the Border States as one 
entity. It was also important to define as clearly as possible, at least 
geographically, this entity. This definition is addressed in the Introduction and is 
partly based on the views of Edward Conrad Smith. ‘The Borderland in the Civil 
War’159 written by Smith in 1927 is a landmark volume on a number of levels. 
The author identifies the Borderland as made up of Kentucky and Missouri but 
not Maryland and Delaware. However he does identify eastern Tennessee and 
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western Virginia as well as the southern parts of Ohio, Illinois and Indiana as 
being socially and economically part of this Borderland. The identification of 
social and economic factors as important was in itself a fresh approach to the 
‘artificial’ geographical distinction of slave states and non-slave states.  
           
Smith’s argument, early in the volume, “In reality it was the South that 
was dependent on the Borderland, rather than the reverse,”160was profound. 
Smith’s identification of two types of slavery; the less intensive being practiced 
in the Borderland helped develop the idea of a ‘third region’ in the Civil War 
and therefore introduce a new dynamic into the study of that conflict. It should 
also be noted that Edward Conrad Smith was Assistant Professor of Political 
Science at New York University, an early example of the impact of a new 
discipline in the study of the Civil War. Finally a small note on the sheer 
complexity of the Civil War in the Border States should be left to Smith; the 
author rejecting any attempt at a chronological approach to events in the 
Border States after April 1861 as being “Nearly impractical”161 due to the 
number of secondary factors at work in these states impacting on wider events.   
           
          Even though clearly of generally similar political outlooks Kentucky and 
Missouri still fulfilled separate roles in the conflict. Again it is fair to say that 
Missouri has proved to be the ‘hotter’ topic for the Civil War writer. The 
dynamism of the American West, the Kansas ‘Border Wars’ and the popular 
appeal of the ‘Guerrilla War’ in Missouri have tended to overshadow Kentucky’s 
wartime experiences. There has been relatively sparse but varied specialist 
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coverage of each state’s respective histories with volumes published from 1865 
onwards. Again as time passed the political bias of the writers began to fade as 
personal ties with the conflict were broken, however books dealing with the 
wider role of each state within the war were scarce. 
           
A near contemporary volume of Edward Conrad Smith’s, E. M .Coulter’s 
1926 ‘The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky’162 , is another landmark 
volume addressing that state’s role in the conflict as a whole. Coulter identifies 
Kentucky’s southern heritage and sympathy but also her, “Distinct individuality” 
163noting the love of Union in the state was not an expression of any 
widespread devotion to the north. Coulter’s identification of both the role 
played by Lincoln and its subtlety helps to unlock just how vital the various 
political manoeuvrings were to the eventual outcome of the secession crisis in 
the state. He also recognises the impact of the Emancipation Proclamation and 
the steadily worsening relationship between the Kentucky populace and the 
Federal Government from the end of 1861; a theme directly impacting on this 
thesis. The pro-southern feeling which swept the state after the war is mostly 
beyond the scope of this work but Coulter identified and examined this 
occurrence and explained its origins in a clear manner.            
           
As noted the political feelings brought on by Civil War took time to 
dissipate, politicians and generals from the both sides in the Border States 
either reappeared on the political stage or took up the pen in defence of their 
wartime record or cause. Two examples of this type of volume illustrate why 
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caution may have to be used when utilising them as source material. ‘The Fight 
for Missouri’164 by Thomas Snead, (Missouri Governor Jackson’s aide-de-camp, 
amongst other military and political posts) published in 1886, is an excellent 
and indeed largely balanced work by somebody who threw in their lot with pro-
southern forces. Snead identifies the key role of Lyon and his facilitation by 
Lincoln in preventing the secession of Missouri. Snead also identifies the 
resolution of the North to fight was not matched by a united response by the 
slave states to Lincoln’s call for volunteers, an important statement from a 
senior Confederate figure.165 
           
For the historical record it is important also to note that Snead identified 
the difficulty of secession but did not dismiss it as impossible, however Snead 
realised there were too many wavering secessionists awaiting events for a 
popular uprising. As for ‘Neutrality’ in Missouri Snead knew conflict was 
inevitable and “Dreams of neutrality [were] baseless hopes.”166Snead’s book 
then has proved to be a solid foundation for subsequent study on the role of 
Missouri in the Civil War; in contrast a Union veteran from Kentucky has 
provided a more biased view of the conflict in his state. 
         
Thomas Speed’s 1907 ‘The Union Cause in Kentucky, 1860-65’167 is a work 
used by scholars of 1860s Kentucky with a dose of caution. Speed, a veteran 
from the family who supported Lincoln’s political machinations in the 
‘Neutrality’ period of 1861, is at pains to rewrite the wrongs he believes had 
been done to pro-unionist Kentuckians by the overwhelmingly pro-Confederate 
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literature published in Kentucky during the 40 years following the 
war.168Although cautioning others for historical misrepresentation, and indeed 
misleading readers,169Speed overstates the numbers of unconditional unionists 
in Kentucky, uses the voting figures in the three state-wide elections to support 
this view and downplays the attachment to slavery within the state and the 
way it was undermined by Lincoln and his administration.  
           
Speed was right to address the outpouring of pro-southern literature in 
Kentucky but by not asking why this was so did not identify the underlying 
feeling in Kentucky during the first two years of the conflict. Despite the shared 
memories and feelings within Kentucky the conflict there still failed to resonate 
much beyond her borders,  no great ‘turning point’ or popular figure drawing in 
the wider enthusiast. 
           
          The war in Kentucky and Missouri therefore often became hidden due to 
both its lack of big battles or big personalities. No battle of the size of 
Gettysburg or southern hero in the fashion of Robert E. Lee drove interest in 
the war in these states sufficient to overcome the geographical isolation in 
comparison to the war in Virginia. Again this phenomenon was but slowly 
addressed, diversifying study of the war only relatively recently. 
           
In 1968 renowned Civil War historian Albert Castel published ‘General 
Stirling Price and the Civil War in the West’,170an excellent work by an expert on 
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the fighting in the Western Theatre Castel’s comments are of equal value; on 
Price and his role in the war, 
           ...he was at best a respectable mediocrity. Yet his actions decisively 
influenced the course of the Civil War... he was the central figure in the Civil 
War west of the Mississippi.[This book]is written to contribute to the 
knowledge and understanding of an important but neglected phase of that 
conflict.171        
           
          Castel praises Snead’s ‘The Fight for Missouri’ as being an important 
source for the life of Price following the destruction of Price’s personal papers 
in 1885172but of Castel’s commentaries the most important is his recognition 
that Missouri had to actively fight for the Union. Arguing against Edward 
Conrad Smith, Castel praises Lyon for his decisive action and does not blame 
him for triggering guerrilla warfare in Missouri. “Union control could not have 
been established gradually. Blair and Lyon could not know ... the Civil War was 
scheduled to run four years.”173 Missouri 1861 was just a part of Price’s career 
and Castel does as promised in highlighting the important role played by ‘The 
most popular man in Missouri’. 
           
Battles in the Border States were generally smaller in scale hiding the 
importance of their impact to the general historian, theorist or, indeed 
enthusiast. The battles of Perryville, Wilson’s Creek and Forts Henry and 
Donelson have been examined a reasonable number of times in recent years, 
enough to begin to raise their respective profiles, as to the lesser known but 
still important encounters they are still left to the highly specialist historian. In 
this category mention must be made of Kenneth A. Hafendorfer, among a 
number of excellent specialist volumes on the war in Kentucky two works stand 
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out. Hafendorfer’s ‘Mill Springs’,174 published in 2001, is a highly researched 
volume on a neglected battle which the author wishes and succeeds in placing 
the campaign and battle, “... in its proper historical framework.”175 Simply by 
clearly outlining the political and military situation in Kentucky before the 
campaign Hafendorfer demonstrates just how important this medium scale 
encounter was to the war in the west and to the wider course of the conflict. 
           
Hafendorfer performs the same excellent task with his 2006 volume 
‘Battle of Richmond, Kentucky’176. Hafendorfer describes not just the crushing 
tactical success achieved by Confederate arms, probably their most complete of 
the whole war, but also the strategic mistake made by General Edmund Kirby 
Smith in invading Kentucky without uniting with Bragg to destroy Buell’s army.  
Covering this type of engagement, which was overshadowed by the fighting at 
Second Bull Run, fought on the same day in Virginia, helps highlight the 
importance of the war in Kentucky to the outcome of the overall conflict.   
 
The Need for a Wide Range of Sources: A Fair Test for Theory 
           
Already discussed in the introduction is the use of the Official Records of 
the War of the Rebellion as a dynamic primary source on civil-military 
relationships in actual war; little further needs to be written in terms of their 
utility to this thesis. Other sources cited in this work include campaign histories 
and the few specialist studies covering the Civil War in the Border States of 
Kentucky and Missouri, although only very few consider both together. As 
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discussed throughout this review the new wider historical perspective used to 
study the Civil War also has affected these types of study making both civil-
military relationships and their impact easier to recognise and therefore 
evaluate.     
           
The source material reviewed here has been utilised to allow this thesis to 
test a theoretical framework based on historical experience with detailed 
specific examples of history which both complicate and/or contradict that 
theory. These sources have also illustrated the influence the study of civil-
military relations has had on the study of the American Civil War. Indeed the 
discipline of civil-military relations has played its part, along with others, in 
widening the subject of the Civil War and allowing a greater understanding of 
the conflict as a whole.  
          
These sources have shown the influence of ‘The Soldier and the State’ by 
its playing a large part in the foundation of the being discipline of civil-military 
relations, demonstrating also that volume’s resilience in maintaining influence 
over its core subject area up to the present day. Sources discussed here have 
additionally demonstrated the impact Huntington’s theories had on 
neighbouring disciplines. Nonetheless many of this sources have shown ‘The 
Soldier and the State’ to be vulnerable to certain areas of historical knowledge 
when considered in the context of theoretical framework which is where they 
must be tested.          
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          Additional sources will be referred to within the relevant case studies, 
mostly specialist histories or biographies/primary sources used to highlight the 
both the complexity and importance of the struggle for the Border States. 
Overall the use of the sources discussed in this chapter and those referred to in 
the case studies below are designed to comprehensively recognise the 
importance of the Border States during the secession crisis and the early period 
of the U.S. Civil War. Only then could the merits of a theoretical framework, 
where historical detail is often subordinated to the application of theory, be 
discussed. Noting the changes in the study of the Civil War has enabled 
Huntington and other civil-military relations theorists to be fairly appraised 
















The Border States in the Secession Crisis 
            
          In both Kentucky and Missouri the events leading up to the 1860 
Presidential Election, and the subsequent progression to the outbreak of war in 
April 1861, displayed factors which consistently affect the four case studies of 
this thesis. Many of the factors required to master civil-military relations in a 
complex civil war situation took shape during this uncertain period before the 
outbreak of hostilities. These factors clearly demonstrating the difficulties all 
sides would face in trying to accomplish political goals in highly uncertain and 
unprepared for circumstances. These circumstances, the result of the historical 
development of the United States, present great difficulties in placing the 
subsequent conflict within any theoretical framework and as such demonstrate 
that details of history can greatly affect theoretical assessment.   
 
           The events of November 1860 to April 1861 clearly show no majority 
desire within the Border States to secede from the Union, nor any widespread 
wish to end or limit the institution of slavery in any way. These events also 
highlight a widespread desire to preserve the traditional social hierarchy in 
both states of which again slavery formed a major, if slowly declining, role. 
Occurrences during this period also betray the ignorance in both the Deep 
South and the Republican Party of the divided stance of the populace of both 
Kentucky and Missouri.  This uncertain period once again demonstrated it is 
much easier to defend the status quo than it is to implement rapid change, 
especially within a divided region. For this reason, in a genuinely revolutionary 
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period, effective political relationships developed in the Border States before 
the onset of all-out conflict would pay dividends once hostilities commenced.  
 
          Despite eventual failure, this period does in no way demonstrate 
secession by either state was impossible or impractical. The seven states of the 
new Confederacy proved that secession was no mere theory and therefore 
moves towards secession in the Border States had to be taken seriously. Overall 
these crises demonstrate that securing the loyalty of Kentucky and Missouri 
required the manipulation of both state leadership and populace but also a 
commitment, on the surface, to respect each state’s sense of identity and 
vision of the United States. Finally what is very clear in these tense months the 
fate of the United States did really depend to a very large degree on the course 
adopted by the Border States.   
          
          The pivotal roles played in the early 1861 phase of the secession crisis 
were not those played by the Deep South nor the Republican New England and 
Mid-West but in fact those played by the Border States. Had all 15 slave states 
left the Union then permanent separation would almost certainly have become 
an established fact and perhaps no serious conflict would have occurred. For 
this solidarity to have happened a firm conviction in both Kentucky and 
Missouri that secession was the only reasonable response to a prospective 
Republican administration was necessary. However the initial divisions within 
both states made it impossible to fully back either protagonist in the growing 
contest, for this reason alone the decision making of the politicians of both 
states and their respective electorates would be pivotal to the continuing 
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pattern of secession. This pattern of secession served to establish the makeup 
of the two opposing sides and went a long way in establishing the viability of 
the Confederacy. Bruce Catton strongly believes in the importance of the 
direction of the Border States, 
 
          If Missouri had gone solidly with the South … and become an integral unit 
in the Confederacy … the whole border area would have been lost to the Union 
and the Confederacy would almost certainly have won the war before it was 
well begun.177  
 
 
          This was of course equally true of Kentucky. However in both Kentucky 
and Missouri the fundamental reality remained the same; pro-Union supporters 
needed only to prevent secession to keep either state legally within the Union. 
It fell both on those pro-southerners in each state who advocated secession 
and the statesmen of the newly forming Confederacy to persuade a sizable 
majority of the population that their future was outside the United States and 
within this new ‘Nation’.    
 
          It is intended within this chapter to chronologically cover the main 
political events of the Secession Crisis from 1859 until April 1861 as they 
impacted on the states of Kentucky and Missouri. The chapter will look briefly 
at wider topics such as the process of secession as is necessary. The options 
available to both Kentucky and Missouri will be discussed along with their 
respective positions in the national crisis. There will be coverage of the 
attempts at compromise agreements and peace talks, processes driven in part 
by Kentucky and supported by the wider Border State area. Finally this chapter 
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will identify the early mistakes and the (much fewer) successes made by the 
respective combatants in securing both Kentucky and Missouri for the struggle 
ahead. 
   
Into a New Decade: Slavery United? 
 
          The closing months of the 1850s tended to accelerate the dynamic 
changes occurring in both Border States. These changes also helped focus 
minds on the importance of the upcoming Presidential election and to the role 
each state would play in the contest. The recent history of both states provided 
precedents as to the likely course of the secession crisis in each state. Therefore 
when the Lincoln’s election as President triggered the secession crisis, the 
various political groupings of each state reacted in a predictable manner.     
 
          In Missouri rival political groupings quickly resorted to the raising of 
‘Militias’ in the manner of 1850s ‘Bleeding’ Kansas. There was no great surprise 
here; in fact historically it is very difficult to discern any peace on the western 
frontier of Missouri from the mid-1850s to the mid-1860s. In contrast Kentucky 
would seek yet again to construct a compromise solution in a time of national 
crisis. A majority of Kentuckians believing it was still their duty to assume the 
role of peace broker. Despite the different approaches adopted by each state 
there is no doubt that the overall majority within both did not desire slavery to 
be altered in any way. There was a particular desire that slavery was not to be 
touched by the national government but paradoxically there was no desire for 
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that government to fall. Votes cast in the November 1860 election support this 
view; there being no majority for a candidate seen as pro-secession and even 
less support for one seen as abolitionist178. This situation was favourable to 
those advocating the status quo in both states and reliant, in many ways, on 
the actions of those outside to change if it were to change decisively.  
 
Map 2. Simplified map showing the density of Slavery in 1860 Missouri179. 
 
 
           The above map is important as it clearly shows the geographical 
concentration of slavery within the state and therefore explains many of the 
political divisions. Note the latterly called ‘Little Dixie’ area along the Missouri 





          As discussed in the introductory chapter the rapid changes experienced 
by the United States in the 1850s had greatly affected both Kentucky and 
Missouri. These changes, by being much more dynamic, had a much more 
unsettling effect on Missouri. This unsettling effect made the state more of a 
potential flashpoint in the secession crisis and this proved to be the case. 
Within Kentucky a much more overt and immediate action was always required 
to heighten the unease towards the immediate future and to give a real edge to 
what had always been a theoretical discussion over the future of slavery. John 
Brown, abolitionist from Kansas, provided the wake up call to Kentucky, the 
South and the United States as a whole at the very end of the decade.180 
 
          Brown’s disastrous failed slave uprising at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, in 
October 1859 and his subsequent public hanging that December polarised 
opinion in the country as a whole. Brown’s raid forced those in the Border 
States to consider, at the very least, which section, North or South, they must 
identify with. In Kansas and Missouri John Brown had already acted directly 
against pro-slavery interests181, but by acting much nearer the political heart of 
the nation had succeeded in spreading his ‘message’ to a wider populace. For 
Kentuckians only a strike at Kentucky herself would have had more impact than 
a strike against Virginia, and in western Virginia, that part of the state with 
which they had most affinity.  
 
          From the point of view of both Kentucky and Missouri, Harpers Ferry and 
its immediate repercussions initially led to a greater identification with their 
fellow southern states. This was especially the case in the slave holding regions, 
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simply from the fear that a traditional way of life was in danger from 
‘Republican Abolitionists’. This fear was heightened by the belief and later 
proof that these abolitionists had shown their willingness to take direct action 
against slavery.182 Links were quickly discovered with New England abolitionists 
and the more extreme elements of the Republican Party. These connections 
were not dissimilar to the funding of anti-slavery forces in Kansas and western 
Missouri by abolitionist groups in the mid-1850s. However Missouri was at that 
time still regarded as a frontier state by most of the country. John Brown’s 
fiasco at Harpers Ferry was a much more direct and worrying issue for the 
entire slave-holding south. 
 
          Before Harpers Ferry the debate in the slaveholding South could have 
been said to have been restricted to politicians, those with significant economic 
interests and the slave holding elite, loosely termed the ‘Planter Aristocracy’. 
This ‘Planter Aristocracy’ having taken upon itself the role of spokesman for the 
entire region, and also not insignificantly having very little in common with 
slave holders in either Kentucky and Missouri183. However the audacity of John 
Brown did allow these planters to magnify the dangers to the rest of southern 
society making it a much more popularised and polarised issue and therefore 
much more dangerous to national stability. For those in the slave holding areas 
of Missouri (See Map 2.) this, of course, was nothing new but to those in 
Kentucky (See Map 3.) it was a genuine alarm call and brought a reaction.    
 
           Kentucky and Missouri responded to the next crisis, the impending 
Presidential Election, by displaying to a greater degree their distinct role in the 
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United States. As the trigger for secession this election characterised the Border 
States politically, economically and geographically as sitting squarely between 
the two extremes of national political ideology. Unlike earlier crises there was 
now very little room for compromise, Lincoln’s candidacy for the Republican 
Party being seen by the Deep South as a reason to discuss leaving the Union 
and his election subsequently the catalyst to actually do so.  
 
          Famously Abraham Lincoln’s name did not appear on any of the ballot 
papers in the Deep South and indeed on only one of the eleven states that 
would form the Confederacy184. However in Kentucky and Missouri Lincoln did 
appear on the ballot but even so had no real chance of winning either state. 
Border State divisions again paradoxically ruined any chance that his failure in 
these two states would make any real difference to the overall result or indeed 
provide unanimous backing from all slave states to a single candidate.185 
 
 
Kentucky: A Strong Desire to Compromise 
 
        Kentucky’s view of herself and of her place in the Union was very much 
founded on the principle of compromise and redress of grievances within the 
constitutional framework. In late 1860 it was inevitable that Kentucky would 
once again be the driving force behind the search for an agreement between 
north and south. However without such a significant figure as Henry Clay there 
was insufficient momentum for any national unity candidate in the run up to 
the polls. The unity fourth party candidate, John Bell of Tennessee, represented 
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the Constitutional Unionist Party effectively embodying Kentucky’s desire to 
remain precisely as it had always been, within the Union.  
 




Note the wider geographical spread of slavery in Kentucky compared to 
Missouri including small areas of dense slavery akin to that of states further 
south. Note also that slavery is not isolated from other states but also that 
eastern Kentucky is similar in many ways to western Virginia and eastern 
Tennessee; this mountainous Appalachians region having the greatest 
concentration of Southern Unionism in the slave states.186  
 
          Kentucky wished to avoid the issue of slavery as much as possible and if 
forced to do so to deal with it at a state level. Not being of any great note on a 
national level Bell had little impact outside of the Border States and in reality 
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any party with as vague a platform as “Upholding the Constitution” was never 
going to solve any of the underlying problems facing the United States. Oliver 
Temple commenting an appeal to the sober judgements of patriots, “Proved to 
be a vain hope. Madness and passion ruling the hour...”187 Bell’s performance in 
winning Kentucky, Tennessee and Virginia did however accurately show the 
feeling amongst much of the population of these states towards the growing 
crisis as did his very close defeat in Missouri.188 It also highlighted obvious 
divisions between these states and those in both north and south. 
 
          What is however of most concern is Kentucky’s stance at this time with 
regard to secession. It was, after all, almost seventy years before that Kentucky 
had at least flirted with the concept if not with the intention. Dwight L. Dumond 
writing in 1931 stated that the, “Fundamental cause of secession was the 
threatened extinction of Slavery.” 189 However due to the lower density of 
slavery and gradual weakening of southern cultural dominance in Kentucky and 
Missouri Lincoln’s election was not enough for them to immediately follow the 
Deep South.  
 
          It can be safely concluded from voting patterns for the majority of people 
in Kentucky the fear of the break-up of the Union was greater than the fear that 
somehow slavery would be abolished. Lincoln’s selection as the Republican 
Presidential candidate was in part to assure those slaveholders who had a 
greater loyalty to the Union their way of life was safe and that only the 




          As things stood in Kentucky the election of Lincoln per-se would not or 
could not cause force secession. Indeed the voices of the Border States had 
been little heard in the increasing number of conferences and conventions held 
in the South from 1858 onwards, failing to produce anyone who could be 
considered a politician of any great stature who actively advocated secession. 
In fact the fear in Kentucky, although perhaps less so in Missouri, was that any 
attempt by the slave states to band together would cause disunion, as indeed 
proved to be the case. 
          Dumond argues in the event of the election of Lincoln as President the 
South or any southern state had only three real courses of action. Each state 
could recognise the Lincoln Administration but resist any overt act of abolition 
it might pursue; the slave states could work together within the federal system 
to obtain a redress of any grievance; and finally they could secede forming a de-
facto Confederacy. Dumond observed, “In every Southern State the contest 
was decided according to a majority subscribing to one or another of these 
policies.”191  It can also be said in the Border States this observation, while 
broadly speaking an accurate one, could be slanted by which ‘view’ dominated 
influential citizens. Those controlling state offices, finances and local military 
forces often had clear views on the crisis, and were in a position to act on them. 
Crucially the proximity and also the actions of both federal civilian officials and 
military forces would have a large influence on thinking, both governmental 
and of the wider public. It was also clear to most that any conflict would impact 
most heavily, at least initially, on the Border States and thus would instil 
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The Slave States: A Common Response to Lincoln’s Election? 
 
          It has been argued and debated repeatedly just how strong the desire for 
secession really was in the South as the news of Lincoln’s electoral success 
reached the region. Lincoln’s victory, despite his three opponents gaining more 
votes in total, must have been frustrating for many in the South. Even more so 
as the clear problem was a divided Democratic Party which had split largely due 
to the intransigent South.192 Equally middle and border slave states had given 
both popular votes and Electoral College votes to Bell and therefore taken 
them away from Southern Democratic candidate Vice President and aristocratic 
Kentuckian John C. Breckinridge.193It must also have been quite obvious to 
those in the South had Lincoln’s opponents united on one ticket the contest, in 
terms of college votes, would alarmingly have been little different.194  
 
          Was the movement of South Carolina a knee jerk reaction as some claim?  
was it genuinely popular?  or was it a calculation on the part of the southern 
elite to seize the chance of achieving a long cherished ambition which may 
never have occurred again? There is some truth in all these assertions. Forrest 
MacDonald convincingly argues that, as in the case of Texas, a popular vote on 
secession in all of the original seven members of the Confederacy would have 
had overwhelming support from the electorate.195However in returning to 
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Dumond’s three options recognition of the Lincoln administration was never a 
consideration for the Deep South, the initial seven Confederate states were 
very keen to leave the Union and had fairly strong backing from all levels of 
white society. However the remaining eight slave states were not willing to 
initially secede but were willing to embark on Dumond’s second option of co-
operative action within (what was left) of the Federal system. It is here that the 
fate of the Confederacy, in the form of secure and relatively peaceful Border 
State secession, lived and died.  
 
          It is clear the 15 Slave states needed to find common ground to work 
effectively as a bloc. Only with common cause could they have been in a 
position to manoeuvre the Lincoln administration to act more overtly against 
slavery and therefore persuading larger numbers of slave states to secede than 
was the actual case. Thus precipitate secession by the Deep South weakened 
slave-holding America from the outset. There have been arguments that the 
Crittenden compromise could have succeeded before South Carolina’s 
secession but not after.196Failure to compromise after South Carolina’s 
secession directly impacted attitudes toward that course of action in the Border 
States. This unilateral action highlighted, for those who were looking, 
weaknesses in the functioning of both Kentucky and Missouri’s respective state 
governments and even more so the divisions within. 
           
          James M. McPherson has called Lincoln’s victory and the South’s reaction 
to it as a Revolution and Counterrevolution.197 This Revolution being the end of 
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traditional Southern dominance of the political direction of the United States it 
being superseded by a ‘Northern Party’ with only northern votes. As a by-
product this ‘Revolution’ had threatened southern unity and in effect destroyed 
the old Democratic Party. Had the result of this ‘Revolution’ stood the 
expansion of slavery and therefore Southern influence would be weakened 
even more. McPherson sees secession and any attempt at compromise as a 
Counterrevolution. Once again this statement impacts most heavily on the 
Border States as maintenance of the status quo, clearly the desire within 
Kentucky and Missouri, was not a long term option between the two seemingly 
harsher alternatives; secession had either to be backed or opposed.  
 
          On December 9th 1860 Governor Magoffin of Kentucky sent an urgent 
request to the Governors of the other 14 slave states for a conference between 
themselves, along with a series of propositions for constitutional amendments 
aimed at the protection of slavery. 198 The timing of this request is interesting, 
over a month after Lincoln’s election and six days after President Buchanan’s 
final address to Congress. Buchanan’s having rather ambiguously stated the 
states had no right to secede but the Federal Government could not prevent 
them doing so. Magoffin’s request was also sent eleven days before the South 
Carolina State Convention voted to ‘Dissolve’ the Union between herself and 
the United States of America. It is therefore probable that Magoffin’s desire for 
compromise was, at the time, genuine. Magoffin’s motives and intentions for 
the political course of Kentucky begin from this time to affect the actions of 




          Of course Magoffin’s request could have had no effect on the states of 
the Deep South as South Carolina, Mississippi and Georgia were already vying 
with each other to leave the Union. All the remaining cotton belt states were 
offering clear support in the form of immediate backing should one of these 
‘big three’ act first. The unity shown by the ‘Cotton Belt’ was mistakenly taken 
by the soon to be Confederate leadership to show that slave states of the 
Upper South would now be more likely to show solidarity by themselves 
seceding. This assumption, that all slave states, except perhaps Delaware, 
would secede at some point hardened any desire to negotiate and increased an 
already heady mix of arrogance and inflexibility.   
 
          This attitude in the Deep South was no more than what had gone on for a 
number of years and caused behaviour of a rather cavalier and at times 
condescending manner towards their fellow slave states. This behaviour 
betrayed a lack of understanding, in most cases, to the more dynamic realities 
of Border State politics and reflected badly on the Deep South in the eyes of the 
ever wider audience fixated on the crisis in the United States. A lack of 
understanding displayed to an even greater degree when the underlying forces 








Southern Nationalism against Southern Unionism: A Struggle over Compromise 
 
          Lincoln’s election of course transformed immediately views on Southern 
Unionism and Southern Nationalism. Any move towards secession was viewed 
on how popular it appeared or actually was to a given state’s public. Firm 
opposition to secession was regarded as being a confirmation of a strong 
Southern Unionist presence and any popular move toward secession as being a 
sign of a feeling of widespread Southern Nationalism.  
 
           There were however several shades of each philosophy. In the Border 
States Southern Nationalism did not necessarily mean support for secession. 
The rapid secession of the Deep South was unlikely to instantly change that 
feeling, their failure to attempt any form of compromise being generally 
frowned upon. However in the North there was an initial fear that nearly all 
slave states would secede but, as David M. Potter has said, “Southern 
sectionalism was never as solid as northerners feared.”199 Potter again noting 
when the run of states leaving the Union stopped at just seven, in the North, 
the concept of Southern Unionism became more appealing and, “…Seemed 
quite real when five slave states in rapid succession decided against 
secession.”200 
 
          Kentucky’s immediate response to Lincoln’s victory was for dialogue, with 
a view toward collective bargaining within the Union. South Carolina, in 
contrast, had triggered collective action against federal authority with dialogue 
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being very one-sided. From December 1860 onwards secessionists and the 
Confederacy constantly failed to find significant common ground in dealings 
with the Border States while they remained freest to act independently, the 
initial military weakness of the Union leaving a vacuum which would not last 
forever. Repeated failure to co-operate with any early peace initiatives resulted 
in the newly formed Confederacy missing out on a chance to unsettle the 
Lincoln administration before it took office. It is conceivable that a majority in 
the Border States would have regarded secession as a reasonable although 
regrettable action had full negotiation been exhausted, but the Deep South 
never displayed the patience required to create that opportunity. 
 
          Due to the rapid secession of South Carolina in reality there was no initial 
common ground available for a co-ordinated response by all slave states to the 
election of Lincoln. However, because the Republican Party was in no way 
trusted in the Border States (outside of St.Louis), attitudes displayed to efforts 
to preserve the national peace then took on a greater value. This universal 
mistrust may have allowed the Republicans to shoulder the majority of blame 
for the crisis if the secessionists had displayed political awareness. There being 
no real doubt the majority of the Republican Party had no more genuine desire 
for negotiation than the Deep South. 
 
          Attempts at a negotiated settlement of the secession crisis revolved 
around two spheres: that of action within Congress and actions without; the 
latter pursued largely by individual or groups of states. The first firm sets of 
proposals were those offered by Senator John J. Crittenden of Kentucky on 
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December 18th 1860. The so-called ‘Crittenden Compromise’ was in effect a call 
for the re-instatement of the Missouri Compromise with Slavery expressly 
protected where it stood and south of a line running from the southern border 
of Missouri to the Pacific. This compromise would then be enshrined within the 
Constitution in a way where repeal was impossible. That part of the proposal 
read, “...No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which shall authorize 
or give to Congress any power to abolish or interfere with slavery in any of the 
States by whose laws it is, or may be allowed or permitted.”201 A Senate 
Committee, including Crittenden, failed to agree on this plan or any by the close 
of the year although President Buchanan would later send a message to 
Congress advocating it. 
 
          This general outline for an agreement would however resurface a number 
of times in the following weeks in Congress, in Peace Conferences and within 
discussions called by the states themselves. These opportunities all occurred 
against the backdrop of the secession of more southern states. Rather than try 
facilitating dialogue however the efforts of the outgoing Buchanan 
Administration was mainly concentrated on at least delaying possible hostilities 
until Lincoln took over. It was in fact both the Lincoln Administration’s and the 
Republican Party’s attitude to the Crittenden Compromise which presented the 
greatest possibility for a larger peaceful secession of the Slave States. However 
for this to be the case the embryonic Confederacy had to have been much 




          Almost immediately after South Carolina’s secession the ‘Cotton’ states 
began to solicit sometimes unwanted advice to their fellow more northerly 
slave states with regard to their options and future actions. Such as a letter 
handed to Governor Magoffin on December 27th 1860 by S.F.Hale of Alabama , 
 
          The Governor of the State of Alabama … to the sovereign State of 
Kentucky appointed to consult in reference to the momentous issues now 
pending between the Northern and Southern States. Although each state must 
finally determine these grave issues for itself, the identity of interests, 
sympathy and institutions, prevailing alike in all of the slave-holding 
states...renders it proper that there should be frank and friendly consultation 
by each with her sister southern states.202 
 
           
          This is an excellent example of the tone of much secessionist ‘negotiation’ 
which amounted to a call for southern unity, a play on the fears of the agenda 
of the incoming Lincoln Administration and a defence of the doctrine of ‘States 
Rights’ which were the foundation of the Confederacy. There is nothing 
whatsoever here of co-operation within the Union and indeed nothing 
acknowledging the real political differences of the Border States to those of the 
Deep South. This is despite it being made clear that in many ways the Border 
States shared many of the fears of their southern cousins. Outgoing Governor 
Stewart of Missouri, also in December 1860, informed a Commissioner from 
Alabama, “The people of Missouri were opposed to immediate secession, but 
that they were prepared to unite with the South in the formation of a 
Confederacy if the terms of fair adjustment were not secured from non-
slaveholding states”203  
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          Incoming Governor Claiborne Jackson favoured co-operative action for a 
redress of grievances204at least in public, having steered his way through 
Missouri State Politics to win the position of Governor on a Northern Democrat 
ticket having almost certainly been pro-Breckinridge.205 Kentucky’s Governor 
Magoffin was more forthright in his belief in negotiation and to Mississippi’s 
Commissioner Featherstone in early January 1861 assured him, 
 
          The Majority of the people of Kentucky were thoroughly Southern in their 
sympathies; that in the event of the permanent dissolution of the Union the 
State would join a Southern Confederacy; but that the then prevailing 
sentiment was unquestionably in favour of exhausting every honourable means 
of securing their rights in the Union.206   
 
         
          This multi-dimensional attempt at dialogue took place alongside a 
scramble by various southern states to secure federal property within their own 
territory of which Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, became the most critical. 
This scramble coincided with various state conventions which facilitated the 
secession of the Deep South and served to heighten the call for similar 
conventions further north.  As the year turned potential flashpoints offered 
shrewd negotiators a chance to bend Border State opinion to their point of 
view, influencing any call for secession should it take place. However once 
again the Deep South blundered and failed to take note of the genuine desire 
of the Border States to maintain the Union. The most glaring example of this 
consistent failure was the boycott by the Deep South of the Washington Peace 





The Washington Conference 
 
          The Washington Peace Conference207 is often dismissed as being a large 
dose of wishful thinking in terms of its potential to actually broker a deal, 
Harold Holzer arguing that by electing Lincoln the voters had already decided 
national policy.208 It did however highlight those who were genuinely willing to 
seek a peaceful solution to the crisis. This undoubtedly had an effect on Border 
State opinion especially in Kentucky, indeed the New York Tribune styled the 
conference “The Border State compromise convention.”209 Between the call for 
a Convention on January 19th and its opening in Washington DC on February 4th 
many things had progressed and lessened any chance of success. Between 
January 1st and February 1st six states had left the Union following 
overwhelming votes in their respective state conventions.210 On the same day 
as the Peace Conference opened a convention of the now seven seceded states 
met in Montgomery, Alabama, to form a new southern Confederacy adopting a 
constitution211 on the 8th and appointing Jefferson Davis as Provisional 
President on the 9th. 
 
          These seven states did not attend the Washington Conference neither did 
Arkansas or indeed five northern States; three because of in-state Republican 
pressure over the whole peace process.212 Even as the delegates in Washington 
sat down they were aware of the growing significance of the crisis at Fort 
Sumter where the federal steamer Star of the West had been fired on by South 
Carolinian guns five weeks before and had turned back. Kansas had formally 
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been admitted to the Union as a Free State on January 29th a situation which 
was equally unpalatable to those of a southern disposition and did nothing to 
create a spirit of compromise. 
 
          The Washington Conference took three weeks to come up with proposals 
nearly identical to those of Crittenden and indeed to those put forward by 
Governor Letcher to the Virginia Legislature in early January213. James 
McPherson points out the Conference had, “Further divided the upper and 
lower South.”214  
However the importance of the Conference was although the Republican Party 
was equally guilty of derailing its proposals from within and without 
Congress,215 whilst making proceedings acrimonious in many ways, it was not 
universally blamed. The Republican Party had adopted a much less public 
stance to derail the process than the mass boycott of the Cotton States and as 
such achieved political success by shifting the blame of failure onto those slave 
states.  
 
          Bruce Catton notes that the press were not happy with meetings being 
held in secret or with the great age of many of the members, styling it a, “Pale 
copy of a true national convention which had been proposed in Congress 
immediately after the election.”216  It has been pointed out, by Frank Van Der 
Linden amongst others, that the whole tone of the conference was one of 
tradition and harked back to a bygone era, the Chair, ex-President Tyler, being 
the prime example.217  However in the Border States, especially Kentucky, there 
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was a desire to hold on to this era. The failure of the Confederacy to work with 
the Border States to defend this desire let the Republican Party off the hook. 
This failure had in fact underlined the haste in which the Deep South quit the 
Union and widened the gap between the Border States and the newly formed 
Confederacy. As James Ford Rhodes has noted, “The historical significance of 
the Peace Convention consists of the evidence it affords to the attachment of 
the border slave States to the Union...”218 
 
          Whatever the legal arguments over secession the process for doing so 
was quite easy; by January 19th 1861 all of the states of the Upper South had 
discussed or begun the process. Those with a say or vote in this process were 
carefully weighing up the actions of both the Deep South and the Republican 
Party to resolving the crisis. The steady calls for compromise and discussion and 
solid steps towards this process gave the middle and border slave states a 
chance to reflect on the situation. Dumond again noting, 
 
          The calling of the Washington Conference …Probably prevented 
immediate secession of most of the remaining slave states during January 
1861… it certainly delayed secession in Virginia, Tennessee, Arkansas and North 
Carolina and prevented it in Kentucky and Missouri.219 
 
           
          The Confederacy’s refusal to participate was part of a go-it-alone policy 
not helped at all by the Confederate Constitution which appeared to coerce the 
Border States in terms of the internal slave trade by inferring this would not 
continue indefinitely should these states not join the Confederacy. Events in 
this crisis moved rapidly, by February 9th Tennessee voted against a proposal to 
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call a secession convention by 68,282 to 59,449. This vote is but one more 
event which may have caused those pro-secessionists and pro-southerners in 
the Border States to bide their time. E. Merton Coulter has written, “The less 
impulsive Upper South had coolly calculated that the election of Lincoln was 
not a sufficient reason for leaving the Union”220They too may have noted that 
the Confederacy and its constituent states were all lobbying intensely in an 
uncoordinated and hardnosed manner, scarcely furthering their cause 
politically nor creating an effective system of Confederate diplomacy by 
undermining President Davis. Principally the new Confederacy lacked the 
centralised authority it would require to more effectively prepare for and then 
fight the war which was very likely to break out.   
 
          By January/February 1861 a pattern was developing whereby the North, 
and in particular the Republican Party, began to manipulate events to prevent 
the spread of secession. It can also be seen that the Confederacy began to 
show itself as being aggressive and unreasonable while manipulating the ‘lame 
duck’ administration of President Buchanan. When the Lincoln Administration 
did take up the reigns the Confederacy would find itself outplayed by both 
Lincoln and the Republican Party within the Border States and even more so in 
Maryland. As such the new administration seized the political initiative back 
from the Confederacy and never really lost it. 
 
          Throughout the secession crisis and the war it was the characteristic of 
both Kentucky and Missouri to act, at times, as sovereign states without legally 
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seceding. This was done by neither embracing directly Southern Nationalism 
nor unconditionally falling behind federal political objectives. What this was 
while the states of the Deep South had little trouble in embracing Southern 
Nationalism, at least initially, and the vast bulk of the remaining states rallied to 
the Union cause, Kentucky and Missouri could find no easy position to adopt. 
The paradox of the whole situation being a position not unlike secession was of 
no advantage to the Confederacy. The Border States not seceding was a 
necessary initial victory for the North. In a situation of uncertainty, minorities in 
each state had everything to gain by acting swiftly. Just as the ‘King Cotton’ 
minority in the United States as a whole acted quickly when Lincoln was elected 
so did pro-Union and Republican minorities in the Border States, taking 
advantage of political and propaganda mistakes made by the Deep South. 
 
 
Republican success in Missouri: Secession Delayed 
 
          On January 2nd 1861 both houses of the Missouri General Assembly met 
at the State Capitol, Jefferson City. There was but one Republican Senator and 
12 Republicans in the House to oppose 83 Democrats (probably strongly pro-
southern although on paper around half were more moderate Northern 
Democrats) and 37 Constitutional Unionists.221Why did they not act decisively 
when even those who did not believe fully in that course of action were 
resigned to a prompt move towards secession? Certainly a very aggressive 
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Republican minority, with tacit and indeed limited active support of the federal 
authorities, did so. 
 
          At the General Assembly in Jefferson City the outgoing Governor, Robert 
M. Stewart, a Northern Democrat from New York, in his leaving address, 
pointed out that he believed secession to be unlawful, particularly as Missouri 
was a state formed from the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. The incoming 
Governor Claiborne F. Jackson222 in his inaugural address to both houses 
stopped short of actively proposing moves toward secession despite 
acknowledging his belief that Missouri should stand with her “Sister States”. By 
further demanding from the Federal Government constitutional guarantees he 
was placing himself firmly in the ‘Crittenden Compromise’ camp. Three 
measures were however proposed: the calling of a State Convention to 
consider secession; moves to re-organise the State Militia and moves to curb 
the powers of the Republican Mayor of St.Louis. It was unfortunate for pro-
secessionists in Missouri that the haste necessary for all three of these courses 
to be fully successful was not found. Of these measures the failure of the 
Governor to secure complete control of the State Militia until after the 
outbreak of hostilities proved most important.223 
 
          In Missouri a Bill calling for the election of delegates to a Secession 
Convention, set to meet on February 28th in Jefferson City, was passed by 
essentially a pro-southern if not pro-secessionist legislature. It was remarkable 
therefore when the Convention’s first act was to adjourn to meet again in 
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St.Louis,224 the Republican and Unionist dominated area of the State. It was in 
fact a characteristically brilliant piece of political manipulation by Frank Blair 
Jnr.225    
 
        Blair had been the force behind the creation of a three, then a two sided 
political struggle in the Missouri Assembly. Those who had been Republicans 
(much in the minority), Douglas, Bell or Breckinridge men slowly began to 
transform into Unconditional Unionists, Conditional Unionists and Secessionists 
respectively. Unconditional and Conditional Unionists embarked on a series of 
secret political deals, electoral fraud and political misrepresentation (It was 
considered by the Missouri public that most of those elected to the convention 
were still pro-southern men)226 to form an alliance against secessionist 
politicians.  
 
          The outcome of this political alliance, as Blair well knew, was that 
secession was dead in Missouri until an overt act by the Lincoln Administration 
breathed new life into it. Blocking moves towards secession was relatively easy 
compared to finding overall agreement to take the state out of the Union.  It 
was perhaps no great coincidence that Frank Blair’s Brother Montgomery, now 
of Maryland, was the incoming Post-Master General and in a position to pull 
any strings that would assist in frustrating Jackson’s schemes. The Blair family 
powerbase in Missouri would also prove a very useful tool for Lincoln and the 




        On the very same day as the Missouri State Convention re-assembled in 
St.Louis, March 4th, Lincoln was inaugurated; for those unconditional unionists 
in the state it came at the right time as covert measures now became available 
to allow direct federal support in preventing Missouri smoothly leaving the 
Union. One very big thorn in Blair’s side, at least for future, was the selection of 
Stirling Price, ex-Governor, as Presiding Officer of the Convention. Seen as a 
moderate and as a safe pair of hands, Blair’s intransigence would eventually 
force Price into the secessionist camp of Governor Jackson and ultimately onto 
the battlefield against federal forces.  
 
          Frank Blair had recognised early on that preventing Governor Jackson 
from actively controlling the State Militia was essential and had done so 
through the blocking of any Militia Bill in the assembly (it being impossible, 
outside of a state of war, for the Governor to directly control state forces). Blair 
had also recognised the importance of the Federal Arsenal in St. Louis, the 
biggest in the South, with an estimated 60,000 small arms and associated 
military equipment,227 these being absolutely vital to any successful Missouri 
secession. Blair had also rushed to arm his Republican political supporters in 
St.Louis as many in the Assembly were now slowly realising they had been 
duped by the Republican Party. Blatant contravention of state laws rapidly saw 
several hundred, mostly German immigrants, form a ‘Home Guard’ in St.Louis 
with money from the east and guns from the Governor of Illinois.228 These 
measures served to make any repeat of those seizures of federal property in 
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the Deep South a much more difficult prospect in Missouri and increased 
Governor Jackson’s caution even more.229  
 
        Amongst all this the Missouri Convention voted 89-1 against secession but 
also 89-6 for the evacuation of Federal Troops from Southern Forts. Russell F. 
Weigley concludes that Governor Jackson, “… and his fellow secessionists … 
hoped that in this anti-coercion sentiment lay the leverage to pry Missouri out 
of the Union.”230However this was insufficient against the patronage employed 
by the Republican Party to subvert both state and federal law to secure its 
political position. 
           
          The gloves then were off in Missouri even if the Confederacy and pro-
southern/secessionist Missouri politicians took far too long to realise the fact, 
however even more worrying for them Lincoln was well aware of this oversight. 
By contrast in Kentucky, Lincoln showed his shrewd feel in handling the Border 
States by sitting well back and letting the secessionists and the Confederacy 
make the mistakes; which they obligingly did on a regular basis before the 
bombardment of Fort Sumter in April. 
 
 
An Impossible Position for Kentucky 
 
        Emory Thomas has written, “With the possible exception of Virginia, no 




There is no better illustration of this than the series of struggles between 
‘Southern Rights’ Governor Magoffin and the largely Conditional Unionist 
Assembly over the course Kentucky would take. Historians disagree over the 
precise position of Magoffin on the issue of secession and over his ambitions 
for Kentucky in that direction. Magoffin has been labelled everything from 
‘Thoroughly Secessionist’232 to ‘Cautious Southern Unionist’233 his first action 
following South Carolina’s secession does however appear to favour the 
former.234 Magoffin’s call to the state legislature in late December 1860 to hold 
a special session to examine options for a secession convention was met firstly 
with a refusal, then by a call from the legislature for a Border State Conference 
and finally its own adjournment until March. The backing of John C.Breckinridge 
to Magoffin’s call also had little effect on the legislature.235  
 
          Lowell Harrison believes that Magoffin saw two possible routes for 
Kentucky. Firstly unite with her southern sisters to force the expansion of 
slavery; any northern refusal leading to the second route of secession en bloc. 
Harrison pointing out that Magoffin was sounding out fellow southern 
governors on this belief with his “six points” for the future of slavery.236 
However the Deep South was not interested thus forcing Magoffin to push too 
early for a secession convention.   
 
          Thus scarcely in U.S. history could one state have so much influence on 
the surface both directly and indirectly on a Presidential election and the 
subsequent secession crisis and ultimately end up powerless as a cherished way 
of life fell apart. Kentucky’s polls showed Lincoln, a Kentuckian, tabling 1364 
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votes; Breckinridge237 scion of Kentucky’s elite and in part Southern 
Nationalism 53,143 votes; Bell representative of the memory of Henry Clay and 
Kentucky compromise the victor with 66,058; and Douglas far back with  25,651 
in a state he had to win to have any chance of defeating Lincoln. As a starting 
point it would seem clear that while ‘aggressive’ secession was perhaps initially 
less likely than in Missouri there was much more chance of it being peaceful 
should it be seen as an unfortunate necessity. It was, paradoxically, the absence 
of a relatively large or concentrated Republican vote which would work in 
Lincoln’s and the Union’s favour. 
           
          Once more the most important figure in the fate of Kentucky is without 
doubt Abraham Lincoln himself. Lincoln was well aware of the delicate nature 
of the Border States his correspondence making this very clear. Secretary of 
State, William H. Seward, writing to Lincoln on December 26th warns,  
 
         …The action of the Border States is uncertain. Sympathy there is strong 
with the Cotton States, while prudence and patriotism dictate adhesion to the 
Union. Nothing could certainly restrain them but the adoption of Mr 
Crittenden’s compromise… [Without which] time and accident must determine 
the course of the Border States.238    
 
           
          It soon became clear that Lincoln had no intention of compromising 
however, his private correspondence from election to inauguration is even 
more bellicose, to his friend Lyman Trumball, “…The tug has come and better 
now than any time hereafter…”239  Kentuckians, with a tradition of dialogue and 
loyalty to the Union, offered him a chance to appeal, without compromise, to 
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the Southern Unionism he believed to be the underlying feeling of the majority 
of the state (he was probably correct in this but to a much lesser degree than 
he believed). Some have put this down to fondness for his native state but it is 
likely to be down to a far better understanding of the Kentuckian political 
mindset.240 A pragmatic Lincoln was no doubt fully aware of what would 
happen if anything like direct federal action was served on Kentucky as it had 
been used on occasion against pro-slavery Missourians in 1850s Kansas. The 
intervention of the Army, although used only relatively lightly, bred a hatred of 
federal authority in pro-southern areas of the state which had persisted. 
Therefore there was no need for any radical response in Kentucky as the desire 
for peace was still strong and crucially there was as yet no animosity toward 
federal officialdom. 
           
          As Weigley has pointed out Lincoln’s hand was never forced in Kentucky 
and he would “… make the state a test of his original policy toward the 
South”241 the absence of any headline grabbing ideologically motivated 
dynamic figure such as Frank Blair or later Nathaniel Lyon enabled Lincoln to do 
just this. However it seems very likely that Lincoln regarded then, as he was to 
do during the war, that while mutually influential, each state had to be handled 
according to circumstances. These circumstances were going for Lincoln while 





          As it transpired Lincoln did not speak in Kentucky on his progress from 
Springfield, Illinois to his inauguration in Washington but he had prepared a 
speech to be given there, making it clear that to back down from his opposition 
to the expansion of slavery would be to change his word and a “True 
Kentuckian would not do this.”243However his decision not to speak can be seen 
as a shrewd decision calculated not to enflame the situation.  
 
Lincoln’s clear stance on Slavery 
 
          Early in March, on arrival in Washington, just before his inauguration 
Lincoln called for a meeting with five respected border state politicians 
including ex-Governor Charles S. Morehead and James Guthrie of Kentucky and 
Colonel A.W. Doniphan of Missouri. In a very forthright meeting, of which exact 
statements are lacking, Lincoln once more made it clear that he would never let 
slavery be extended beyond its current borders.244There is no doubt, however, 
that Lincoln was pushed very hard in this meeting and perhaps well beyond the 
boundaries of respect and deference to the office, of a United States President. 
That he did not bend is quite telling. 
 
          Lincoln’s inaugural address has also to be seen as a message to the Border 
States as much as to anyone else: No intention to interfere with or extend 
slavery; no right to secession and most clearly, “In your hands, my dissatisfied 
countrymen, and not in mine, is the … issue of Civil War. The Government will 
not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the 
aggressors.”245 This at once weakened the chances that a wait and see strategy 
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would successful for secessionists in the Border States but it did, on the surface,  
allow room for a ‘Neutrality’ strategy that would develop in the Border States 
during the coming months especially in Kentucky. 
 
          Lincoln putting the onus onto the Confederacy did strengthened the ‘hot-
heads’ in the Border States some of whom were arriving in Charleston on the 
expectation of fighting breaking out, and many more who were joining or 
wanted to join pro-southern militia/guard units in both Kentucky, Missouri and 
indeed Maryland. It also signalled support for those pro-unionists in the slave 




Unlawful Action in St.Louis 
 
          The first military units to be formed, in a pattern that would be repeated 
in Kentucky and Maryland, were from the pro-southern populace of St.Louis 
who created ‘Minute Men’ companies, allowed under state law, in almost 
immediate response to the pro-unionist Home Guard. These few companies 
were led by such commanders as Basil Duke of Kentucky and local Brigadier 
General Daniel Frost, a veteran of the Kansas Border ‘Wars’. Initially these 
companies were formed into a ‘Brigade’ of around 500 men but were woefully 
under-armed if rather zealous. This lack of equipment for pro-southern forces 
again brought into perspective how important the St.Louis Arsenal would 




          Frank Blair246 had lobbied the Buchanan administration hard to provide 
Federal troops to defend the Arsenal, and if possible get the arms within 
released to his ‘Home Guard’. After a shifting around of commanders, all of 
whom proved to be too ‘southern’ for Blair’s comfort, Captain Nathaniel Lyon 
arrived with his company of U.S. Regulars and immediately formed a 
partnership with Blair which would persistently thwart moves towards 
Missouri’s secession. 
  
          Lyon’s arrival at St.Louis in February was notable for its decisive effect on 
the city. Very quickly Lyon gave strong backing to Blair’s actions and made it 
clear his intentions to prevent Missouri’s secession at all costs. Crucially, before 
Lincoln’s inauguration, lobbying on Lyon’s behalf by Montgomery Blair to 
Lieutenant General Winfield Scott had provided 500 men to garrison the 
Arsenal but after Lincoln took over in Washington Lyon was given official 
command. Lyon was an open anti-slavery and anti-southern man and was the 
ideal vehicle for Blair’s plans. His immediate seizure and emplacement of 
artillery in key areas of St.Louis was in contravention of state law but nothing 
could be done to prevent such a move.  
 
          It is important to note that throughout February and early March 1861 
Blair and Lyon made a number of agreements regarding unauthorised transfers 
of arms to troops (the pro-union Home Guard) not officially or even unofficially 
under United States command. Lyon, risking court-martial, effectively began to 
organise and train these troops while Blair successfully lobbied for the removal 
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of those United States officers in St.Louis Lyon considered to be pro-
southern.247 These actions were with Lincoln’s tacit approval as were dealings 
involving the Republican Governors of nearby states.   
 
         In contrast Frost had made no progress in gaining possession of the 
Arsenal when definite opportunities were presented. He had met with, but had 
not sought to make use of, the pro-southern leanings of the previous two 
garrison commanders, like his political master had believed waiting was the 
correct strategy.248It was only after Lyon’s overt actions that Frost 
recommended to Governor Jackson he seek Confederate help in terms of 
military equipment such as siege and engineering material; exactly the same 
equipment found in the Arsenal. That the Confederate Government had urged 
the Governor and Frost to act sooner is also clear along with vague offers of 
financial and military support if they did so. By the end of March 1861 Missouri 
was in effect a bomb waiting for a detonator and the growing crisis at Fort 




Kentucky begins to Arm 
 
          Kentucky never had the explosive feel of Missouri but tension was 
present. The clash between Governor and Legislature, while still legally 
couched, was every bit as acrimonious revolving around military preparations 
and the political stance of the State. Harpers Ferry had already caused Kentucky 
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to rethink its enrolled militia system and she had passed a Bill doing so on 
March 5th 1860 every man 18-45 liable to be on ‘The Roll’, from these 
volunteers would form a State Guard. The task of forming this small army from 
scratch would be that of another soon to be major personality of the Civil War 
in the West, Simon Bolivar Buckner.249    
 
        Buckner and Magoffin found volunteers were much easier to find than 
equipment or more properly money to buy that equipment. The legislature 
held the purse strings and outside of a legally established war this was 
crucial.250 Buckner managed to perform miracles in organising over 4000 
equipped men with a reasonable surplus of guns by January 1861. His $3.5 
million request to fully expand then equip this force was turned down in early 
1861 as he was offered just $20,000, it being noted by the legislature that the 
guard were largely made up of young pro-southern men officered by the same. 





Was Secession a Practical Option? 
 
           It does seem that there were genuine if small chances for one or both of 
Missouri and Kentucky, to secede from the United States in the period between 
November 1860 and April 1861. This may have been peaceful or it may have 
sparked conflict. Northern intransigence or precipitate action against slavery by 
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the Lincoln Administration may have led to 13 or 14 slave states seceding had 
collective bargaining within the Union been the response to the Presidential 
Election. However political unity within the slave states never had a real chance 
due to South Carolina’s rapid secession backed by a largely enthusiastic Deep 
South. 
 
          The history of both Kentucky and Missouri always suggested that there 
would be at the very least sympathy for any action the Deep South may take 
short of aggressive posturing or unprovoked rebellion. The different history, if 
not tradition, of each state was always going to lead to two differing responses 
to secession despite a markedly similar overall feeling. In the case of Missouri 
conflict between pro and anti-slavery factions with the federal authorities often 
an unwanted intermediary, indicated that a local reaction might occur which 
would spark off moves to secede. In contrast Kentucky would respond as it had 
to the pre-election crisis; opt for compromise. 
           
          The role of the regional political leader counted for more in the Border 
States than anywhere else in the crisis, the backgrounds of these leaders, 
especially in Missouri indicates the genuine division within each state and also 
the Democratic Party. The contest between Southern Nationalism and Southern 
Unionism was always going to be closest here. These states and also Maryland 
were the only ones of 15 slave states where there was any measure of support 
for the Republican Party or where nearby Republican Party influence could be 
brought to bear. In this early stage of the struggle, where political machinations 
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had mostly yet to give way to military movement, the Republican Party and 
unconditional unionists had largely triumphed but none more so than Lincoln 
himself.   
 
          In contrast to Lincoln’s determination to stick to a course he believed in, 
Governor Jackson, schooled in Missouri’s often shifting politics, played a 
waiting game and missed his best chance to gain control of the state’s 
resources. In a perfectly legal fashion, under Missouri State Law, Jackson could 
have secured the vital tools of the state and moved toward secession. Time 
after time Jackson misread situations where decisive action may have led to 
clear results. Jackson’s principle opponent in Missouri, Frank Blair, did not. 
Jackson and his military subordinate Frost had behaved in an orthodox manner 
and failed. 
 
          Recognising the danger of inactivity, Blair blatantly broke state laws 
where necessary; solicited federal and other outside state help, again quite 
unlawfully, to buy time until the Lincoln Administration could offer more overt 
assistance. There is no doubt that pro-southern movement towards securing 
the arsenal at St.Louis had a number of chances to be successful. Securing this 
primary objective coupled with rapid movement towards the passage of a 
Militia Bill should have provided a well armed pro-southern force able to back a 
‘Lawful’ secession or ‘Armed Neutrality’. The failure to take these arms 
hampered pro-southern Missouri volunteers throughout the war.252Jackson had 





          Kentucky in the weeks leading up to the bombardment of Fort Sumter had 
not warranted the use of unorthodox methods and so they were not used. 
Without precipitate action by the Federal Government Kentuckians were just 
not ready to leave the Union despite what Governor Magoffin might have 
hoped. Kentuckians, however, were clearly ready to defend their way of life 
from anybody, an obvious fact pro-secessionists somehow missed. Lincoln did 
not, but made it clear that he would not bend from his position and that he 
would not adopt the Crittenden Compromise championed by Kentucky. 
Magoffin had tried to act but found the Legislature unresponsive. Kentucky’s 
subsequent move toward neutrality needed time to be successful; hotheads in 
Charleston, and to a much lesser extent in Kentucky herself, did not allow 
this.253 
 
          The role of the Confederacy and Jefferson Davis can only be regarded as 
too unsubtle and uncoordinated. There were far too many unilateral 
approaches to the Border States on behalf of individual Confederate states and 
a patent lack of understanding of Border State politics as a whole. The overall 
feeling that cultural ties would ensure the secession of both Kentucky and 
Missouri was fatally wide of the mark. This culture of misreading of the Border 
State consensus by Confederate authorities, both civil and military, begun with 
South Carolina’s secession and would continue throughout the crucial early 
stages of the war. The failure by the Deep South to at least be seen to be 
prepared to compromise was a dangerous oversight as this was the best way to 
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The Pattern for Conflict Established 
 
            It should be argued that the pattern for the whole Civil War was laid 
down in the few weeks leading to April 14th 1861. It can equally be argued that 
much of this pattern was formed in the Border States. Nowhere else did the 
Republican Party and the Deep South clash directly and nowhere else was the 
balance between Southern Unionism and Nationalism so close. In the largely 
non-violent contest played out between South Carolina’s secession and the 
bombardment of Sumter the secessionists both in and outside the Border 
States were both outthought and outmanoeuvred by those who were a 
relatively small minority, even in Missouri.  
 
          Each person in the Border States yet to be swayed one way or the other 
watched closely for the actions of both sides. The secessionists’ actions failed to 
have a decisive effect in terms of creating a groundswell for immediate 
secession in either state or to oppose the Federal Government overtly with 
state resources. Against both secessionists and compromisers Lincoln and the 
Republican Party gave nothing, consistently and many times overtly ignored 
state law in Missouri and yet strengthened their overall position, both 
politically and militarily, simply by buying time. Despite pressure in his own 
cabinet to offer concessions Lincoln had managed to shift the onus of war onto 
a Confederacy which he refused to recognise and to pass the burden of 
commencing military action onto Jefferson Davis’ shoulders.  
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          In the Border States where the balance was always precarious whoever 
shouldered the moral responsibility for starting the war would always have 
suffered at the very least short term political damage if not fatal long term 
prospects; as David Potter has said over the Confederate decision to fire on 
Sumter, “Narrow military considerations … dictated the critical cabinet decision 
of April 9th with unfortunate consequences for the Confederacy.”254These 
consequences, of course, also included the international dimension where the 
Confederacy’s aggressive act was also morally damaging for the most part with 
those European powers that may have supported its bid for wider recognition 
in some way.       
 
          When both Kentucky and Missouri reacted to the fallout from Sumter it 
was very clear that supporting the Confederacy now was supporting a 
revolution and not just supporting one or other party in a political dispute. Very 
clearly it was also not necessary to support the Republican Party to maintain 
the status quo of each state and to at least guarantee peace in the short term. 
Lincoln clearly understood this fact and acted accordingly. 
 
          Within the Deep South it was always what Lincoln represented that was 
the fear; the supporters of Southern Unionism were never remotely strong 
enough for anything Lincoln did to have any impact on its political direction. In 
the Border States it was a different case, the desire to remain in the Union 
allowed Lincoln to manipulate the wishes of the majority and to support a 




          The first two case studies in this thesis will highlight how the situation in 
the six month period after the fall of Fort Sumter developed. They will also 
continue to highlight the effective use of ad-hoc civil-military relationships by 
Lincoln to secure both short term political goals and to maintain the status of 
both Kentucky and Missouri within the Union. These two case studies, firstly in 
Missouri and then Kentucky, will demonstrate that decisive movements 
through traditional legal or organisational frameworks are hard to achieve 
when those blocking such moves are both motivated and pragmatic. 
 
           The political patterns and relationships established in the months leading 
up to the outbreak of war were those which were to directly influence its 
course in the Border States. When considering the success or otherwise of the 
civil-military relationships which were about to be formed and tested we must 
remember that success often goes to leaders who correctly identify the 
characteristics of any given situation and adapt accordingly. We have already 
seen how the Confederacy and pro-secessionists had failed to do this in a 
political contest which as yet excluded a meaningful military dimension. It will 
also be demonstrated the Confederacy’s failure to adapt followed her onto the 
battlefield when the inevitable occurred.      
 
          From the point of view of any theory of civil-military relations the 
secession crisis has two notable aspects. Secession by its very nature created a 
new political entity in the form of the Confederacy faced with creating, 
essentially from scratch, a system of civil-military relations, indeed while that 
new entity was either expanding or shortly likely to do so. Conversely the 
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United States faced with secession initially attempted to function in precisely 
the same manner in terms of the Constitution, despite for all practical terms its 
political model being unaccustomed if not unsustainable in such a crisis. Faced 
with the resignation of a very large minority of her officers, the seizure of many 
of her arsenals and indeed the deportation and later siege of her garrisons the 
United States, and therefore President Lincoln, faced a crisis not envisaged by 
the Constitution nor faced before.  
           
          The Confederates in contrast, regarding themselves as true heirs to the 
Founding Fathers, regarded the Constitution as an ideal and indeed now re-
interpreted it with the primacy of each state in mind.255 The new nation 
therefore began with inflexibility in the civil-military structure of its new 
enterprise which would have to be overcome if long term success was to be 




   
 









Case Study 1: Missouri April to September 1861 
 
          This case study will deal with the secession crisis in Missouri from spring 
to autumn 1861, following the opening of hostilities in South Carolina; as such a 
brief overview of events at Charleston will follow. It is important to recall that 
an already complex situation in Missouri was transformed by these opening 
shots into a much more dangerous standoff with subsequent armed conflict 
inevitable.  
 
          This chapter will illustrate that existing systems of civil-military 
relationships can be unsuitable, unready and unresponsive to complex 
hostilities and therefore improvisation becomes necessary for success. Lincoln’s 
ability to exploit and create opportunities from the situation in Missouri will be 
discussed. This case study will also demonstrate in this Lincoln was very much 
aided by his earlier success at Fort Sumter and previous covert interventions in 
St.Louis. The danger of complacency and inflexibility with regard to establishing 
new political relationships will be highlighted by the very poor performance of 
the new Confederacy in its first test of ‘Alliance’ warfare.     
 
          On April 12th Confederate President Jefferson Davis ordered the 
bombardment against Fort Sumter to commence. This decision was a triumph 
for Lincoln, having successfully transferred the burden of starting the war, by a 
direct attack on United States facilities, onto the Confederacy. This impressive 
use of brinkmanship had also proved to be a triumph by Lincoln over both his 
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cabinet and hotheads from the Republican Party, who respectively favoured 
evacuation and a military expedition to resolve the impasse. Secretary of State 
Seward in particular, along with Commander-in-Chief of the Army General 
Winfield Scott, had lobbied for evacuation while staunch Republicans such as 
Montgomery Blair were happier with Lincoln’s announcement of his intention 
to resupply the fort.256  Honourable resistance to overwhelming odds avoided 
both the Union being perceived as the aggressor or as weak and compliant in 
the face of Confederate pressure.  
 
          The impact of Lincoln’s stance on Fort Sumter unsettled the situation in 
Missouri and Kentucky, undermining the pro-secessionist argument that the 
North was the clear aggressor in the conflict. Davis’ response to the threat to 
the Confederacy’s ‘Honour’ persuaded many of those who may have backed 
secession in either state to wait. Those who were as yet undecided in their 
loyalties reacted to the Confederate bombardment by edging closer to the 
Union’s point of view. Sumter had also served notice that the South was not 
going to be allowed to secede peacefully or federal property surrendered 
without a fight if resistance was practicable.  
 
           Any evacuation of the Fort would have strongly reinforced the 
Confederacy’s standing at home and abroad in terms of legitimising secession. 
Conversely any large scale Union attack on Charleston may also have led to all 
remaining slave states seceding, save again Delaware and probably Maryland; 
any aggressive Union act almost certainly rallying the slave states to a common 
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cause. Any aggressive action taken by Lincoln in South Carolina would have 
effectively removed any non-military options to prevent secession in the Border 
States and render the remaining military options much harder to achieve.    
 
          Fort Sumter therefore, was a crucially important example of Lincoln’s 
flexible and single minded approach to the secession crisis and Civil War in 
general. Lincoln’s stated aim of maintaining the Union justified, in his own 
mind, the following of any reasonable path to accomplish this goal. Lincoln 
outmanoeuvred the South throughout the crisis with hints at negotiation and 
promised withdrawal of the Fort’s garrison, gradually limiting Confederate 
options. This tactic was to be used subsequently with Lincoln’s dealings with 
Missouri’s Governor Jackson and his Kentucky counterpart Magoffin. By 
dictating the terms and largely timing of the conflict’s outbreak Lincoln had 
removed Jefferson Davis’ argument that the only thing the South wanted was 
to be left alone. All this was observed closely in the Border States, but triggered 
more immediate action further south, in the middle slave states. 
 
          Lincoln’s April call for 75,000 volunteers to put down the rebellion 
sparked off a second round of secession in the Upper South with Virginia, 
Tennessee, Arkansas and North Carolina leaving the Union in steady succession. 
Governors Jackson and Magoffin both firmly rejected Lincoln’s call for 
volunteers, and spoke for the majority of Missourians and Kentuckians when 
they did so. However the task of seceding for both states had been made more 
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difficult as they were no longer attempting to leave the Union ‘legally’ but were 
now proposing to join an armed rebellion.  
             
          As illustrated in a previous chapter, in the crisis before the fall of Fort 
Sumter Lincoln had demonstrated his determination to act outside of the 
constraints of the Constitution to prevent Missouri’s secession. In stark contrast 
Governor Jackson had consistently operated within legal restraints and 
ultimately achieved nothing, wasting time and failing to exploit the inevitable 
confusion hampering a federal government gearing up for war. The 
Confederate government too had found itself unwilling to deal with a state not 
yet seceded but believed to be ready to do so, finding itself in a position of no 
legal relationship whatsoever, trusting cultural ties would suffice. The failure by 
the pro-secessionists and the Confederacy before Sumter to form an effective 
alliance would continue throughout the rest of 1861, and indeed beyond. 
 
 
Missouri’s Response to Fort Sumter 
 
          Lincoln’s call for volunteers did end the uneasy standoff which had 
developed in Missouri since the Presidential elections of the previous 
November. However Governor Jackson was still intent on both securing the 
Federal arsenal near St.Louis and legally proceeding towards secession without 
outright conflict if possible. Jackson’s reply to Lincoln was bullish in the 
extreme, “Your requisition is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary... not 
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one man will Missouri furnish to carry on any such crusade against her southern 
sisters.”257Furthermore, outside of St.Louis, it was a generally popular 
response.  Powers previously not granted to Jackson were even more hotly 
debated in the State Legislature with the aim of putting money and men at 
state i.e. Jackson’s, disposal.  
 









          By late April the Governor was in contact with the Provisional 
Confederate Government in Montgomery, Alabama, but as yet both parties had 
little of real substance to offer the other. An April 26th request by Secretary of 
War Leroy P. Walker for Missouri to provide a regiment of volunteer infantry to 
rendezvous at Richmond258 was turned down by Jackson, 
          
          I have no legal authority to furnish the men you desire. Missouri is yet 
under the tyranny of Lincoln’s Government, so far, at least as forms go. We are 
woefully deficient here in arms... but we have plenty of men ready, willing and 
anxious to march to the defence of the South... Until we are better prepared 
[we] must move cautiously.259    
 
         
          In contrast to the modest offers of real help to Missouri secessionists 
from Jefferson Davis, Lincoln had leverage on the ground and he was willing to 
use it as circumstances dictated. Frank Blair and Nathaniel Lyon were the ideal 
instruments in this situation, principally because Lincoln had chosen not to rein 
them in during February and March. Lincoln had clearly profited by Blair’s and 
Lyon’s unlawful and unconstitutional means previously, recognising as a result 
the pro-unionists in the state had maintained the initiative. Lyon’s earlier 
securing of the St.Louis Arsenal and Blair’s recruitment of pro-Union volunteers 
from his Republican supporters had made any rapid move against federal 
property by pro-secessionists, after April, extremely difficult. It had proved 
impossible for Missouri’s authorities to act in the manner of Virginia; that is to 





          The civil-military relationships utilised by all sides in Missouri at this time 
are absolutely crucial as they very much dictated Lincoln’s (and Governor 
Jackson’s) options. By May 1861 the majority of U.S. regular officers were 
following orders as directed, their role traditionally seen as being that of 
politically neutral instruments of a democratically elected government. In most 
cases, especially west of the Mississippi, these orders still largely included 
routine duties carried out much the same way as before hostilities. There had 
been no widespread case of officers acting outside of their traditional role as 
servants of civilian authority other than to resign their commissions, as they 
were entitled to so do, offering their services to the Confederacy. By May the 
majority of pro-southern officers had resigned their commissions and any 
remaining who still harboured pro-southern sympathies did not appear to 
overtly act on them.  
 
          As we have seen Lyon facilitated the removal of officers with perceived 
southern sympathies from command positions in St.Louis, quite unlawfully, 
although they had never actively assisted the State of Missouri. In fact Lyon and 
his immediate subordinates261 were the only officers in Missouri who could 
have been said to have acted in any way unprofessionally before Lincoln’s call 
for volunteers.  Therefore the War Department was reliant on what should 
have been a conservative running of its command chain in a state which was 
not lawfully in rebellion against the United States. In Missouri then an 
improvised command chain, often wholly unofficial, would be both necessary 
and prove successful in carrying out Lincoln’s wishes. 
167 
 
          Lincoln however still needed firmer action to secure both his political and 
military objectives in Missouri which, overtly, his Presidential powers did not 
explicitly allow him to take. The Blair/Lyon alliance, extremely active before 
Sumter, remained vital to Lincoln and he would continue to utilise, even 
depend on, it. The position of Jackson was much more uncertain, as Governor 
his powers could not easily allow him to secure his political objectives without a 
legally declared state of war in Missouri. Jackson therefore had to rely on the 
Legislature to increase his control of Missouri’s military assets without the 
urgency direct federal or pro-unionist military action would have instilled in the 
state’s law makers.  
 
          However had Jackson secured his political objective of secession the state 
would have been in rebellion, as it would if state troops had seized control of 
the St.Louis Arsenal. Securing both objectives would of course have made 
resistance against federal authority much longer lived. By resorting to, in effect, 
an ad-hoc restructuring of civil-military relationships in terms of the command 
chain to preserve Missouri’s status in the Union, Lincoln did enough to dissuade 
Jackson from taking decisive action. Watchfully operating in both political and 
military dimensions Lincoln would trust Blair to master the realm of Missouri’s 
state politics while Lyon would act as enforcer; continuing what had become a 
very determined effort on his part to prevent pro-secessionists effectively 






The Constitutional Paradox 
 
          Any theory of civil-military relations when applied to the situation in 
Missouri in 1861 must first look at the role of the U.S. Constitution. Within that 
document the division of powers between the states and the Federal 
Government, the dual nature of state/federal control of military forces and the 
role of the President as Commander-in-Chief laid out the way war was to be 
conducted by the United States. However these had all been designed for 
anything other than intrastate conflict, assuming, in fact, a conflict against one 
of the European powers in North America. In the case of civil war within a 
‘loyal’ yet divided state, two branches that should have been co-operating were 
in fundamental disagreement.  
 
          Very simply Lincoln believed, as duly elected President, he was entitled to 
support from the state of Missouri. In this belief he was opposed by the bulk of 
Missouri politicians who believed the President was acting unconstitutionally. 
Within this disagreement lay the United States Army, administered by the War 
Department, clearly facing an active rebellion in a large number of states but 
legally not yet in Missouri. In the eyes of the law there was no insurrection in 
Missouri only a refusal by the Governor to provide volunteers which arguably 





          It can, however, be very strongly argued that Missouri was actively 
seeking a form of armed neutrality. Lincoln could easily have viewed neutrality 
as de-facto secession and feel justified in meeting any demand Blair and Lyon 
might make to secure the city of St.Louis and the wider state. Lincoln’s caveats 
were always that slavery was never to be directly threatened nor those who 
were regarded as ‘Conditional Unionists’ given reason to change that 
viewpoint. Blair and Lyon served as generally effective levers for the Lincoln 
administration often against the wishes of the War Department whose 
adjustment to war, and civil war at that, was proving difficult in the extreme.  
 
          For an organisation attuned to directing just 16,000 men in a series of 
widely scattered garrisons with a professional officer corps experienced in 
largely peacetime operations, the immediate nationwide challenge to the 
United States Army was immense. Whilst in Missouri at the beginning of May 
the most immediate Union challenge in was, as it had been since the election of 
Lincoln, the securing of the city’s Arsenal and preventing its capture by state 
forces. Militarily the best way to do this was to directly remove any immediate 
armed threat to that establishment; this is precisely what Lyon intended to do.   
 
 
The ‘Camp Jackson Affair’ 
 
          Nathaniel Lyon’s May 10th capture of nearly 1,000 pro-southern Missouri 
Militiamen and subsequent marching under guard through the streets of 
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St.Louis was the defining moment in the struggle for Missouri. The seizure by 
Lyon of the perfectly lawfully established ‘Camp Jackson’ by a force including 
several thousand pro-Union men of questionable legal status, went against the 
expected behaviour of the professional officer corps of the United States, but 
decisively secured the initiative in Missouri.      
 
          The ‘Camp Jackson Affair’ then became the catalyst for open warfare in 
Missouri equally important was the way in which Blair and Lyon were able to 
embark on such a radical and unlawful course of action. By May 9th Blair had 
successfully, against the wishes of the Army, had the pro-Union Home Guard 
sworn into Federal service. Blair had also successfully filled, with his German 
supporters, Missouri’s three regiment 3,123 man quota of volunteers262 and 
removed (for the first time) Brigadier-General Harney as commander of the 
Western Department. Alone Harney’s subsequent temporary replacement by 
Lyon was extraordinary in the context of the traditions of the U.S. Army.  
 
          All of these decisions were however dependent on Lincoln’s direct or tacit 
approval, and as such potentially damaging to his relationship with the War 
Department, his official instrument for implementing political objectives by 
military means. The War Department had successfully prevented Illinois 
regiments being transferred to St.Louis but Lyon had equally successfully 
transferred arms from the Arsenal to arm both these troops and pro-Union 
volunteers in the city. This sense of urgency, displayed by both Lincoln and by 
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Lyon and Blair on the ground, was sorely lacking in their pro-southern 
opponents.  
 
          Hesitancy was characteristic of Governor Jackson and pro-secessionists in 
Missouri. However neither had been aided in any way by the Confederacy or 
any of the individual Southern States with tangible or rapid support whether 
covert or overt. Jackson requested artillery from the Confederacy; Davis 
replied, “Our power to supply you with ordnance is far short of the will to serve 
you.”263The four guns sent from the Baton Rouge Arsenal arrived too late for 
the use they were intended.  
 
          Jackson had a reputation for being a consummate politician in the hotbed 
of Missouri politics, changing his public stance when required to appear much 
more moderate than was the actual case. This frequent changing of stance 
inhibited Jackson’s desire for decisive action as he clearly felt, quite rightly, the 
majority of the state favoured a form of neutrality.264 The feeling was 
embodied by widespread dislike for the Federal Government, no great desire to 
fight the Confederacy and general support for the status quo in regard to 
slavery. Christopher Phillips has described Jackson’s stance as that of, “A 
Steward rather than that of provocateur…”265 Donald Connelly regards 
Jackson’s refusal to provide volunteers as being actively secessionist.266 There 
was, however, an appetite in many quarters for taking on ‘The Yankee Dutch’ as 
the Germans immigrants were known to Missourians of southern heritage. 
Lincoln clearly felt that he had nothing to gain from mollifying this fear and was 
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happy to solidly back his, and the Republican Party’s, one and only dependable 
unconditional block of support in the Border States. 
           
          Both Brigadier General Frost and Lieutenant Governor Reynolds had failed 
to persuade Jackson to seize the Arsenal even after Fort Sumter, as the 
Governor still considered he had no legal power to do so. It was however legal 
for the State Militia to train and they did just that by setting up a camp within 
easy reach of the Arsenal. This ‘Camp Jackson’ was to have been on the bluffs 
overlooking the Arsenal with artillery emplaced to support an assault. Lyon had 
forestalled this plan, with questionable legality, by occupying the Bluffs and by 
the time ‘Camp Jackson’ was established he outnumbered Frost’s nearly 900 
encamped militiamen by 10 to 1. It was the belated, and now barely secret, 
delivery of siege guns and small arms from the seized Federal Arsenal at Baton 
Rouge to Camp Jackson by Confederate Steamer that gave Lyon the excuse to 
act.     
 
          Republican and unconditional unionist actions in St. Louis throughout 
1861 were always an indication of the current state of the struggle going on, 
both in the Western Department and Washington D.C., between the 
Republican Party and the War Department. The Confederate Government had 
inadvertently given Lyon the excuse to act but the United States War 
Department had successfully lobbied to have Harney267 reinstated as Western 
Department commander, Lyon receiving a communication that the Brigadier-
General was due to return on May 11th . Lyon’s biographer, Christopher Phillips, 
strongly argues that Lyon had always desired to launch an attack on 
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secessionist/pro-southern forces in St.Louis and ultimately across the rest of 
the state.268 Lyon, therefore having no intention of allowing the moderate 
Harney to reduce the threat of conflict, became determined to act rapidly. On 
May 10th 6,500 of Lyon’s men moved on Camp Jackson including the newly 
formed 1st Missouri Volunteers under ‘Colonel’ Frank Blair. This force had 
succeeded in surrounding the camp by the afternoon.  
 
          What appeared to be surprise on the part of Lyon was no such thing, his 
West Point classmate Frost, also making use of a network of spies, had early 
enough warning. Frost simply could not believe that Lyon would act in such a 
zealous or indeed unlawful fashion even when Frost’s last minute attempt at 
negotiation was rebuffed.269 On May 11th, via Harney, Frost forwarded his 
correspondence with Lyon along with a strong protest to the United States 
Adjutant General’s office in Washington, pointing out his strong position under 
law, 
 
          In accordance with the laws of the State of Missouri... and in obedience to 
the orders of the Governor, I entered into an encampment with the militia 
force of St.Louis County, for the purpose of instructing the same, in accordance 
with the laws of the United States.270      
 
           
          On receiving Lyon’s demand to surrender Frost had replied, “I never for a 
moment conceived the idea that so illegal and unconstitutional a demand as I 
have just received from you would be made by an officer of the United States 




          The surrender of Camp Jackson was almost incidental to Lyon’s offers of 
parole which were almost universally refused and the subsequent marching of 
the pro-southern state militiamen through St.Louis back to the Arsenal as 
prisoners. During the march, in the early evening of the 10th, tensions grew 
amongst the pro-southern crowd which had swelled in both numbers and 
aggression towards the ‘German’ Regiments marching either side of the 
prisoners. Inevitably these poorly trained soldiers fired on the crowds, 28 being 
killed, along with two federal soldiers and three of the pro-southern 
militiamen.272Lyon, in his report to the Adjutant-General justified his actions, 
 
          [On the receipt of Confederate arms by Frost] I foresaw that under the 
extraordinary measures of the governor and legislature of this state aggressions 
would soon commence against the general government on the part of these 
opposes of it... It was therefore necessary to meet this embarrassing 
complication as early as possible273 
 
          
          These actions by Lyon, fully supported by Blair broke the military impasse 
in Missouri but the subsequent reactions by the various parties’ are crucial to 
understanding just who was still pulling the strings in Missouri. It soon became 
clear that this was Lincoln, demonstrating that he had the political situation in 
hand. Lyon, secure in Lincoln’s backing, was swift to remind the Adjutant-
General that he was, “Now performing under the authority of the President.” 
274, this defiant statement highlights the belief that Lyon was placing himself in 
the crusading role and that Lincoln recognised the War Department, as it 




          Governor Jackson who had struggled since the fall of Fort Sumter to get 
the Militia Bill through the General Assembly promptly did so in a 15 minute 
emergency session on the late evening of May 10th. The Governor was granted 
further emergency powers when exaggerated fears of Lyon’s immediate march 
on the State Capitol at Jefferson City did the rounds a few hours later.275 The 
Militia was renamed the Missouri State Guard (MSG) and crucially Stirling Price 
appointed its head. “The most popular man in Missouri”276 ex-Governor Price 
was the personification of the large number of moderates who were driven into 
the Governor’s camp by the actions of Lyon and Blair. It would be fair to say 
Price probably represented the feelings of a majority in the state, but by no 
means a clear majority. The appointment was popular in the state if less so with 
extreme secessionists. 277 However Price’s appointment could have been 
decisive only if time was available to exploit the situation. Lyon had consistently 
shown he understood the value of denying that commodity to an opponent. 
 
          However there was still a desire amongst many pro-unionists to preserve 
at least an uneasy peace in Missouri. Lincoln careful not to, as yet, fully pursue 
the military option in the state. There is still a certain amount of doubt 
regarding just how much faith Lincoln had in Lyon following ‘Camp Jackson’. 
Just how much Lincoln truly was in favour of the actions which had taken place 
in St.Louis on May 10th remains not entirely clear. Frank Blair’s biographer 
William E. Parrish notes the President was initially receptive to the calls of 
moderate Unionists and their unease over Lyon.278 What is clear is that lines of 
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communication and lobbying between St.Louis and Lincoln were very strong, 
allowing the President to appreciate the mood of the populace. 
 
          Harney returned to St.Louis on 11th May,279 Phillips argues that his 
subsequent moderate reaction to the Camp Jackson affair was based on a 
realisation that both Lyon and Blair’s political connections were just too strong. 
David Connelly sums up what he describes as Lincoln’s “Vacillation” after Camp 
Jackson as a both a product of a “Divided Cabinet...and part of his own desire to 
respect Missouri public opinion and a conflicting realization that decisive action 
was needed.”280 
 
          This indecision in the mind of Lincoln probably made it easier to 
effectively delegate authority to Frank Blair. A Presidential order held by Blair 
prevented Harney disbanding the Home Guard281 while the War Department 
confirmed Lyon’s position as Arsenal Commander. Lincoln clearly wanted to 
cool the situation a little and was initially supportive of efforts by Harney to at 
least slow the move to all-out war in Missouri. However Lincoln’s actions in the 
week following ‘Camp Jackson’ indicate his faith in the men on the ground and 
of the influence the Blair lobby was exerting on him. The ultimate fate of 
Harney, a second and final removal from command, shows clearly Lincoln’s 
susceptibility to Republican lobbyists. 
 
          However Harney’s removal never forced Lincoln to abandon his initial 
belief in Southern Unionism and therefore his goal of reuniting the Union as it 
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stood before his election. An effort to preserve the peace still needed to be 
made in Missouri after the violent events of Camp Jackson however optimistic 
that might have been. Not to have done so would have damaged any party not 
apparently willing to compromise. These insincere manoeuvrings proved to be 
the prelude to war.  
 
 
Insincere Peace efforts: Jockeying for Position 
 
          The first three months of the war in Missouri are a perfect example of the 
inexact nature of Presidential power in the United States and that indeed the 
Constitution was vague on the issue of war and even more so on civil war. The 
use of unofficial channels of influence is not uncommon in an unforeseen 
situation but the Republican Party, a new political force, excelled at this form of 
political manipulation. Lincoln’s skills were best displayed in knowing just when 
and how to use this form of political manipulation. The radical agenda of some 
of the Republican elements involved in the Missouri crisis could have proved 
disastrous to the future of the Union. It then required a very high level of 
political skill to manipulate these elements without alienating them. However 
at no time would it be correct to ascribe Lincoln as having complete freedom of 





          Lincoln’s cabinet included Edward Bates, a supposedly moderate Missouri 
lawyer since 1814, as Attorney General alongside Montgomery Blair as 
Postmaster General. These two were instrumental in defeating moderate 
Missouri Unionist attempts to have Lyon removed following ‘Camp Jackson’ 
and subsequently further promoting Lyon. Dennis K. Boman noting that the 
political connections of Bates and Blair complimented each other,282 thus 
strengthening Lincoln’s overall understanding of the situation.  
 
          This intense Missouri lobbying brought on the first use of Lincoln’s 
dismissals by proxy; that is the issuing of an order, usually via the War 
Department, removing or promoting a given General at the discretion of a man 
on the ground. This ‘Man on the ground’ could equally be politician or senior 
military officer. Franklin Dick, Frank Blair’s own envoy to Lincoln, observed on 
the process, “The result is that the President and the Cabinet fully endorse his 
(Lyon’s) conduct and will appoint him a Brigadier General and effectually 
remove Harney out of his way. Lyon must go ahead now and win new 
laurels.”283A tacit agreement is clear here in Lincoln’s willingness to reward 
success even if won in an unorthodox fashion and in the face of more cautious 
official channels. 
  
          There is some debate as to General-in-Chief Scott’s involvement in the 
process, even to his mistake in the sending of the orders for firstly removing 
Harney and promoting Lyon without the final say so of Lincoln. Connelly 
believing Scott recognised the revolutionary nature of the situation in Missouri 
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but was unable to respond to the turn of events, Lincoln recognising the need 
to use alternative channels to influence the situation.284 There is no doubt 
Secretary of War Cameron was opposed but did eventually agree to “Special 
Order No. 135”285 which was issued to Frank Blair promoting Lyon as of May 
17th and sending Harney on extended leave of absence when Blair himself felt it 
appropriate to do so. Lincoln did not countermand the order however but did 
write to Blair on the 18th, 
 
         I was not quite satisfied with the order when it was made …Since then I 
have become more doubtful of its propriety....I do not write now to 
countermand it, but to say that I wish you would withhold it unless, in your 
judgement, the necessity to the contrary is very urgent… If in your judgement, 
it is indispensable let it be so.286  
 
          
          These instructions came into play following Harney’s most significant 
intervention in the crisis, his agreement with Stirling Price on May 21st. The so-
called Price-Harney Agreement had a profound effect on all political viewpoints 
in Missouri, leaving no doubt as to who had grasped the true situation in the 
state and who was prepared to exploit it. The agreement effectively allowed 
the MSG to maintain order within the wider state and pro-Union forces to do 
the same in the St. Louis area. The two forces would then tacitly stand off each 
other therefore reducing the chance of general hostilities breaking out in the 
state. 
 
         As will be discussed in the following case study this was not unlike the 
situation that would develop in Kentucky, however in Missouri it was to be 
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handled somewhat differently. The agreement was favourable to the 
secessionists/armed neutralists in allowing time for volunteers to rapidly swell 
the ranks of the MSG had it held. Boman regards Harney as being, “Ill-
advised”287but also notes Lincoln’s awareness that the agreement was 
disadvantageous.  
 
          However, crucially, any MSG volunteers would be without the invaluable 
equipment which had once sat in the St.Louis Arsenal and now armed a large 
number of pro-Union troops. The time offered by this standoff, had it been of a 
similar length to Kentucky’s ‘Neutrality’ period, say three months, might have 
been enough to train and arm this potentially considerable force. To Missouri 
moderates any form of peace was much better than war but to pro-unionists 
this was a defiance of federal authority which over time could not be allowed to 
continue. 
 
          The debate over Jackson’s and Price’s, and indeed Harney’s ,motives for 
this agreement are in some ways irrelevant in that Blair and more so Lyon had 
no intention of allowing it to stand. Once again through the Adjutant General of 
the Army, Lincoln was able to indirectly nudge the situation. To Harney, 
 
         …The professions of loyalty to the Union by the State authorities of 
Missouri are not to be relied upon. …They [are] too far committed to secession 
to be entitled to your confidence. …The authority of the United States is 
paramount. Whenever it is apparent that a movement is hostile, you will not 




         Blair read the President’s mood accurately when he took the decision to 
relieve Harney on May 30th. Lyon seized the reins quickly, although once again 
the War Department wished to curtail his power by subordinating his 
department to another which would take some time and had no effect on 
Lyon’s intent or ability to act.  
 
          In stark contrast to the decisive action embarked on by Lyon and Blair, 
supported by Lincoln and the Republican lobby, the Confederate authorities 
were offering very little to Missouri secessionists who were beginning to fall out 
amongst themselves over the correct course of action. Jefferson Davis’ 
characteristic holding of grudges quickly took effect in his view of Jackson and 
Price, with disastrous effects for his cause in the Border States, the Trans-
Mississippi, and wider war effort289. Davis, as with Lincoln, was unhappy with 
the Price-Harney agreement and blamed Jackson and Price for lack of decisive 
action in pushing for secession. Lieutenant Governor Reynolds290, on an 
unauthorised trip to Richmond, concurred as did guerrilla leader M.Jeff 
Thompson,291 personally accusing Governor Jackson of lacking the qualities 
necessary for the crisis as Thompson too travelled to Richmond in search of 
tangible Confederate support.292 
 
          Reynolds himself claims that his plans for dealing with Lyon and securing 
secession were not acted on by Jackson and had included an immediate issuing 
of a state-wide proclamation for volunteers to contest Lyon, although with no 
mention of secession. Reynolds’ proclamation was to have been based only on 
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Blair and Lyon’s unconstitutional actions as justifications for a call-to-arms.293 
Reynolds also claims to have had an agreement whereby a triumvirate of 
himself, Jackson and Price were to have directed a ‘war-effort’ in Missouri 
which would include a direct personal appeal for support from Davis. Reynolds 
opposition to a Kentucky’s type neutrality is expressed as is his belief that direct 
action may have secured the state. He also claims that Price was aware of his 
intention to go to Richmond without Jackson’s knowledge but that the General 
preferred to buy time with an agreement with Harney rather than fight.294  
 
          Harney’s reinstatement had, probably unintentionally, once again forced 
indecision onto Jackson and had in effect split the pro-southern/secessionist 
leadership. Harney was clearly thinking in terms of maintaining order in the 
state, the traditional role of the Army in the West in fact; Lyon’s totally 
different mindset made any agreement unlikely. One final meeting would 
clearly demonstrate the vast difference in the thinking of the key personalities 
during the crisis in Missouri and subsequently just what decisive action can 
achieve in moving forward a complex crisis. 
 
 
Confrontation at the Planter House 
 
          The Planter House meeting is extraordinary even in a large and often very 
savage civil war. The meeting’s uncompromising nature and the decisions 
which effectively drove national policy a thousand miles from Washington D.C., 
instigated by two relatively junior personalities, were indeed remarkable. Lyon, 
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although now Department commander, was slightly swayed by the moderate 
lobby in St.Louis from the beginning of June, although it has been argued by 
Hans Christian Adamson that he was more concerned by the lack of training of 
his troops and their lack of numbers than by any desire for peace in Missouri.295 
Although rejecting the Price-Harney agreement Lyon agreed to meet, along 
with Blair, Governor Jackson and General Price. 
 
          The meeting, in St.Louis on June 11th, with Jackson and Price given safe 
passage, was uncompromising; the four major players in the state around the 
same table ostensibly to preserve some form of peace. It was intended for Blair 
to be spokesman for the Federal Government’s position with Lyon present as 
an observer.296 Price and Jackson’s demands for the disbandment of the pro-
Union Home Guard could never have been agreed upon, equally Jackson and 
Price had no intention of consenting to Federal occupation of the state and 
control of all military forces. It was as Albert Castel has simply put it, 
“Irreconcilable”.297   
 
           As the meeting progressed Lyon’s self control slowly disappeared and 
after a few hours angrily declared he had done all he could to maintain peace 
and confronted Jackson, “Better, sir, far better, that the blood of every man, 
woman and child within the limits of the State should flow, than that she 




          It is clear that at best another few uneasy days of ‘peace’ was all that 
could have been expected from the meeting if all four participants had truly 
desired it, Lyon clearly did not. Jackson and Price were stalling for time and 
were, in the first days of June, making initial contacts with both Confederate 
and Arkansas State troops over military co-operation. Blair had clearly made 
the decision that political disagreement had developed into a military contest 
and Lyon was the best man to fight it, after all as a mere captain in the Regular 
Army,299 Lyon had managed to summon the State Governor and, on behalf of 
the US Government, effectively declare war on that state’s legally established 
forces.300 
 
          Lyon, excepting Lincoln, stands out clearly from every senior figure in this 
crisis by his rapid and decisive actions. His words could have been angry 
rhetoric, they were not. Lyon was convinced he knew what was required 
militarily and was quickly organising his forces to seize Missouri’s two major 
railroads and secure control of the Missouri River, in short Lyon wished to deny 
the commodity Jackson and Price needed most, that of time. The verdict on 
Lyon by the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the war was unequivocal, “St. 
Louis was preserved from falling under Rebel control only by the prompt and 








All-out War in Missouri 
 
          Historians have long argued over numbers regarding how many men 
fought in the war from Missouri and for what side, what is very clear is had 
Lyon delayed after June 11th each day several hundred more volunteers would 
have joined the State Guard and any delay of a few weeks would have brought 
more arms, supplies and equipment and the potential for effective Confederate 
support. Jackson clearly saw this too and on his way back to Jefferson City 
finally issued a proclamation urging Missourians to resist Federal incursions, 
defend their state and in effect stand with the South. Jackson, to the end, 
publically defended his actions as being lawful reminding Missourians, 
 
          I hold it to be my solemn duty to remind you that Missouri is still one of 
the United States... it is your duty to obey all the constitutional requirements of 
the Federal Government. It is equally my duty to advise you that your first 
allegiance is due to your own state... you are under no obligation to obey 
unconstitutional edicts of military despotism enthroned in Washington...302 
 
            
          Jackson had however lost the initiative, indeed he had consistently failed 
to grab it, and by the morning of June 13th Lyon’s troops were moving against 
all their initial objectives. 
 
          Lyon has been accused of conducting a personal crusade against those 
who stood against Federal authority and especially the planter class in 




          Lyon’s war was more than political extremism; it was a personal vendetta, 
wrought by the blind hatred of the nation’s secessionists. ... He viewed himself 
as the state’s supreme arbiter... It was his duty, it was his crusade.304 
  
             
          If that was the case it was only because Lincoln allowed him to do so and 
because, however reluctantly, the War Department provided many of the tools. 
The next man to try to carry out a personal political agenda in Missouri soon 
found it was impossible without the support of Lincoln. Lyon is wholly 
consistent in his correspondence in his desire to enforce the “Authority of the 
Government”, perhaps overlooking the dual nature of a federation, regarding 
Jackson’s proclamation as, “Tantamount to a declaration of war.”305  
 
         There have been claims that other actions were ‘decisive’ in the outcome 
of the war in the Trans-Mississippi and the Border States. The culmination of 
Lyon’s campaign at Wilson’s Creek, discussed below, being regarded by some in 
that light. Wilson’s Creek however was a major Union tactical defeat. Pea Ridge 
as discussed in the third case study also has its supporters for this accolade.306 
William L. Shea even regards the battle of Prairie Grove, Arkansas fought on 
December 7th 1862 as settling “...the fate of the trans-Mississippi.”307 However 
the early months of the struggle for Missouri were the most important. In these 
early months Lyon had destroyed by far the best chance of Missouri effectively 
seceding; securing the vast bulk of her military potential, both short and long 
term to the national government. 
 
          There is no doubt that the potential of the MSG was significant, several 
thousand of those who fought in 1861 would form a number of elite brigades 
for the Confederacy in the years to come, but as many as several tens of 
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thousands were lost by Lyon preventing their formation let alone training. 
There would be no other chance to put this scale of volunteers into the field 
from Missouri in State or Confederate units, Piston and Sweeney observing, “In 
no other theater of the war was the disparity of resources between the 
contestants as great or of such lasting consequence.”308    
 
          With Lyon and Blair as instruments, Lincoln had used the almost 
universally unpopular Republican Party within Missouri to secure his objectives 
without uniting his opponents within the state to open or fully organised 
resistance until it was too late. Whether by design or by chance the desire of 
the bulk of the population to be ‘Neutral’ offered the unconditional unionists 
the initiative which they seized with the support then direction of the 
President.    
 
         Lyon’s pursuit of the State Guard, ultimately into south-western Missouri 
is an excellent example of an initially very successful advance which was 
operationally pushed too far. Lyon’s advance on Jefferson City caused a panicky 
retreat on the 15th by Jackson from the State Capitol with the few hundred 
untrained troops who had time to gather there, severely disrupting the State’s 
administrative and financial ability to organise for conflict. Jackson had 
intended to concentrate all recruits from each of the State’s nine military 
districts at the central location of Booneville, 70 miles up the Missouri River 
from the Capitol. However Lyon arrived rapidly again by steamer on the 17th 
routing the MSG volunteers who were forced to retreat towards Springfield in 
the southwest of the state.  
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          Jackson was present in person at Booneville309 and against military advice 
wanted to fight, an affair, “Fought at the nod of a politician not a military 
commander.”310 The inevitable defeat severed his communications with pro-
southern elements north of the Missouri River and did nothing for his standing 
in the Confederacy or the reputation of his troops. Lyon’s well executed 
operation culminating in closing the Missouri River to the thousands of State 
Guard recruits eager to join up was, as Christopher Phillips has stated, “… an 
unquestioned success.”311 Thomas Snead, Jackson’s ADC and acting Adjutant of 
the State Guard regarding Booneville, 
 
          Insignificant as was this engagement in a military aspect, it was in fact a 
stunning blow to the Southern Rights people of the state … which did 
incalculable injury to the Confederates. It was the consummation of Blair’s 
statesmanlike scheme to make it impossible for Missouri to secede … as she 
would surely have done had her people been left free to do as they pleased.312  
 
          
          Phillips has concluded that Lyon subsequently set aside any strategic 
considerations in order to punish his enemies and the evidence is strong. 
Lincoln too may have felt this, despite strong lobbying he did not stop the War 
Department from subordinating Lyon’s department to the Department of the 
Ohio under Major General McClellan effective from June 18th, strategically 
highly questionable, and indeed unworkable, other than to carry out its primary 
goal of reining in Lyon. However McClellan had no interest in Missouri and left 
Lyon alone. Another two weeks of negotiation led to the reinstatement of the 
Department of the West with Missouri at its heart and with, from July 9th, the 




          The flaws in the Confederacy’s initial dealings with Missouri are all too 
apparent in these few decisive weeks of the conflict; refusal on principal to 
effectively deal with state authorities who have not yet formally seceded; 
personal animosity between Davis and Jackson/Price and refusal of the 
Confederate War Department to even regard the MSG as equal partners in a de 
facto alliance. No offers of meaningful support were to be contemplated unless 
the MSG agreed to take direct orders from Confederate commanders or War 
Department. The comparison between successful Republican lobbying in 
Washington and the fractured efforts of the pro-southern/secessionist 
Missourians in Richmond is stark, not the least because there had been nothing 
like a united front presented by Missouri to the Confederate Government at 
any time during these months. It was altogether a very poor debut for the so-
called ‘Missouri’ lobby.  
 
          Lyon had scored a decisive victory but his eventual fate highlights the 
failings of all sides in 1861 Missouri, including the adverse effects of the 
Republican lobby on the direction of the Lincoln administration. The Federal 
effort in Missouri was largely successful because Lyon and Blair, with the 
backing of Lincoln excelled in their own spheres, the arrival of Fremont who 
regarded himself as a master of both war and politics unhinged the war effort 
in the state just as the nation’s attention was becoming more focussed on 
events in far-away Virginia.  
 
          Lyon had arrived in Springfield on July 13th his Army in a deteriorating 
condition. Within a few days this army began to break up with the War 
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Department requesting the transfer of troops and many volunteers leaving 
after their enlistments expired. The State Guard had not been totally destroyed 
however and was reforming with upwards of 10,000 troops of varying quality to 
the southwest of Springfield, with Price in command. Governor Jackson headed 
to Richmond, consulting with other southern states on the way. The whole 
Confederate war effort in the Trans-Mississippi would be neatly summed up in 
July and August 1861 by battlefield triumph, missed opportunity and wholesale 
lack of cooperation. The secessionists needed to convince the majority of 
Missourians they were still the legitimate representatives of that state, would 
they get the chance?   
 
 
The Fight for Legitimacy 
 
          The key to effective civil-military relationships in the struggle for the 
Border States was the need to control the civilian populace without being seen 
to oppose the wishes of the majority i.e. maintain legitimacy. The example of 
Missouri in summer 1861 is both Lincoln’s and Blair’s ability to do just this. 
Governor Jackson’s flight from Lyon created a power vacuum which was filled 
by conditional and unconditional unionists. Lyon had simply closed down the 
offices of state government when he occupied Jefferson City but as William 
E.Parrish has pointed out, “It quickly became obvious that some kind of civilian 
responsibility was needed to co-ordinate the efforts of the federal government 
with Missouri Unionists.”313 Blair displayed a shrewd understanding of the 
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situation by not lobbying for the position of Military Governor which many of 
his supporters urged on him. Instead the State Convention was recalled on July 
22nd minus most of the pro-southern members, many of whom were with 
Jackson. 
 
          This recalled Convention was dominated by Hamilton R.Gamble;314 using 
the Unionist majority to declare the executive branch of the state government 
‘vacant’, abrogating the 1859 Militia Act which had given Jackson his wartime 
powers and setting up a Provisional State Government. After the remaining 
pro-southern members resigned following their failure to, quite lawfully, have 
the Convention declared unconstitutional under state law, Gamble was 
unanimously appointed Provisional Governor.315An indication of federal 
approval for these actions was the immediate recognition by Lincoln of 
Gamble’s appointment, again clearly unconstitutional in all ways. Once more 
these decisive military and political actions contrasted greatly with the 
indecision displayed in both fields by Lincoln’s opponents.316      
 
 
The Battle of Wilson’s Creek 
 
         On June 26th Ben McCulloch, commanding Confederate forces in Arkansas, 
was instructed by Adjutant General Cooper to assist Price and the MSG 
providing this did not jeopardise his primary goal of defending the northern 
borders of the state, this instruction also authorised an invasion of Kansas 
should McCulloch deem it necessary.317 On July 4th Confederate Secretary of 
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War Walker made clear this assistance was to be with the highest level of 
prudence due to the fact that Missouri had not left the Union, undoubtedly 
instructed on this point by Davis, again however an invasion of Kansas was 
regarded as acceptable and indeed possibly “Most effective.” Walker going on 
to make clear, “...special facts may arise or circumstances may exist, which 
from the remoteness of the position, it would be impossible for this 
department to give you specific and definite instructions.”318 McCulloch then 
had been granted much freedom of action. 
 
          Lyon’s decision to attack Price and McCulloch at Wilson’s Creek to the 
southwest of Springfield on August 10th was his characteristic solution to the 
trap he had put himself in. The surprise attack on the Confederate/MSG camp 
resulted in a vicious stand-up fight and the defeat of Lyon’s heavily 
outnumbered army following his death on the field.319 Wilson’s Creek was not 
the decisive battle of the Trans-Mississippi Theatre; it was fought too late for 
that. The battle ended a campaign which had already delivered a strategic 
victory for the Union. What the battle did was expose the limitations of 
Fremont who failed to co-ordinate with Lyon and had been diverted by an 
abortive Confederate move into southeast Missouri from western Tennessee. It 
also highlighted the huge divisions between the Confederate view of the war in 
Missouri and its place in the wider conflict, and that of the Jackson/Price camp.  
 
         As the war’s first martyred general, Lyon briefly moved the spotlight back 
onto Missouri with the blame laid at Fremont, activating once more lobbying  
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from the Blair family and a subsequent reaction from Fremont. Meanwhile the 
pro-southern ‘Alliance’ could not agree on how to follow up their victory with 
McCulloch falling back to Arkansas and Price advancing to the Missouri River 





           On August 15th Brigadier General Ben McCulloch issued the first of the 
Confederacy’s proclamations to the Border States, faithfully sticking to the 
Davis administration’s political message, 
 
          I have come among you simply with the view of making war upon our 
Northern foes, to ... give the oppressed of your state an opportunity of again 
standing up as freemen and uttering their true sentiments... I do not come to 
make war upon any of your people, Union or otherwise... Missouri must be 
allowed to choose her own destiny...The time has now arrived for the people of 
the State to act, Missouri must now take her position be it North or South.320 
 
 
         Fremont’s own reaction to the furore following the resurgence of the pro-
southern cause in Missouri once again demonstrated that the man who had the 
best grasp on the situation in the Border States and the country as a whole was 
most certainly not Fremont but still Lincoln. 
 
         On August 30th Fremont issued his own ‘Proclamation’ of ‘Martial Law’ in 
response both to the growth in pro-southern ‘partisan’ activity in Missouri and 
to Price’s advance. It was to instigate the first move towards military control 
(outside of Maryland) within the hostile areas of the Border States in the war so 
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far. Included were clauses for the unilateral emancipation of slaves in Missouri. 
Mindful of the effect it would have in Kentucky Lincoln shrewdly brought 
Fremont to heel and once again restrained the urges of the radicals who were 
perfectly happy with such a drastic course. Fremont’s view of his role in 
Missouri was clearly at odds with Lincoln’s however his view on the condition of 
the State and what was required to carry out what he saw as his task is quite 
clear, 
 
          Circumstances, in my judgment, of sufficient urgency render it necessary 
that the commanding general of this department should assume the 
administrative powers of the State...In this condition the public safety and the 
success of our arms require unity of purpose. In order to suppress disorder and 
to maintain public peace...I do hereby extend and declare martial law 
throughout the State of Missouri.321     
  
 
          Of even greater concern to Lincoln were two following clauses, 
 
          All persons who shall be taken with arms in their hands... shall be tried by 
court-martial, and if found guilty will be shot...The property of all persons in the 
State of Missouri who shall take up arms against the United States, or shall be 
directly proven to have taken an active part with their enemies in the field, I 




          In Fremont’s defence many of these measures and also some of a much 
more severe nature were introduced to parts of or indeed the entire state later 
on in the conflict. However Lincoln knew that for any chance of the Union being 
restored in anything like its ante-bellum self, such measures in 1861 were very 
likely to increase pro-southern support in the Border States and with it 
permanent separation of the nation. Dennis Boman has described Fremont’s 
proclamation as an, “...example of a lack of coordination between the military 
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and civilian authorities...” displayed at all levels in Missouri including Lincoln, 
Gamble and the military commanders.323  
 
           However Lincoln remained well aware of the relationship between 
Missouri and Kentucky with regard to their respective views on slavery. Lincoln 
being especially aware of their shared Border State view that any change in the 
nature of slavery could and should only be decided by the people of each state, 
not by the Federal Government and most certainly not by a general’s decree. It 
was also clear to Lincoln that any move on slavery in any Border State would be 
regarded by their populace as a move against slavery in all of them. His 
response to Fremont, 
 
          I think there is a great danger that the paragraph in relation to the 
confiscation of property and the liberating of slaves of traitorous owners will 
alarm our Southern Union friends and turn them against us; perhaps ruin our 
rather fair prospect for Kentucky...324     
 
 
          
          Whether written in a spirit of caution not censure as Lincoln claimed, 
Fremont was instructed to conform his proclamation to fit the First Confiscation 
Act, which had been passed by Congress on August 6th325, itself highly 
contentious, little used and probably unconstitutional. Lincoln clearly had no 
intention of compromising on his primary objective, that of securing Border 
State loyalty, even if such a proclamation would have eased the difficulties for 
Union military operations in the southwest, southeast and west of Missouri. All 






          The interdependence of the Border States in the Civil War were being no 
better illustrated than with each sides concerns as Price was moving north. 
Operations in the southeast of Missouri were increasing with eyes of both 
combatants turning toward both the Mississippi and western Kentucky. 
Fremont in particular was getting increasingly concerned over Columbus, 
Kentucky and its strategically strong position on the Mississippi. His subordinate 
in the District of Southeastern Missouri, Brigadier General Grant, was beginning 
to operate effectively in this region and was causing M.Jeff Thompson, an 
equally effective commander, to register his concerns to his superiors, who 
were more than receptive. Fremont to the War Department, September 5th, 
 
          The enemy in Southeast Missouri has retreated to New Madrid [on the 
Mississippi in the extreme southeast of the state] I think he intends to throw his 
main force into West Kentucky. He will immediately occupy Columbus, the 
ground opposite Cairo and Paducah.326   
 
 
           
          However Fremont had already instructed Grant to assemble forces to 
occupy Columbus before this communiqué. Thompson had quickly worked out 
Fremont’s intention and informed his superior at New Madrid, Brigadier 
General Pillow, that combinations totalling 18,000 men were either to, “Occupy 
Columbus or move on you... and bag you.”327 This fear over the fate of 
Columbus will be examined further in the following case study but it seemed 
that elsewhere in Missouri Union fortunes had been reversed.  
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          Price’s rapid advance switched Fremont’s attention once again when the 
MSG, following a swift march, laid siege to Lexington, on the Missouri River, 
from 13th September, finally storming a Union fortification outside the town on 
the 20th capturing then paroling the 3,500 man garrison. In the eyes of 
Governor Jackson, present during the final assault, this MSG victory was 
achieved as the armed force of a, “Sovereign, Free and Independent Republic,” 
Jackson having declared, quite unlawfully, this to be the case as early as August 
5th.328 Not surprisingly Jackson once again asked for Confederate help in 
maintaining his position in the pro-southern heartland of Missouri both from 
McCulloch, by now back in Arkansas, and from Richmond. None was 
forthcoming and at last Fremont began to assemble his forces to force Price 
south once again.  
 
          Of little note in itself the battle of Lexington and the subsequent few days 
of MSG occupation indicate firstly just how many men would have joined Price 
if he could have held the area long enough, his force nearly doubling in size in 
less than two weeks.329 Perhaps even more importantly the brief campaign 
demonstrated just how far apart the MSG and the Confederacy were in terms 
of co-operation. As late as December McCulloch was still defending his actions 
to the War Department in regard to the war in Missouri and his relationship 
with the MSG and Price in particular.330 McCulloch feeling the criticism which 
had come his way from the Missouri lobby in Richmond following his failure to 




A Success for Unorthodoxy? 
 
        This case study has highlighted the 1861 contest for Missouri as a vital 
dimension of the Civil War. A contest requiring unorthodox solutions to 
problems which had not, or could not be foreseen by those drawing up the 
political systems of the United States nor the mechanisms for directing her 
armed forces. From a grand strategic viewpoint the absolute key to the 
situation was the need to maintain Missouri in the Union and not allow it 
secede or play a full role in the Confederate war effort, this was achieved. 
 
          Radical and decisive individuals in the form of Lyon and Blair triumphed 
over the conservative state politicians of Missouri of all persuasions and had 
manipulated the legal framework and the Constitution of the United States to 
secure Lincoln’s objectives. Firm leadership by Lincoln had utilised both Lyon’s 
and Blair’s talents to the maximum without allowing either to set an agenda 
contrary to the overall objective of the conflict.  
 
         The failed alliance of the Confederacy and pro-southern Missouri was vital 
for the war in the Western Theatre and the long term survival of the rebellion. 
No agreed upon objective, no effective co-operation and lack of decision 
among all aspects of their collective leadership set the subsequent pattern for 
the war effort in the Trans-Mississippi. This inefficient command performance 
exposed Arkansas and more importantly sparked fears over the fate of 
Kentucky and Tennessee much earlier than needed to have been the case. 
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          Some have argued that Lyon’s actions triggered the brutal guerrilla 
warfare which developed in Missouri during the conflict, James A. Rawley, for 
one, considering Lincoln’s reliance on Blair to be misguided331. However 
strategically for the North, guerrilla warfare was preferable to facing several 
tens of thousands of motivated Missouri troops on a conventional battlefield. 
Ultimately this form of warfare was an expression of the South’s inability to 
control areas where in fact it had widespread support.  
 
          Aside from guerrilla and unconventional warfare, both inevitable as 
legacies of ‘Bleeding Kansas’, Missouri produced two difficulties for Lincoln’s 
war aims; his reliance on political appointees in military command had set a 
precedent as had the influence, often against the wishes of the War 
Department, of the Republican Governors. This would impact eventually on the 
war aims of the Union and gradually increase the pressure on Lincoln to alter 
his views on the need for changes in the Union’s long term political objectives. 
For the Confederacy the missed opportunity in Missouri would create a vocal 
lobby in Richmond which would become a distraction and would also reinforce 
Jefferson Davis’ convictions that non-west pointers were a liability and not loyal 
to his administration. However the contest in Missouri had provided lessons for 
effective civil-military relations in fluid, complex civil war situations and they 






Lessons for Civil-Military Relations 
 
          This case study has been dominated by the successful actions of three 
men, Lincoln, Frank Blair and, on the ground in Missouri, decisively so by 
Nathaniel Lyon. Of the three both Lincoln and Blair are not untypical figures; 
the former as a first rate national leader is very rare but not unique the latter is 
in fact quite typical of a local political figure with sufficient skills and social 
standing to manipulate rapid change in his own region or state. Lyon on the 
other hand is atypical, a relatively junior figure in a politically very conservative 
organisation Lyon’s actions allow questions to be asked over the nature of 
effective civil-military relations in complex and civil conflict. During the mid-
nineteenth century the United States may be in some ways unique in its pace of 
dynamic change, both political and economic, in all recorded history probably 
less so. It is perhaps then very useful that Lyon emerged from such a 
conservative body as the U.S. Army in such a time of change, as civil war has 
the potential to be the catalyst for change even from organisations termed as 
‘conservative’.   
 
          As discussed in the Literary Review Samuel Huntington’s theory of civil-
military relations describes America as having established a military tradition 
from the early years of the nineteenth century. This tradition consisted of 
“Technicism, Popularism and Professionalism”332these being firmly established 
prior to the Civil War, the latter two most identified with the army. Within 
‘Popularism’ Huntington identified an American distaste for any form of 
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standing army as both limiting the size of the regular army and creating a belief 
that a militia would, if raised by the states, suffice. This belief itself deriving 
from a conviction that every American citizen would become a natural soldier 
with very little training when required.333  
 
          Again as discussed in the literary review ‘Professionalism’, in this context, 
Huntington regards as inherently Southern and conservative in nature. That 
Nathaniel Lyon was a native of ‘liberal’ Connecticut is consistent with 
Huntington but nonetheless West Pointers were, in theory, indoctrinated to be 
apolitical. However the sheer dynamic of the situation in 1861 Missouri leaves 
both the regular officer and his established organisation struggling to respond.      
 
          In 1861 Missouri Huntington’s concept of ‘Popularism’ manifests itself on 
all sides with the rapid formation of volunteer units supporting opposing 
political viewpoints. This was an immediate challenge to the ‘professionalism’ 
of the officer corps, both in the number of non-professional officers appointed 
to command these troops, and in the requirement to command large forces 
with the aim of imposing often un-popular political changes.  
 
          Professional sympathy for the conservative South was often also matched 
by the distaste shown for volunteer and militia troops by both the regular army 
and the War Department. As thousands of men prepared to join the various 
units forming in Missouri the traditional command chain of both the War 
Department and the State Militia were found inadequate. This inadequacy did 
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allow unorthodox approaches to the application of military force quite 
unforeseen by those who laid out the Constitution decades before and 
unsuited to the system which had developed from it. These volunteer units 
were also vastly different from the volunteer units raised to fight in the 
Mexican war barely ten years before, not the least because they were raised to 
fight one another and were legally dubious in a number of ways.       
 
          The system of civilian control in the War Department had evolved by the 
late 1850s into a small bureaucracy directing garrison forces attuned more to 
engineering than war fighting. The Department was not in a position to arm or 
equip new troops this quickly, nor could it provide experienced officers to train 
or command at anything like the required scale.334 The Army and the War 
Department were relying on their regular officers to operate and follow orders 
in a pre-war manner and therefore did not expect relatively junior officers to 
make and act on political judgements, much less on ideology. 335  Lyon’s impact 
is even more extraordinary as there was no attempt to conceal his ultimate 
objectives yet he very largely achieved them all, neither the War Department 
nor senior officers having the political leverage or know-how to stop him once 
he had support from Lincoln.   
 
          Lyon’s actions following his arrival in St.Louis were consistently politically 
and ideologically driven, directly influencing state and in effect national politics. 
Whatever their true sympathies the previous garrison commanders of the 
St.Louis Arsenal had generally carried out their duties in a non-political manner, 
as indeed had Kentuckian Major Anderson at Fort Sumter. In no way can it be 
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argued that any of Lyon’s predecessors had either actively opposed or aided 
Jackson in his political objectives in the manner that Lyon assisted Blair. 
 
          Lincoln had recognised quickly that he could only initially expect the War 
Department to act slowly and that effective action by determined and 
motivated allies would be much more reliable. With the number of regular 
U.S.Army troops already proving inadequate to defend Federal installations in 
the slave states against thousands of southern militia, the energy displayed by 
Lyon was invaluable in holding onto one of the key targets in the slave states. 
Lincoln sensed two things, in order for secession to be halted; the Arsenal in 
particular and St.Louis as a whole had to be held. If doing so went against the 
traditions of the United States then that was unfortunate.    
 
           Huntington mentions two realties of the nineteenth century United 
States in particular and of conflict in general; the strong tradition of Liberalism 
established in America by mid-century and his observation, “The political object 
of the war remains the guide throughout the struggle.”336This second point 
explains both Lincoln’s and Blair’s actions at all times and explains their need 
for Lyon. In a contest with Governor Jackson and his lawful control of the 
State’s military resources unlawful measures were unavoidable. Although 
Liberalism was the dominant ideology Huntington has pointed out it was 
contrasted by the fundamentally conservative nature of the Constitution337. As 
noted the career military officer was considered to be equally conservative with 
West Point regarded as an inherently conservative institution by the 1850s. This 
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was widely believed in the Republican Party, and by Lincoln himself. What was 
more it was considered that the conservative nature of the military was a result 
of its relative dominance by the South who had been equally dominant in the 
civilian branch of the military, the War Department.  
 
         Despite being a West Pointer Lyon’s actions were contrary to the ethos of 
the academy, but quite clearly stem both from his New England background 
and time spent on duty in Kansas in the mid-1850s. Lyon, previously a 
Democrat, had been angered by the abandonment of the Missouri 
Compromise. He had become strongly anti-slavery following his military service 
in Kansas much of it spent trying to keep a lid on the ‘War’ being fought there. 
It has also been argued, by Phillips, that Lyon believed the Army’s actions in 
Kansas had benefitted the ‘pro-slavers’ more than the ‘free-soilers’338 acting 
effectively as defenders of the status-quo and not as protectors of liberal 
progress. His ideological standpoint can easily be regarded as unfinished 
business with ‘slave-power’, Lyon’s contempt for their role in Missouri being 
little concealed.  
 
          Lyon’s actions therefore, once explained, fit into some of Samuel Finer’s 
theories on civil-military relationships339. Finer examines the reasons for 
intervention by the military in politics. Finer explores motive for intervention as 
the starting point. Missouri in spring 1861 would have been an obvious 
situation for military intervention had the U.S. Army a tradition of such action. 
That this tradition was wholly lacking highlights just how remarkable Lyon was. 
It also questions Huntington’s use of the U.S. Civil War to mark the first major 
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turning point in that nation’s civil-military relationships in that he overlooked 
functional regional differences. The war in Missouri up to September 1861 is 
very ‘un-American’ much more so than elsewhere even in the context of a 
constitutionally unforeseen civil war.   
 
          For an army familiar with intervention the situation in Missouri can in a 
number of ways be likened to a nation (or federation) where rule of law or of 
the established authority has broken down and demands for autonomy and 
separation are high. Finer cites the Weimar Republic, in the early 1920s, as an 
example of the military intervening to prevent both the breakup of a country 
and to preserve its system of government. 340In these cases the military 
intervene to restore civil supremacy however the role of the majority of the 
officer corps in the Spanish Civil War is also similar in a number of areas 
although ‘Counter-revolutionary’ in terms of its aims.  
 
          It is also not a very large gap from the role of the Basque and Catalan 
regions in1930s Spain to the role of Missouri in 1861; Union and Nationalist 
rule imposed as opposed to the Confederate and Republican co-
operative/alliance approach. Franco’s extremely harsh treatment both during 
and after the Spanish Civil-War towards any separatist movement was matched 
by those within resisting savagely for as long as possible, both with semi-regular 
and irregular forces. The subsequent rise of ETA in the Basque regions is 
testament to the ferocity of much of the conflict in these areas between 1936 
and 1939. That a largely atheist and leftist Republic was willing to co-operate 
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with independent yet strongly Catholic regions indicates their value to the 
overall outcome of the conflict.341        
 
          Lyon’s motive is clearly to restore the supremacy of the Federal 
government and to punish those who seek to ignore it. Within the Border 
States there is a strong feeling that  the Lincoln Administration is using federal 
military force to both threaten the constitutional rights of both state and 
citizens and to alter the character of the Union as a whole. With regard to 
Finer’s other possible motives for military intervention Lyon clearly believes his 
is acting in the national interest as he sees it.342 
 
           As Christopher Phillips has argued, Lyon’s contemporaries began to 
observe characteristics displaying his belief in a personal destiny in an almost 
religious fashion, a chosen man to save the destiny of the Union. Lyon, in this 
role of ‘chosen man’ resembled both Franco and perhaps more accurately 
Admiral Kolchak343 although on a relatively smaller scale. Lyon, in a similar 
fashion to the White Russian Admiral, believed himself to be acting for a higher 
national authority, in this case the U.S. Government as opposed to the 
Romanov Dynasty. Characterising all three was a sense of self belief which at 
least in the cases of Lyon and Franco proved superior to their varied foes. Both 
Lyon and Franco had been quite prepared to ignore the rule of law to defend 
this ‘higher authority’.  
 
          Characteristic of this case study is the success achieved by breaking or 
bending of the Constitution. Of course Lincoln, in swearing to defend the 
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Constitution, was quite prepared to ignore it when it proved unworkable or 
inefficient. In contrast Governor Jackson’s fear of being seen to operate 
without legal backing was fatal. In peacetime the Constitution allows full 
control of the Militia of each state to be vested with the respective state 
authorities. In each state the Governor is de jure commander-in-chief, with 
military funding largely being provided by vote of the state legislature.344 
 
          At no time before May 1861 could the actions of the Missouri militia be 
considered to be unconstitutional. The State was perfectly at liberty to 
augment the militia in any way it saw fit and had begun to restructure from 
1858 in response to the ongoing border clashes with Kansas. The President only 
becomes Commander-in-Chief of any given state militia in time of war where 
that war is fought on the territory of said state; there was as yet no war in 
Missouri and no foreign power had invaded the state. In contrast many actions 
of Blair and Lyon would have justified intervention by Missouri state forces in 
any other circumstance than the political chaos following Lincoln’s election. 
Unlawful recruitment of the ‘Home Guard’ in St.Louis could be regarded as 
attempted armed insurrection against the state of Missouri, allowing Governor 
Jackson to subdue it as he saw fit. This situation could have been exploited by a 
pro-southern officer with similar dynamism to Lyon.  
 
           Contrasting Lyon’s aggressive actions, Brigadier General Frost made no 
decisive move towards securing either the St.Louis Arsenal nor hampering the 
pro-Union forces forming in the city. Operating completely within traditional 
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civil-military structures Frost merely advised his civilian master restricting 
himself to actions lawful under the Missouri Constitution. Lyon as a 
professional, regular army officer and West Point graduate acted in a quite 
untypical manner for a man of his office. According to theoretical study Lyon as 
a product of liberalist America, should not and would not have intervened. 
However civil supremacy, in his view, was under threat in a way that could not 
be planned for by the writers of the United States Constitution and as a result 
felt himself obliged to act in its spirit rather than its substance. An important 
paradox of the crisis are the imperfections within the Constitution, had it been 
more relevant or explicit in relation to civil conflict they may not have been 
quite so many gaps for Lincoln to exploit. However, exploit these gaps he did.   
 
          The U.S. Constitution had a number of flaws in it which were not clear 
until conflict actually broke out and of course the Founding Fathers had not 
foreseen civil war.345Huntington characterises the Militia clauses as sanctioning 
an “Empire within an Empire”346 with obvious results in Missouri. He also 
identifies the Commander-in-Chief clause as being ill-defined by the 
Constitution being used to justify, “The exercise of broad powers during times 
of national emergency.”347  
 
          Also identified is a system which threatens the role of the Secretary of 
War in times of conflict when he faces being marginalised by the President and 
also by the professional head of the Army.348These flaws all manifest 
themselves in Missouri, but conversely they offered a determined President a 
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vehicle to act quickly. The Confederacy, whilst having an almost identical 
constitution, was in a position of no legal authority in a state it needed to 
secure for its long term survival, politically it was relying totally on a legal entity 
which still operated in its enemy’s legal framework if only for the time being.  
 
         Leroy Walker, Confederate Secretary of War, found himself at odds with 
Davis and ultimately sidelined throughout the period covered by this case 
study349, his positive responses and requests to support and to utilise Missouri’s 
pro-southern forces were undermined by Davis’ caution. Walker receives 
undue criticism for what was Davis’ fault and indeed ultimately Governor 
Jackson’s. Walker’s Federal counterpart Simon Cameron350 fought harder to 
maintain his authority, being well aware of the role being played by Blair in 
particular and the Republican Party in general. The role of Lyon was by no 
means universally approved of in the War Department or indeed by senior 
officers in Washington. However Lyon was protected by Lincoln in all actions 
regarding St.Louis, with ground being conceded to the War Department in 
regard to Lyon only in areas Lincoln regarded as being less vital. 
          
          Secretary Cameron’s correspondence with Governors Yates and Morton is 
increasingly terse throughout April and May usually over continued bypassing 
of the command chain. To Morton on May 6th “Obey no order from Mr. Blair, or 
anyone else, other than an officer duly authorized to give orders.”351 In 
correspondence to Blair the same sense of anger is present in Cameron’s 
opposition to Blair’s attempts to procure equipment for unauthorised troops 
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raised without permission by the War Department. Cameron’s dislike to a 
styling of ‘Colonel Blair’ when no legal authority could grant such a commission 
is also ill-concealed. Lincoln’s views on the ad-hoc nature of the situation are 
clear, having Cameron instruct Lyon to proclaim martial law in St.Louis on April 
30th and to recruit 10,000 volunteers to defend the City. Interestingly Lincoln is 
adept at using official channels to convey his unorthodox instructions while 
keeping any personal instructions or views to private or secret correspondence. 
This use of unorthodox channels contrasted sharply with Jackson’s continued 
desire to operate within a legal framework, which only were fulfilled when the 
pro-secession side’s position became critical.  
 
          An important lesson for effective civil-military relations is provided by the 
performance of Fremont. An attempt to be decisive failed disastrously as did an 
attempt to take on the vested interests of the Republican Party in St.Louis. It 
should have been quite clear that the Blair family held all of the Republican 
strings of power in the state and had the ear of the President. Fremont’s failure 
to understand the importance of slavery in Missouri and the role it played in 
relation to Kentucky was foolish. However once again Lincoln had offered 
Fremont a chance to be successful on the battlefield and he had failed to take 
it.  
 
          What is clear in this case study, and will be equally true in subsequent 
case studies is the need to be successful on the battlefield in order to reinforce 
any political gains made, and if successful to make those victories count 
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towards the ultimate political objective. Lyon had done so consistently in 
securing Lincoln’s immediate objectives, excepting Wilson’s Creek where he 
paid for his failure in full. In contrast Price would win two complete tactical 
victories but ultimately achieve no lasting gain. A sorry tale of poor co-
operation, poor command structure and the absence of any coherent strategy 
for pro-secession/southern and Confederate forces had lost a real chance to 
secure Missouri.    
 
          Covering Missouri before Kentucky in a case study is a testament to 
Lincoln’s judgement that the more volatile state had to be dealt with first. It 
also demonstrated the President’s strategic awareness in the need to hold 
St.Louis and the more valuable western bank of the Mississippi. Lincoln’s use of 
a strongly pro-Union and pro-Republican grouping concentrated in St.Louis 
along with dynamic leadership on the ground saved Missouri for the Union. 
Lincoln’s was a show of decisive leadership, successful because of its 
unorthodoxy. Keeping the War Department largely co-operating and eventually 
acquiescing was also crucial. The following case study, covering Kentucky during 
the same period, will demonstrate that this form of complex civil war at times 
requires different types of military and political solutions each of which utilise, 
at least temporarily, fresh approaches to civil-military relationships. Another 
roll-call of Confederate failure will show orthodoxy and ill-defined authority are 
inadequate.   
 




Case Study 2: Kentucky, April to September 1861 
                
          This case study focuses on more subtle aspects of complex civil conflict 
and the covert use of both political and military power to achieve a political 
objective. The largely uneasy struggle for political control of Kentucky in the 
middle months of 1861 was crucial for the subsequent development of the 
American Civil War in terms of military strategy. This hard fought contest also 
proved important for the development of  the Union’s long term political 
objectives; paving the way for the removal of slavery as a conceivable political 
goal. 
 
          The contest for Kentucky provides a number of lessons in terms of the use 
of political influence and covert military force. With regard to the operation of 
civil-military relationships the period of Kentucky’s ‘Neutrality’, April to 
September 1861, again shows the utility of informal or ad-hoc relationships 
between a national government and a local/regional political grouping. These 
relationships impact not just on that region’s government institutions, i.e. at 
State Level, but also on immediate neighbours allowing national policy to be 
better focussed but opening up the danger of splintering that policy. As with 
Missouri, the failure of Kentucky’s political institutions to agree on a united 
course of action regarding the state’s stance in the Civil War presented 
opportunities to exploit the situation if either combatant proved skilled 
enough.   
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          This chapter will chronologically look at the situation in Kentucky 
regarding political direction, internal military preparation and external military 
‘threats’ from both North and South. The ‘Neutrality’ period is punctuated by 
three state-wide elections which excellently demonstrate the steadily changing 
political balance in Kentucky; this chapter will look at all three. Finally the 
conclusion will examine the disastrous invasion of Kentucky by Confederate 
forces in the first week of September 1861.    
 
          Concurrent to the contest taking place in Missouri was a similar struggle 
occurring in Kentucky for the ultimate direction of that state in the civil war. 
Arguably more important in the longer term than Missouri, due to her political 
heritage and central geographical position, keeping Kentucky in the Union was 
in many ways Lincoln’s most important success in the middle part of 1861. 
Lincoln’s ultimate political objective was to restore the Union and this would, in 
his own words, have been too much of a task had Kentucky left the Union 
under any circumstances. To do that he would have to block any moves 
towards secession by the state government, parry any attempt by the 
Confederacy to influence Kentucky’s political stance and have sufficient military 
force available to fight for the state if subsequently required.   
 
          Lincoln was to be aided, once again, by the consistent failures shown by 
both Confederate political and military authorities. As in Missouri the 
Confederacy failed to secure any significant long term strategic benefit from 
Kentucky directly or indirectly. In fact Kentucky’s period of ‘Neutrality’ 
undermined the whole future of collective Southern Nationalism and the 
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sustainability of the new nation. As with each case study, understanding the 
local situation in Kentucky and manipulating it accordingly should have been 
the desired objective for each of the competing sides. President Lincoln’s ability 
to recognise and then achieve this objective would enable him to maintain both 
the initiative politically and later militarily within the state. Kentucky in April 
1861 was undoubtedly the most complex political situation in the nation as a 
whole. Successfully exploiting this situation would go a significant way in 
achieving both protagonists’ grand strategic objectives, and enable wider 
political goals to be both shaped and achieved. 
 
         In Kentucky from April to September 1861 Lincoln’s actions were for the 
most part masterly, making the most of the perception that Confederate 
intransigence was responsible for firing the first shots at Fort Sumter. Lincoln’s 
skill is underlined by his recognition that Kentucky’s situation was different to 
that of Missouri and as such tact not overt dynamic action would be required. 
In contrast once again the Davis Administration would act in the same coercive, 
detached and disjointed manner it was then following with pro-
southern/secessionist elements in Missouri. In both states the Confederacy’s 
rash bombardment of Sumter had caused some of those occupying the political 
middle ground to wait and see. In Kentucky the fall of Sumter dampened down 
support for secession and also support for the necessary political processes 
required to achieve that goal ‘lawfully’. Without Confederate aggression 
Lincoln’s call for volunteers to restore the Union may well have tipped the 
balance in the demand for a Kentucky secession convention. As it was the wait-
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and-see policy would become, in the short term, a consensus for ‘Neutrality’ 
with both sides equally suspicious that it conferred an as yet undetermined 










Kentucky’s Response to Fort Sumter, April 1861 
 
          Governor Magoffin responded to Lincoln’s call for volunteers in similar 
fashion to Missouri’s Governor Jackson, refusing to furnish Kentucky’s quota 
requested by the War Department, “In answer I say emphatically that Kentucky 
will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern 
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States.”352 Undoubtedly Magoffin was expressing the view of the vast majority 
of Kentuckians. Although loyalty to the Union was still widespread, a strong 
feeling of southern identity remained and the will to find a compromise 
solution had not yet been exhausted. Despite earlier unsuccessful attempts 
between the Presidential election and the outbreak of hostilities to find 
political agreement, this failure had not yet brought the majority of Kentuckians 
to the point of choosing sides or abandoning their attachment to the status 
quo.  
 
          These general sentiments led logically to a stance of de facto neutrality in 
Kentucky in the absence of anything else broadly acceptable. ‘Neutrality’, it 
may be argued, is as unconstitutional as secession. Refusing to furnish troops 
for the national government was tantamount to an act of rebellion in the eyes 
of many unionists, especially Republicans. The situation was then extremely 
delicate, especially with a number of key figures in this immediate crisis being 
more radical and less patient than Lincoln. These radical Republicans, many 
observing Kentucky from just across the Ohio, were waiting to ‘punish’ 
Kentucky for her perceived disloyalty. These three states Ohio, Illinois and 
Indiana, as they had and were doing in Missouri, were prepared to offer 
support to pro-unionists in Kentucky. Unlike in traditionally more volatile 
Missouri within Kentucky such a move would have acted against Union 




          The problem facing both the Federal Government and the Confederacy 
was even more complex than Missouri. Without overtly resorting to arms, each 
side was tasked with finding a political route to securing the strategic and 
military resources of Kentucky. Crucially, at the very least, each side had to 
deny these resources to their opponents without being regarded by the 
majority of Kentuckians as the aggressor. Moving too early or indeed too late 
militarily could prove costly, a situation equally obvious to both sides. In the 
fashion of Fort Sumter this form of brinkmanship asked serious questions of 
political leaders and later military commanders. For military leaders, either 
professional West Pointers or political appointees, situations would have to be 
confronted where no recent experience had remotely prepared them for. 
Decisions based on political expediency and not primarily military 
considerations would have to be tackled where the pressure and desire to act 
with military force was strong.  
 
          Unlike Missouri, Kentucky had pre-war political figures of genuinely 
national standing, some of whom had been active and fully involved in every 
stage of the crisis. Support from or indeed manipulation of these men would be 
initially required to secure any political goals within the state. Missouri had 
always threatened to produce large numbers of troops hostile to the Federal 
authorities if not openly secessionist, in Kentucky a force already existed; the 
State Guard. This force still remained with its relatively well trained and 
growing force of around 5,000353 the majority of whom were pro-southern. 
Although pro-Union elements within the legislature had prevented this force 
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being enlarged and better equipped, the largely pro-southern General Simon 
Bolivar Buckner was still in place as Inspector General and would take on an 
increasingly active political role as the de facto envoy of Governor Magoffin. 
 
         Some historians, Edward Conrad Smith amongst them, have noted that it 
was fortunate for the Union that Kentucky’s legislature or a secession 
convention was not in session on April 12th354, arguing that the uproar may 
have led to an emotional move towards secession. This is speculative at best; 
the state senate had shown itself to be pro-Unionist if also pro-neutrality, any 
secession convention may also have struggled to produce a decisive majority. 
Although the House was more pro-southern it was still less so than Magoffin 
and those in the Confederacy assumed to be the case. Overall the political 
feeling, as the news of Sumter filtered through and the call for Volunteers to 
put down the Rebellion was received, was to not immediately provide 
volunteers and await events, ‘Neutrality’ in effect. 
 
          As E.M.Coulter has clearly identified, pro-unionists merely had to prevent 
a popular wave of pro-southern feeling from developing into precipitate 
secession. Coulter also identified that salvation of the Union was the underlying 
priority, not support for a Republican administration that was no more popular 
in Kentucky than in Tennessee.355Those statesmen who were regarded as pro-
Union would therefore be of the utmost use for both protagonists, not the least 
in helping to gage the public mood. Conversely, of course, those regarded as 
pro-Confederate would labour against the tag of being pro-war and acting 





          John J Crittenden’s stance during Kentucky’s ‘neutrality’ was crucial. Each 
political grouping within the state lobbied for his support wishing to be 
associated with his moral authority and obvious desire to maintain peace both 
in the state and the nation as a whole.  Following Henry Clay as the elder 
statesman of Kentucky, and in some ways of the ante-bellum United States, his 
voice was listened to and his desire for compromise and the integrity of the 
Union was unwavering. As early as April 18th Crittenden called for Kentucky not 
to take part in the conflict (technically an act of rebellion by the senator), but to 
mediate, undoubtedly a reflection of the feelings of the majority of the state. 
Crucially Crittenden’s argument was in two parts; firstly the direction the 
Lincoln administration was taking the Union in was not the correct one but it 
must only be changed within the Union; secondly Kentucky had no obligations 
to the Confederacy whatsoever having played very little part in pro-secession 
politics in the lead up to war. The message overall being any grievances must 
be settled from within the Union by the states themselves, and this included 
slavery.356This message is very much in accordance with the view of historian 
Dwight Dumond as discussed in a previous chapter. Kentucky’s choice over her 
course of action being somewhere between Dumond’s first and second options; 
tacit acceptance of the Lincoln Administration but refusal to co-operate until 




          Kentucky’s other Senator John C Breckinridge’s position in April 1861 was 
already beginning to strongly contrast with that of Crittenden. His relatively 
poor showing as Southern Democrat Presidential candidate and his role as Vice 
President in the discredited Buchanan administration had dented his popularity 
to some degree. He had also firmly rejected in his own mind the question of the 
so called ‘Border Confederacy’ and could not see Kentucky as the southernmost 
part of a ‘Northern Union’358. That he would support any Border State 
Convention was clear but crucially he had stated on the floor of the United 
States Senate, in March, that he would  accept secession if only as a last 
resort.359 His biographer, William C. Davis, has identified precisely what impact 
this speech had. Although largely taken out of context by his opponents, and 
not his true position, whatever he said from then on “Would be anathema to 
the North and succour for the South”360 Any dialogue with Breckinridge would 
be a potential danger to each side but more so to the South. 
  
          It was therefore of incalculable advantage to either political viewpoint in 
Kentucky to have Crittenden’s support, even if it was just tacit approval. At the 
same time Breckinridge’s support, or perceived support, was of little use as 
while it stiffened the resolve of many pro-secessionists it did little to increase 
their numbers. While Crittenden still reflected the feeling of the majority in 
Kentucky working with him, or being seen to be doing so, was absolutely 
necessary. Lincoln recognised this immediately, and strove to do so, despite 
being unwilling in any way to entertain the ‘Crittenden Compromise’ proposed 
earlier in the year as a way of preventing the conflict.    
221 
 
          Much closer to Breckinridge than to Crittenden stood Governor Magoffin 
and like it or not his position dictated he could not be ignored in the short term 
by the Lincoln administration. Even now his true objectives are not entirely 
clear, Coulter regards him as, “Not an original secessionist, and had long shown 
a sincere desire to compromise the national difficulties and save the 
Union.”361Lowell Harrison believes Magoffin was staunchly pro-slavery but that 
Lincoln’s election alone had not made him a secessionist.362 
 
          However unionists at the time regarded Magoffin as a secessionist, and 
had done for several months, Kentucky Union veteran Thomas Speed is one, 
although of course Speed in no way retained an unbiased view.363This 
perception did however render Magoffin susceptible and vulnerable to 
pressure from many directions and once again it was Lincoln who saw this most 
clearly. As the key figure in any move towards secession the Governor had to 
be either sidelined by the legislature or marginalised covertly to ensure 
Kentucky’s continued loyalty. Subtly supported by the Confederacy Magoffin 
may have been able to persuade Kentuckians secession was the best and surest 
option for the state’s peace-loving majority. However, as Governor, Magoffin 
was the figurehead of ‘Neutrality’ and had to show that it was both effective 
and impartial, in other words to do so he would have to work against secession. 
Only Lincoln could have made Magoffin’s paradox easier to overcome by 
overtly marching troops into the state or directly threatening loyal slaveholders 
‘property’, two options he actively prevented for the entire period of neutrality.   
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          Many of the same factors at work in Missouri immediately after Sumter 
were magnified in Kentucky, principally relations between her and her 
neighbours. To the north lay Ohio, Indiana and Illinois led by Republican 
Governors more openly radical than Lincoln. All three were considerably more 
overt in their dealings and threats to Kentucky than they were over Missouri, 
although in the latter case they had been much more influential by being more 
covert. These threats became a considerable danger to Lincoln’s goal of 
preventing Kentucky’s secession. Kentuckians proving more homogenous would 
have been more likely to rally together than to fracture in the face of 
Republican threats or military action. This was of course also the case over any 
foolish action or overt threat for her southern neighbours. 
 
          To the south lay Tennessee and the ardently secessionist Governor Isham 
Harris who would successfully use Sumter and Lincoln’s call for Volunteers to 
take his state into the Confederacy, despite the mountainous eastern portion 
being solidly against this action. These pro-unionist mountain men of eastern 
Tennessee would later constantly cloud both Lincoln’s judgment and 
complicate Tennessee’s relationship with the Confederacy impacting both 
military strategy and command organisation. In addition the ever worsening 
relationship between President Davis and Harris was not helped by their 
disunited stance over Kentucky and the ultimate direction of Tennessee’s 
(relatively) large military and strategic resources. The long term defence of that 
state and the broader western Confederate ‘Heartland’ depended on effective 
co-operation between the two.  
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          By refusing to answer Lincoln’s call for Volunteers Magoffin, although 
with the approval of the majority his state, was as guilty as the Governors of 
Virginia or Tennessee in opposing the national government of the United 
States. Speeches by Crittenden and others made it clear that overt pro-Union 
pressure may transform this desire to avoid conflict with the Confederacy to a 
desire to confront the national government outright. That is not to say that 
there was not a reasonably sized minority who were unconditional unionists 
and were prepared to answer Lincoln’s call or that there was nobody north of 
the Ohio prepared to help them. Lincoln, consistent on these types of issue 
during this uncertain period, took no overt action when the decision over 
Kentucky’s stance remained in the balance. However the President immediately 
sounded out conservative unionists in Kentucky, some of whom he knew well. 
This was an initial and successful attempt to create at the very earliest stage of 
the conflict a covert command set-up involving local resources which could be 
built on as circumstances dictated. Lincoln would maintain the tempo of this 
form of control remarkably well throughout this whole period. 
 
          Lincoln’s handling of Kentucky cannot be completely unravelled even 
today, the first historians covering the subject even speculated that he was in 
favour of ‘Neutrality’ and even influenced its conception. E.M.Coulter is 
probably correct by identifying Lincoln as, “Allowing ‘Neutrality’ to be the cover 
for a more openly unionist stand when the time came.364”As in Missouri, 
Lincoln was adept at exploiting the situation in line with overall objectives. Any 
talk of Lincoln being the driving force behind ‘Neutrality’ is certainly untrue, 
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two things are clear however any overt attempt by the War Department or 
individual northern states to unsettle ‘Neutrality’ was by and large prevented or 
toned down by Lincoln and any plausible scheme to covertly make use of it was 
acted upon. In this way, as in Missouri, Lincoln had a measure of control over 
events wholly lacking to the secessionists and much more influence than 
Jefferson Davis on what was taking place within Kentucky.  
 
          Neutrality then suited Lincoln in the short term as it served to halt any 
proceedings toward secession. There is also very little doubt that Lincoln fully 
intended to have the resources of Kentucky at the disposal of the United States 
once he felt secession was no longer practical. If this could be done with a ‘light 
touch’ then that would be preferable however the use of federal troops and the 
de facto weakening of Kentucky’s political independence were always available 
options. 
 
Manipulation from Within 
 
          Faced with the reality of the situation Lincoln, in late April, assured two 
prominent pro-Union Kentuckians, Garret Davis and W.L.Underwood, that he 
would not “Threaten Kentucky.”365 This established a pattern of using nothing 
more than verbal reassurance, at best open to interpretation, when dealing 
with prominent Kentucky politicians. Garret Davis, as leader of the State Central 
Committee, was the ideal individual for Lincoln’s conciliatory policy to be 
channelled through. Edward Conrad Smith goes so far as to say that Lincoln’s 
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assurances of there being no plans for Federal troops to march across the state 
and that he could not compel Kentucky to furnish troops was the, “Only one 
that could have saved Kentucky for the Union at the time.”366 Although it would 
appear to be a reaction to a situation out of his control it had in reality not 
diverted him from his political objectives, it had also established a pattern 
whereby the pro-southern faction would offer a chance for Lincoln to increase 
his involvement in the state. 
 
          The existence of the Kentucky State Guard (KSG) sparked a similar 
situation to that of Missouri. Following Fort Sumter pro-Union supporters 
rushed to set up their own militia in order to offset the perceived pro-
Confederate stance of the KSG. In the pro-Union areas of the state; along the 
Ohio, in the mountainous east and in most urban districts companies sprung up 
from late April. Alongside pro-Union members of the legislature, who would 
successfully seek to limit the KSG budget, this new ‘Home Guard’ ushered in the 
so-called ‘Armed Neutrality’ period. ‘Armed Neutrality’ acted as a form of 
mutual visible deterrent, at least in the short term, to the threat of each side 
marching into the state or seizing control from within367.   
 
           In early May Lincoln authorised 5,000 muskets to be secretly distributed 
to arm these pro-Union volunteers. Lincoln had been approached by Lieutenant 
William Nelson, USN, Kentucky native, who was acting on behalf of prominent 
pro-Union Kentuckians to do just this. Lincoln’s acquaintances, James and 
Joshua Speed, greatly facilitated this process by using their contacts to covertly 
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move these arms from Cincinnati to Louisville and thence throughout Kentucky. 
Technically Lincoln had not broken his word but it was the first in a steady 
stream of covert actions expressly designed to manipulate then undermine 
‘Neutrality’ in Kentucky. Most notable was the use by Lincoln of a professional 
naval officer for such a mission and almost equally Nelson’s zealous endeavours 
to take on the role. The orders Nelson received from the Adjutant General 
mentioning, “Special duties” and an authorisation to, “Use such means as you 
may deem expedient.”368 Nelson was given in this letter carte-blanche to 
muster in any volunteers and appoint all regimental officers. This well thought 
out action by Lincoln again contrasted to those of his opponents. 
 
          Confederate policy in April to early May was strangely erratic still based 
on the belief that Kentucky would inevitably join the South for cultural and 
economic reasons. It was assumed that Magoffin would find a legal route to 
secession despite clear evidence to the contrary. This Confederate view was 
bolstered by the several thousand, mostly younger, men from Kentucky who 
headed south into Tennessee with a view to joining the Confederate Army 
either in Kentucky or Tennessee regiments. Many of these volunteers came 
from the KSG and indeed whole companies asked for permission to volunteer. 
It is over these volunteers that Magoffin can be initially accused of breaching 
the neutrality stance by co-operating with the Confederate government.  
 
          Magoffin had rejected, although in much more diplomatic terms than to 
Lincoln, Jefferson Davis’ request for one regiment of volunteers to be sent to 
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Virginia to join the Confederate army forming there. He did however remain in 
contact with Secretary of War Walker over volunteers heading into Tennessee 
from at least April 24th/25th, the nature of this communication best described as 
semi-official. 369 As such the Confederate War Department considered the 
Kentucky authorities to be co-operative at this time. Indeed by May 5th Colonel 
Duncan, lately of the KSG, was present with his battalion at Harpers Ferry, 
Virginia.370These volunteers undoubtedly strengthened Lincoln’s hand without 
speeding progress towards secession confirming, as they did, the pro-southern 
nature of the KSG and the perceived need for the Home Guard. All these 
developments had taken place without the Legislature being in session, when it 





           From the commencement of his term in 1859 Governor Magoffin had 
been broadly opposed by the legislature, especially the State Senate, this 
polarisation had in fact become more pronounced by May 1861. At the start of 
the new legislative session in Frankfort a conference was convened where 
three ‘southern rights’ men and three unionists hoped to agree on a legislative 
programme. Present were Breckinridge and Magoffin as two of the southern 
rightists whilst Crittenden was one of the unionists. Meeting on May 10th they 
failed to agree to a secession convention being held and could only agree that 
neutrality should be declared, but only by Magoffin. Importantly both Houses 
would only resolve to work for mediation, not establish neutrality as the legal 
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stance of the state.371 This was a victory for the unionists as now only an overt 
act by Lincoln or Republican elements would turn support away from neutrality 
toward secession. 
 
          A further victory was gained when the Home Guard was officially 
recognised through a state legislative act putting it under the nominal 
command of Buckner. In effect this curtailed the power of the KSG by the 
setting up of a committee consisting of Magoffin and four others to oversee 
both these forces and the military budget. From the beginning there was a 
unionist majority on the Military Board, later removing Magoffin entirely. 
Buckner also found his recommendation for $3 million for the State Guard 
rejected and replaced with $1 million borrowed on state credit, shared equally 
with the Home Guard, with a number of specific (all advantageous to unionists) 
limitations on the use of this money.372 In addition the first test of public 
opinion had occurred on May 4th and Lincoln was once again able to take 
advantage by correctly judging the mood of the Kentucky populace. 
 
          The voters of Kentucky were to go to the polls on three separate 
occasions during the ‘Neutrality’ period and once again two factors stand out: 
In all three elections there was a clear popular desire for neutrality as a way to 
maintain some sort of peace in Kentucky and an inconsistent approach by 
states’ rights/pro-southern politicians as opposed to a more focussed unionist 
approach. At all times, not widely recognised by Kentuckians, this more 
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consistent stance taken by unionists was subtly backed by Lincoln and indeed 
manipulated throughout.   
       
          The absence of any ‘Camp Jackson’ type incident in Kentucky allowed 
political debate a much greater direct role in developments, the first being the 
elections on May 4th for the Border State Convention called by the last pre-
Sumter legislative session on April 4th . The two tickets of Unionist and Southern 
Rights had jostled for several months but the latter blundered greatly by 
withdrawing from the contest days before, allowing all 12 seats to go to the 
Unionists. Just over 100,000 voters backed the Unionists roughly two thirds as 
many as the total number of votes cast in the Presidential Election. 
                      
          Morally the Southern Rightists were questioned on their genuine desire 
for peace and mediation. Crittenden, along with Lincoln supporters James 
Guthrie and Garret Davis, was returned to the Convention; the elder statesman 
elected as Chair. Sitting from May 27th to June 3rd this Convention was to some 
of no consequence, in fact only five non-Kentucky delegates attended.373  
However Edward Conrad Smith noted three things: the Convention stated that 
there was no warrant for secession in the Constitution; the Southern States 
were not justified by the facts in doing so and the law should be changed to 
guarantee slave property in the four loyal Border States.374 Two things were 
important then, the discrediting of secession and a belief that slavery in 
Kentucky was safe in the Union. It is clear that an active abolitionist like Lyon 
would have had a catastrophic impact in Kentucky where support for slavery in 
the state was much higher than for secession. Lincoln instinctively saw this and 
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acted accordingly, recognising that a more subtle and therefore more 
reassuring form of military presence was required and indeed this was at hand.  
 
          Luckily for Lincoln the Garrison Commander of Fort Sumter was a 
Kentuckian from a slaveholding family, Major Robert Anderson. Anderson’s 
honourable, professional performance at Charleston established him as a 
national hero so Lincoln appointed him a Brigadier General of Volunteers on 
May 7th. Anderson was then quickly sent to Cincinnati to establish an as yet 
unnamed headquarters opposite Kentucky, responsible for recruits forming in 
that area. This was a shrewd appointment designed to mollify those in 
Kentucky nervous about possible federal military actions. In addition to the 
‘Lincoln Guns’ distributed with the help of Nelson, the President had also 
agreed in early May to form ‘Camp Clay’ also near Cincinnati. Guthrie and 
W.E.Woodruff were given federal commissions to recruit two of the four 
requested regiments375 of Kentucky Volunteers originally called for on April 
17th. The majority of the officers would be native Kentuckians but the majority 
of the rank and file would be from Ohio and other states north of the Ohio 
River. This move by Lincoln was designed to placate the Republican Governors 
in their desire to pressure Kentucky, slowing them down to his own pace, but 
also tapping the large number of volunteers they were offering.    
 
          In Maryland there had been no need for a Camp Clay, federal troops had 
simply moved in and seized control of the state, in effect replacing 
constitutional rule by military occupation and martial law. In Missouri the initial 
movement of troops and weapons into St.Louis had made the pro-
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secessionists, at least at first, more cautious and did not immediately spark 
early moves for secession from the legislature. A Maryland or Missouri type 
response in Kentucky would have had unpredictable results at best, that Lincoln 
was able to develop three distinct approaches to the initial refusal of co-
operation from each border slave state is telling. 
 
           Although taking advantage of the situation created in Missouri by Lyon 
and Blair and the knowledge of the Missourians in his administration Lincoln 
remained genuinely insightful regarding the other two states. Lincoln was right 
on top of the disturbances in Maryland a leader of his calibre would not and 
indeed could not allow Maryland a popular choice, whereas his ties to Kentucky 
led to greater understanding and subtlety. Indeed by mid-May of the border 
slave-state governors Magoffin still had a certain freedom of action probably 
more so than Jackson in Missouri and infinitely more than Thomas Hicks in 
Maryland. However Magoffin, by issuing a proclamation of neutrality, not only 
restricted his own freedom of action but also put the Confederacy more at odds 
with the wishes of the majority of Kentuckians.    
           
          Magoffin’s proclamation of Neutrality on May 20th settled for a while the 
political stance of the state. The Governor citing, “Many applications from the 
good citizens of this Commonwealth,”376 asking for such a proclamation. 
Magoffin declared in part, 
 
          I hereby notify and warn all the other States whether separate or united, 
especially the ‘United States’ and the ‘Confederate States’ that I solemnly 
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forbid any movement upon the soil of Kentucky or occupation of any … place 
within the lawful boundaries of this state. I also forbid all good citizens of this 
Commonwealth, whether incorporated in the State Guard or otherwise, making 
any warlike or hostile demonstration against any of the authorities aforesaid. 
…earnestly counselling my fellow-citizens of Kentucky to make … preparations 
to assume the armor and attitude presented by the law of self-defence and 
strictly of self-defence alone.377   
 
            
          With its adjournment on May 24th the Legislature had, following the 
weakening of Magoffin’s financial control over the state’s armed forces, 
handed the advantage of time to pro-unionists. Internally a tacit agreement 
had developed that recruitment outside of the state would be permitted if a 
volunteer should be able to reach the training camp in question.378 This session 
of the legislature also marked the turning point in the realisation that neutrality 
could be of almost equal advantage to the Confederacy as secession. It became 
clear that Kentucky’s stance had created a buffer between Tennessee and the 
North, blocking all overland invasion routes allowing time for Tennessee to fully 
prepare her defence. Many pro-southerners became ardent supporters of the 
neutrality stance for this very reason. Magoffin eventually became additionally 
motivated to renew efforts for mediation based on neutrality and to sustain 
normal economic relations outside Kentucky’s borders if possible.  
 
          The proclamation of Neutrality is important in a number of areas, 
however the most important is it in effect it the maintenance of the status quo, 
that is Kentucky had not seceded nor even begun the process. Although Lincoln 
was aware that a mistake from him or one of his subordinates or fellow 
Republicans could revive support for secession he had secured his first political 
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objective and as such had the political initiative. Magoffin’s proclamation also 
allowed the President the time required to prepare to seize the military 
initiative as he knew armed conflict would become inevitable in the short to 
medium term. However in order to do this he needed the support of his fellow 
Republican politicians, crucial for a President elected from a party with a short 





          William Hesseltine, writing in 1948, argued that at the beginning of the 
secession crisis Lincoln, “In truth … was only one of many chief executives in the 
country.”379He described the Republican Party as a grouping of local trends 
suddenly given a national task. Hesseltine points out that Lincoln owed a great 
debt to western Republican Governors for his nomination, the very same men 
who were anxious to force Kentucky’s allegiance to the Union by any available 
means. Indiana’s Governor Morton’s initial response to Magoffin’s refusal to 
provide volunteers serves to illustrate the antagonism present, “I hold that 
Indiana and Kentucky are but integral parts of the nation, subject to the 
government of the United States, and bound to obey the requisitions of the 
President.”380  
    
          Governor Dennison of Ohio too had been outspoken in his relations with 
Kentucky and his vocal support for its unionists although, undoubtedly through 
pressure from Lincoln, he had accepted her stance temporarily. The massive 
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unanimous response to the call for volunteers in Ohio had strengthened 
Dennison’s hand. This patriotic response had also spurred local efforts to close 
the Ohio River to trade with the south including that from Kentucky, Dennison 
being more than happy to overlook these attacks on trade. Magoffin also found 
himself outmanoeuvred by Dennison in attempts at mediation as it was clear to 
the former that it had no chance and that he was not personally trusted by any 
of the key Governors of Illinois, Indiana or Ohio. By sending an envoy rather 
than opting for personal diplomacy however he committed a political error by 
appearing not to take the search for a compromise solution seriously.  
 
          Lincoln’s handling of Dennison over Kentucky must be viewed alongside 
the free hand the latter was receiving in his dealings with Virginia. Lincoln had 
agreed that Ohio troops could advance into western Virginia to greatly improve 
the strategic security of Ohio, a move which paved the way for the state of 
West Virginia to appear in highly unconstitutional fashion two years later. 
Hesseltine calls this “Laissez Faire”381 but it was consistent with Lincoln’s 
support for southern unionists in states who had already seceded. A repeat of 
this advance into Kentucky as desired by Yates, Morton and Dennison would at 
best have led to a situation like that in western Missouri and at worst 
widespread formal resistance to federal arms.   
 
          In contrast to Lincoln’s handling of the Republican Governors, 
Confederate relations with Kentucky’s southern neighbour developed initially 
with Tennessee and the Confederacy as ill-defined allies; a situation as 
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undesirable as that which would later occur within Missouri. Without a popular 
vote Governor Harris urged the Tennessee legislature to ‘Declare 
Independence’ which they did on May 6th the following day entering into a 
military league with the Confederacy. However both these moves were later 
ratified by the voters of the state by a comfortable majority on June 8th. 
Thomas Connelly points out that Harris made this relationship with the 
Confederacy open to interpretation in order to ensure that the secession vote 
produced the desired clear majority.382However this created a dual voice when 
dealing with Kentucky, including from as early as April 29th a call from the 
Tennessean House to move troops across the state line to occupy the massively 
pro-southern river port of Columbus383 thus preventing its feared seizure by 
federal forces.  
 
          Columbus’ military importance was obvious, however politically a 
movement of any size anywhere across the state line would have been suicidal. 
Despite this danger of unilateral Tennessean action it was not until early July 
that the Confederacy would even begin to rationalise the command situation in 
Tennessee. Until July a combination of Harris and his military commander 
General Pillow would agitate the situation, often by both corresponding with 
Magoffin in contradiction to Confederate policy and not always in accordance 
with each other. 
 
          The complex nature of a four or even five sided contest for Kentucky 
made ‘Neutrality’ untenable which of course heightened the pressure for action 
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so as not to lose the initiative. Managing this situation would be difficult; 
Lincoln approached it with no great gestures operating in the background and 
was effective for that. The South, by contrast, operated in a disjointed unsure 
fashion punctuated with speeches by members of the Davis Cabinet and other 
prominent Confederates.384 Tennessee’s often unpredictable leadership and 
legislature were another factor in the disunited and unsubtle approach to the 
Kentucky public.  
 
          Aside from military muscle the biggest weapon available to states 
bordering Kentucky was the economic blockade. Illinois, Indiana and Ohio 
gradually strengthened their unofficial local blockades into state sanctioned 
moves by the end of May, just as Tennessee became concerned with the effects 
of her trade with the north and navigation on the Mississippi. Coulter sees the 
issue of ‘free trade’ being an important factor to the outcome of ‘Neutrality’. 
Magoffin had failed to resolve differences with Dennison over river tensions 
and Governor Yates of Illinois impounded lead bound for Tennessee385to 
hamper Kentucky’s trade with the south. Tensions in Louisville grew over this 
‘partial blockade’, the city being the centre of trade to the Confederacy which 
was accelerating toward being four times the size of trade with the north due 
to orders for arms and equipment coming from each Confederate state.  
 
          By late May Lincoln had taken trade policy in hand including preventing 
the seizure of Kentucky River ports on the south bank of the Ohio. Lowell 
Harrison considers respective trade policies as probably being responsible for 
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keeping Kentucky in the Union, the May 21st Confederate ban on Cotton 
exports to Kentucky386 being another example of political naivety. Stephen 
Engle notes that Governor Harris was a particularly enthusiastic enforcer of 
such embargoes.387  The same type of political naivety displayed by the Deep 
South before fighting broke out was still being repeated. This naivety being the 
failure of Confederate politicians to recognise the importance of free 
commerce to the people of Kentucky; in the same measure overestimating the 
strength of cultural ties which had in fact been slowly weakening for at least 
the past decade due in part to changing economic orientation.   
 
          The importance of ‘economic warfare’, as these policies may be termed, 
are not so much for their actual economic impact nor even the strategic 
materials which were obtained or blocked, but the political impact on the 
people of Kentucky. Very much in the manner of the clause in the Confederate 
Constitution where the slave trade between Kentucky and the Deep South 
could be ended should Congress decide it was necessary. This of course 
impacted on the strong American belief in free trade, any deliberate hindrance 
to this tradition being viewed as tantamount to coercion.388When viewed as 
such the independent minded Kentuckian tended to recoil, regarding their 
economic livelihoods to be more important than shared cultural identity. The 
measure of Lincoln’s mastery of the situation was in his ability to keep the 
radical governors in hand without appearing overly reactive. Even when Davis 
attempted to rectify obvious mistakes it was done in such a way as to display 
both uncertainty and carried a loss of prestige. 
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Pressure from Inside and Out 
 
          Lincoln did however make use of pro-unionists within Kentucky to 
economically hamper the south in more covert fashion, James Guthrie, 
President of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and ex-Whig Secretary of 
State was well placed to make it difficult for recruits to get to Tennessee and to 
force military shipments to go by river where they could be at least delayed. 
May 28th saw the formation of the Department of Kentucky under Anderson, 
serving the purpose of placing volunteer units under War Department control 
ready for the steady expansion of available manpower. 
 
           Magoffin however, was still attempting to deal with various situations by 
the use of envoys; Buckner often the preferred personage. Buckner’s meetings 
with General McClellan are instructive in showing Lincoln’s handling of the 
military desire to advance into Kentucky in the fashion of western Virginia. 
McClellan himself was also eventually persuaded that tact remained necessary 
in Kentucky. In a letter to General-in-Chief Winfield Scott on April 23rd 
McClellan admits to preparing to occupy the northern shore of Kentucky 
opposite Cincinnati.389By May 17th, “…I would not stand by and see the loyal 
union men of Kentucky crushed.”390 McClellan too was lobbying Lincoln for 
Nelson to distribute more guns in eastern Kentucky from the end of May. When 
heading the Department of the Ohio however McClellan becomes more 
cautious391 describing the situation as “delicate” predicting that the electorate 
were pro-Union, again to Lieutenant General Scott on June 5th he urges, “No 
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troops be sent into Kentucky…. I feel so keenly the vital importance of keeping 
Kentucky in the Union that I must urge delay until we know exactly what we are 
doing.”392Just three days after this letter the first controversial meeting 
between Buckner and McClellan occurred in Cincinnati. 
 
          In contrast to the crisis in Missouri where diplomacy was in short supply 
and meetings often hostile and confrontational those in relation to Kentucky 
tended to be more cordial. Lincoln, while often happy to keep Missouri’s 
diplomacy at arm’s length, took a more personal diplomatic approach to the 
situation in Kentucky. Much store was put by these meetings and once again 
even today precisely who said what to whom is still uncertain. 
 
          Buckner’s first meeting on June 8th with McClellan was in the presence of 
Samuel Gill an unconditional Unionist from Kentucky.393 Two conflicting stories 
emerged. Buckner believed, and told Magoffin so, their meeting verbally 
agreed that Magoffin was pledged to keep the forces of both sides out of the 
state and to protect Federal property within it; if Kentucky forces could not 
guarantee neutrality only then Union forces would intervene. A further chance 
meeting occurred on the 13th with no perceived change in their mutual 
understanding. Buckner met Pillow in Memphis a few days later; convincing 
both him and subsequently Governor Harris that McClellan was sincere, thus 
serving to halt Pillow’s plans to move on Columbus. McClellan was also writing 
to Magoffin on June 11th with regard to rumours of Tennessean troops 
preparing to occupy islands in the Mississippi River; four days later Buckner 
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moved troops to nearby Paducah to reassure both sides that neutrality had 
teeth.394 
 
          Most Kentuckians and Tennesseans were happy with this so-called 
agreement; however as soon as it was published on June 20th McClellan came 
under written attack by various Unionists, Republicans, the War Department 
and his Army superior. His communication to Lieutenant General Scott on the 
26th is perhaps his strongest denial of any such agreement, stating that he was 
being misrepresented by Buckner and that the meeting was not official in any 
case. Buckner’s biographer, Stickles, is convinced that McClellan did 
substantially agree to what Buckner claimed he did.395Tellingly, for a month at 
least, all parties would respect the terms of this ‘agreement’ therefore 
extending the life of neutrality further. Once again a state-wide election 
occurred to influence the subsequent course of events. 
 
The Second Vote 
 
          Lincoln called for a special session of Congress to sit on July 4th the 
elections for which were to be held on June 20th. This time Kentucky unionist 
candidates were opposed by ‘States Rights’ or in some cases secessionist 
candidates. Included on the Union ticket was Crittenden, having retired as U.S. 
Senator at the end of the previous congressional session. Crittenden’s decision 
to stand finally saw him being attacked by states rights supporters but this 
backfired as an attack on Crittenden was in effect an attack on the prevailing 
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political feeling of the state. The elections were an overwhelming success for 
the Unionist ticket; 9 out of 10 districts secured with an overall majority of 
54,000 votes.396Only the first district, that of Columbus, falling to 
secessionists/states rightists. Crittenden of course won and became a freshman 
in the house.   
 
          The election was a clear if indirect endorsement of Lincoln’s handling of 
the crisis, as many Unionist votes were from those who were pro-neutrality and 
perceived it to be effective. The level of any intimidation is uncertain or indeed 
how many pro-southerners opted not to vote is equally so. Certainly only a 
minority were voting for Lincoln per-se but were voting to remain in the Union. 
Lowell Harrison states that a Pamphlet distributed widely on May 30th/31st by 
Joseph Holt was highly influential in the vote, the pamphlet arguing the 
Confederacy intended Kentucky to be a battlefield and barrier protecting the 
south from Federal invasion. Holt, Lincoln’s friend and the most pro-Union of 
the discredited Buchanan Cabinet, was a highly respected figure in the state, 
“Holt may have been the most effective campaigner for the Union in the 
summer of 1861”.397A number of Confederate leaders, rightly or wrongly, had 
been reported as expressing similar expectations of Kentucky becoming a 
battlefield heightening fear amongst the electorate. 
 
          Between the Buckner/McClellan meetings and the opening of the new 
Congress Lincoln and the War Department had not been idle. By late June State 
Senator Lovell Rousseau had received Washington’s blessing398 and a 
commission to form ‘Camp Joe Holt’ just across the Ohio River in Indiana. This 
242 
 
camp filled out two more of Kentucky’s quota of Regiments; this time from 
Home Guard companies recruited inside the state and then marched 
north.399More significantly the War Department issued orders to Nelson on July 
1st to recruit three more Kentucky Regiments in secret within the state with 
arms clandestinely distributed as before. The purpose of these regiments was 
to facilitate the recruitment of seven regiments of East Tennessee troops, 
hopefully, with arms and equipment smuggled into that state if not with 
volunteers who had fled into Kentucky. 400  
 
          Lincoln was behind these actions laying the foundation of disagreement 
between the administration and the military professionals over the correct 
strategy for the middle/western theatre of operations. It too marked the debut 
of Senator Andrew Johnson of Tennessee in influencing national policy, 
beginning his path to the White House and his antagonistic relationship with 
much of the United States military and more than a few of her politicians. It 
should also be stated the very idea that Lincoln would be forced to secretly 
establish training camps, with the connivance of both the War Department and 
local politicians against the desire of both the people and Governor of a still 
loyal state, indicates how ineffective normal command arrangements were in 
that sort of situation.    
           
          Crittenden’s return to Congress drew headlines and his actions in 
Washington DC once again voiced Kentucky’s concerns. These concerns were 
no longer primarily over the desire for conciliation but also over the worrying 
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number of very arguably unconstitutional acts carried out by the Lincoln 
administration and the precise political object of the war. In Kentucky these 
two questions boiled down to the security of personal property and more 
specifically slave property, and to the future of neutrality.  
 
          On July 10th Buckner, with the authority of Magoffin and alongside 
Crittenden, met with Lincoln. This meeting embodies Lincoln’s entire policy 
over Kentucky. Buckner was seeking reassurances from Lincoln that he would 
respect neutrality and not send troops into the state. Lincoln responded by 
saying that he had no current plans to do so but would not be bound by any 
promises. The only record of the conversation was in the form of a 
memorandum handed to Buckner which was merely initialled by Crittenden. 
Lincoln had not identified himself with it in any way.401 Crittenden wished to be 
satisfied that Lincoln merely desired to restore the Union, and there is no doubt 
that he had been, however the question does have to stand on whether Lincoln 
was deliberately manipulating Crittenden. Buckner was probably also mollified 
for a time and this was just what Lincoln intended as pro-Union forces within 
the state slowly took control of the apparatus of neutrality. Buckner’s 
subsequent actions would indicate that he eventually recognised the reality of 















Loss of pro-Southern influence in Kentucky 
 
          Buckner resigned on July 20th from his position as Inspector General of the 
State Guard. His resignation letter to Magoffin indicated that he felt the 
Military Board was now preventing him exercising effective control and inferred 
that he believed the Home Guard to be the military arm of a pro-Union political 
dominance of the state402. On July 9th the Board had called for all arms to be 
removed from the State Guard and had halted all funds for the improvement of 
its encampments. Magoffin was powerless to prevent these actions as the 
Board was under the control of the legislature. Interestingly Buckner did not as 
yet choose sides and still indicated a genuine wish for neutrality to continue if 
possible. 
 
          Senator Breckinridge had been ill in June and as a result had exerted little 
influence on events, on his return to congress for the emergency session he too 
spoke out against Lincoln’s ‘Unconstitutional acts’. Unlike Crittenden, 
Breckinridge was considered solidly pro-southern and although, as his 
biographer William C. Davis points out, “He was constitutionally right on almost 
every question”403 he failed to recognise, unlike Lincoln, it was a matter of war 
for the restoration of the Union and not a disagreement over the 
administration of the law. Four days after the first Battle of Bull Run, on July 
25th, Breckinridge was accused on the floor of the United States Senate of not 
representing the true will of Kentucky. The effective nature of his reply was the 
accusation would have been true if Kentucky, unlike him, desired a war against 
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her fellow states. Although his desire for neutrality was genuine he was 
considered a Confederate on the basis that he continually attacked the Lincoln 
administration and apportioned no blame to the Confederacy for the crisis. His 
son had further undermined his position by joining the Confederate Army on 
July 13th, Breckinridge too had been a regular visitor to the White House but 
Lincoln had not sought to use him to negotiate.  
 
          When the congressional session ended in early August Breckinridge had 
been thoroughly defeated politically and would return to a Kentucky more 
firmly under unionist influence. The unionists and Lincoln were waiting for one 
more indication of the situation in Kentucky before adopting a more overt 
stance; elections to the state legislature were due on August 5th to provide that 
indication. 
 
A Note on Kentucky’s Complex Relationships 
          Below is the second diagram illustrating the complex nature of the 
relationships, political and military, found in ‘Neutrality’ Kentucky. Compared to 
that of the Confederates (See fig.1), whose relationships offer little sure control 
or manipulation over Kentucky’s future, those of the Union side illustrate 
Lincoln’s effective control over covert military forces inside Kentucky and 
influence over her pro-unionist politicians. The example of the KSG is telling, 
the Confederate War Department has some influence but Lincoln’s supporters 
can and do weaken this organisation through the coercive Military Board and 
legislative financial control. Pro-Union troops are also ready in state whilst 














The Final Vote 
 
          The three elections in Kentucky give a unique insight into the changing 
feeling of the populace. At no time do they show any sort of majority desire for 
secession yet at no time could they be considered to be an endorsement of 
either Republican politics or the way the Lincoln Administration was preparing 
to prosecute the war. Yet after the last poll Lincoln could be perfectly satisfied 
he was in position to both prevent secession and secure the majority of the 
resources of the state. Once again the pro-Unionist majority on August 5th was 
an increase on the previous vote delivering, if required, a two thirds majority in 
the legislature for both houses, further undermining Magoffin’s power as Chief 
Executive by effectively removing his veto. Thomas Speed puts great store by 
this election, “It would be difficult to find … a more satisfactory settlement of 
any question than that of Union or Secession in Kentucky.”404Speed is quick to 
proclaim the vote as a true reflection of the feeling of the state and attacks his 
contemporaries who claimed the vote was principally a vote for neutrality. 
These elections did however signal the end was near for neutrality and as such 
Lincoln had positioned himself well for the next phase. 
 
          On August 6th Nelson judged it timely to reveal the existence of Camp Dick 
Robinson in the east of the state where he had been clandestinely training the 
first of the regiments of volunteers the War Department had instructed him to 
form. With the assistance of a number of pro-Union Kentucky and Tennessee 
politicians, arms had reached the area in secret and several thousand men were 
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already en-route. Magoffin, Davis and Harris at once realised that they had 
been caught off guard, sparking off a series of telegrams between themselves, 
and from within the state, to Lincoln.  
 
          In reply to Magoffin’s calls for the closure of Camp Dick Robinson Lincoln 
wrote on August 24th, 
 
         I do not believe that it is the popular wish of Kentucky that this force will 
be removed beyond her limits … I most cordially sympathize with your 
Excellency in the wish to preserve the peace of my own native state; but it is 
with regret I search, and cannot find … any declaration, or intimation, that you 
entertain any desire for the preservation of the federal union.405   
 
 
          Lincoln’s making of this correspondence public also undermined Magoffin 
who was simultaneously seeking reassurance from Davis. In Richmond his 
envoy, George W. Johnson, received in part this reply from the President on 
August 28th, 
 
          It can scarcely be necessary to assure your Excellency that the 
Government of the Confederate States will continue to respect the neutrality of 
Kentucky so long as her people will maintain it themselves. But neutrality to be 
entitled to respect must be strictly maintained between both parties … if the 
door be opened on the one side to … one of the belligerent parties upon the 
other, it ought not be shut to the assailed when they seek to enter it for 
purposes of self-defence.406   
 
 
          By the time Magoffin received both replies the U.S. War Department had 
renamed and expanded Anderson’s command to the Department of the 
Cumberland and incorporated eastern Tennessee into it. Throughout the 
month both Confederate and Tennessean fears over invasion had returned and 
the voice of the military lobby grew louder as a result. 
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Pressure for Action 
 
          On August 12th Major General Leonidas Polk arrived in Memphis to take 
command of Confederate Department No 2. Initially this concerned just 
Western Tennessee and Arkansas. Polk, friend and fellow West Point Cadet of 
Davis, was an uncertain appointment from any point of view being an ordained 
Bishop with a very short active career in the army. More to the point he was a 
poor appointment in terms of political judgement if not in symbolism. Initially 
Harris, through Pillow, retained command over the central and eastern parts of 
Tennessee, those closest to Camp Dick Robinson. This confused command 
arrangement407 was the fault of Davis who was waiting for the arrival of Albert 
Sidney Johnston who was en-route to Richmond from California and was ear-
marked for command of a very much enlarged department no 2. Johnston, a 
Kentuckian by birth, had a huge reputation in the ante-bellum army and it was 
universally believed would be equal to any task political or military in this 
theatre. Until Johnston’s arrival Polk’s judgement counted and he began to 
share Pillow’s obsession with defending the Mississippi, in particular Columbus 
and her bluffs, despite personally falling out with Pillow.408 
 
          In eastern Tennessee Harris had placed in command prominent 
Democratic politician Felix Zollicoffer and had ordered him, on August 4th, to 
respect neutrality only while Federal troops did so. By the end of August Harris 
was verbally attacking Magoffin for his failure to remove Camp Dick Robinson 
but still assuring him of his intention to respect neutrality. In strong contrast to 
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Lincoln therefore Davis had very little control over his forces which would 
seriously weaken Confederate prospects by collapsing neutrality. In fact a 
number of Union commanders were eager to move on Columbus and Paducah 
but they had not done so as their orders had not permitted it. Polk and Pillow 
had no such restrictions. 
 
          August saw the increase in pro-southern supporters heading from 
Kentucky into the Confederacy, a tacit admittance that they could no longer 
win the political argument in their home state. Those that wished to fight 
heading generally to Tennessee as before, those intent on ‘political’ assistance 
heading for Richmond where a Kentucky lobby was building up in a similar 
fashion to the ‘Missouri lobby’.  
 
          On August 30th, in part influenced by the Kentucky lobby in Richmond and 
by Union military and naval movements409, the Confederate Congress dealt 
another blow to neutrality by voting a $1 million package to Kentucky. To be 
used at the discretion of Davis this grant was, “To aid the people of Kentucky in 
repelling any invasion or occupation of their soil by forces of the United 
States...”410  calling, in addition, for the return of Confederate recruiters to the 
state.  
 
           Buckner was one of those lobbying in Richmond having turned down 
Lincoln’s offer of a Brigadier General’s commission issued on August 17th411and 
was almost certainly trying to arrange arms shipments for pro-southern 
volunteers still inside Kentucky. Breckinridge was not one of these volunteers 
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yet, but was still actively resisting Lincoln by the use of public meetings 
throughout Kentucky, often alongside Magoffin, an increasingly hazardous 
undertaking with the growing number of Union volunteers in the state. 
 
          Crittenden returned to Kentucky, as did Breckinridge, when Congress was 
adjourned and continued to urge Lincoln to exercise caution over the 
recruitment of volunteers by waiting for the next session of the state legislature 
to firmly fix the state in the Union Camp.412 Lincoln would not agree to this 
indicating perhaps that he regarded Crittenden’s usefulness to be in decline. 
Events, however, were about to accelerate rapidly from the end of August, 
taking them briefly out of Lincoln’s hands. 
 
 
Polk’s Calamitous Decision  
         
          The Civil War was partly characterised by the shifting boundaries of 
military departments and districts sometimes for purely political purposes, to 
facilitate military objectives or indeed for mixed reasons. These changes tended 
to occur more regularly on the Union side. Some of the Union appointments in 
Kentucky by Lincoln are blatant political placements while in Missouri it may be 
argued that Lincoln was more intent on fitting the department to the man. It is 
however probably no coincidence that both sides tended to see the Mississippi 
as more of a military avenue and tailored their command structure accordingly. 
Fremont’s appointment as head of the Department of the West was a disaster 
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except for one decision, the appointment of Brigadier General U.S.Grant to the 
command of the District of Cairo on August 28th.  
 
          Grant’s command was opposite Paducah which along with Columbus was 
overwhelmingly pro-Confederate413. This made Polk and Pillow even more 
jumpy about their left flank. Fremont’s proclamation of August 30th has been 
covered in the previous case study, it remains a ‘what-if’ in that its effects 
would have been much more sustained had not the events of the first week of 
September in Kentucky occurred. Although pressure from Lincoln’s Kentucky 
allies also hastened demands for Fremont to rescind his proclamation 
subsequent Confederate actions wholly overshadowed his politically ill-
considered unilateral declaration. In the end little real damage was done to the 
Union cause within the state. 
 
          Polk wrote Magoffin on September 2nd, “I think it of the greatest 
consequence to the Southern cause in Kentucky or elsewhere that I should be 
ahead of the enemy in occupying Columbus and Paducah ”414The following day 
he ordered Pillow to advance on Columbus which he began to do on the 3rd. 
What Thomas Connelly has termed, “Probably one of the greatest mistakes of 
the war…”415 was in part sparked by federal occupation on the 2nd of Belmont 
on the Missouri bank of the Mississippi across from Columbus. In addition 
Grant’s ‘demonstration’ against Paducah, soon after his arrival in Cairo, had 
unsettled Polk, leading him to act without Davis’ say so. Any race to Paducah 
between Grant and Polk was soon over however, as the latter had no chance 
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whatsoever of winning, Grant, already preparing to seize the town, had only to 
move upriver and did so, arriving on the 4th416. 
 
          Polk became the focal point for a flurry of telegrams moving back and 
forward amongst the Southern leadership and Magoffin. Polk’s movement for 
largely military reasons had transformed the war at a stroke and handed 
Lincoln a massive political victory which he was well placed to build upon due 
to the growing presence of Union troops in the state. Davis’ hand was forced 
and Magoffin was fatally undermined. As such Confederate non-military 
options were in effect exhausted but the formalities still had to be played out 
while both sides rushed to occupy and secure as much of Kentucky politically 
and militarily as they could. 
 
          In contrast to McCulloch in Missouri, Polk had not informed Davis, Harris 
or the War Department of his intentions, the latter ordering him to withdraw 
on the 4th. Davis, despite protests from Harris, realised there was no turning 
back and supported Polk. Harris’ letter to Polk labelled the move as, 
“Unfortunate, as the President and myself are pledged to respect the neutrality 
of Kentucky.”417Coulter considers that in many ways Kentucky’s ‘neutrality’ had 
been initially breached by federal forces, but the clear perception within the 
state was that Polk had ended it by full scale invasion. 
 
          Polk soon after lost the initiative militarily as he had no plan beyond 
advancing on Columbus and Davis failed to limit the political damage by 
ordering either a rapid withdrawal or more practically fully informing the 
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Kentucky people the reasons for Confederate actions. Polk, once again 
misreading the situation, informed Magoffin after six days that he would be 
prepared to withdraw if federal forces also did so. Polk little realised that his 
invasion had undermined the Governor who was forced to issue a proclamation 
on the 11th, presented by the legislature following his overridden veto, 
demanding the unconditional withdrawal of Confederate and Tennessee 
troops. Even more serious the States Rights party could not create any 
significant support for their proposal demanding both sides leave Kentucky. On 
the 18th, following no Confederate response, the legislature called for Polk’s 
forces to be expelled and invited General Anderson to do so. Once again 
Magoffin’s veto was overturned and with this the legislature slowly began to 
hand over the state’s administration and its military resources, in practical 
terms, to federal authorities.418 
 
          Of course once again Lincoln had already moved quickly and quietly by 
ordering Anderson to move his headquarters to Louisville on the 8th but 
crucially for future policy in the theatre Governors Morton, Yates and Dennison 
were initially the only sources of the bulk of the forces required to build his 
command. Whilst Davis appointed A.S.Johnston as commander of an expanded 
Department No.2 on the 10th giving him absolute discretion on whether 
Confederate forces were to remain in the state. Johnston saw that withdrawal 
was impractical and resolved to compete with federal forces and secure as 
much of the state as he could in order to protect Tennessee and the 
Confederate heartland. His first move was to order Zollicoffer to advance from 
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Knoxville to seize the Cumberland Gap and then advance into eastern Kentucky. 
On hearing of Magoffin’s proclamation Buckner wrote to General Cooper, the 
Adjutant-General of the Confederate Army, 
 
          Please direct … Kentucky officers to report to me as they are disposable. 
They are necessary for the safety of Kentucky. No political necessity now exists 
for withholding a commission, if one is intended for me.419 
 
 
          Buckner, in Nashville when Johnston arrived on the 14th, was immediately 
appointed Brigadier General subject to Davis’ approval and placed in command 
of a force directed to advance on Bowling Green in south-central Kentucky. By 
the 18th Buckner had secured his objective, writing to Magoffin, 
 
          ...I this morning occupied this position as a defensive measure against the 
Federal forces, which have endeavoured to possess themselves of the entire 
territory of Kentucky, as a means of subverting the liberties of the State and the 
Confederate States. 420 
 
           
          It was unfortunate for the Confederacy that in no way were their actions 
seen in this light. Far from being viewed as defenders of southern rights they 
were viewed as unwanted invaders by the majority of Kentuckians and 
principally blamed for ending the uneasy peace, although it might be justly 
claimed that Lincoln’s actions throughout August were equally provocative. It 
was Lincoln who held his nerve and Polk who had not. 
 
          On the 19th both Kentucky houses recommended, after pressure from 
Washington, that Breckinridge should be arrested, hearing just in time of a 
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warrant being on his head he fled to Tennessee. On reaching Nashville he 
headed directly to Bowling Green and joined up with Buckner’s force.421 
           
          In September Crittenden had not yet felt any reason to disbelieve Lincoln 
on his intentions and indeed regarded Confederate actions as confirmation of 
his own position. Crittenden’s son George however resigned from the U.S. army 
in June and joined the Confederate forces, Davis himself appointed the west 
pointer to succeed Zollicoffer before the end of September. Crittenden’s other 
sons remained with the Union, Thomas, a senior figure in the State Guard, 
accepted a Brigadier General’s commission the following month.   
 
          On September 15th Nelson was replaced at Camp Dick Robinson by regular 
army officer George Thomas and directed to form additional training camps 
nearby with a view to a future movement into eastern Tennessee. By the end of 
September three distinct ‘fronts’ were forming in Kentucky: The western on the 
Columbus-Paducah axis; the second in south-central Kentucky centred on 
Bowling Green between Nashville and Louisville and finally in the east around 
the Cumberland Gap; the route into eastern Tennessee or indeed the Blue 
Grass. The military pattern of the Civil War in the Western Theatre would be to 
a great degree decided by contest of the opposing forces on these fronts in the 







The Importance of Covert Civil-military Relations 
 
          In every case study the role of the politically appointed general and of the 
military professional faced with political decision making is important, within 
Kentucky in the period April to September 1861 it is the most crucial. It is clear 
that Lincoln’s tight control over the military forces at his disposal prevented 
precipitate action against Paducah and Columbus when the military felt they 
needed to act. It is also clear that covert actions within Kentucky were enough 
to prevent unilateral action by Ohio, Indiana and Illinois working against 
Lincoln’s planning. Official correspondence makes it very clear the confused 
nature of the Confederate/Tennessee command structure allowed Polk to 
make a disastrous political decision for purely military reasons. Polk’s unilateral 
discussions of policy with Magoffin without reference either to Davis or 
Governor Harris cut across the command structure at two points, betraying the 
highly confused role both Kentucky and Tennessee played in Confederate civil-
military relations. 
 
           Polk’s ostensive strategic arguments for invading Kentucky proved to be 
hollow from a purely military point of view as he failed to seize Paducah, which 
would have blockaded the Cumberland, Ohio and Tennessee Rivers. Polk had 
also failed to draw away any of the Union forces in the centre or east of the 
state and as such Buckner was unable to advance far enough to seize any of the 
horse breeding areas, including the Blue Grass where the bulk of southern 
supporters resided. In exchange for an uncoordinated advance of a few days 
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the Confederacy had lost the initiative in Kentucky and the Western Theatre. In 
what would increasingly become a war of military potential they had secured 
neither significant additional resources nor enough time to fully realise what 
they had.      
    
          The best that a political leader can hope to do while pursuing his primary 
political objective is to help shape events and take advantage of any 
opportunities that may come his way. Lincoln went a long way in achieving this 
from the outset and importantly avoided the pitfalls of making it too obvious. 
The only question mark would be the effectiveness of the many political 
appointments to military commands when open campaigning began. Lincoln 
had allowed the complexities of the situation to work in his favour as once 
again the Unionists in Kentucky only needed to preserve the status quo. This 
became much easier when public opinion became more solid against any 
revolutionary action in the form of secession, although of course Lincoln’s 
opponents’ blundering had eased this task. 
 
          Southern Nationalism had failed in Kentucky but the triumph of Southern 
Unionism had led Lincoln to be heavily involved with Kentucky and East 
Tennessee politicians who wanted immediate offensive action against that 
portion of the Confederate State. With Union generals favouring a more 
cautious build-up in the centre of Kentucky the seeds of strategic disagreement 




          Lincoln very cleverly operated three different systems of political control 
and military direction during the near six months of ‘Neutrality.’ Overt actions 
by federal troops forming up on the borders of Kentucky had never triggered 
enough hostility in Kentucky as a whole to push the state into the Confederacy 
but had allowed an army to be built up in the traditional manner. The use of 
allies within Kentucky’s legislature had both blocked secession and gradually 
removed control of state forces away from the Governor into pro-Unionist 
hands. Lincoln’s covert use of Southern Unionists from both Kentucky and 
Tennessee, along with the dynamism of Nelson and less so Andrew Johnson, 
had completed this three sided approach, largely seizing the initiative from the 
pro-secessionists and the Confederacy.  
 
          Although this triumph for flexibility was handed to Lincoln by Polk’s and 
Pillow’s loss of nerve both they, President Davis and Governor Harris had 
already been outmanoeuvred. Davis’ desire to act in a traditional and lawful 
fashion contributed greatly to a miss-matched command system displaying the 
worst parts of civil-military relationships developed in an ad-hoc fashion 
without an agreed objective. Lincoln had used the complex nature of the 
situation in Kentucky in the end to his advantage; he had manipulated Magoffin 
and by doing so had exposed Davis lack of originality and firm decision making.     
 
           Once again in the pivotal conflict in the development of the United States 
President Lincoln had succeeded by not adhering to the traditional American 
model of civil-military relations. It is important to note his flexibility is displayed 
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by the use of tradition to overtly pursue his political objectives reassuring the 
loyal Kentuckian of his sincerity whilst at the same time creating a wholly secret 
civil-military relationship to project both political and military influence into the 
state. This was necessary due to the sheer complexity of the situation in 
Kentucky; in fact one of the most complex of the whole war.    
          
           In terms of theoretical frameworks the ‘Neutrality’ period is a prime 
example of crucial historical occurrence defying easy assessment. Even 
intervention by the officer corps is covert with William Nelson’s actions more in 
the form of a suggestion agreed by Lincoln than Lyon’s crusade against Missouri 
secessionists. This supports Huntington on one level; Nelson remaining true to 
the concept of civilian control if not necessarily through traditional 
arrangements. However it is the whole concept of the neutral state/province in 
civil wars which creates both problems for theoretical assessment but also for 
the protagonists in achieving even their minimum goals. With both sides having 
good reasons for counting on the support of the people of Kentucky but also 
regarding the seizure of her resources as being absolutely vital there can be no 
‘ideal’ approach only one which is extremely pragmatic but well disguised. In 
itself this poses difficult questions for any theoretical framework.     
  
          These first two case studies are essential for analysing the development of 
the war in the Border States until the threat of secession had been effectively 
removed. The next chapter in a number of ways deals with the actual 
prosecution of the war in terms of the pursuit of war winning objectives by 
262 
 
military means. Political objectives and military strategy now move much 
clearer into play. It will be demonstrated that command relationships emerging 
from a contest for control of both Kentucky and Missouri could be ill-suited to 
coherent strategy and actual campaigning. It will also show various ideas of 






















Case Study 3: Forts Henry and Donelson. 
 
          This case study focuses on the period in the Border State conflict where 
the formation of correct military strategy clashed with political necessity over 
how the war was to be prosecuted. This chapter will also demonstrate the 
continued struggle to secure effective military and political support in each 
state whilst denying it to the enemy. The actions covered will demonstrate this 
struggle remained unrelenting as the fighting spread into Tennessee and the 
war took on more of the formal trappings associated with a large armed 
struggle.  
 
          From September 1861 onwards, in the eyes of both combatants, the 
enemy was now represented by an opposing armed force rather than just 
political opponents. Both sides also feared this enemy to be aggressive, well 
organised and only a short march away. Local unconfirmed rumour regularly 
increased in size the numbers of the enemy until they assumed terrifying 
proportions. In this context civil-military relationships in Kentucky and Missouri 
had to develop a less ad-hoc nature and became more dogmatic, especially so 
for the Union. However the need to effectively facilitate both offensive and 
defensive military action was still limited by the need to guarantee political 
control over either state. For the Union this control could not be relaxed as 
territorial gains made could be neutralised by local unrest in the rear of the 
field armies. With the onus for offensive action on the Union, as time passed 
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this desire to hold onto newly ‘liberated’ ground became more of a problem 
and fundamentally affected developing civil-military relations.  
          
          From the end of September 1861 until early summer 1862 the task facing 
the Union was basically offensive while that of the Confederacy and her ‘allies’ 
in Kentucky and Missouri was essentially defensive. This case study will look at 
the major Union offensive designed to break the Confederate defensive line 
and the supporting operations assisting that offensive. The Confederate 
preparations for this inevitable offensive and their attempts to legitimise both 
Kentucky and Missouri as being part of the new southern ‘nation’ will also form 
a large section of this chapter.  
 
          All these military preparations were played out against a background of 
the struggle, yet to be decisively won by the Union, to secure political and 
strategic control in the Border States. This struggle for political security was 
especially turbulent in Missouri despite the dangers of ‘lawful’ secession in the 
manner of the original Confederate States having been all but removed. This is 
also a case study which begins to highlight the imbalance in military resources 
between the two sides, emphasising very clearly the incalculable advantage 
successful secession in the Border States would have been to the long term 
prospects of the Confederacy.   
 
          The previous case studies have shown that the respective secession crises 
in Missouri and Kentucky presented a different set of difficulties for the 
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competing sides at the start of the Civil War. Uncannily the Lincoln 
administration had proved generally successful in overcoming these difficulties 
by adjusting policy accordingly. In contrast the disjointed Confederate approach 
had been unfocussed leaving the secessionists of each state largely 
unsupported. In no way could the Union prevention of secession be war-ending 
but two important initial objectives had been achieved; the halt of Confederate 
expansion and seizing of the military initiative in the Western Theatre, although 
in Missouri Stirling Price appeared to still be disputing this.  
 
          Missouri had always required decisive action to secure political direction 
of the state. Military intervention had proved necessary, but its unorthodox 
manner had proved successful for the Union at the grand strategic level. It had 
not proved enough to completely remove pro-secessionist presence from the 
state. However this was unrealistic in Missouri where political unrest over 
slavery had been the norm since the mid-1850s.  
 
          Kentucky had proven to be a political struggle for the support of the 
people of the state, in effect to overturn their genuine desire to avoid military 
involvement in the conflict and an initial intention to broker a compromise. 
Secession had been prevented with the added bonus for Lincoln of the 
Confederacy invading Kentucky in an undisciplined manner on the basis of 
military not political calculation. By the end of September both of these states 
were active components within the Western Theatre but with the inherent 
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political uncertainty of divided loyalty and mutual mistrust, there was as yet no 
sense of permanence within either state as to their long term future. 
 
 




Missouri, October 1861. 
 
          There is still debate as to the overall strategic influence of Missouri on the 
Civil War once the Missouri State Guard (MSG) had been driven both from 
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St.Louis and the state’s slaveholding heartlands. Albert Castel states that 
Missouri (in late 1861), “Might prove the difference between victory and defeat 
in the war as a whole.”422Castel noting it was lack of resources rather than lack 
of Confederate desire to exploit her strategic potential. Russell F. Weigly is 
probably representative of the majority view when he argues that Wilson’s 
Creek had confirmed the Union in strategic control of Missouri but had laid the 
ground for the more brutal irregular warfare that was to occur later in the 
war.423However there was a need for Union forces to exploit that strategic 
advantage correctly, this being part of the longer term challenge in Missouri. In 
the short term, however, the pro-secessionist forces under Major General Price 
remained an active army which had to be neutralised.    
 
          Having just inflicted the most complete tactical defeat suffered by the 
Union in 1861, Stirling Price, as we have seen, was forced to fall back with the 
MSG towards Springfield from Lexington at the end of September. It was the 
first example of the impact the far greater resources now available to the Union 
had on the war in Missouri. It was also indicative of Price’s inability to 
permanently recruit even a reasonable proportion of pro-southern men in the 
state; let alone arm them. This brief campaign established a pattern of hostile 
pro-southern or Confederate movement which regularly threatened the initially 
unsteady Federal hold on the state. The Federals each time being forced to 
react to these incursions with a strong, often disproportionate, military 
response. Union forces responding to these incursions were often made up of 
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inefficient local units or irregulars doing nothing to dampen down the 
internecine aspect of the war in Missouri.  
 
          The major strategic value of Missouri to the South had now become the 
diversion of Union forces away from other theatres of war. This could best be 
done with a conventional military threat from an effective army either in or 
close to Missouri. Equally distracting was the hope that the substantial minority 
of pro-southerners in the state would hamper the Union war effort by any 
viable means; this did indeed prove to be the case but 1861 was too early for it 
to be effective.424 A secondary contest, which had begun with Governor 
Jackson’s flight south, over political legitimacy and ‘Constitutional rights’ would 
increase tensions in Missouri as 1861 progressed. These tensions, arising out of 
the increasing federal control over state government and over the uncertainties 
regarding the future of slavery, could still be manipulated by pro-secessionists 




Kentucky, October 1861. 
 
         The autumn and winter of 1861 were in many ways the quietest of the war 
in all theatres in terms of battlefield confrontation, however a series of actions 
largely centred in and adjacent to Kentucky would bring this period to a 
dynamic end early in 1862. The military build up in Kentucky was therefore the 
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catalyst for the eventual ending of the stalemate in the Western Theatre and 
the war as whole. Consequently the political and military reasons for the build 
up and the political and military leadership tasked with managing it exercised a 
great deal of debate on both sides. Clashes between the political and military 
leadership over correct strategy and allocation of resources centred on both 
Kentucky herself and the overall role of this theatre in the prosecution of the 
wider war.  
 
          It has been steadily recognised over recent years the western campaign, 
beginning in Kentucky in the spring of 1862, was one of the most decisive of the 
whole war. This recognition driven, in part, by Benjamin Franklin Cooling’s 
comprehensive 1987 study “Forts Henry and Donelson”425, was a result of the 
increasing importance being placed on the so-called ‘Confederate Heartland’. 
Cooling, having acknowledged Thomas Connelly’s “Army of the Heartland”426 as 
being partly the inspiration for his work, arguing the loss of Tennessee and the 
surrounding areas was fatal for Confederate long term prospects. The loss of 
this “Heartland”427 in early 1862 being then extremely difficult for the 
Confederacy to ever recover; in fact fatally undermining their Grand Strategy of 
defending all parts of the new nation.  
 
          It has therefore become apparent the collapse of A.S. Johnston’s 
defensive line in Kentucky and the subsequent loss of Memphis and Nashville, 
with their surrounding areas, was the key factor in undermining the long term 
prospects of the Confederacy.428 The campaign that was to begin with the 
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dramatic fall of Forts Henry and Donelson and lead to a spectacular advance 
into this Confederate ‘Heartland’ was the result of the inherent weaknesses of 
the Confederate defensive line established in southern Kentucky following the 
collapse of ‘Neutrality’.  
 
           The three advances into Kentucky by the Confederates in September had 
established a defensive screen in the south of the state covering roughly a 
quarter of its area. Confederate grand strategy had already largely been 
decided by this time, anything other than defence of all parts of the new nation 
being politically unacceptable in a confederation formed from the doctrine of 
‘States rights’.429 This in part explains the initial laissez-faire attitude adopted by 
the Davis administration to the respective border state secession crises. Davis’ 
hope for peaceful secession in each case would have removed the burden of 
the Confederacy as an invading force and replaced it with the mantle of 
defenders of ‘Southern rights’.  
 
          Legalistic respectability and procedure would still influence Confederate 
relations with both states as would the increasing voice of both exiled lobbies in 
Richmond. Whether there was any remaining mileage in an alliance between all 
15 slave states however depended almost entirely on the direction of the 
Lincoln administration over the future of slavery. This stance on the future of 
slavery was linked to federal attitudes towards the people of the Border States 
and to Lincoln’s inherent faith in Southern Unionism. This stance depended to a 
large degree on the attitude of the Union Army as a whole, along with that of 
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federal officials and administrators. Amongst these groups there was a 
widespread feeling that the people of Kentucky or Missouri were neither loyal 
nor ‘reliable’ in their support for the Union war effort.  
 
          Militarily the Union forces had the initiative should they wish to take it; 
the time and place of any major offensive was theirs to choose. The developing 
situation in Kentucky from October 1861 onwards gave Union forces a number 
of offensive options but also created a number of political difficulties. However 




The Confederate Challenge: Creating a Lasting Defence. 
 
          A.S.Johnston’s Department No.2 was an enormous responsibility for one 
man to oversee and against the background of a Davis administration already 
becoming fixated with the war in the east it was becoming increasingly so. 
Tasked with defending a ‘front’ of over 700 miles stretching from Indian 
Territory to the Kentucky/Virginia state line Johnston’s task was extremely 
difficult. A shortage of manpower was a problem and arming those already 
mobilised was even more challenging. Competing with the army in Virginia for 
resources and with the respective Governors in his department for both these, 
and over the final say on specific military matters distracted from this task. 
Delaying a Union offensive until his forces were both larger and better 
prepared was his only logical option in the circumstances. The avoidance of any 
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more military or political blunders of the type perpetrated by Polk in early 
September was also a major concern.  
 
          While Johnston’s need to buy time was clear his need to find an effective 
way of co-operating with both Richmond and the Confederate Governors was 
equally so. Johnston’s most important battle in the last few months of 1861 
was to find a way of increasing the efficiency of the civil-military structures in 
his department, structures which his President and Commander-in-Chief had 
exposed him to. 
 
           President Davis had in many ways cut Johnston adrift in terms of specific 
direction other than instructions to generally defend all parts of his 
department. Despite initially having the final say in ordering a withdrawal from 
Kentucky Johnston realised, politically at least, there was no alternative but to 
stay. Ironically Johnston’s appointment was a great rarity in the Confederacy in 
that it was almost universally popular which paradoxically proved to be a 
weakness in that everyone of note believed Johnston could work miracles 
without any great assistance from themselves. This belief that Johnston could 
cope despite his department being second on the list of priorities proved to be 
extremely dangerous naivety. 
 
            Davis had, in effect, promised all troops raised by Tennessee, Mississippi 
and Arkansas would be available for use as Johnston saw fit in addition to any 
volunteers from Kentucky or Missouri enlisting in Confederate organised units 
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(i.e. non-state guard)430. This promise was never as straightforward as it might 
have been. Arkansas was slow in providing troops due to a growing fear of 
invasion from Missouri, an early example of the effects of strategic diversion 
working against the Confederacy. In addition Arkansas was also the most 
isolated and backward of Confederate states, her Governor had already called 
for both more arms and troops to operate west of the Mississippi, worrying 
about the pro-Union stance of the north-western part of the state. Mississippi’s 
Governor, John J. Pettus, was also more concerned with his own state and the 
Gulf Coast in general, feeling this was more vulnerable. This left Johnston 
relying very heavily on Tennessee and the co-operation of Governor Harris, 
especially when Johnston’s relationship with the new Secretary of War Judah P. 
Benjamin started off badly and never improved.431 
 
          In some ways Harris had done an excellent job preparing Tennessee for 
war. A vast number of volunteers, in excess of 50,000, had initially come 
forward to enlist in the Provisional Army of Tennessee, when the state formally 
joined the Confederacy these men were gradually transferred to her service. 
Being relatively industrialised Tennessee was, with the direction of Harris, able 
to steadily build up her own armaments and equipage production quite quickly, 
although small arms production was initially much slower. Realistically Johnston 
then had to have the Governor’s support for any operation requiring 
Tennessean resources or more importantly for any removal of Tennessee 




          Johnston had also inherited Harris’ military and political priorities which 
had governed Tennessee’s initial defensive preparations i.e. a defensive 
strategy prioritising the Mississippi in the west of the state and suppressing 
growing pro-unionist political unrest in the east. This pro-unionist protest had 
steadily grown and was threatening the strategically vital cities of Knoxville and 
Chattanooga; it would continue to be a distraction to any Confederate 
operations in-theatre. Johnston himself had shown that he much preferred to 
occupy a more central position, traditionally the militarily correct stance when 
outnumbered, and did so by fortifying his positions in and around Bowling 
Green. Confederate movement there had been rapid and had unnerved Union 
forces but further advances north had to be abandoned. Far from being 
supportive the local Kentucky populace were proving to be pro-unionist and 
therefore threatening to any extended line of supply.  
 
          Johnston was therefore forced onto the defensive almost immediately. In 
fact finding himself in a similar position to that in Missouri where most of the 
pro-southern areas of the state were isolated from easy Confederate support. 
In order to get to the generally pro-southern Blue Grass region Johnston would 
either have to advance over logistically barren hostile territory or find a way to 
outflank a numerically superior force steadily growing in numbers. To attempt 
to do so against a foe with a more secure logistical base would have been 
suicidal. Johnston then would have to be reactive rather than pro-active, 




          Johnston’s command team in Kentucky were very mixed and reflected as 
much political necessity as military effectiveness. Polk remained in command at 
Columbus with Pillow as second-in-command, both incompetent militarily but 
politically useful to a degree, and more importantly immovable. Polk had been 
Johnston’s roommate at West Point in addition to Davis’ classmate and Pillow, 
with his Democratic powerbase in Tennessee, could not be touched. Davis 
himself was well aware of Pillow’s shortcomings and it was unfortunate that 
part of his reasoning for appointing Polk was to outrank Pillow with someone 
equally politically acceptable to Tennesseans.433 
 
          Johnston’s concern for south-central Kentucky is highlighted by his choice 
for command. Buckner was regarded as highly competent militarily and 
politically influential, if divisive, but perhaps better utilised in a subordinate 
role. As such Johnston, who initially had remained with Polk, moved his 
Headquarters to Bowling Green in mid October and effectively took control of 
the Army of Central Kentucky himself. Before Johnston arrived he ordered 
Hardee to move his force, now in north-eastern Arkansas, to Bowling Green. 
Upon his arrival Hardee was placed in command. Of course Johnston’s presence 
in Bowling Green hardly made this an independent appointment. However 
Hardee was regarded as the most competent general in the army434 indicating 
that Johnston was convinced the main Union offensive would eventually be by 
the most direct and logistically sustainable avenue, that along the Louisville and 




          On the mountainous east Tennessee/Kentucky sector of front Zollicoffer 
remained in command, again he could not be removed for political reasons. 
Zollicoffer has divided scholarly opinion in regard to his military competence, 
Thomas Connelly regards him as, “…actually a capable strategist”435however 
Stanley Horn points out his innate aggression and lack of formal military 
training were handicaps and as a subordinate he could not be relied upon 
always to follow or understand orders.436 Once again it was to Davis’ credit that 
he sensed Zollicoffer’s shortcomings and moved to appoint George Crittenden 
as his superior in a slightly expanded force. This could not be done until late 
November and the delay would have consequences.  
 
          Eastern Tennessee was a doubly difficult part of Johnston’s line as for 
every one man operating at the front another was required to prevent pro-
unionist unrest turning into insurrection in the rear areas. Strategically any 
sizable insurrection would threaten the railroads running from Richmond to the 
Mississippi and could conceivably facilitate or provoke Union offensive action 
from eastern Kentucky. As a result Governor Harris’ role was more influential 
on this part of the front, both in his policy towards the pro-unionists and in his 
allocation of resources specifically to control them. Harris’ lobbying of Davis on 
the need for more Confederate resources for his state was weighted toward 
the political instability in the east and the fear of an attack, from and by the 




          In the context of Kentucky and Tennessee alone Johnston’s focus on 
Bowling Green was not ideal, in the context of his responsibilities for the whole 
department it was a risky gamble. Hardee’s role in south-eastern 
Missouri/north-eastern Arkansas had been full of strategic promise but with 
little result, largely due to incompetent direction from above but this force had 
always remained a potential threat to any Union offensive along the 
Mississippi. The transfer of Hardee’s force was one less worry for Fremont and 
left Price and McCulloch even more isolated. The uncertain co-operation 
between these latter two would also have to be addressed if they were to play 
a successful role in securing Johnston’s left flank and shielding Arkansas by 
holding south west Missouri. 
 
 
The Union Offensive: Where and How to Strike? 
 
          The Confederate movement into Kentucky had instantly solved many of 
Lincoln’s political difficulties in the state. The Kentucky legislature had indicated 
clearly that the apparatus of government were firmly in pro-Union hands and 
the military forces of the state were at the federal government’s disposal. 
Despite having a good measure of political control Union forces within and on 
the borders of the state were for the most part in no condition to take 
advantage of Confederate weakness. This lack of offensive capability was made 
worse by the widespread fear of a renewed Confederate advance continuing all 
the way to the Ohio and beyond. The task facing Lincoln and his military 
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leadership became organising armies capable of defeating Confederate military 
forces in Kentucky and to prevent those in Missouri from diverting them from 
this purpose without lessening Union political control. 
 
          Lincoln’s difficulties were very much the same as Davis’ in that once 
making a military appointment for largely political reasons he had to stick by it 
unless a major blunder gave him an excuse to remove the individual. The 
organisation of military districts and departments became much more 
important once active campaigning had commenced as now military 
competence had to be prioritised above political influence, if at all possible. 
However this did not lessen the pressure on Lincoln from his supporters for 
action nor his desire to keep faith with Southern Unionism, in particular to 
actively support those pro-unionists in eastern Tennessee. When all were 
confident Kentucky was secure in the Union development of a successful 
strategy could begin. The War Department and senior military leadership would 
then be tasked with securing the long term political objectives of the war 
without ignoring those more immediately pressing. Lincoln was much more 
aware these two sets of objectives often diverged more in Kentucky than 
anywhere else. He had to be seen to be both actively prosecuting the war and 
to support those who had stayed loyal. In this theatre it was loyalists in east 
Tennessee and to a much lesser extent in north-western Arkansas whom 






Lincoln Shuffles the Pack: Union Changes in Command. 
 
          The shifting of department commanders and boundaries had worked for 
Lincoln in Missouri until the arrival of Fremont. Fremont’s appointment as 
commander of the Department of the West had only one gain of any note, the 
placing of Grant in command of the District of Cairo. Fremont’s pursuit of Price 
following the battle of Lexington was a glaring example of what the Union was 
trying to avoid; a diversion of large forces away from more crucial theatres. 
Short of securing a permanent presence in central Missouri all Price could hope 
to achieve with his outnumbered force was just such a diversion. The 38,000 
men employed by Fremont at the end of September to casually follow up 
Price’s steady withdrawal to Springfield was the biggest single Union force west 
of Virginia.437 It is clear by the end of September Lincoln had decided that 
Fremont at some stage needed to be removed from his command. The Blair 
powerbase in Missouri once more proved to be much more influential than 
official channels and would be heavily involved in removing Fremont.  
 
          In a fashion similar to that of the removal of Harney earlier in the year, 
Frank Blair clashing with Fremont exercised his influence to pressure Lincoln to 
remove Fremont who had in fact ordered Blair’s arrest. On top of his foolish 
proclamation of late August and poor military performance, Fremont’s 
administrative abilities were found wanting; even to be negligent, resulting in a 
large number of corrupt and fraudulent military contracts being offered in his 
department.438 This scandal became public in October certainly helping the 
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President makeup his mind to replace Fremont. Lincoln handed a letter to 
Brigadier General Samuel Curtis, dated October 24th, to give to Fremont 
relieving him of command but to be withheld if Fremont had, “Won a battle, be 
actually in battle or be in the immediate presence of the enemy...”439 Curtis 
found no reason not to hand over the letter and as directed Major General 
Hunter, previously sent by Lincoln to assist Fremont, was placed in temporary 
command. 
 
          Lincoln’s instructions to Hunter are very detailed despite initially stating, 
“Knowing how hazardous it is to bind down a distant commander in the field to 
specific lines... it is intended to leave a considerable margin for the exercise of 
your judgement and discretion...”440 He was to halt the pursuit of Price, divide 
his forces into two to secure the two major railroads in the state and be in a 
position to intercept any further incursion by Price. In addition any guerrilla 
activity was to be dealt with by local forces only.   
          
           Grant, given a fairly free hand by Fremont, was active throughout 
October in southeast Missouri and northwest Kentucky against both reports of 
and sometimes actual Confederate regular and irregular forces. This constant 
action easily made him the most dynamic commander in either state and on 
either side. Grant’s forces were however limited, the District of Cairo relatively 
small geographically and most importantly he was as yet in no position to 
independently carry out any decisive offensive action. However it is important 
to note that Grant did appreciate very early on the sensitive political nature of 
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the conflict in Kentucky indicated by his cautious treatment of civilians most of 
whom were pro-southern. While acting in accordance with Lincoln’s general 
wishes Grant avoided upsetting Governor Yates of Illinois whose extreme 
attitude to southern sympathizers was well known. The provision of the bulk of 
Grant’s troops by Illinois was a potential political hurdle well avoided by the 
General. 441 
 
          The District of Cairo’s boundaries east of the Mississippi ran to the west 
bank of the Cumberland approximately 50 miles into Kentucky from then on 
the state was in the Department of the Cumberland. This department was still 
under the command of Anderson until his resignation due to ill health on 
October 8th heralding a round of ‘musical chairs’ in Western Theatre command 
positions. William T. Sherman replaced Anderson but it was the low point of his 
military career. Sherman’s realistic and often pessimistic view of war told him 
very quickly that many of the men and more so the commanders in his 
department were not up to the job of defending the state let alone assuming 
the offensive. Sherman’s call for more and better troops and leaders was not 
popular with the War Department but it did give them an excuse to divert 
resources away from Fremont who had been making the same enormous 
demands for a much longer period and from far less genuine need. 
 
            What Sherman, initially as Anderson’s second-in-command, had 
witnessed was the shear panic Buckner’s advance into central Kentucky had 
caused. Union Home Guard units had proved ineffective and those volunteer 
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units around Camp Dick Robinson undertrained and slow to respond. 
Worryingly volunteer officers, many being local politicians and notables, were 
not up to the job of fighting a ‘real’ war. Aside from Grant, the federal military 
professionals were driven onto the psychological defensive by what they had 
seen. These included George H. Thomas whose position as head of Camp Dick 
Robinson was undermined by pro-Union Kentucky politicians competing for 
volunteers to raise their own regiments. 442 
            
          On both sides there was a sense of a lack of initial direction and varying 
degrees of pessimism with diverting competitions for both resources and 
political influence. Once again Lincoln, unlike Davis, can be shown to at least 
attempt to address these problems and actively make or facilitate change. From 
early October Lincoln considered the situation in Kentucky and discussed 
possible actions, trying to instil offensive spirit into a conservative minded 
command team. Lincoln’s wishes for offensive action in Kentucky were always 
centred on the need to support those behind southern lines who still remained 
loyal to the Union. In this fashion Southern Unionism had its greatest impact on 
the war not by anything it achieved directly against the Confederacy but by the 
influence it had over the President. This influence, once western Virginia was 
secured, largely focussed on eastern Tennessee and would do so until the war 
aims of the Union began to change during the latter half of 1862. 
 
          In early October Lincoln drew up a memorandum summing up, with 
reasonable accuracy, the situation in Kentucky regarding Federal troop strength 
283 
 
and dispositions along with current estimates of the strength and positions of 
the Confederates. This memorandum expressed a desire for a concentration of 
forces in the east and centre of the state for an offensive aimed at eastern 
Tennessee directly through the Cumberland Gap.443It is quite arguable that 
Lincoln was well within his constitutional powers to suggest such actions 
although he was careful to state,  
 
           It is for the Military men to decide whether they can find a pass through 
the mountains at or a near the [Cumberland] Gap which cannot be defended by 
the enemy... and what is to be done in regard to this. 444   
 
           
          Lincoln’s strategic vision also extended to the exploitation of 
opportunities presented by this proposed movement, hoping that Fremont in 
Missouri and forces in Virginia may benefit. Equally important within this 
memorandum were Lincoln’s thoughts regarding the division of military 
resources. Lincoln intended that all resources west of the Mississippi should by 
and large remain in that department and those created between the Mississippi 
and the Appalachian Mountains be available for use where they had been 
formed i.e. for offensive action beginning in Kentucky. In order for these 
objectives to be realised in would be necessary once again to reorganise the 
command structure.  
 
          As General-in-Chief, Winfield Scott had played a reasonably successful 
part in the Missouri crisis but had become increasingly marginalised 
subsequently. The Union defeat at First Bull Run, in July, had further weakened 
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Scott’s position although he had counselled against the overwhelming political 
demands for an early offensive against the Confederate army in Manassas, 
Virginia. With McClellan’s appointment to the command of the newly formed 
Army of the Potomac following Bull Run, the political struggle between the two 
began in earnest. Much as Sherman was to do in his brief tenure in command in 
Kentucky, Scott realised quickly that the war would be long and would require 
large numbers of men. More importantly Scott recognised that a coherent 
strategy would be necessary to employ this large army. Lincoln was not in a 
position to support Scott once public and political pressure built up over failure 
to swiftly defeat the South and the old man was ‘persuaded’ to resign on 
October 31st by Lincoln and replaced on November 2nd by McClellan. 
 
          McClellan’s appointment is crucial for the conduct of the war in both 
Kentucky and Missouri. McClellan remained in command of the Army of the 
Potomac as well as assuming his new duties and as such needed efficient 
administrators and ideally men as loyal as possible to him in other key 
commands. As recorded above Lincoln had taken the opportunity to remove 
Fremont from command in the West. With his usual pattern of offering a final 
chance to a failing commander knowing full well that it would not be taken.  
 
          En route to St.Louis, to witness for himself Fremont’s level of 
incompetence, Secretary of War Cameron encountered Sherman and his 
demands for greater resources. Cameron’s declaration of Sherman’s ‘insanity’ 
created an opportunity to reshape the Department once again. McClellan 
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decided to expand it slightly and renamed it the Department of the Ohio 
crucially appointing Maj. General Don Carlos Buell, a friend with a similar 
mindset, as commander. McClellan, arguably the most politically contentious of 
all Civil War generals, felt obliged to recommend his erstwhile rival to the 
position of General-in-Chief, Major General Henry Halleck, as Fremont’s 
permanent replacement in the west, reassigning Sherman to him in the 
process. Halleck certainly no friend of McClellan was also an excellent 
administrator, politically conservative, militarily cautious and a thoroughly 
professional soldier. Interestingly Halleck’s department was reduced in size 
with its renaming as the Department of the Missouri, a new Department of 
Kansas being formed from the western areas of the former department with 
Hunter appointed to command it. Militarily this was correct but politically it 
would in time cause difficulties, but while the war remained largely 
‘conventional’ in southwest Missouri it proved effective. 445  
 
            Once Halleck was in place by November 19th the whole pattern of the 
war in the west would be defined by the professional relationship between 
McClellan, Buell and Halleck and between Lincoln and all three. Behind Lincoln 
political pressure was constantly building, not the least from Republican 
politicians who demanded action and had more radical views on just how the 
war should be prosecuted and over the conflict’s eventual political goals.  
 
          Pressure on Lincoln also sprung from an inherent fear in the mid-western 
states that whatever reverses the secessionists had suffered they were still a 
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force not yet spent in either Kentucky or Missouri. A steady stream of 
correspondence from loyal states cited the numbers of volunteer troops 
provided and openly sought to influence Lincoln’s military objectives. On the 
removal of western troops from the Western Theatre to Maryland and Virginia 
the Union Defence Committee of Chicago wrote Lincoln on October 1st, 
 
          The state of affairs in Kentucky and Missouri is such as to cause the 
greatest anxiety to every lover of the Union. In Missouri... the force capable of 
taking the field is inadequate to meet the enemy... The same may be said of our 
troops in Kentucky... If any great disaster shall befall our arms in either of these 
states... it might be said that the East was strengthened at the expense of the 
West.... We only wish to represent the state of public sentiment... in the 
alarming aspect of affairs in Missouri and Kentucky...446    
 
           
          Three days later a panicky Governor of Iowa, Samuel J. Kirkwood, wrote of 
conditions in Missouri causing, “Much excitement and alarm...” asking for more 
arms without which, “...it is difficult to see how we can save the southern 
frontier of our State from invasion and plunder.”447Lincoln then had to be seen 
to act but with agreement from both his generals and support from his political 
allies, clearly not a straightforward task. Characteristic of Lincoln’s response to 
this form of pressure was an instruction to Halleck on December 1st,  
 
          General: As an insurrection exists in the United States and is in arms in the 
State of Missouri, you are authorised and empowered to suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus within the limits of your command... to exercise martial law as 
you find it necessary... to secure the public safety and authority of the United 
States.448  
 
           
          Jefferson Davis, under a similar set of circumstances never displayed a 
comparable surety under political pressure nor seriously attempted to seek a 




          Halleck proved also more adept than Fremont in co-operating with 
Provisional Governor Gamble who was continuing his pattern of unlawful 
procedure to subtly tighten Union control in the state without the need for a 
full federal takeover. Gamble’s control of the State Convention empowered him 
to negotiate with Lincoln over volunteers to the new Missouri State Militia 
(MSM). MSM numbers were made up of those who neither wished to fight for 
or against the Union but to defend their own state. The MSM enabled pro-
Union men to be posted outside the state and allowed Gamble to receive a 
large federal subsidy. In exchange for a semblance of Missouri control over her 
manpower a series of oaths of allegiance were brought in alongside Halleck’s 
increasing identification and targeting of those regarded as secessionist. Indeed 
these measures can be identified as part of the escalation to all out guerrilla 
war in parts of Missouri later in the war.449 
 
 
Expanding the Confederacy: Worthless Secession? 
 
          Having relinquished the initiative General A.S. Johnston had allowed the 
Union High Command the luxury of implementing their restructuring and 
devising their strategy unhindered, although through no real fault of his own. In 
both states pro-secessionists still wished to formally ally themselves with the 
Confederacy and Davis still desired this relationship and as such more effort 
was put into carrying this out rather than improving the extremely vulnerable 
military situation. With Davis’ attention on the war in Virginia there was much 
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un-coordinated independent action not the least amongst the pro-secessionists 
in the Border States. 
 
         Governor Jackson called a meeting of the Missouri General Assembly for 
October 21st to be held at Neosho in the southwest of the state. The order of 
business was simply to formally secede and adopt the Confederate Constitution 
in order to become the 12th Confederate State. There was no quorum when 
business began on the 28th and there would not be, nor would there be any 
ratification referendum and of course no election for the Confederate 
Congress, the Assembly taking upon itself that task.450Despite this highly 
irregular and dubious set of procedures the Confederate Congress happily 
voted for Missouri’s admittance on November 28th with Davis proclaiming the 
fact the same day. Amongst these political movements the main issue dividing 
pro-southern Missourians and the Confederacy had not yet been addressed; 
coherent military strategy west of the Mississippi and the role and position of 
Missouri State troops within it.  
 
          Perhaps not coincidentally in Kentucky a similar formal effort was 
underway to take the state out of the Union. This was arguably even more 
irregular than that of Missouri’s as Magoffin was still Governor and therefore 
no lawful assembly could be called. As such a ‘Sovereignty Convention’ was 
held in Russelville, from November 18th, with delegates from those counties 
under Confederate control and refugees from those that were not. A 
Provisional Governor, George W. Johnson, was chosen, an ordinance of 
secession was adopted and commissioners appointed to negotiate with the 
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Confederacy.451 Once again political demands overrode Davis’ previous legal 
scruples and in the manner of Missouri Kentucky became the 13th and final 
Confederate state on December 10th. Kentucky was even more dependent on 
Confederate money and the presence of her armies than was Missouri for her 
new ‘State Government’ to even barely function.  
 
          The important factors in these secession developments were the 
respective strengthening of the Kentucky and Missouri lobbies in Richmond, 
both formally and informally, for no great increase in the strategic wellbeing of 
the Confederacy or politically that of Davis. The Confederate Congress and 
especially the Governors had already begun to hamper efficient direction of the 
war, especially in the west, and were already beginning to collectively oppose 
the President. Davis had simply increased the number of his opponents by 24 
and 2 respectively.452   
 
          Davis and Johnston’s hands were now in effect even more tied in 
Kentucky, any military withdrawal from the state, or even any significant 
movement of forces out of her boundaries now carried greater political 
penalty. The rapid establishment of Bowling Green as the centre of  the so-
called ‘Confederate State Government’ also helped fixate Johnston’s attention 
on what was not an especially defensible location in the centre of his line away 






Plans take shape: The Debate heats up. 
 
         Jefferson Davis’ comment of learning of Halleck’s appointment is 
interesting, “The Federal forces are not hereafter, as heretofore, to be 
commanded by path-finders and holiday soldiers, but by men of military 
education and experience in war.”453 Whether this appointment prompted 
Davis to attempt to solve Confederate command problems in the Trans-
Mississippi is probable but Halleck set about unravelling the chaos that Fremont 
had left him and granted the Confederacy more time as a result. Equally Buell 
was faced with the same chaos in his own department with the important 
difference that pressure was building on him to a far greater degree to launch 
an offensive and more specifically one to save eastern Tennessee. 
 
          An argument can be made that Buell was the most important Union 
commander in the West until the close of 1862. At all times, on paper, his army 
was the largest, was generally opposed by the greatest concentration of enemy 
troops and by the best enemy commanders. From the point of view of civil-
military relations Buell’s dealings with national and state leaders were the most 
crucial, his army being the chosen instrument for securing Lincoln’s declared 
political objectives. Buell’s department was in effect responsible for the visible 
attitude of the Federal government towards southern or border state citizens. 
Buell’s biographer Stephen Engle has identified the absurdity of his instructions 
when assuming command of the Department of the Ohio, instructions which 
even more absurdly Buell helped draw up. Buell was to secure as much of 
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Kentucky as possible, defeat Johnston’s main army and to relieve East 
Tennessee. These objectives were to be concurrent and, in line with McClellan’s 
instructions for the conduct of the war which were at that time little different 
to Lincoln’s, no individual’s constitutional rights were to be infringed while 
securing them.454   
 
          As we have seen up to the appointment of Buell, troops and armaments 
gathered in eastern Kentucky were expressly for the purpose of securing 
eastern Tennessee once Kentucky’s loyalties were certain. Buell had initially 
been more positive about an advance toward Knoxville via the Cumberland Gap 
but once in command quickly came to regard such a movement as strategically 
incorrect and logistically impossible. Buell was convinced that the militarily 
correct target of defeating the enemy’s main army would give him and the 
Union cause the greater reward. Defeating Johnston’s force at Bowling Green 
would open the route to Nashville, which was, in Buell’s view, a much more 
significant objective both militarily and, as it happened, politically than 
Knoxville. Support for such a move came from Guthrie whose railroad would 
logistically underpin any advance on Nashville which was in effect an offensive 
directly along the tracks of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. 455 
 
          Throughout November Buell hardened his attitude against a move 
through the Cumberland Gap, discussions with Andrew Johnson sowing the 
seeds of a troubled relationship between the two. Buell quickly came to believe 
that Senator Johnson had been persuaded that an attack on Nashville was 
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correct with the latter in fact not being convinced at all. McClellan’s attitude at 
this time is of interest as the General-in-Chief’s prodding of Buell to advance 
into eastern Tennessee was never in the form of a direct order. Lincoln under 
increasing pressure also never ordered Buell directly to move into this region 
only ‘suggesting’ that he did so and was equally unsuccessful in getting 
McClellan to attack in Virginia. Engle has labelled McClellan ‘Machiavellian’ in 
his attitude to Buell by allowing military freedom of action alongside 
highlighting eastern Tennessee’s utmost political value by urging an attack 
there.456 It goes without saying that McClellan’s lack of offensive action with 
the Army of the Potomac was precisely in the same mould as Buell’s and 
justified in precisely the same way; the need for full preparation before any 
offensive action could take place. 
 
          Militarily correct strategy did start to play a part in Union planning from 
early December as Lincoln shrewdly began suggesting that an advance into 
eastern Tennessee could play a useful supporting role to any advance into 
central Tennessee. McClellan, Buell and Halleck, all recognising that any division 
of an opponent’s resources through supporting movements would greatly 
increase the chances of a successful main offensive, were in favour of co-
operative action but of course on their own terms. It then fell on Lincoln to try 
and encourage this co-operation and to overcome the inevitable mutual 
suspicion and mistrust. Halleck, a rival to both Buell and McClellan, began his 
highly influential part in the Civil War with his appointment as commander of 
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the Department of the Missouri by wholeheartedly entering into this spirit of 
mistrust but his abilities as a first rate administrator rapidly emerged. 
 
          Halleck correctly identified the continuing existence of Price’s Army in 
southwest Missouri posed a threat to any Union offensive either down the 
Mississippi or into Kentucky. He also realised that by allocating too many 
resources to combat Price he would still be doing his opponent’s job for him. 
On 25th December Halleck created the Military District of Southwest Missouri 
placed Brigadier General Samuel Curtis in charge and directed him to neutralise 
the threat of Price. Halleck made it very clear that once Price had been dealt 
with those troops on garrison duty within the state would be freed for offensive 
action in co-operation with Buell.457A cautious McClellan took time to agree to 
the plan but on January 13th Curtis advanced on Price.  
 
 
Confederate Reorganisation in Missouri. 
 
          It is symptomatic of Davis’ approach to the Western Theatre that a 
decision which should have been taken for a number of obvious reasons 
needed several months to be reached. On January 10th Davis appointed Major 
General Earl Van Dorn as commander of a new Military District of the Trans-
Mississippi. Van Dorn’s appointment was intended to solve the strained 
relationship between Price and McCulloch, to placate the Missouri lobby in 
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Congress and to more effectively counter Halleck’s increasingly efficient Union 
forces.  
 
          Still nominally under Johnston’s command Van Dorn was Davis’ third 
choice for the post and as it turned out a thoroughly wrong selection.458The 
Missouri lobby had wanted Price for the job but Davis’ personal dislike made 
that impossible459 although he was promised a promotion if enough 
Missourians joined the Confederate army as opposed to remaining in the State 
Guard. By appointing a friend and neighbouring plantation owner from 
Mississippi Davis exercised poor judgement although, as a West Pointer, Van 
Dorn was most certainly not a ‘political’ general of the type which Davis loathed 
but often was obliged to appoint. 
 
          Strategically Price had been reasonably effective up to the appointment of 
Van Dorn, although his objectives were almost exclusively with Missouri in 
mind. McCulloch had for the most part detrimentally stuck to the directions he 
had received from the War Department and had been singularly reluctant to 
exercise any initiative, being castigated by Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin 
for his failure to support Price after Wilson’s Creek, “I cannot understand why 
you withdrew your troops instead of pursuing the enemy...Send an 
explanation.”460It was unfortunate then that Van Dorn failed to recognise his 
primary strategic mission, that of tying down enemy forces by remaining an 
active threat to Missouri and secondly being prepared to co-operate with his 
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Department commander either side of the Mississippi, should that be 
necessary.  
 
           On Van Dorn’s mind from his appointment onward was a rapid offensive 
aimed at the seizure of St.Louis, a fantastic objective both logistically and 
numerically for his relatively small and under equipped army. However he 
began to prepare for just such an offensive by uniting McCulloch’s Confederate 
troops in Arkansas with Price’s Missouri State troops who were being pushed 
steadily south by Curtis’ advance. Just as Van Dorn was about to embark on his 
hastily planned and logistically dubious offensive, the Union forces in Kentucky 
were also about to embark on their long delayed and initially cautious 
campaign after many months of inactivity.   
 
Finding the Right Man. 
 
          The complicated political nature of both Kentucky and Missouri in the Civil 
War can obscure the fact that the need for an effective operational commander 
had not gone away and in fact was just as critical. In the American tradition at 
that time ‘political’ appointees were the norm and professional military men 
distrusted. 461The appointment of any senior officer was in the hands of Lincoln 
and Davis but volunteer regimental officer appointments mostly remained in 
the hands of the governors or local notables. Lincoln had played the system 
reasonably well in terms of securing political control in Kentucky but had 
sacrificed military effectiveness to do this. Davis had been much less successful 
296 
 
but also often unsubtle in terms of upsetting local populaces or various 
lobbyists in Richmond. Some higher appointments were relatively obvious 
Halleck and A.S. Johnston for two but selecting combat commanders at the 
beginning of any war is difficult. A Zealot like Lyon, although dynamic, cannot 
be relied upon to be objective. What was generally needed was a determined 
commander who would fight and not constantly overestimate the enemy, 
someone without their own political agenda who would both follow orders but 
would also use their initiative once on campaign. It was fortunate for Lincoln 
that in Grant he had just this sort of commander.   
 
          Neither Lincoln nor Davis could have personally taken the field in the Civil 
War in the fashion that many North American political leaders had done as 
recently as the 1840s notably the very unsuccessful Dictator Santa Ana in the 
Mexican War. It was occasionally suggested that Davis assume command in the 
West but it was never practical. Some of the Confederate Governors took the 
field a few times or acted as aides-de-camp and indeed governors from both 
sides directed local forces against enemy incursions from their desks. Indeed 
Lincoln himself attempted to direct federal forces against Jackson in the Valley 
Campaign of May-June 1862 and predictably suffered strategic defeat as much 
as his field commanders were beaten in the field.462 However what was 
possible and absolutely necessary was the backing and exploiting the successes 
of any general who appeared to be capable of defeating the enemy. 
 
          Appointed a regimental Colonel by Illinois Governor Yates, Grant’s early 
Civil War career developed without moving out of the same geographical area 
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for long. Grant’s steady successes, once appointed to head the District of Cairo, 
continued under the orders of the various evolutions of the Department of the 
West. Grant remaining resident in this area of operations despite the 
contention over his proper place in the command chain, Buell not unreasonably 
requesting that all Kentucky, as Tennessee, be subject to his Department of the 
Ohio. However Halleck protested vigorously enough for the status quo to be 
maintained, co-operation being promised in the much discussed offensive in 
Kentucky. Grant had shown while under Fremont’s command that he was well 
capable of independent offensive action culminating with his attack and seizure 
of Belmont in the first week of November.463  
 
          The centre piece of a number of co-operative movements throughout the 
District of Cairo in both states, at Belmont Grant personally directed the attack 
and defeat of a Confederate regiment encamped at this small Missouri hamlet 
opposite Columbus on the Mississippi. Superior forces under Polk and Pillow 
had driven him back by the end of the 7th but the strategic nerve had been 
touched and both these men were convinced that Columbus would be the 
principle objective of any offensive in Kentucky. Their thinking being Union 
control of the Mississippi would expose the left flank of Johnston’s main force 
at Bowling Green. Confederate engineering resources and heavy artillery units 
were now prioritised for Columbus and the large infantry force deployed to 
protect it would be moved away only very reluctantly. It was also Grant who 
recognised the gap between Bowling Green and Columbus was the area which 
promised greatest results if attacked.  
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           An additional factor in the correct prosecution of strategy in a wartime 
democracy is the apportioning of credit and blame. It can be argued that the 
American style of warfare in the mid-nineteenth century valued this facet of 
warfare very highly. The jockeying for position of Halleck, Buell and McClellan in 
January and February 1862 is a singular example of senior generals reluctant to 
take a risk for fear of one of their rivals taking advantage of any failure. The 
lessons of the Mexican war were also in the mind of many of the Union 
generals; be they professionals, West Pointers returned to the colours or 
political appointees. The Mexican War having seen Zach Taylor take the White 
House, Winfield Scott get close and Jefferson Davis rise to national political 
influence on the back of battlefield success and the resultant popular acclaim.  
 
          Where the duration and final outcome was still uncertain, as was the 
nature of the war to come, the political rewards at the conclusion of the 
conflict for those deemed to have been successful were a factor in the minds of 
many senior generals.  It was then fortunate for all three and for the United 
States that Grant had no interest in this sort of game and was only interested in 
finding and engaging the enemy.464 It was also fortunate that Lincoln 
recognised that he could and should force co-operation between Halleck, Buell 
and McClellan. Benjamin Franklin Cooling describes this inertia as tiresome and, 
“Insensitive to political urgency.”465 Lincoln’s task in carrying the burden of this 
initiative was to support a general who could handle this urgency without 




Objective Identified: The Twin Forts. 
 
          McClellan, Halleck and Buell had all eventually identified the centre of 
Johnston’s line as being the correct target for an offensive. McClellan had in 
mind Buell striking towards Bowling Green while Halleck tied down potential 
reinforcements with a simultaneous diversion further to the west. This 
diversion was to be carried out with troops from Grant’s District of Cairo. 
However Halleck stalled over co-operation with Buell. It was fortunate once 
again that McClellan fell ill at the end of December and Lincoln in effect stood 
in and enquired as to the state of co-operation between the two and found that 
none existed. When McClellan recovered in the first week of January he had no 
choice but to keep demanding Buell and Halleck act. Slowly but surely the 
Union war machine prepared to attack.466  
 
          Although it could be argued that Johnston had an advantage over Halleck 
and Buell simply because he had sole control over the direction of troops in the 
theatre, as opposed to their divided command, this advantage was offset by 
many disadvantages. Johnston’s main disadvantage was still a lack of resources, 
both men and equipment. Johnston also lacked firm support from Davis as 
opposed to his Union counterparts who were urged on by Lincoln to co-operate 
and given more resources to further encourage action. 
 
           As January began any command advantage was scant consolation to 
Johnston as the overall numerical discrepancy between himself and his 
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opponents was growing, even though they were not as yet aware of how 
much.467 As yet there had been no reinforcements sent from the east to his 
department and in fact he had been faced with competition from the Virginia 
army for the purchase of supplies. The worst example of the lack of priority 
assigned to Johnston’s forces being the instruction from the War Department 
to ship east some of those supplies he had painstakingly stockpiled. Johnston 
was also still paying the price for mistakes made by Governor Harris.468 
 
          Harris had been well aware of the vulnerability of central Tennessee to an 
advance along both the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers and had ordered the 
construction of defences along both to counter this. Running parallel to each 
other north to south for roughly 40 miles both rivers were 10 miles apart as 
they crossed into Tennessee from Kentucky, although the border was in places 
irregular rather than a perfect east to west line. Just inside Tennessee the 
Cumberland turned east towards Nashville while the Tennessee continued due 
south towards Alabama. The first problem was Harris prioritising the defence of 
the Mississippi and as such heavy artillery and engineering units were not 
committed early enough. Secondly Harris had counted on Kentucky’s neutrality 
enduring to protect his state which also prevented occupation of the best 
points on the Tennessee for construction of fortifications which were in fact 
over the state line in Kentucky. Finally Harris, for political reasons, could not 
compel Nashville plantation owners to provide slaves for war construction work 
while the state was not yet in the Confederacy and only half heartedly when 
she formally joined. 
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          Johnston took over a situation where plans for the construction of two 
forts one, Fort Henry, on the east bank of the Tennessee and the other, Fort 
Donelson, on the west bank of the Cumberland were far behind schedule.469 He 
compounded the situation by not effectively overseeing or garrisoning the 
fortifications as they gradually took shape.470However by January, just as the 
Union High Command began to recognise the ‘twin rivers’ as a way of avoiding 
a direct assault against  the ‘huge’ forces Johnston had assembled in Columbus 
and Bowling Green, the Confederate leadership began to recognise both forts 
as being vulnerable to such a movement and belatedly sought to reinforce. 
Harris and Johnston both became worried at the same time about Henry and 
Donelson and did begin to rectify the situation, the latter sending an envoy to 
Davis pleading for assistance “I can do nothing for him”471 was the reply 
although this was not quite true. Davis elected to rid himself of the ‘problem’ of 
General Beauregard472 by sending him as ‘Second-in-Command’ to Johnston 
and by sending John B Floyd’s small Virginian brigade to Bowling Green; the 
latter appointment would prove to be disastrous. 
 
          Despite the high levels of political pressure generated by the situation in 
the Border States in January 1862 it still involved a classic military problem for 
both sides. Despite the disparity in resources both had sufficient to achieve 
their respective objectives especially if the enemy made too many incorrect 
decisions. This decision making depended on the calibre of the many generals 
involved and this was soon shown to be highly variable. It would also depend 
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on the efficiency of the command chain and the working relationships between 
Lincoln and Davis and their generals.  
 
 
Union Offensives Launched. 
 
          Grant was ordered by Halleck on January 6th to make a demonstration 
against both Columbus and along both the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers. 
In a comprehensive series of movements completed by the 17th he did just that, 
increasing once more the anxiety felt by Polk for Columbus but also alerting 
Johnston to the mobility of Grant’s force due to the support provided by the 
Navy’s gunboats and steamer-transports. It also became quite obvious that 
movement by steamer was much more efficient than by a road network made 
almost impassable by winter mud. Movement by water was to prove much 
more flexible than by the railroads which could be destroyed or damaged by a 
retreating enemy. Just as this threat to his left-centre developed Johnston was 
informed of a crushing defeat on his right where a ‘political general’ once again 
displayed inevitable naivety.    
 
           In response to pressure from Lincoln and the ‘Loyal’ Tennesseans Buell 
ordered his First Division, under Thomas, to advance against Zollicoffer’s force 
which occupied Mills Springs, eastern Kentucky, on the Cumberland River.473 
This force firmly blocked any invasion route into eastern Tennessee and would 
need to be defeated should any major offensive be launched. Receiving the 
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order on 29th December Thomas began moving two weeks later. Included in his 
force was the so-called “East Tennessee brigade” of Samuel Carter.  
 
         Zollicoffer had correctly blocked the Cumberland at Mill Springs but had 
blundered by crossing the bulk of his force over the river and digging in on the 
opposite bank. By leaving his army exposed against a superior force of 
uncertain numbers with a major river at his back Zollicoffer had betrayed his 
lack of formal military education. By the time George Crittenden finally arrived 
on January 7th to take over command from Zollicoffer it was no longer possible 
to withdraw as the river was too high. Realising that Thomas was assembling a 
superior force it was resolved that a surprise attack on his force before it was 
ready to strike was the only option.  
 
           Zollicoffer’s death at Logan’s Cross Roads (Mill Springs to the South) on 
January 19th after a soaking wet night march and a hard fought repulse by 
Thomas exposed Johnston’s right flank for what it was, largely a bluff. Rather 
than follow up however Buell argued the paucity of Rebel numbers diminished 
the need for any direct offensive into eastern Tennessee and moreover proved 
that large forces could not be supplied in any case.  
 
            Crittenden’s career was destroyed along with his army and he retreated 
80 miles back into Tennessee and as Thomas Connelly has pointed out suffered 
a huge loss of, “Prestige … in the Tory counties of East Tennessee and 
Kentucky.” 474 Historians have divided their blame between Crittenden and 
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Zollicoffer, the author of the only comprehensive study, Kenneth Hafendorfer, 
blaming Crittenden more than Zollicoffer475 but it is actually militarily, if not 
politically, irrelevant as Buell never had any intention of launching a major 
offensive against Johnston’s right. This defeat did however serve to divert 
Johnston’s attention away from what Halleck might be doing in western 
Kentucky to what Buell might be doing to force him out of Bowling Green. 
 
         The subsequent success of Grant’s attack against Forts Henry and 
Donelson has served to muddy the waters in terms of who should get credit for 
ordering the offensive and why. Kendall Gott makes it clear that Grant saw the 
opportunity and asked Halleck to authorize an attack on Fort Henry which 
Halleck initially refused to discuss. Ironically it seems that rumours of 
Beauregard’s arrival with a fictitious 15 regiments made up Halleck’s mind to 
act without asking for McClellan’s permission or consulting Buell.476On February 
2nd Grant’s orders arrived followed very rapidly on the 4th by the bombardment 
of and the landing of troops from transports in the Tennessee against Fort 
Henry. 
 
          The main events of Forts Henry and Donelson are readily available if not 
as widely known as the authors of the small number of comprehensive studies 
would like. What is very clear is that Grant had identified the Confederate weak 
spot and struck hard. The incomplete and flooding Fort Henry fell on the 6th; 
Grant had personally seized the initiative and intending to hold it planned to 
advance overland the 12 miles to Donelson when ready, regardless of whether 
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any support came from Buell. Grant’s initial success compelled Halleck to ship 
all available reinforcements and supplies to Fort Henry as they became 
available. With the defeat at Fort Henry ,scandalised by the  flooding of the low 
lying gun batteries in the fort due to poor engineering, the true shambles of 
Confederate military and political control in the West was about to be 
exposed.477       
 
           Grant, largely on his own initiative, marched against Fort Donelson 
reaching it on the 12th. Johnston had six days to respond to the fall of Henry but 
failed to correctly do so. Gott very accurately sets out Johnston’s options on the 
morning of the 7th and points out that under Davis’ grand strategic concept a 
fight to hold Donelson and defeat Grant’s army would have been the correct 
move.478Defeating an isolated portion of a numerically superior opponent 
would also have been the militarily correct decision. It is likely, but by no means 
certain, that Beauregard who arrived in time for Johnston’s council of war in 
Bowling Green on the 7th was in favour of concentrating against Grant as was 
Hardee. However this did not occur and under what Cooling has described as, 
“Muddled indecision”479Johnston decided to abandon both Columbus and 
Bowling Green as both had been outflanked by Grant. Johnston, however, also 
decided to reinforce Donelson but not by enough to be sure of defeating Grant. 
Meanwhile Johnston visualised a concentration of his army in a secure position 
prepared by the state of Tennessee for such an occasion. This concentration 
would, it was hoped, still allow the defeat of an isolated smaller Union force; 
thus wresting the initiative back from Union forces.  
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           Grant pressed the attack on Donelson and as a result forced Halleck to 
back the offensive and eventually also forcing Buell to move on Bowling Green 
as the Confederates fell back. While the tactical details remain unimportant 
Grant’s successful siege of Fort Donelson, 12th-16th February, ending in the 
surrender of nearly 12,500 Confederates480 was a huge success and the clearest 
of the war so far both tactically and strategically. The senior Confederate 
commanders at Fort Donelson arrived too late to have any significant impact in 
preparing its defences, also proved to be mediocre to very poor when the 
battle commenced. Pillow and Floyd the two senior generals escaped, to 
ridicule and censure destroying their careers481, leaving Buckner to surrender. 
Buckner’s friendship with Grant having no effect on the latter’s demand for 
unconditional surrender. At least 1000 Kentuckians joined Buckner in surrender 
although most, like he, would be exchanged and fight again. 
 
          One of the reasons the battles at Fort Henry and Donelson had been 
largely overlooked for many years is the slaughter house of Shiloh followed 
them by just two months. Shiloh, at the time, was both the biggest and 
bloodiest battle in recorded history on the North American continent. The 
sheer scale of the battle has also overshadowed the argument and indecision in 
the Union High Command over just how to exploit the successes at the twin 
forts. 
 
           Shiloh’s bloodbath has also obscured just how quickly and how far the 
Confederates were forced to retreat and the impact such a defeat and 
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withdrawal had on pro-Confederate support in Kentucky. The routing of the 
‘Provisional Government’ and ‘Governor’ removing the only measure of semi-
permanent political control exercised by the Confederacy in the Border States 
and landing a near fatal blow to their claims of legitimacy. For the Union a new 
set of difficulties were about to be encountered over which parts of Tennessee 
were to be ‘liberated’ first and the political framework required to ensure 
Tennessee’s ‘loyalty’. 
 
          Political symbolism played a large part in the fighting around the Border 
States, the collapse of Johnston’s entire defensive strategy significantly 
undermined confidence in the long term future of the Confederacy amongst 
her supporters there. Johnston’s hopes of fighting a decisive battle in defence 
of Nashville also came to nothing when he discovered the defensive works he 
believed to be present were in fact wholly inadequate.482 Forced to abandon 
the city Johnston’s loss of prestige was great as he realised that he would have 
to abandon nearly the whole of western and central Tennessee being then 
persuaded by Beauregard to concentrate the army just south of the state line at 
Corinth, Mississippi. Meanwhile troops from Buell’s army arrived in Nashville at 
the end of February; they had advanced on Bowling Green following the fall of 
Fort Donelson to find Johnston gone. The heart of the political struggle 
between Southern Unionism and Southern Nationalism, along with the 
question of Federal war aims, was about to be played out in the debate of how 




A Question of Loyalty 
 
          What makes the struggle for the Border States and their immediate 
southern neighbours in 1861/2 so different from the rest of the war and 
difficult for any question of civil-military relationships is the complexity of there 
being no clear popular support for any of the combatants on a state wide basis. 
Indeed in a war fought to uphold the Constitution, secession was viewed by 
unionists as unlawful and therefore did not exist. However the rebellion was a 
fact and the blockade of southern ports granted de facto status to the 
Confederacy as a combatant within Europe and other European run societies. 
Within this legal paradox ‘loyalty’ and ‘Constitutional rights’ impact directly, not 
only on the civil-military structure but also on the conduct of each individual 
army and each soldier within. 
 
          Stephen Engle has observed the capture of Nashville, “Proved to be for 
Buell and Lincoln a curse as well as a blessing, since it accentuated the perils of 
civil-military problems.”483The city brought the first significant clash between 
the federal civil and military authorities over what to do with newly occupied 
areas which had been firmly under Confederate control for a significant amount 
of time. Buell’s arrival in Nashville allowed him to adopt his own policies on 
how the war should be conducted in terms of the stance adopted toward 
southern civilians; this was to be in the form of general leniency to all but the 
most extreme secessionists. As Engle has also observed Buell was in fact faced 
with the first task of political reconstruction in the South. A task also faced 
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within a time of yet more change within the Union High Command now driven 
by a Republican dominated Congress, itself buoyed by the recent victories and 
now also pressing for more fundamental war aims. 
 
          On February 26th Buell issued General Orders 13a to the Army of the Ohio. 
Expressing his belief that in effect secession was a rash and emotional act and 
that loyalty to the Union would once again be evident in Nashville. However he 
continued, 
 
          We are in arms, not for the purpose of invading the rights of our fellow 
countrymen anywhere, but to maintain the integrity of the Union and protect 
the Constitution... We cannot, therefore look with indifference on any conduct 
designed to give aid and comfort to those endeavouring to defeat these 
objects... 484             
 
           
          Buell remained constant in this belief throughout the war as did 
McClellan, it was also a belief held at that time by the War Department, since 
January that year headed by Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton. It was then 
most unfortunate for Buell that his relationships with both McClellan and 
Halleck was about to be fundamentally changed. Not only were Buell’s 
professional relationships about to change the traditional role of the politician 
in the affairs of the United States military was also to see new precedents set.    
 
          Two decisions made by Lincoln impacted directly on civil-military 
relationships in Tennessee and the wider Union command structure in the 
Western Theatre. The first was the appointment on March 4th of Andrew 
Johnson as Military Governor of Tennessee. A very notable first in the history of 
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the United States, Lincoln’s appointment of Johnson was popular with 
Republican politicians and included an arbitrary commission of Brigadier 
General. Unanimously endorsed by the Senate these appointments were 
generally not at all popular amongst the long-service West Pointers 
commanding in the West. Johnson’s arrival in Nashville on March 11th coincided 
with Lincoln’s second pivotal decision, Presidential War Order No. 3. This order 
removed McClellan from his position of General-in-Chief to just command of 
the Army of the Potomac, promoted Halleck to command a new Department of 
the Mississippi with Buell reduced to his subordinate. These changes removed 
McClellan’s direct influence from the war in the West and as a result his 
support for Buell and at once elevated Halleck’s to de facto senior military 
strategist in the Western Theatre. This military strategy would now have to 
work with Lincoln’s gradually changing political objectives but was none the 
less, on paper at least, a much more traditional and effective command 
arrangement. 485   
 
          Stephen Engle has written at length about Buell’s role and the wider civil-
military situation in Tennessee in 1862. Engle recognises the appointment of 
Andrew Johnson as the first indication of a change in the political direction of 
Lincoln in terms of war aims. Further arguing that even the appointment of the 
Democratic leaning Halleck to ‘Army Group’ command in the West was actually 
a simplification of the command structure which weakened the Democratic 
Party’s control over military policy.486 It was however Johnson’s appointment 
which caused more friction. 
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          The relationship between Buell and Johnson was now worse than it had 
been in the previous year and centred on Buell’s failure to recapture unionist 
eastern Tennessee as opposed to the largely still pro-Confederate west and 
central portions of the state. Johnson’s immediate adaption of a heavy handed 
policy in Nashville soon undid any progress made by Buell in undermining 
Confederate support in central Tennessee and had the added effect of dividing 
the  divisional commanders in the Army of the Ohio. Depending on their 
background many officers had strong views on what stance should be followed 
in regard to southern citizens. The majority of career military professionals like 
Nelson supported Buell’s view of the dangers of a politician as military 
Governor while those more ‘politicised’ generals, such as Ormsby Mitchel, 
whose views on slavery became more radical when they saw the institution 
firsthand, opposed Buell and became the majority over time.487 More to the 
point, even though still a Democrat, Johnson was a member of the Committee 
on the Conduct of the War and as a former two-time Governor of Tennessee 
had every intention of maximising this deliberately ill-defined role given to him 
by the President.  
 
          Halleck also quickly moved to take revenge on Grant for the perceived 
stealing of his glory by sacking the victor of the twin forts and by severely 
restricting Buell’s freedom of action. Grant however was reinstated following 
Lincoln’s intervention but Halleck’s strategic vision was clearly succeeding in 




Missouri: Strategic Diversion 
 
          Halleck’s vision for the war in the Border States was vindicated by the 
success achieved by Brigadier General Curtis in Missouri. Driving Price out of 
the state was a strategic victory and the following advance into Arkansas 
supported Lincoln’s Southern Unionist political agenda.  








Note the importance of the telegraph road to offensives into and from 
Missouri. Also note the geographic isolation of forces operating in south-
western Missouri from those in Columbus; the state being roughly 300 miles 




          Fortunately for Curtis, an army careerist and a seasoned West Point 
Graduate of the class of 1831, despite local pressure to stay the survival of his 
army was more important than the Unionists of north-western Arkansas. In 
order to preserve his army Curtis fell back when the Confederates showed signs 
of offensive action. This military sense was fully vindicated in early March.   
 
          Grant’s offensive against the twin forts was launched in February at 
precisely the same time as Van Dorn was attempting the impossible task of 
advancing on St.Louis. Van Dorn’s movement, initially towards Springfield was 
of no strategic benefit to Confederate forces in Kentucky. At no time were Van 
Dorn’s forces in a position to threaten any Union forces in south-eastern 
Missouri or able to rapidly move to reinforce Johnston’s main concentrations 
east of the Mississippi. Dangerously too Curtis had carried out his instructions 
rather well, chasing Price out of Missouri but just as he crossed into Arkansas 
he found Van Dorn moving against him. Curtis, adopting a defensive stance, 
asked Halleck for reinforcements on 22nd February and was refused488. Halleck 
was well aware of his strategic priorities and instead fed reinforcements to 
Grant, also not without thoughts of stealing some of the glory of recent victory 
for himself. A rapidly advancing Van Dorn finally caught up with Curtis in the 
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first week of March just south of the Missouri state line and attacked his 
positions at Pea Ridge/Elkhorn Tavern with a risky and too hastily carried out 
flanking attack. 
 
          Some, William Shea and Earl Hess489 among them, have viewed the battle 
of Pea Ridge as the decisive battle of the Civil War in the Trans-Mississippi, in 
many ways because it was the biggest in scale, but it was not that decisive, 
there was no possibility the Confederates could hope to regain what had been 
lost the previous year. Van Dorn’s attack on March 7-8th with an army of 17,000 
against 11,000 resulted in a bloody repulse490 due largely to shortage of 
supplies and lack of training for the new, often unenthusiastic, recruits he had 
hastily assembled. Shea and Hess have credited much of the Union success to 
Halleck’s strategy of securing Missouri before moving on Kentucky. Both, rather 
optimistically, believe that Van Dorn could have reached either the Missouri 
River or St.Louis491 however they are absolutely correct in assessing the huge 
defeat of Van Dorn as removing any conventional threat to Union operations in 
Missouri. Van Dorn’s subsequent flight from the battlefield freed up large 
numbers of troops tied down in garrisons to be sent to reinforce Grant’s 
success in Tennessee. Of course in response Johnston’s and Beauregard’s calls 
for Van Dorn to reinforce their forces were much harder to implement and 
subsequently forces which, had they been present on the first day of Shiloh 
may have been decisive, arrived in Corinth nearly a month late. 
 
          By luck rather than judgement Union forces under Grant survived 
Johnston’s surprise attack at Shiloh on 6th/7th April. Johnston’s concentration, 
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without Van Dorn, was just a few days too late to crush Grant before Buell 
arrived to win the battle on the second day. Halleck’s strategic concentration 
had proved enough to deny Johnston the crushing victory he required to undo 
some of the damage suffered since early February. General A.S. Johnston was 
killed on the field with his aide-de-camp, Tennessee Governor Harris, helplessly 
watching him bleed to death. Also killed was Kentucky’s Confederate 
‘Governor’ George Johnson fighting as a volunteer with the Kentucky ‘Orphan 
Brigade’. Shiloh should have ended the fight for Kentucky, also probably the 
war in the Western Theatre and therefore shortened the entire conflict, but it 
did not.     
 
          The Confederacy and pro-secessionists in the Border States had suffered 
two large scale strategic defeats at the hands of the Union by the end of April 
1862. It clearly should have been the end of the War in practical terms had the 
victory at Shiloh been followed up correctly. However sowing the seeds for the 
returning of campaigning to Kentucky Lincoln would once again turn his 
attention to eastern Tennessee, the need to support Southern Unionism and to 
retain control of the volatile areas of the newly ‘liberated’ South. This fixation 
underlines why the Border State struggle affects civil-military relations so much 










          This case study has tried to show that while clearly Kentucky was the 
crucial base for the first successful Union offensive of the war, the situation in 
Missouri had an effect on the course of the campaign which has often been 
overlooked. The final act in the Ozark region of Arkansas/Missouri highlights 
precisely the disjointed Confederate strategic approach to the war in the 
Western Theatre in contrast to the Unions more co-operative approach. It 
demonstrates that both sides were handicapped by strong political pressures 
which centred on areas of Southern Unionist and Southern Nationalist support 
straddling both Kentucky and Missouri. Lincoln’s true success being his 
subordination of this pressure to work with his conservative military 
commanders to win a stunning victory despite his stated aim of ‘redeeming’ 
eastern Tennessee.  
 
          Structural problems in civil-military relationships unresolved from the 
formation of the Confederacy and its attempts to expand following the 
bombardment of Sumter had proved costly. It is even arguable that the 
disruptive effect on the war effort caused by Kentucky and Missouri exiles in 
Richmond and the subsequent political pressure to hold as much of these two 
states as possible had become a liability. The command system in the Western 
Theatre, contributing to A.S. Johnston’s daunting task, would have been 
damaging with just the array of mediocre personalities involved, much as in any 
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war, but the unresolved ‘legal’ position of both Kentucky and Missouri vastly 
complicated matters .     
 
          Samuel Huntington’s reasons for the recognition of the Civil War as a 
turning point in civil-military relations within the United States can in some 
ways be supported by the historical aspects of this case study. Lincoln’s 
successful struggle with congress and with a reluctant ‘West Point’ dominated 
conservative high command is clearly in evidence. The new ‘professional’ 
approach also makes its initial appearance in the form of Curtis and much more 
importantly Grant. The chequered career of Fremont, Huntington’s archetypical 
failed political general,492 also has its potentially most disastrous impact in the 
West. However as in the previous two case studies underlying factors run 
through Lincoln’s considerations which complicate the application of his 
theoretical framework; the need to secure politically both Kentucky and 
Missouri by any practical means and to support Southern Unionism at the 
expense of ‘conventional’ military strategy. 
 
          Huntington’s neglect of the Confederacy and the reasons for its demise 
can again be criticised by simply observing the confusion created by an attempt 
to maintain a traditional model of civil-military relations in a highly uncertain 
environment. While recognising Lincoln’s role in Union success and even noting 
its unconstitutional aspect Huntington by not noting the Union’s consistent 
attempt to usurp duly elected governments in Kentucky and Missouri makes life 
much easier for his own theoretical framework. The Committee on the Conduct 
of the War is mentioned a number of times by Huntington as part of a very 
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valid argument that all parts of a federal government will both seek to appoint 
and influence military officers, especially field commanders. Huntington 
characterised the Committee as, “The most extreme example of the mixing of 
politics and strategy.”493 Huntington, by citing the Committee’s conflict with 
McClellan in the East, actually overlooks its far greater influence in the West 
and the Border States, the final case study will show this once more.  
 
            The final case study of this thesis will show that the struggle for Kentucky 
was not over with A.S. Johnston’s death and defeat at Shiloh. It will show both 
offensive and defensive operations by both sides were hugely influenced by the 
regional political situation in both Kentucky and Tennessee. It will demonstrate 
that even with refined command structures compromises to efficiency were 
still forced on both sides because of the unique nature of this region in the Civil 
War. It will also show that the professionalism and skill of the battlefield 
general always remains a vital factor, even in conflicts of high political 
complexity.  
 
                      
 








Case Study 4: The Perryville Campaign June to November 1862 
          
         The final case study covers the most militarily fluid period of the fight for 
Kentucky, culminating in the biggest clash of arms in that state’s history. This 
chapter will demonstrate the contest for Kentucky had still to be decisively 
settled even by the middle of 1862, despite the Union victories of earlier in the 
year appearing to put the contest beyond reasonable doubt. Many of the 
weaknesses in civil-military relationships displayed in the previous case studies 
had still to be eliminated from both sides and will again be demonstrated. This 
case study discusses President Lincoln’s biggest mistake in the Western Theatre 
and examines clear opportunities thrown away by the Confederacy due to 
incompatible political and military objectives and inefficient command 
structures.  
 
            This chapter concludes an 18 month period where the contest for the 
Border States defined the war in the Western Theatre. This hard fought contest 
was decided by quality of leadership, clear political direction and efficient use 
of resources. A close victory won, in the end, by the side with a more flexible 
and effective, if occasionally irregular, civil-military structure. Also a victory won 
where the political characteristics of Kentucky and individuality of her people 
never allowed complete military freedom of action to any general or complete 




          This thesis has attempted to convey that whatever the balance between 
political objectives and purely military strategies at any given time in the 
Western Theatre the Border States retained their influence on both sides’ 
decision making. Both states retained disproportionate political and command 
representation with one or both combatants throughout. What would be called 
the Perryville campaign would illustrate this influence for a final occasion in a 
large scale conventional clash of arms in the Border States.  
 
          The 1862 Kentucky Campaign would still show large scale military 
operations and occupations within a border state had much greater political 
significance and clouded military judgment to a dangerous degree. It has been 
demonstrated in previous case studies how professional military men were 
forced to make decisions in the political realm for which many were largely 
unqualified. Many were of course all too aware of their lack of political 
experience, increasing tensions in relationships with subordinates who owed 
their position purely to political orientation and geographical power base. 
 
          The different civil-military characteristics of the Kentucky campaign were 
in fact recognised by veterans of the war after the conflict, Nathan Shaler in 
1891,    
 
         …most of the campaigns of our civil war afford lessons which are useful 
only to students of military science; [The Kentucky Campaign] is full of 
instruction concerning the relations which may exist between the duty of the 
soldier and the functions of civil government.494 
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          The previous case studies have noted that direct action by relatively junior 
subordinates on the ground had influenced the war in the Border States in a 
number of ways. Lyon and Blair had tipped the hand of the national 
government, with of course approval from Lincoln; Polk had disastrously 
invaded Kentucky on his own initiative and Grant had decisively defeated the 
Confederates with a precisely targeted and executed attack.  
 
          The Kentucky campaign of 1862 is different to previous case studies in a 
number of ways. Firstly the organisation of the conflict had advanced to a level 
where command and control was for the most part potentially and actually 
superior to that of its outbreak. Unlike Pillow and Polk in September 1861 
acting, temporary or short lived commanders were now less common. A field 
army or corps commander now had a better understanding of how to 
command and fight his force both on campaign and in a pitched battle. Both 
Lincoln and Davis could telegraph their respective Army and Department 
commanders more reliably in more given situations than even the latter part of 
1861.  
 
          Secondly the maverick Kentucky or Missouri politician had now largely 
fled, been sacked, resigned, died or been integrated into the civil or military 
structures of the two sides; often as little more than a figurehead. We have 
seen how Hamilton Gamble had installed himself as Governor of Missouri 
relying on his reputation as a politically reliable safe pair of hands to support 
Lincoln’s political goals. In contrast we have also seen the ‘Rebel’ Governors 
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become part of the ‘Border State’ and Trans-Mississippi lobbies in Richmond 
disrupting Confederate strategic clarity and command organisation. Finally any 
sizable individual initiative at this stage in the war was only possible because 
the higher policy makers were indifferent to that part of the war effort or that 
military commander was in direct confrontation with these policy makers, this 
case study will show elements of both.        
 
         It is no coincidence that this case study centres more on the application 
and operation of military strategy; theatres of operations had become much 
more clearly defined by summer 1862 and the formation of significantly larger 
armies an accomplished fact. By mid-1862 of vexed political questions only 
slavery had yet to be directly addressed in terms of a fundamental change in 
United States governmental policy. The future of slavery was of course the 
central political issue for many in Kentucky (and Missouri) and more widely for 
many on both warring sides and for those following events from abroad. 
 
          Previous case studies have demonstrated any discussion about or action 
actually granting any form of emancipation radically altered loyalties in 
Kentucky, even to the extent of men downing arms. It is evident in the gradual 
Union change in policy regarding slavery that Lincoln was growing in confidence 
in terms of the loyalty of the Border States and in the measure of political 
control the federal government exercised. The passage though Congress of the 
two Confiscation Acts495 and the raising of the issue of compensated 
emancipation for the four ‘loyal’ slave states was a sign that Lincoln believed he 
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had both Kentucky and Missouri generally politically secure. However the 
abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia in April 1862 was a signal to all of 
the change in the political objectives of the war which were likely to come in 
the near future, these were likely to demand at least gradual emancipation in 
these four ‘loyal’ slave states. With this desire to overtly bring emancipation 
onto the political agenda had Lincoln misjudged the depth of Kentucky’s 
allegiance at this stage in the war?    
        
          The argument has been stated at the start of this thesis both Kentucky 
and Missouri’s allegiances were absolutely crucial for the outcome of the 
secession dispute and even whether that dispute would develop into armed 
conflict. Within the first two case studies it has been shown that keeping firstly 
Missouri then Kentucky in the Union were major grand strategic victories. The 
third case study highlighted a Union strategic victory derived from a military 
success in direct contrast to its list of failures in Virginia; seemingly securing 
Kentucky permanently and firmly for the Union.  
 
          This case study will cover the relationship between the Western and 
Eastern theatres to a greater degree than previously and also point to how the 
pattern of the war was developing into a form of competition for resources 
between the two. It will show how both theatres were also interdependent and 
that the invasion of Kentucky enhanced the political clout of certain northern 
politicians forcing a rethink in both the political and military relationship 
between Kentucky and the Federal Government. This changed relationship 
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having far-reaching consequences akin to those occurring in Missouri the 
previous year. 
           
          Once again Lincoln’s much surer understanding of how to direct the war 
and his growing sense of what was required to terminate the conflict will 
contrast with Davis’ inability to successfully oversee the Western Theatre. It will 
also show Lincoln’s generally more successful choice of subordinates and more 
importantly his much firmer handling of them. However it will be argued that 
Lincoln was most certainly not infallible. The President made two, arguably 
three, major strategic errors which could have resulted in the destruction of his 
second largest field army and did result in the loss of many of the gains 
achieved in the successful offensive that spring.  
 
          The Union’s advance on Chattanooga, eastern Tennessee in early summer 
1862 and the Confederate response leading to the invasion of Kentucky 
illustrates many of the trends and patterns considered in the previous case 
studies. For the Union these trends are dominated by the near obsession with 
eastern Tennessee displayed by many members of the Lincoln Administration; 
while the Confederacy still fails to implement an efficient command structure 
and prioritise the war in the west. The period June to September also overlays 
the major change in Federal political direction during the war: the debate over 
and the announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation. This case study will 
show that the scope for individual influence below national command level is 
still evident, still driven by the uncertainty of the ‘loyalty’ of the Border States 
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and their environs. This uncertain loyalty is very firm evidence the struggle for 
political control between Southern Unionism and Southern Nationalism was 
still far from over in the Border States. 
           
          Despite partially rationalised command structures and recruitment, 
including the Confederate Conscription Act of April 1862, the roles of the state 
politician and the general in the field still could and did drive or alter national 
command priorities both directly and indirectly. The 1862 Kentucky campaign 
demonstrates, despite the dynamics of a war of increasing intensity, Abraham 
Lincoln is still the pivotal directing force for Union political objectives. It will be 
argued this role often undermined what was regarded by some of his generals 
as correct military strategy. In previous case studies the roles of Lincoln and 
Jefferson Davis have been contrasted and will be done once more in this case 
study, it being perfectly possible that the influence of a subordinate is largely 
due to his superior’s ignorance, indifference or misplaced trust. 
 
         Aside from Lincoln there are a number of influential individuals crucial to 
this campaign and unlike the previous case studies these are now 
predominately professional military men. These generals, in the midst of an 
intensifying war, are now largely reacting to military strategic problems or 
squaring these problems with directions or lack of direction from their political 
masters. In some cases these men have played a part in previous case studies 
but are characterised by having been regarded as being generally successful in 
carrying out their assigned tasks in the initial stages of the war.   
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          On the Confederate side both military and subsequently political decisions 
are dominated by General Braxton Bragg and Major General Edmund Kirby 
Smith as the architects of the advance into Kentucky. These two commanders 
have created a debate which has yet to be resolved over who deserves the 
greater share of the blame for a campaign whose expectations they did most to 
raise. Major General Joseph Wheeler, Confederate Cavalry Chief during the 
invasion, opened the debate by sitting on the fence in his 1880s recollection of 
the campaign.496Such historians as Thomas Connelly,497Stanley Horn,498Grady 
McWhiney,499 and Kenneth Noe500 all devoting considerable space trying to 
apportion blame. This debate, along with the major political decisions taken by 
these two outside of the Davis administration will be discussed below. Others 
too had an impact on Confederate direction at crucial times but the key 
decisions are taken by these men before the campaign’s inception, during its 
active phase and during the subsequent retreat back to Tennessee. 
 
          Militarily the Union side is dominated throughout the course of this 
campaign by the actions of Major General Don Carlos Buell and his Army of the 
Ohio, along with his superior Henry Halleck firstly as Union ‘Army Group’ 
commander in the West then from July as General-in-Chief. Political enemies 
and a lack of support from the military high command led to Buell becoming 
the scapegoat for what was regarded as a near disaster in the North, illustrating 
the magnitude of this campaign in its potential to shape the course of the war. 
Other parties play a vital part but it is the struggle by Buell to fight the war in a 
militarily correct manner despite often direct pressure by Lincoln which holds 
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centre stage. Halleck may be regarded as the referee in a very real sense, Curt 
Anders noting that Halleck tried to avoid being the go-between for the 
uniformed and civilian branches of the military. 501 Although Halleck retained 
his own agendas, both personal and political, these being much in evidence 
since replacing Fremont in Missouri at the end of 1861.  
 
          The wide and influential role of the State Governor in the U.S. Civil War 
has been covered in the previous case studies. What will be shown here is this 
influence can be suddenly increased dramatically when an enemy army is 
marching rapidly towards one’s State. The resurgent political influence of these 
governors will be discussed below both as the campaign approaches its climax 
and in the context of nationwide elections. 
 
          Arguments and recriminations over the course of the 1862 Kentucky 
campaign were often fiery at the time and would go on for years in some cases. 
The culmination of this campaign on the battlefield of Perryville, in early 
October, with Buell’s forces concentrated against Bragg and Kirby Smith’s 
separated and dispersed forces is fascinating. No less telling is the sacking of 
Buell as commander of the Army of the Ohio followed by a court of enquiry, the 
so-called ‘Buell Commission’502, whilst Bragg was backed by Jefferson Davis who 
also supported Kirby Smith’s subsequent promotion.503Throughout the 
campaign Kentucky’s influence in all dimensions was apparent and could not at 
any time be ignored and became the central theme for all decision making. 
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However the campaign was triggered by events in Tennessee and the near 
disastrous position Confederate fortunes had fallen to by the end of April 1862.      
        
           This thesis regarded the failure of the Confederate strategy of 
concentration and the failed destruction of Grant’s isolated army at Shiloh as 
the conclusion of the previous case study. A.S. Johnston’s strategy of 
attempting to hold a 400 mile front with limited natural lines of defence, whilst 
outnumbered greater than 2 to 1 was very likely to fail in the longer term if 
Kentucky and Missouri largely remained under Union control. His death at 
Shiloh trying to reverse this strategic defeat could have heralded the start of 
precipitate Confederate defeat, it did not.  
 
          What astonishes, from a military strategic point of view, is the Union 
adoption of elements of both Johnston’s strategies, largely failing with them 
over a period of at least four months. The Union’s adoption of a ‘defensive 
cordon’ then a hasty concentration against a rapid enemy offensive differed in 
outcome only in the final battle where Union superior numbers achieved 
strategic if not tactical triumph.   As will be shown the blame for these Union 
errors lies in the fixation on eastern Tennessee and its pro-Union populace by 












Map 9. Key features in Kentucky and Tennessee, June to October 1862. 
 
 
Lincoln Targets Chattanooga 
 
          Throughout most of 1862 the unionists of eastern Tennessee (and to a 
lesser extent those of northern Alabama,) were again the paramount focus of 
Union and especially Republican politicians. This focus dominated both the 
political and subsequently military objectives of the Lincoln administration in 
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the Western Theatre. It has been argued by a number of historians, Kenneth 
Noe504 being one; the whole Kentucky campaign of 1862 developed from this 
fixation, which was the strongest indication of faith shown by Lincoln in 
Southern Unionism.   
 
          As would be expected after Shiloh Halleck concentrated his armies to 
match the southern deployment in and around Corinth Mississippi. 
Consequently with a numerical advantage of 2 to 1 Halleck was able to force 
the Confederate army, including the newly, if lately, arrived forces of Van Dorn 
and Price from Arkansas, into a steady retreat. In response to Halleck’s superior 
numbers battle was not offered by new Confederate commander General 
Beauregard. However the Union pursuit was halted without the Confederate 
army being destroyed or brought to battle. Halleck’s ‘Army Group’, now in 
excess of 100,000 men, was instead split up to defend a line which ran from 
northern Mississippi, through northern Alabama into central Tennessee. This 
decision was to have far reaching implications for the Union cause in the 
Western Theatre. 505  
 
          The objective desired by President Lincoln was not the Confederate Army 
but the city of Chattanooga, the gateway into eastern Tennessee. As discussed 
previously Lincoln had installed Andrew Johnson as Federal Military Governor 
of Tennessee, Johnson’s desire to seize that city pressured both Halleck but 
more importantly his subordinate Buell who would be tasked with its capture. 
As a Democrat and still sitting U.S. Senator hailing from eastern Tennessee 
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Johnson’s appointment, as already noted, included the rank of Brigadier 
General.506This complication of civil-military relations in Tennessee had been 
far from ideal in offensive warfare, it would be so again, indeed almost proving 





          There remains a debate over how much relative influence Lincoln and 
Halleck had over Federal strategy in the summer of 1862. Halleck was one of a 
number of key figures in the successful campaign initiated by the fall of Fort 
Henry but his influence was considerably enhanced by his appointment as 
General-in-Chief where his potential for political input was greater. As Stephen 
Ambrose has noted Halleck was still the believer in a war of ‘positions’ he had 
been in the early 1862 battles. Ambrose likening Halleck to a partial follower of 
Jomini507 as his distaste for the Swiss theorists’ decisive battle is marked. 
Halleck has been regarded as flexible and technologically aware, to a degree, 
with his relatively sophisticated stationing of forces following the capture of 
Corinth in June. However his failure to destroy the southern army was a glaring 
error which returned to haunt him. Huntington interestingly noted Halleck’s 
“Professional military ethic”, his defence of the need for scientific professional 
military instruction and his innate conservatism.508  
 
          Throughout this thesis Lincoln’s constant desire to maintain the Union as 
far as possible in its pre-war form has been noted. In both states we have seen 
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Lincoln work with the Southern Unionist elements if possible and more extreme 
Republican elements where necessary to achieve this goal. In early summer 
1862 Lincoln was still very much wedded to the idea of Southern Unionism. The 
often unconstitutional acts required to safeguard loyalty in the Border States 
were to be targeted on eastern Tennessee. Lincoln believed (quite rightly) that 
Unionist presence in eastern Tennessee was still strong and a growing problem 
to the Confederacy. However his desire to give aid, just as in 1861, was 
hampered by the near impossibility of moving and supplying an army in this 
region, much less supplying a local population in rebellion. This rebellion, it 
must be noted, would have been against a Confederacy which still had 
sufficient forces and adequate logistical capabilities to crush even a supported 
uprising in reasonable time with acceptable losses.       
       
          Lincoln’s appointment, in July, of Halleck as General-in-Chief will be 
discussed briefly below but it does show the one clear difference between 1862 
and 1861; a recognition of the need for a more efficient and smoother 
functioning command system on both sides. However the American democratic 
tradition dictated this could not be immune from political pressure and 
interference. It is in this role as a facilitator of political policy directives to the 
military that Halleck made his reputation. Halleck’s appointment was in effect 
as a middleman between Lincoln and his generals; balancing the militarily 
correct with the politically necessary. Curt Anders has described Halleck’s 
relationship with Lincoln at this time as, “...counsel to the President in United 
States versus Confederacy”509, going on to say that Autumn 1862 mixed 
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Lincoln’s political and military activities in such a way as to considerably 
complicate that relationship.510Once again the pivotal nature of this campaign 
makes Halleck’s role more crucial than in the later war years; 1862 being the 
year of ongoing debate and eventual change in the long term political 
objectives of the war in the North.     
 
          As was the case with Lyon and Fremont in 1861 Missouri, the choice of 
army or department commander was perhaps more important for the Union 
than the Confederacy. Relations with the local populace were seen as crucial in 
terms of maintaining a sullen acceptance of Federal occupation if not active 
support in the Border region and more so when formal ‘enemy’ territory was 
reached. The Harney – Lyon disagreements strongly illustrate the danger of 
strident political beliefs within the military itself, much less the appointment of 
true ‘political’ generals as Fremont had been and Frank Blair had become. In a 
different category however is the key Union army commander of the campaign 
Don Carlos Buell. 
     
              Buell’s Army of the Ohio arrived on the second day of the Battle of 
Shiloh to salvage victory and incidentally Grant’s career. Buell was to be once 
more detached by Halleck with the objective of capturing Chattanooga and 
proceeding to ‘liberate’ eastern Tennessee. This initial phase of the campaign 





         Buell’s views on the people of the Confederacy as illustrated in the 
previous case study were generally conciliatory both respecting private 
property and most importantly respecting slave property; in other words a 
conservative and professional West Point view on the supremacy of the 
Constitution as it then stood. Coupled with Buell’s reputation as a solid if 
unspectacular professional soldier his labelling by Stephen Engle as a, “Political 
liability” to the Lincoln administration is unsurprising.511Following a two day 
conference on June 11th Halleck directed Buell to advance along the railroad 
and capture Chattanooga. The role played by Halleck at this juncture is shrewd 
in terms of judging the mood of his political masters but also highlights his 
distaste for a sustained offensive against the opponent’s main army. Stephen 
Ambrose noting  
 
         … Halleck knew that Washington wanted more offensive action from the 
army in the West; he also knew that the slightest promise of activity in East 
Tennessee would dispel Lincoln’s objections to non-aggressive activity in all 
other areas.512  
           
          The very nature of the discussion over the route of advance on 
Chattanooga is illuminating; both generals correctly identifying the Tennessee 
River as being too low to be a reliable supply line and therefore railroads would 
have to be employed. Buell favoured falling back from northern Alabama 
towards Nashville then advancing southeast towards Chattanooga, Halleck 
disagreed and insisted on an advance due east from Huntsville, Alabama. It is 
clear that Lincoln did not want newly liberated Alabama unionists to be 
abandoned. It was this advance which would trigger the military and political 
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machinations leading to the transfer of the war back to central Kentucky. James 
B. Fry, Buell’s Chief of Staff, has written that Halleck’s planning for 1862 was, 
“Based on the supposition that the enemy will not attempt an active campaign 
during the summer.”513Fry concedes that Halleck was under pressure from 
Lincoln this time in the form of Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War,514 “The 
Chattanooga expedition must not, on any account be given up. The President 
regards that and the movement against East Tennessee as one of the most 
important movements of the war.”515 
 
          As his biographer Engle points out, “Buell had been finding reasons not to 
go to East Tennessee since he took command.”516 He was now in no doubt as to 
what was required and with very little room in which to work with in terms of 
obtaining the campaign’s objective his way. Lincoln also was clear in his 
priorities when Major General McClellan called for more troops to be sent from 
the West for operations against Richmond, Halleck’s reluctance to comply was 
backed by the President considering the expedition against Chattanooga as 
being, “Fully as important as the taking and holding of Richmond.”517James Lee 
McDonough argues that only a campaign in eastern Tennessee could satisfy 
both political and military objectives, despite the opening up of the Mississippi 
River by the seizure of Vicksburg being still the primary military objective of the 
Union.518Once again simple strategy would dictate that any objective would be 





A Confederate Offensive in the West: Where to strike? 
        
          Throughout the war to date the main focus for the Confederate High 
Command, including President Davis, had been and would continue to be the 
Virginia front. The movement of the main Confederate Army in the Western 
Theatre from northern Mississippi to central Kentucky coincided almost exactly 
with the series of large scale battles, directed by General Robert E. Lee, fought 
in Virginia from the end of May. These battles, including two major victories at 
the Seven Days and 2nd Bull Run/Manassas, culminated in the Confederate 
invasion of Maryland in September. The irregular and uncertain nature of 
Confederate higher direction of the western campaign is obvious but loose co-
ordination between the two theatres did exist and that relationship will be 
discussed.  
 
         Kentuckian lobbying in Richmond by the summer of 1862 was, like 
Missourian, vocal and persistent from in and out of Congress. Any proposed 
return in force to the Blue Grass State, if practicable, was not likely to be 
objected to by Davis or the War Department for solely that reason. Indeed any 
proposal was likely to be seen as useful in other areas. The strong argument by 
Kentucky congressmen and senior officers that the people of Kentucky were, 
for the most part, true southerners and secessionists waiting for the 
Confederate army to liberate them was a belief that was still widely shared in 
Richmond. Many at least felt that they should share the conviction that the 
Border States were under the ‘Yankee yolk’ and that each state was eagerly 
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awaiting ‘liberation’. Of course everyone recognised that only an invading 
Confederate army could put this belief to the test.   
          
           For the people of Kentucky a question asked several times previously in 
this conflict was again posed when a relatively large, well equipped and veteran 
Confederate army did arrive in their state; how deep was their individual 
support or otherwise for the ‘cause’?  Importantly every Kentuckian knew that 
‘Neutrality’ had long since ceased to be an option and questioned whether any 
large scale Confederate military presence would amount to more than just a 
raid.  The outcome of this campaign depended a great deal on how these 
questions were answered by every pro-southern Kentuckian, and was to have a 
lasting impact on the war in the Western Theatre and on the conflict as a 
whole. It many ways it would be like the failure of the Confederacy in 
Southwest Missouri in 1861/62 which had effectively ended the formal military 
struggle for that border state.  
 
             General Bragg’s relationship with Kentucky and Kentuckians was to be 
crucial to the success or otherwise of the Confederacy in the west in 1862 and 
will be examined closely. However it was Bragg’s rapid turnaround in ‘battle 
worthiness’ of the main southern army, his correct appraisal of Union strategic 
intentions and his innovative use of the new technologies of mid-nineteenth 
century warfare which changed the focus of war in the theatre. By seizing the 
initiative in July 1862 Bragg created a strategic pattern that would dominate 
the war in the west for a year, recovering a fair proportion of that lost with the 
collapse of A.S. Johnston’s defensive line.    
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          Although the senior officer Bragg was theoretically ‘co-operating’ with 
Kirby Smith in Smith’s own department in what would become a ‘joint’ invasion 
of Kentucky. This damning error created by Davis and the Confederate War 
Department was very much reminiscent of the chaos seen in the late summer 
and autumn of 1861 covered in previous case studies. Whatever their political 
and military objectives in Kentucky the Confederacy had to obtain them with 
individuals at cross purposes. Without a firm political hand, similar to Lincoln’s, 
both Bragg and Kirby Smith were not able to focus on their military objectives. 
Beyond approving both generals’ plans Davis played, as Jones and Hattaway 
noted, only a, “Small role”, in the campaign but did influence Bragg to support 
Kirby Smith, then war in Virginia dominated his time.519 
 
          The very same pro-unionist sentiment displayed in the east of the state 
which prevented Tennessee from seceding before Fort Sumter had never gone 
away, despite the failure of Federal operations from Kentucky in 1861 to ever 
amount to anything sustained or practical. This unionism had proved a constant 
thorn in the side of the Confederacy, the War Department responding by 
creating the Department of East Tennessee to deal directly with the problem. 
Appointed to command this Department in February 1862 was Major General 
Edmund Kirby Smith. 
 
          Kirby Smith’s brief as department commander was quite clear; railroad 
links from Virginia to the West must be kept open at all costs especially the 
major hub, Chattanooga. In addition pro-Union guerrillas were to be 
suppressed, the new Conscription Act520 to be fully enforced and the mountain 
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people’s pro-unionist sentiment to be pacified in order to maintain the steady 
flow of valuable resources to the slowly industrialising parts of the 
Confederacy. For these objectives the small departmental force hovering 
between 10-15,000 men was both dispersed and inadequate to oppose a 
substantial Union expeditionary force on its own should that situation occur. 
Geographically the department also held the Cumberland Gap and the City of 
Knoxville , the former an old immigrant trail into Kentucky on the right of Kirby 
Smith’s 180 mile defence line, both being key strategic objectives for either 
side. The route of controversy on the Confederate side of this campaign lies in 
Kirby Smith and his Department and in his relationship with the man he asked 
to assist him in his primary mission of securing Chattanooga; Bragg. 
 
          It will always remain uncertain as to who was true originator of the 
Confederate invasion of Kentucky. What is not in doubt was Braxton Bragg’s 
clear intent to regain the strategic initiative in the west and his extensive efforts 
to prepare his forces to capitalise on Halleck’s and Lincoln’s mistakes. When all 
Union offensive operations except that on Chattanooga were halted Bragg was 
presented with a choice of when to strike but could not decide how and where. 
 
          Buell has been accused at the time, and since, of being slow in his 
advance on Chattanooga, Ambrose being one critic,521 thus allowing Bragg to 
first reinforce the city then transfer the bulk of his army via a roundabout rail 
journey. However James Lee McDonough believes in the summer of 1862, 
“Buell’s generalship would have to be judged as more positive than negative. 
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Even... with 20/20 hindsight the general’s conduct of the campaign appears 
responsible and reasonable.”522Buell was forced to detach garrisons at regular 
intervals as he advanced further into enemy territory to prevent attacks on his 
supply lines which were becoming both effective and constant. In addition 
Lincoln’s and Halleck’s decision not to finish off Bragg’s army allowed Bragg to 
move anywhere he desired, literally as Richmond gave him no firm orders. 
Thomas Connelly has characterised the Confederate High Command’s attitude 
to both Bragg and Kirby Smith as one of, “Inattention.”523     
 
          Militarily Kirby Smith had no choice but to call on Bragg for support, the 
latter recognising that by moving to Chattanooga he would not only outflank 
the Union forces in northern Mississippi, northern Alabama and Tennessee but 
also potentially isolate Buell. Historical disagreement begins at this very point 
as to how much persuading was necessary by Kirby Smith in order to get Bragg 
to move. It seems, however, that Bragg had been developing a plan for just 
such a move and the urgency of Kirby Smith’s requests served to put these 
plans in motion.  
 
Bragg Moves Out. 
 
           Many military historians would regard Bragg’s movement of the 35,000 
man Army of Mississippi from Tupelo, Mississippi to Chattanooga as one of the 
most brilliant of the whole war. This swift movement, showing, “a perceptive 
knowledge of the value of railroads”524 , took just 10 days to transfer the bulk 
of the army, the last elements arriving on July 30th with the supply train arriving 
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steadily afterwards. The genius of the movement was the indirect nature of the 
800 mile route utilised, the irony being that the unavailable direct route was 
the very same railroad (the Memphis & Charleston) then being used by Buell. 
Everything was to prove that Bragg had made the correct initial move.525    
 
         Equally important was the first face to face meeting between Bragg and 
Kirby Smith in Chattanooga on July 31st where uncertain offers of co-operation 
were made and the first real disagreement encountered. Thomas Connelly 
sums up neatly the different objectives followed by both men, “For Kirby Smith 
it was Kentucky; for Bragg it seemed to be Buell.”526  
 
          Bragg favoured an advance into middle Tennessee aimed at recapturing 
Nashville following the defeat of Buell who was to be cut off before he could 
fall back on the city which formed part of his supply matrix. Nashville was a 
Confederate political objective but clearly would only certainly fall with the 
defeat of Buell’s army. Kirby Smith, whose army was now concentrated 100 
miles to the east of Bragg, favoured co-operation but only once in Kentucky. 
Kirby Smith, in the words of Kenneth Hafendorfer, “playing the part of the great 
conqueror”,527 was partly swayed by the need to recapture the Cumberland 
Gap which he had been forced to abandon when Buell advanced on 
Chattanooga and also by reports he received from Colonel John Hunt Morgan 
joyfully predicting 25,000 to 30,000 volunteers ready to join the southern army 




          The role of Morgan has often been seen as only of marginal importance in 
the war; a series of destructive and increasingly ambitious raids into Kentucky 
culminating in a spectacular pursuit and surrender north of the Ohio in July 
1863. Morgan when considered as a Kentucky (not Confederate) popular hero 
in the summer of 1862 carried weight with many, his observations regarding 
the situation in pro-southern areas of the state did have an impact. Militarily 
Morgan’s raids, in conjunction with those of Brigadier General Nathan Bedford 
Forrest, in mid 1862 indirectly slowed Buell’s advance on Chattanooga, 
facilitated the Confederate offensive but also alerted Federal authorities to the 
possibility their political control of Kentucky could be threatened and was far 
from total. 
           
          Bragg had also heard from other sources, not the least from Kentuckians 
under his command, Kentucky was still receptive to the Confederacy if only an 
army could be sent, but initially it was his intention to unite for a decisive battle 
near Nashville for “The redemption of Middle Tennessee”.529Bragg had been 
under pressure from both the Kentucky and Tennessee lobbies, the latter in the 
form of Governor Harris demanding that Nashville be retaken, but he still 
reasoned Buell would have to be defeated. Somewhere along the line Bragg 
changed his objective.  In the two pronged offensive it was decided that Kirby 
Smith would move first by way of the Cumberland Gap (or round it) and then 
Bragg would follow when his supply trains had fully assembled by moving out of 
Chattanooga. Both agreed to unite at some stage, but the controversy 
surrounds where that concentration was to be and who would be in command. 
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Kirby Smith arriving in Kentucky before Bragg had even moved would create 
problems for military objectivity. 
 
Last Hurrah of the Kentucky Lobby. 
 
          It is fair to say that despite its vocal nature by mid-1862 Kentucky’s 
lobbying in Richmond was still unsuccessful in actively changing Davis’ strategic 
policies or in any way directly altering the course of the war. Like those of 
Maryland and Missouri her supporters were not yet the unwelcome orphans 
they would gradually become as the war dragged on so the Presidential ear was 
still reluctantly available if little else. Davis did however promote Breckinridge 
to Major General in April but this was due more for his service at Shiloh than 
pressure from the Kentucky Lobby.530The role of Breckinridge is interesting in 
this campaign as it was largely missing, and serves to highlight Bragg’s real line 
of thought when he first developed plans to regain the initiative. 
 
          Already regarded as one of the foremost brigades in the army, the 
Kentucky ‘Orphan’ brigade instead of being transferred to Chattanooga found 
itself in the Vicksburg garrison under none other than Van Dorn with 
Breckinridge as divisional commander and Mrs Lincoln’s cousin Ben Hardin 
Helm as brigade commander.531 As part of his offensive strategy Bragg had left 
this force along with another under Price to oppose a much larger force left by 
Halleck, under Grant, to defend Union gains in western Tennessee and northern 
Mississippi. It is simply inconceivable that had Bragg originally intended to 
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move directly to Kentucky he would have left this brigade behind. It was only in 
August, after Bragg’s meeting with Kirby Smith, that Bragg requested 
Breckinridge’s presence in the Army, “Your influence in Kentucky would be 
equal to an extra division in my army.”532 At this precise time his division was 
fighting both malaria and the enemy in a vain attempt to recapture Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana, a campaign designed entirely by Van Dorn without Bragg’s 
involvement or concern by the War Department to strategic priorities. Bragg 
was not the only one who recognised the impact a senior Kentucky General 
might have on the campaign as both he and Kirby Smith were determined to 
have the services of Simon Bolivar Buckner in their respective armies. 
 
         Following his capture at Fort Donelson Buckner, not withstanding his 
loathing by Republicans and his labelling as a traitor in some parts, was finally 
exchanged on July 29th and reached Chattanooga on August 18th with a 
promotion to Major General and a position of Divisional Commander in Bragg’s 
army.533 Previous efforts by Buckner to appeal for a widespread popular 
demand for secession in Kentucky had failed but Kirby Smith asked both Bragg 
then the War Department for his services unsuccessfully. Both realised 
however that Breckinridge and more importantly Kentucky troops were more 
useful than Buckner in any invasion. 
 
          The Kentucky Lobby were clever enough to see that once an invasion of 
Kentucky was underway, regardless of how it came about, their influence 
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would be heightened and in a joint letter to Davis on August 18th Kentucky 
Senators and Congressmen made their feelings clear, 
 
          Believing from information derived … that a large majority of the people 
of the state sympathize with the south and that a large proportion of the men 
will at once join your army, we regard it of the highest importance that as many 
officers in the service of the Government are from the State of Kentucky … we 
do not regard this as so important looking to military results, but we desire to 




A Complex Offensive 
 
          The complexity of the Confederate offensive in late summer 1862 would 
be regarded as ambitious with mid-twentieth century communications let 
alone mid-nineteenth and it was not helped by an irrational command 
structure largely the result of both Davis and the War Department’s misreading 
of the strategic requirements of the theatre. 
 
         Bragg had intended his move against the Union as a three pronged attack 
with forces under both Van Dorn and Price combining to occupy or defeat 
dispersed Federal forces in northern Mississippi. This force would then advance 
into western Tennessee to further divert and disperse forces moving against a 
hopefully recombined Bragg/Kirby Smith force. Van Dorn and Price’s track 
record alone would have given cause for concern but the fact that both 
commanded distinct armies under Bragg and not directly under the War 
Department was problematical. The detail is unimportant but the series of 
suggestions given by Bragg to both Van Dorn and Price are both vague and 
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impractical with no specific orders other than to prevent large scale 
reinforcements reaching Buell from forces under Grant’s command and to take 
the offensive if possible. The rail hub of Corinth535, Mississippi was regarded as 
the ideal target as its capture would cause severe disruption to Union forces 
and may have provided an invasion route into western Tennessee.536 
 
          With a promise to Van Dorn that he would command any combined army 
but also by putting the onus on Price to move into Tennessee Bragg completely 
failed to clearly direct these forces. As Peter Cozzens has written, “Cooperation, 
no matter how cordiale, was no substitute for unified command...nor were 
polite suggestions.”537 Clearly the War Department directing a unified 
command would have been far more effective than Bragg attempting to direct 
two districts, but again effective Confederate central direction was still lacking 
in this theatre. Price finally advanced north on September 8th nine days after 
Bragg left Chattanooga but by this time Kirby Smith had nearly destroyed a 
small army under William Nelson at Richmond, Kentucky and was advancing 
rapidly into the Bluegrass with no intention of reuniting with Bragg just yet, 
especially in Tennessee. He was now the driving force of the offensive. William 
C. Davis has traced these command problems directly back to Jefferson Davis by 
not appointing Bragg as theatre commander, by allowing Bragg’s subordinates 
i.e. Davis’ friend Van Dorn direct access and by being the architect of the 




          There is also an argument that Davis facilitated the offensive move into 
Kentucky. At best Davis’ facilitation is considered by Thomas Connelly to have 
“Vaguely” defined the campaign’s objective, the President desiring ‘Governor’ 
Hawes to be sworn in should the offensive successfully reach Kentucky. Davis 
leaving purely political decisions largely to each general other than to give each 
a draft proclamation should an ‘invasion’ be undertaken.539 This proclamation 
was sent to both Bragg and Kirby Smith (along with Lee) on September 12th540. 
However a letter sent to Bragg by Davis on August 5th hints at co-operation with 
Kirby Smith in an offensive aimed at “Crushing Buell”, advancing on Nashville, 
and then the “Liberation of Tennessee and Kentucky”.541Even so this can be 
regarded as little more than advice rather than a directive or carefully 
conceived set of orders.    
 
          In terms of comparison and of co-ordination with Lee’s advance into 
Maryland, Bragg’s advance was much more organised and sustainable and was 
not the pursuit of a defeated army by an exhausted army as was the case of 
Lee’s invasion. Lee had seen the advantages to him of Bragg’s offensive but this 
was hardly co-ordination. By the time Lee crossed the Potomac on September 
5th Kirby Smith was securing central Kentucky with Bragg also advancing rapidly 
northwards, seemingly towards Louisville. All the time of course Lee was 
scarcely more than 100 miles from Richmond, Virginia and in relatively easy 






Buell Under Pressure. 
 
          While the Confederate offensive objectives became increasingly complex 
upon entering Kentucky those of the Union initially simplified. The primary 
military objective soon became the survival of Buell’s Army of the Ohio which 
was in severe danger. Buell’s survival of course depended on the temporary 
abandonment at least of the stated political objective of liberating eastern 
Tennessee. However to withdraw without being absolutely sure where both 
Bragg and Kirby Smith were headed was politically difficult but militarily 
necessary.    
 
          The moment southern reinforcements arrived at Chattanooga it was no 
longer a practical objective for Buell and his political enemies realising this 
increased the accusations against  him of advancing too slowly, even 
deliberately so. The General also faced accusations of being pro-southern or at 
least sympathetic to secession. Engle argues that this slow advance was 
intended to facilitate ease of supply as Buell did not wish to seize provisions 
from the local populace wishing therefore to ease the pressure on his 
overstretched railroad. Buell also wished to deceive Bragg as to his true 
objective.542 However, whatever Buell’s objective Bragg’s move to Chattanooga 
would have forced him to retreat despite political pressures to the contrary. 
Even in retreat Buell was pressured as to just how and where he retreated and 




          The best indication that Bragg had seized the initiative was the four week 
period whereby Buell waited for Bragg to move as other forces were hurriedly 
scraped together to block Kirby Smith’s advance. Calls for Buell’s head 
increased in this period led by Governors Morton, Yates and Tod, of Indiana, 
Illinois and Ohio respectively, the very same governors who had sought to 
interfere in Kentucky the year before. These men were jumpy and had panicked 
at the sight of Morgan riding through Kentucky in June and July, the sight of 
Kirby Smith and the massive army they supposed him to have created a serious 
situation. It may indeed have been this panic which clouded Kirby Smith 
judgement and also persuaded Bragg that Kentucky might now be the proper 
objective. Was there in fact any basis for the fear that Kentucky might yet opt 
for the south? 
 
 
Kentucky in mid-1862: Still ready to back the South? 
 
           John Hunt Morgan’s raiders in summer 1862 were encountering 
Kentuckians who were experiencing an increasingly harsh occupation by 
Federal troops, increasingly backed by Home Guard units. A steady increase in 
the number of arrests throughout the year was a reflection of the control being 
gained by radical Kentuckians.543 Women and Churchmen were not immune 
and no real attempt was made to distinguish between secessionists and those 
with ‘Southern sympathies’. As E.M. Coulter has written, Federal concern was 
to control Kentucky and not to count on its resources naturally falling to 
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them.544 Kirby Smith’s invasion also enabled the Military Board to be abolished 
and all state forces to formally fall under Federal control. The vexed question of 
the rights of Kentucky slaveholders was often settled on an arbitrary basis with 
‘loyalty’ to the Union as the basis for deciding whether slaves were confiscated 
or indeed confiscated without compensation. Many seized slaves were not 
freed only exchanged masters in the form of the US Army for use on military 
projects.545 This use of discretion was a common Union practice in the Border 
States where widespread abandonment of constitutional rights had not ceased 
since the secession crisis erupted. In this climate it is easy to see, along with his 
personal popularity, how Morgan might have overestimated the willingness of 
Kentuckians to fully support an invasion. 
 
          The personification of Federal authority in Kentucky became Jeremiah T. 
Boyle the Military Commander of the District of Kentucky and a native of the 
state; a pattern of appointment repeated in lesser Federal positions to preserve 
the illusion of local control.546Secretary of War Stanton appointed Boyle on May 
27th due to his, “Intimate knowledge of the requirements of the service in his 
state…”547 His reputation for severity against the ‘disloyal’ was matched only by 
his inability to fully counter both regular and irregular Confederate cavalry raids 
into the state. As mentioned above Morgan himself was at least the partial 





          The crackdown was however much more than one of military security it 
was one of obvious and clear desire for firm political control. Boyle issued his 
General Order Number 5 on July 21st 1862 while Bragg was still en-route to 
Chattanooga, 
 
          …To be enforced by military commanders in the District of Kentucky. No 
person hostile in opinion to the Government and desiring its overthrow will be 
allowed to stand for office in the District of Kentucky… in seeking office he 
becomes an active traitor.549   
           
Courts and Provost Marshals too remained in Federal hands,550 another 
indication that if the State itself could not join the Confederacy, the 
Confederacy would therefore have to ‘redeem’ the state regardless of popular 
will. A pattern evident in all case studies is the determination of Union 
authorities to break any independent state powers in both Kentucky and 
Missouri. The Kentucky Militia Law was amended on May 6th compelling locally 
raised troops to swear allegiance to both Kentucky and the United 
States.551There can be no doubt that many of these policies was linked to the 
ongoing discussions within the Lincoln administration and the Republican party 
over the future of slavery and therefore the political direction of the war and 
specifically its potential impact on the upcoming November elections.  
 
          Previously any move towards any form of emancipation was largely 
dependent on political stability and Union military success in the border 
area.552Lincoln quickly rejecting any unilateral attempt by his military 
commanders to free slaves as Fremont had found in 1861 Missouri. Despite 
getting both houses of Congress to agree to a resolution on compensated 
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emancipation by early April 1862, Alan Guelzo has noted it was becoming clear 
that, “ …whatever Lincoln might have thought about the vulnerability of slavery 
in the Border, the Border States wanted to hear nothing about emancipation, 
compensated or otherwise.”553  
 
          Guelzo is quite right in saying that while the Union appeared to be 
winning the war in both theatres in spring and early summer 1862 
emancipation was going to come about simply as a matter of course.554 
However if at any time this progress was halted or reversed in either theatre 
then the nature of the war may have been fundamentally changed. 
Paradoxically Kentucky’s steadfast refusal to even consider a change in the 
status of slavery threatened its previous loyalty to the Federal Government. 
Failure to compromise, which was the characteristic of the state, played into 
the hands of those Governors on her northern borders.  
 
          Of course even Lincoln could not stretch the law enough to include the 
Border States in the Emancipation Proclamation as these states were not, “In 
rebellion against the United States.”555 However the message would have been 
clear enough; slavery was doomed. First drafted in late July Lincoln, although 
under pressure, could not act without a military victory as the timing of the 






The Armies return to Kentucky 
 
         September 1862 has been called the most crucial month of the war for the 
Confederacy in both major theatres; Southern forces were invading or 
preparing to invade border states, in two cases following up crushing victories 
and in the third case forcing a numerically larger army to hastily retreat. On the 
first of the month Kirby Smith’s forces captured Lexington, Kentucky following 
up victory at Richmond. This crushing tactical victory had undone Bragg’s 
strategy of concentration against Buell but had fulfilled Kirby Smith’s initial 
objective of an independent advance into Kentucky with, as Hafendorfer has 
put it, “Persistent coercion and manipulations”556 on the latter’s part. A week 
later elements of his army advanced north to make a demonstration against 
Cincinnati and the remainder spread out to the west occupying the state 
Capitol of Frankfort. While crossing the Ohio River into the state of the same 
name was impractical, advancing on Louisville to the west appeared to be 
possible. 
 
          Kirby Smith’s victory forced Bragg’s hand and led him to advance through 
Middle Tennessee heading toward Glasgow, Kentucky which he entered on 
September 13th also forcing him into the sphere of politics to which he was 
unaccustomed. Bragg then issued a proclamation to the people of Kentucky, 
 
         Kentuckians… I have entered your state with the Confederate Army of the 
West, and offer you a chance to free yourselves from the tyranny of a despotic 
ruler … if you prefer Federal rule, show it by your frowns and we will return 




         As noted above this was similar to Lee’s proclamation on entering 
Maryland, President Davis having set the tone of political message presented 
by the ‘liberating’ armies; emphasising a Confederacy fighting for peace and 
wanting to be left alone.558 Militarily Bragg was now in a position similar to that 
at the end of July, but further north and further from his supply depots; he was 
still a great distance from Kirby Smith, still in very uncertain contact with Van 
Dorn and Price and still on the flank of Buell’s army 30 miles to his west at 
Bowling Green.          
 
          The reaction of Lincoln and Halleck to Kirby Smith’s invasion was the 
creation of a new Department of the Ohio under General Wright in late August, 
including troops in Kentucky but not in Tennessee. This superseded Boyle’s 
District of Kentucky but he maintained command of his troops.559 Buell quickly 
sent William Nelson to Louisville to form the new troops being sent to the city 
into an Army of Kentucky, also with the intention of concentrating the Army of 
the Ohio there if necessary. This complicated structure enabled much more 
political interference not the least because the new troops being despatched to 
Louisville and other Kentucky garrisons were from the states immediately north 
of the Ohio.  
          
          How Buell arrived at Bowling Green is not so much important as the 
political attacks he suffered to get there. Once Bragg decided he could not take 
Nashville nor defeat Buell in Tennessee without the support of Kirby Smith his 
only objective had to be Kentucky and Buell would always be forced to follow. 
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Falling back on Nashville put Buell at the mercy of Tennessee’s Military 
Governor Andrew Johnson and once into Kentucky at those of the Republican 
Governors. Fry regards Buell as having been responsible for Bragg’s dilemma by 
his speed of marching560 but this is not the case as when given a clear objective 
Bragg’s Army out-marched the more supply laden Army of the Ohio,561 it was 
Kirby Smith who ruined the chance of a decisive battle in Middle Tennessee.  
 
          Waiting for Bragg to move had lowered the morale of Buell’s army already 
dispirited by the ‘softly, softly’ approach to ‘rebel’ civilians. Retreating rapidly 
via Nashville to Bowling Green up to 30 miles a day had the same effect. 
However Bragg still threatened Buell’s supply line, the Louisville & Nashville 
Railroad, and was closer to Munfordville the next garrisoned junction, than 
Buell. This was soon confirmed by the surrender, after a few days, of 
Munfordville’s 4,000 man garrison to Bragg’s entire force on September 17th. It 
was the very same night that Bragg considered his next move and held a council 
of war. His decision was possibly the most important he would make in the 
entire war, coming as it did on the bloodiest day in American History with Lee’s 
strategic defeat at Antietam and his subsequent withdrawal from Maryland.     
 
          There is a certain amount of debate about Bragg’s correct course after 
securing Munfordville, even to the extent that capturing the garrison was 
unnecessary,562diverting Bragg away from his correct objective of concentrating 
with Kirby Smith. However Bragg’s original intention was to force Buell into a 
position where Buell would have to fight an offensive battle or face disaster. 
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Munfordville was situated on the north bank of the Green River squarely on the 
Louisville & Nashville Railroad, between Buell and his supply source at 
Louisville, seemingly ideal for this task. Bragg still had the option of advancing 
indirectly on Nashville, the reason for Andrew Johnson’s demands for an 
adequate garrison (against Bragg’s whole army they would not have been), 
Southern writers and impartial historians have pointed out that Louisville could 
have been reached by Bragg and occupied evenly briefly ahead of Buell. 
However James Lee McDonough points out that this was never Bragg’s 
objective, it had always been to concentrate Confederate forces before fighting 
any major battle, “There was never any race for Louisville between Buell and 
Bragg, at least not so far as Bragg was concerned.”563Of the available options 
Bragg decided to march towards Lexington and unite with Kirby Smith. Stanley 
Horn strongly criticises Bragg for failing to force Buell to fight, pointing out that 
both his generals and rank-and-file expected this course of action and calls this 
decision, “Probably the greatest moral crisis of the war.”564 
 
          Expectations of the Southern populace following Bragg’s initial success 
had raised the stakes riding on the campaign and Bragg was well aware of this. 
It was undoubtedly partly for political reasons that Bragg avoided battle and 
moved toward Kirby Smith. Both generals still believed that many volunteers 
were ready to join them in the Blue Grass region and if in sufficient numbers 
the state may be secured. Both were already thinking in terms of officially 
inaugurating the new so-called Confederate ‘Governor’ Richard Hawes in the 
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Capitol Frankfort. Meanwhile Buell’s Army was arriving in Louisville into a 
political storm.   
 
          With the safe arrival of Buell in Louisville came Lincoln’s intention to 
remove him from command. This decision was made on September 24th then 
suspended due to pressure from some quarters that Buell’s delivery of the 
army was a form of victory then the order was finally delivered on the 29th. 
Outside of the Army the atmosphere was described by Engle as, “Furious” with 
the North Western Governors and Andrew Johnson the driving force behind the 
demand for Buell’s sacking.565 The choice to take command, George H.Thomas, 
turned down the offer stating that with battle imminent it would be unwise to 
change commanders, although he may also have regarded the position as a 
poisoned chalice with defeat to the veteran Rebel army seen as being probable. 
The Army then, still under Buell’s command, moved out of Louisville on 
October 1st heading towards the Lexington-Frankfort area. An important factor 
was the high level of Kentucky representation in the Army of the Ohio; Thomas 
L. Crittenden commanding II Corps, L.Rousseau, J.S.Jackson, T.J.Wood all 
commanding infantry divisions thus holding a symbolic value amongst the 
people of the state.566  
 
          Two important factors occurred to change the whole focus of the 
campaign for the Confederates, firstly there was no longer any chance of 
forcing a large federal force into an unfavourable battle and secondly, despite 
their initial welcome, Kentuckians were not backing up vocal support with 
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widespread enlistments. The unfortunate paradox of the need to have a bigger 
army to ensure a victory which would encourage men to enlist to create this 
bigger army was hitting the Confederates. In other words Bragg’s initial 
campaign which had genuine strategic objectives was developing into a large 
scale raid, and Kentuckians knew it. Bragg’s regard for Breckinridge and 
Kentuckians in general would never recover from this reaction. On September 
24th Bragg wrote to Davis, “The failure of General Breckinridge to carry out his 
part of my programme has seriously embarrassed me, and moreover the whole 
campaign…”567 Breckinridge had refused to serve with Bragg without his 
‘Orphan’ Brigade and as such did not arrive in Knoxville, eastern Tennessee 
until October 3rd and simply could not move from there for another week, by 
then it was too late. 
 
The Emancipation Proclamation. 
 
          Lincoln also did not wait for a battle to be fought in Kentucky; the victory 
at Antietam/Sharpsburg halting Lee’s invasion of Maryland had already given 
him the political credit necessary to issue the preliminary Emancipation 
Proclamation on the 22nd. It is interesting to speculate whether Lincoln 
considered Bragg’s army incapable of a major victory by this time, this is 
unlikely, but rather did Lincoln believe that whatever Bragg achieved it could 
not outweigh the effect of Lee’s defeat in the eyes of America or the wider 
world? In fact Lincoln probably felt that it would be dangerous to wait for a 
clearer cut victory, and that Kentucky was fundamentally politically safe, with 
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provisions in the proclamation, on the face of it, favourable to border state 
slave owners. E.M.Coulter has written that the Emancipation Proclamation, “… 
was of course, wholly unconstitutional, except as it might be construed as a war 
power … it did not apply to the Border States; but Kentucky too well knew that 
all slavery rose and fell together.”568 
 
          As Guelzo has noted Lincoln intended the proclamation to be military, 
“…it would become a military act, backed explicitly by federal bayonets.”569The 
message was clear that to formally secede would risk the full wrath of the 
Federal army down upon any state backing slavery and not just in the arbitrary 
way hitherto adopted. Also implicit was that slavery was doomed in the long 
term and it was likely that the Federal and not border state governments would 
settle the issue.570 All this increased the pressure on Bragg to fight and win in 
Kentucky as any retreat would be regarded as final political defeat in the state 
regardless of the considerable strategic achievements he had already 
accomplished. 
 
          As Buell marched out of Louisville, Bragg met with Kirby Smith and Hawes 
in Lexington, symptomatic of the whole campaign was the rousing reception 
Bragg received from the populace but almost no recruits.571Politically Bragg felt 
that he needed to hold as much of the State as possible and to ‘legalise’ this 
occupation by inaugurating Hawes572 as soon as possible, this was scheduled 
for October 4th in Frankfort. There has been speculation over whether Bragg 
wanted to enforce the Conscription Act in Kentucky and this question has never 
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been fully answered, it is probable that he would he have liked to but realised 
that it would have been a very unwise move politically.573 Lowell Harrison is 
probably correct when he writes that the best chance of conscription working 
was to have it undertaken by the Provisional Kentucky Government. Harrison 
also points out this had been preliminarily discussed by the Kentucky Lobby and 
the Confederate Government.574 
 
 
The Battle of Perryville: Kentucky held for the Union. 
 
           Both the political objectives and military dimensions of this campaign 
came together in the first week of October. Bragg with the weaker army575 had 
dispersed his forces to hold territory for political considerations without 
defeating the main enemy army. Buell under intense political pressure 
advanced southeast from Louisville on four parallel roads threatening both 
Frankfort and Lexington and the Rebel supply line. Fry makes clear two things 
which were on Buell’s mind; firstly his estimate of Rebel numbers was roughly 
75,000576 and secondly he believed they would unite and would fight him, “It 
was not supposed that the invasion of Kentucky by two great Rebel armies was 
merely a raid.”577Buell too guessed that the Confederate political objective had 
to be legitimising the ‘Secession’ of the previous year. Fry again agrees with his 
commander in arguing that Bragg’s retreat was the best result that could be 





          Bragg and his subordinates failed to detect the main Union thrust or 
follow orders whether in detail or spirit. The final irony of the campaign was the 
interruption of ‘Governor’ Hawes inaugural speech, in Frankfort on the 4th, by 
Union gunfire, precipitating the Confederate abandonment of the city. Bragg 
having failed to concentrate against this force, which was only a detachment, 
also failed to concentrate against Buell’s main body which was now 
concentrating to the south, approaching the town of Perryville on Bragg’s left 
flank. Kirby Smith held the right flank at the town of Versailles 45 miles away, 
and for the final time in the campaign called on Bragg for help against what was 
the smaller enemy force. 578 
 
          As a result of Confederate mistakes October 8th dawned with Buell’s army 
of 52,000 men facing 17,000 southerners just to the west of Perryville. Buell’s 
safe pair of hands had brought him into the best position militarily desirable 
and should have ensured an annihilating victory. However under the 
impression that he was facing the vast majority of a Confederate veteran army 
he did not attack. Shortage of water was a factor in the clash with a small 
northern advance detachment driving away a similar southern force from a 
stream. Bragg resolved to deal with the Union force and then move east to 
support Kirby Smith. Bragg still had no idea he was facing the bulk of Buell’s 
army. Subsequent arguments between Bragg and his subordinates had no 
effect on the Kentucky campaign, the major decisions having been made, but 
both Corps commanders, Polk and Hardee, subsequently claiming they were 
aware of the presence of all of Buell’s Army. These claims marked the beginning 
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of the breakdown in command cohesion which would destroy the Confederacy 
in the West over the next two years.  
 
          Nonetheless in the early afternoon one of the most bizarre occurrences of 
the war was played out when nearly all of the 16,000 Rebel infantry present 
launched a surprise attack on the Union left flank, which was nearly shattered, 
almost succeeding in routing an army nearly three times as big. The most 
puzzling thing of all was that the Union right, an entire corps of over 15,000 
men, did not hear one single shot fired. Nor did Buell, an atmospheric 
phenomenon served to muffle the sounds of fighting, he was neither informed 
nor aware of the scale of the clash for several hours. Throughout the fighting 
one Rebel cavalry brigade of 1500 men were all who stood in the way of a 
devastating attack, had it been ordered by Buell.  
 
          Darkness halted the battle after savage close range fighting with 
proportional losses for those units engaged as great, perhaps greater, than any 
battle of a similar duration of the whole war. Bragg had inflicted more 
casualties579 with a much smaller army and had gained a tactical victory but by 
that night, at last realising he faced Buell’s entire army, he ordered a retreat 
south to concentrate with Kirby Smith. The battle of Perryville was over but the 
recriminations were about to begin on both sides 
 
          Perryville was the climatic end to the fight for Kentucky, only because 
both commanders were unwilling to risk another battle, both seemingly 
oblivious to political censure they would face by not doing so. Buell, still 
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overestimating Bragg, did not press to finish off his opponent; the latter began 
a steady retreat back towards the Cumberland Gap and into Tennessee. News 
of Van Dorn’s and Price’s bloody repulse at Corinth on 3rd-4th October had 
arrived undoing the final part of Bragg’s combined offensive, persuading him 
that even with a concentrated force a further battle was just too risky.580 
 
          Buell pursued for a while but was pressed directly by the Lincoln 
administration and Halleck to destroy Bragg and advance directly into eastern 
Tennessee through the Cumberland Gap as Engle has observed, “Congressional 
elections were near, mid-western Republicans demanded defeat of the enemy 
lest the party lose prestige.” Midwestern Governors were not prepared to 
accept losses on the scale of Perryville without a clear cut victory.581Another 
paradox of the whole campaign being despite these close victories causing 
Democratic gains against the Republicans in mid-term elections resulting from 
the fall in public confidence in the direction of the war, the Republicans held 
onto power. The harsh Union military control of the Border States largely offset 
losses simply by removing administration opponents from the ticket. 
  
          Lincoln too rightly regarded both Antietam and Perryville as being close 
victories at best, not vote winners for the Republican Party and when Buell 
returned to his desire only to advance on eastern Tennessee by way of 
Nashville his removal from command became inevitable and was accomplished 
on October 30th.  The Buell Commission582 is chronologically largely outside of 
this study in that its existence merely underlines the hostility towards the 
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General in many political and military spheres, the fight for physical control of 
Kentucky having ended before its initial hearing. As a result of Perryville 
Lincoln’s new political and military broom had survived and could be built on.  
 
          Bragg however also survived. Davis being his only significant supporter, 
but that was enough to retain Bragg’s command despite a near revolt in all 
ranks of the now consolidated and newly renamed Army of Tennessee. The 
Kentucky Lobby although vociferous had lost much of its credibility due to the 
distinct lack of recruits obtained while on campaign. It is estimated that only 
around 1500 men joined new units and maybe the same again reinforced those 
already in existence.583 In the end Kentuckians, despite whatever their true 
allegiances may have been, were unprepared to actively support the 
Confederate invasion and join the army. In a way it was just as Coulter put it, “A 
month of rare excitement before the old order returned.”584Kentuckians, 
including ‘Governor’ Hawes,585 blamed Bragg almost unreservedly for the 
failure of the campaign thus further fuelling Bragg’s anti-Kentucky vendetta.   
 
          Once again it was Lincoln who had remained in control of the situation in 
a border slave state by gauging very accurately just what he could get away 
with in terms of the average Kentuckian. A Kentucky union soldier summed 
much of this up by saying of the Emancipation Proclamation, “If announced 12 
months ago it would have driven us all … into the ranks of the Southern 
Army”586That over 20 Kentucky units587 fought for the Union at Perryville under 
a good number of generals with Kentuckian backgrounds is in stark contrast to 
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the three units (all Cavalry) present for the South albeit with Buckner leading an 
infantry Division.  
 
 
Lessons from the Kentucky Campaign 
           
          Throughout this case study it is clear that of the two sides the Union was 
closest in having a clearly defined war aim and was the firmest in maintaining 
direction through tighter political and military control. Lincoln had eliminated 
the mavericks, once their usefulness had passed, from positions of influence in 
border state politics. Lincoln had also, as was the case with the large Kentucky 
military representation, ensured those Kentuckians who were both loyal to the 
Union and the Republican Party were securely in the chain of command. The 
President had recognised and had begun to act on the strategic reality of the 
civil war as it was developing; in that the war should be fought as a whole not in 
parts and for a definite aim not simply a return to the status quo. It was, as 
Russell F.Weigley has observed, part of the shift from Napoleonic strategy to 
one of annihilation.588 
           
          This shift in strategy was the crux of the struggle between Buell and the 
administration. Buell did not regard the objective of eastern Tennessee as the 
correct one and certainly did not wish to be told how or when to obtain an 
objective once he had been ordered to gain it. Buell lived up to his reputation 
as a steady field commander throughout the whole campaign and did not make 
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one single decision based on  a political objective but on maintaining the 
cohesion and fighting efficiency of his army. There was no sense of fervour or 
radical zeal as shown by Lyon in 1861 or indeed the purposeful approach 
demonstrated by William Nelson589 in his Kentucky assignments. It must also be 
said that the Buell Commission found absolutely, “No evidence worthy of 
consideration…”590 against Buell’s loyalty however the greatest censure is that 
the commission felt, “Compelled to attribute the escape of the rebels from 
Kentucky [after Perryville]” to two days halt by his (Buell’s) main army from 11th 
to 13th October.591     
 
          Halleck has been blamed for many of the disasters that befell the Union, 
Archer Jones noting that the several Confederate offensives were, “Not an 
auspicious beginning as general-in-chief.”592Both Halleck and Lincoln failing to 
recognise the destruction of the main enemy army would make any political 
objective that much easier to achieve. It is crucial to note that Lincoln learned 
this lesson by the end of both the Perryville and Antietam campaigns sacking 
both Buell and McClellan for failing to destroy both Bragg and Lee’s army after 
their respective invasions of the Border States. On purely military grounds 
these dismissals were probably justified. As Engle has noted, “In a season of 
cleansing for the Union High Command Buell was simply another leader 
eliminated as Union authorities continued to reconcile the civil-military 
conflicts inherent in conducting a political war.”593     
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          As has been covered in previously the northern war governors were highly 
influential when the fighting threatened their own states, the uproar in 
Cincinnati on the approach of Kirby Smith being the prime example. Fear of 
defeat at the ballot when elections were near also became a factor in the desire 
of these Republicans to drive military policy. However Lincoln’s decisive 
leadership was able to steer a middle course and water down or disregard any 
call for truly radical policies until they could be successfully enacted later on. 
 
          On the face of it Jeremiah Boyle may be regarded as an important figure 
but he was on a relatively tight leash and was easily dismissed when it became 
necessary by another ‘reliable’ Kentuckian. The arbitrary attitude to slavery, as 
already seen in Missouri could be said to have undermined loyalty to the Union 
in Kentucky but this formed just one part of the deliberate attempt by the 
administration to secure control of the state and eliminate dissent. The ability 
of the people of Kentucky to make a free and fair choice as to their future had 
gone. The resignation of Governor Magoffin in August due to extreme political 
pressure neatly highlighted the reality of the situation.594 The one remaining 
major unionist fear of course was a large scale invasion by the South. Now this 
fear had been for all practical purposes removed. 
 
 
Failure Again for the Southern Command 
 
          There has always been a fascination over the contrast between Lincoln 
and Davis both being natives of Kentucky. Davis’ obsession with the war in 
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Virginia is a factor in the relative ignorance of the war in the West from the 
point of view of historical study. In all four case studies we have seen Davis 
ignorant, indecisive or dismissive of the situation in the Border States or to the 
Western Theatre in general. True to this pattern Davis failed completely to 
resolve the command situation which from start to finish hampered the entire 
campaign. Once again he left decisions which were largely or wholly in the 
political sphere to generals, and therefore indirectly to whomever may have 
had influence over that given general.  
 
          The departmental organisation was foolish for offensive warfare, and 
made a co-ordinated attack even more difficult than it was already. It is true, 
“Military critics are [still] amazed at the Confederate commands’ lack of co-
ordination and collaboration in Kentucky.”595 The War Department and its 
secretary Randolph596 (yet another personnel change as Davis struggled to find 
a Secretary suitable to his style of direction) must also take its share of the 
blame but the enhanced role that Davis insisted on taking with regard to the 
direction of the war leaves the vast majority squarely on him. 
 
          The whole nature of the Confederate campaign in Kentucky comes down 
to the relationship between Bragg and Kirby Smith. It is almost impossible to 
satisfactorily apportion the lion’s share of the blame for the campaign’s failure 
to either of them alone. Militarily Bragg’s movement from Tupelo to 
Chattanooga was perhaps the greatest strategic movement of the war, 
arguably prolonging the conflict by at least a year. Bragg’s initial plan to 
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concentrate against Buell was correct but allowing Kirby Smith to move first 
was foolish. Hambleton Tapp cites two missed chances to concentrate against 
Buell’s tiring army and speculates on the ‘race’ for Louisville which Bragg should 
have won had he entered into it.597Whatever the potential political impact of 
Breckinridge he and his troops would have made a difference in any 
conceivable military situation, Bragg could have had both at hand earlier. He 
also could have given Van Dorn and Price concrete orders in terms of objectives 
and timing in their move into Western Tennessee.  
 
          Once in Kentucky Bragg’s political unsuitability also clouded his military 
judgment and exposed his operational and tactical shortcomings. When he saw 
that despite the promises of the Kentucky lobby there was no flood of recruits 
only empty greetings then his sour relationship with both Kentuckians and 
Kentucky would begin in earnest. This sour relationship would also extend to 
nearly all his subordinates not just Breckinridge and Buckner but Kirby Smith, 
Polk and Hardee and indeed most of the divisional commanders.598 It was this 
internecine command conflict which would undermine Confederate military 
efforts in the Western Theatre for the rest of the war. It is conceivable that this 
unrest could have been largely avoided if Bragg had fought and won a major 
battle for the city of Nashville.  
 
          Kirby Smith was rewarded for his part in the campaign by promotion. He 
failed in his objective of capturing the garrison of the Cumberland Gap, the 
ostensive reason for his initial move into Kentucky and despite destroying 
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Nelson’s force at Richmond, failed to create any lasting military gain by his 
advance. Holding Frankfort was pointless if Buell’s Army reached Louisville 
without being intercepted and destroyed. Kirby Smith’s consistent failure to 
march to join Bragg was a major reason for Confederate failure, his trumpeting 
of the desire of Kentucky to throw off the Federal yoke was naïve by accepting 
John Hunt Morgan’s observations uncritically and then forwarding them to 
Richmond. 
 
          The Kentucky lobby in Richmond, as would be expected, seized on its 
chance to influence the war but in no way facilitated the success of the 
campaign. Hawes had no time to make any impact and the strong argument 
that any Kentuckian who wanted to fight for the south had either joined the 
army or fled across the lines is hard to refute. In fact it would be fair to say that 
the only victory achieved by the Kentucky lobby was the victory scored against 
Governor Harris of Tennessee who failed in his attempts to have the offensive 
focus on middle Tennessee, his desire being to redeem the state capitol which 
was massively pro-Confederate as opposed to holding eastern Tennessee which 
was steadfastly unionist. 
 
          Realistically there was no need for any political proclamation to 
accompany any Confederate invasion of a border state; all could see that any 
political change in Kentucky or indeed Missouri and Maryland relied solely on a 
major battlefield success, regardless of the political message being delivered. 
The paradox was quite clear: a major victory would have brought those 
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wavering in support to the southern ranks and gone a long way to prolonging 
the Confederate stay in the state and legitimising any Governor and State 
administration the Confederacy may have set up, without those extra recruits it 
was far, far harder. 
 
          Ever since the respective conflicts in Kentucky and Missouri became active 
raids had been a part of wartime reality. Thus it was always the task of the 
Confederacy to convince the people of Kentucky that Bragg and Kirby Smith’s 
invasion was not just a large scale raid. As it was the Union’s task both 
politically and militarily to prevent this by at least avoiding a major defeat and 
to his credit Buell grasped this.   
 
Lincoln triumphs again, Just. 
 
          Lincoln’s relationship with Southern Unionism went two separate ways 
during this period both of which would have been severely undermined by a 
battlefield disaster on a grand scale. Lincoln’s focus on eastern Tennessee never 
wavered and it was arguably his priority for much of the time. However his 
relationship with border state slavery changed with its refusal to compromise in 
any way with regard to emancipation. The abolition of slavery in the District of 
Columbia was a watershed, and was not and could not have been considered 
just a year before. By issuing the Emancipation Proclamation in the way and 




          It is speculative but vital to mention that any major Confederate victory in 
Kentucky, Tennessee or Maryland in September or October may have 
prevented the proclamation’s issue or have lessened its impact and would have 
been markedly more damaging in the fall elections. As it was the Confederacy 
was fatally weakened both politically and militarily in the longer term by the 
Emancipation Proclamation, Bragg’s campaign was the only opportunity the 
Confederacy would have to negate these truths on the field of battle in a vital 
place; i.e. a slave state still within the Union. 
 
          The retreat of the Confederate forces back through the Cumberland Gap, 
albeit to a much more secure military position than that from which they 
embarked, was of profound import to Kentucky, and all of the Border States. 
Southern Nationalists had failed with political appeals and persuasion, 
economic leverage, prolonged static defence and now with a formal large scale 
invasion to seize control of Kentucky firstly from its stance of neutrality and 
finally from what was an increasingly unpopular Union occupation. The loyalty 
to their concept of the Union and the Constitution were still too great. 
Subsequent federal actions were to prove that this was wishful thinking on the 
part of most Kentuckians, but by that time the contest was over.        
 
          It must be noted in this case study, where force of arms is the dominant 
factor, the role of Kentucky in the war was decided in part by two professional 
West Point trained American soldiers not doing their jobs correctly in the 
military sphere. Barron Deaderick stating,“Bragg and Kirby Smith accomplished 
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little in the Kentucky campaign of 1862 because they failed to join forces at the 
proper time and place to beat Buell in battle.”599Buell created a perfect 
opportunity to decisively defeat Bragg could not do so and would have to make 
way for someone who could. 
 
          In what could be described as a classic campaign of nineteenth century 
manoeuvre warfare defeat was almost visited on both sides a number of times 
due to the desire to prioritise the political support of groups in enemy territory. 
Despite more experienced armies and commanders political interference had 
almost undone the Union and had endangered the impact of the Emancipation 
proclamation. In a way the Union had been saved by Confederate political 
indifference the political decisions not being made by Davis but by Bragg and 
Kirby Smith. Political interference in democracies is common, none more so 
than America, but it was the complicating factors of Southern Unionism and 
Southern Nationalism in Kentucky and Tennessee, an extra dimension in the 
conflict, which caused mistakes.  
 
          Civil-military relationships failed many times throughout this whole 
campaign and in common with the very first case study, the secession crisis in 
Missouri, it was only because the Union was defending the status quo it won by 
default. Lincoln’s military direction had been too restrictive but it was superior 
to that of Davis who let Bragg fail in the realm of politics and as a result throw 




          It is clear once again in this case study that strong and effective leadership 
can overcome poor command structure and compensate for imperfect civil-
military relationships. However in this case study both sides displayed 
potentially fatal judgement even though Lincoln had in no way lost sight of the 
importance of Kentucky only of the real threat posed by Bragg’s army. It was 
profoundly unfortunate for the Confederacy that the most unsuitable general 
politically, Bragg, was tasked with the extremely difficult task of legitimising an 
invasion of Kentucky whilst securing his primary military objective of destroying 
Buell’s army.  
 
          Kirby Smith’s lack of co-operation can be traced back directly to a 
command structure designed to maintain internal security and not to facilitate 
offensive warfare, often much more difficult in a civil war situation than in 
inter-state conflict. It should also be noted that Buell’s adherence to the 
traditional actions of a conservative West Point officer that of protecting 
constitutional rights and following a militarily correct strategy probably saved 
his army, which was all that was required to frustrate Bragg and maintain 
political control of Kentucky. Without this ‘traditional’ approach the issuing of 
the Emancipation Proclamation at the very least would have been undermined 
by a very sizeable defeat of Union arms in either Kentucky or Tennessee.  
 
          As with all three previous case studies the complexity of civil war in a 
region with undecided loyalties creates in the sphere of civil-military 
relationships, if not its own set of rules, its own set of complexities. What we 
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have seen once again is the renewed premium placed on leadership if the 
structure of command and civil-military co-operation is both strained and 
working at cross-purposes. This case study has also demonstrated if the war at 
theatre level is not co-ordinated with the war as a whole and its higher political 
objectives these same political objectives can be severely undermined.   
 
          The theoretical impact of the Kentucky campaign of the second half of 
1862 really depends on just how important success or failure for Union arms in 
that state actually was. This thesis has constantly argued that political control 
over Kentucky remained vital to Union success in the war until the 
Emancipation Proclamation was established fact. For any theory of civil-military 
relations therefore two important factors stand out: firstly the active attempts 
by federal authorities and by Lincoln to remove any say for anyone other than 
staunch unionists in the political processes of the state; and the absolute failure 
of Confederate authorities to co-ordinate either politically or military three 
offensives in two theatres.  
 
           Most importantly in the critical month of September 1862 the ‘civilised 
world’ was watching, decisions made at all times were especially vital. It is 
perhaps again important to note that Lincoln still managed to hold on to the 
political initiative and, strategic arguments aside, Davis’ failure to undermine 
the Emancipation Proclamation was a failure in the eyes of the world.600 
           
          In regard to Samuel Huntington’s theorising on civil-military relations the 
complicating notion of divided loyalties not analysed in ‘The Soldier and the 
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State’, where a state is not in rebellion but is treated as if it in fact is, has again 
affected the nature of civilian control of the military. Both military commanders 
and senior politicians became overly exercised by the symbolism of fighting in 
the Border States and securing both the loyalty of the populace alongside 
military victory. Excessive control and pressure on Buell to protect Southern 
unionists was no less dangerous than the lax direction of Bragg and Kirby Smith 
by relying on residual southern nationalism to deliver victory. It is telling that 
both Presidents failed to insist on the concentration of their armies to deliver a 
decisive military victory and thereby achieve their political objectives.  
           
          Victory for the Union in this decisive Kentucky campaign was in fact 
despite of the twin forces of Southern Unionism and Kentuckian political 
uncertainty driving military objectives. The victory was down to the same old 
Confederate mistakes and to Buell’s desire to save his army; he had triumphed 
by keeping this force intact and ready to hold onto the hard won state of 
Kentucky.        











           
          This thesis has highlighted the dangers of relying on a theoretical 
framework for the function of civil-military relations where important and 
relevant historical events are subordinated or omitted to fit that theory. It has 
also demonstrated how a specific area of a major historical event, crucial to the 
evolution of a national traditional, can be re-investigated to challenge theoretical 
validity in the realm of complex conflict. This work has argued that historical 
detail and the unique nature of historical events can severely challenge the 
efficient application of any theoretical framework which overlooks key aspects 
for the benefit of simplification. 
           
          Samuel Huntington’s identification of the U.S. Civil War as the crucial 
nineteenth century turning point in that nation’s civil-military tradition invited a 
reinvestigation of not just the war, but also the preceding secession crisis in the 
Border States and of the various civil-military relationships employed there. This 
thesis has argued the secession crisis in the Border States was a key factor in 
ensuring the ‘Rebellion’ was successfully opposed and Confederate nationhood 
denied. The failure of the Confederacy to peacefully expand therefore offered 
the Lincoln administration a manageable if very difficult task in preserving the 
Union. Without frustrating the certainly achievable Confederate aims of peaceful 
secession a smaller Union would have faced many years of protracted conflict 
which politically may well have been beyond it. 
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          This thesis in identifying the U.S. Civil War as a far more complex conflict 
than acknowledged by Samuel Huntington, was both a comment on Huntington’s 
theoretical framework but also on the historical downplaying in the 1950s and 
1960s of the role of the Western Theatre in that conflict. This thesis was also a 
comment on Huntington’s belief that history should be generalised or reordered 
to assist theoretical understanding if required. 
 
           Huntington’s historical subordination and omission was true of the 
secession crisis in the Border States and the subsequent conflict in that region 
throughout 1862. The history of this period and varied nature of the civil-military 
relationships involved impact directly on the interpretation of some of 
Huntington’s conclusions. While not blaming Huntington for adopting the then 
mainstream approach to Civil War study, by utilising the steady trend towards a 
wider more westernised look at the war, more questions have been asked of his 
and other theoretical analysis. 
 
           In this thesis this more westernised approach to the Civil War has centred 
on the still neglected roles of both Kentucky and Missouri. This study has sought 
to argue both Kentucky and Missouri’s impact on all aspects and levels of conflict 
were several times crucial to the overall outcome of the war. It has also argued 
the need to secure the resources of these states demanded higher levels of 




          This thesis has demonstrated the war in the Border States to be an 
extremely complex conflict in a nation where both the Constitution and rights 
under the law were highly regarded. It has been noted major civil wars, both 
concurrent and subsequent to the U.S. Civil War displayed a similar degree of 
complexity and international concern/participation, but these conflicts could not 
entirely fairly examine Huntington’s historical framework to an entirely 
satisfactory level.  
           
          The four case studies in  this thesis have each highlighted pivotal situations 
where civil-military relations operated in ways making easy analysis problematic, 
but were overlooked by Huntington in ‘The Soldier and the State’. Rare but 
important instances of constitutionally unforeseen difficulties were highlighted 
in both Kentucky and Missouri where new forms of civil-military relationships 
proved necessary to overcome. 
           
          The first case study highlighted an example of ad hoc military relationships 
successful because of marked atypical unprofessionalism; the second highlighting 
the unusual notion of ‘neutrality’ within a civil war; the third examining a contest 
over disputed ‘loyalty’ and the final case study noting the disproportionate 
influence one state exerted on both major military operations and national 
political objectives. In each case study certain individuals influenced or were 
influenced by regional factors which question certain generalisations of the 
functioning of civil-military relations. 
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          As the first case study has demonstrated the situation faced by the United 
States in the first half of 1861 in Missouri was of extreme importance to the 
preservation of the Union yet has an historical complexity defying easy   
theoretical assessment. All protagonists in Missouri’s conflict, as did the 
Congressional Committee for the Conduct of the War, recognised the role played 
by Nathaniel Lyon as being decisive. However Lyon’s behaviour was completely 
at odds with that of a West Point graduate and career soldier, even in 1863 let 
alone 1861; his use of initially unauthorised military forces and subversion of the 
command chain being highly notable. 
           
          Union success in Missouri was assisted by Missouri’s pro-secessionist 
Governor Jackson’s strict adherence to legal statute and precedence. Aside from 
instructing overt disregard for the law it would be difficult to proscribe what 
should be done in such a situation, as it would be for a party in the form of the 
Confederacy inhabiting a de facto legal twilight zone. In trying to co-operate with 
her supporters in Missouri the Confederacy highlighted the paradox during the 
secession crisis of just who has legal jurisdiction when a federation realigns. This 
paradox not dissimilar to the widespread international recognition of the 
Confederacy as a belligerent under international law,601 despite it not being 
recognised by the United States, both concepts of course difficult for civil-
military relations analysis.  
          
          The second case study presented an example of a complex situation where 
the use of force was to be avoided but at the same had to be available to counter 
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any move by the other side. The extreme difficulty of this situation being any 
perception of aggression toward Kentucky would be as dangerous as a military 
defeat for the overall outcome in that state. Kentucky’s neutrality period is not 
just the uncertain initial period that can occur in civil war; the conflict actively 
being fought in two neighbouring states and Tennessee’s eventual secession 
compounding the situation further. 1861 Kentucky presents civil-military 
theorists with another factor, that of the political impact of the regional leader in 
a complex conflict. 
            
          Kentucky’s Governor Magoffin’s role within his state, region and the wider 
war was at times pivotal. Decisions made by Magoffin affected both Union and 
Confederate strategic direction in this early phase of the war; it is once again 
instructional that Lincoln was able to isolate the Governor politically and was not 
forced to compromise his primary aim of restoring the Union. Lincoln’s use of 
both covert and overt methods to undermine Kentucky’s freedom of action was 
marked. Jefferson Davis in contrast was consistently unable to influence the 
outcome of the contest, failing to formulate effective civil-military relationships 
at any level. 
           
          Kentucky’s ‘neutrality’ allowed that state transient political influence, 
enabling her to create an independent military force and command structure; in 
effect a third force in the Civil War. This thesis discussed three states displaying a 
measure of independence by organising, and in one case, campaigning with their 
own military forces. Three case studies have referred to the difficulties of co-
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operating with third party military forces even when integrated into a national 
force; again arguing that such occurrences must not be theoretically overlooked. 
           
          Between April and September 1861 Kentucky steadily progressed from 
peace to war. This progression was characterised by several military forces, 
under several different command structures, preparing for the inevitable conflict 
both inside and outside of the state. Once again how can this sort of complexity 
be easily unravelled and fit into a comprehensive theoretical framework?  
           
          Union victories at Forts Henry and Donelson proved to be decisive for the 
outcome of the war in the Western Theatre. From the point of view of civil- 
military relations both the preparations for and the aftermath of the offensives 
are instructive. The anxiety felt by Union leaders over pro-southern support and 
‘loyalty’ in states still officially in the Union is far more complex than the usual 
problems of occupying enemy territory. This fear was matched by a Confederate 
obsession over political legitimacy displayed in its desire not to be regarded as an 
enemy invader but as the champion of southern rights. These twin concerns, 
precisely because of the Southern Unionist/Southern Nationalist struggle, 
directly impacted on chains of command to the detriment of military efficiency, 
at times subordinating legitimate civilian control to the military and military 
freedom of action to political pressures outside of traditional channels. The key 
factor being the regional political characteristics of the Border States directly 
complicated military planning and objectives.      
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          President Lincoln’s obsession with unionist support in eastern Tennessee is 
discussed in three case studies in this thesis. This support, at times his priority 
over every other aspect of the war, is instructional for the study of civil-military 
relations in such complex conflicts as it included tremendous political leverage 
from just a minority of one state. Discussed in the third case study, Lincoln’s 
constant pressure on senior generals over where and how an offensive should 
proceed is underlined by the first appointment of a Military Governor in 
American history; Andrew Johnson. Johnson’s appointment was truly remarkable 
in its precedence for civil-military relations, a solution to the competing views for 
restoring the Union and a powerful example of the influence of Southern 
Unionism.  
          
          In the third, as in the first two case studies, the Confederacy failed to 
construct either common goals or effective co-operation with secessionists in the 
Border States. Indeed Southern Nationalism failed to deliver effective secession 
in either state, failed to offer decisive help to the Confederacy’s survival but did 
deliver two hollow declarations of ‘Secession’ set against genuine Union strategic 
triumphs. Failure by the Confederate leadership to adapt Tennessee’s strategic 
priorities to those designed to benefit the whole Confederacy were highlighted in 
the second and third case studies further complicating civil-military relations. 
          
          While discussing both sides’ 1862 summer/autumn campaigning in the 
Western Theatre the final case study still asks questions of civil-military relations 
theory in expanding complex conflict. Two important aspects make this so; the 
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reaction of military professionalism to a change in the political objective of the 
war and how much civilian control should be imposed on an army undertaking 
offensive action in areas of ‘uncertain’ loyalty. These two interacting factors had 
to be resolved during a fundamental change in Union political objectives; the 
issue of the Emancipation Proclamation, and during Confederate offensives 
seeking both to ‘liberate’ fellow slave states and secure foreign intervention. 
           
          In discussing the Confederate offensive into Kentucky in 1862 this thesis 
has argued that a major Confederate battlefield victory would have seriously 
undermined the impact of the Emancipation Proclamation. This proclamation, 
issued following a marginal Union victory in the ‘loyal’ slave state of Maryland, 
was a signal to both international onlookers and the people of both sides the war 
was now being fought for fundamental political change. 
           
          The constant failure by both sides to destroy a major portion of their 
opponent’s field army opting instead to physically occupy an area regarded as 
‘loyal’ has been a pattern discussed in each case study. Again it should be noted 
that two defensive victories, Antietam and Perryville, were in the end all that was 
required to spell the end of slavery in America, the significance of Confederate 
failure to ‘redeem’ these states being very clear both domestically and 
internationally at the time. 
        
          Again it has been noted how offensive movements into areas of divided 
loyalties were often regarded as ‘advances’ offering ‘liberation’ from the 
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oppressor. These movements were often accompanied by proclamations issued 
by various generals on behalf of their respective political masters, many quoted 
in this thesis. This dimension, new to the United States, also gave many senior 
officers or careerists, political responsibilities and roles they were ill-suited for. 
Conversely political appointees, very much part of the American volunteer 
tradition, were much more at home in this environment often to the detriment 
of military efficiency. 
          
           A series of fluid offensive movements in summer-autumn 1862 once again 
labelled and burdened the military professional as the political embodiment of 
their respective side. These movements demonstrated the subordination of 
military objective to political message during both offensive and defensive 
operations. The consequences of General Bragg’s failure to win a clear battlefield 
victory in his 1862 offensive should alone justify a closer examination of the civil-
military factors in that demise. 
           
          Bragg’s offensive begins and ends with almost indifference by both Davis 
and the Confederate War Department in contrast to Major General Buell’s 
defensive response being pressured constantly by Lincoln, Republican politicians, 
Andrew Johnson and latterly by the Committee for the Conduct of the War. 
However a theory of civil-military relations may find it difficult to proscribe the 
correct balance between civilian direction and military independence due to the 
political symbolism of Kentucky in this conflict. 
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          Political symbolism in Kentucky proved to be enduring and as such 
panicked many Republican politicians and confused Bragg as to his real priority. 
Buell also should have recognised the need for a decisive victory in Kentucky if he 
wished to retain his command and should have recognised the changing political 
nature of the whole war was even more important in Kentucky due to the slavery 
issue.    
          It remains important to note that a decisive battlefield victory in the 
Perryville campaign for either side would have gone a long way in achieving their 
respective political goals, despite the catalogue of failures and mistakes by those 
higher up the chain of command. In both cases command structures had 
reflected the difficulties involved in retaining political control over areas of 
uncertain loyalty rather than military efficiency, indeed it had sacrificed military 
efficiency for political symbolism. However it was also very necessary to consider 
the posture any advance should take, hence the proclamations. With each side 
seeking to portray themselves as the true embodiment of the will of Kentucky, as 
in Missouri, legitimacy had remained a factor throughout the period of all case 
studies. 
 
          Any framework for civil-military relations in such complex conflicts would 
have to address the issue of the army’s posture in an area of disputed loyalty, 
with the role of local troops and leaders a key factor. Perryville was a battle 
notable for the absence of the Confederacy’s most famous Kentucky general, 
Breckinridge and most famous Kentucky unit the ‘Orphan Brigade’ with 
consequences not just military but also of political symbolism. Huntington may 
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have regarded this as an unnecessary historical detail; however the pivotal 
nature of both time and place would suggest that it is not. 
           
          The secession crisis and early Civil War in the Border States demonstrated 
the mastering of at least two areas was required for success in such situations of 
complex conflict; firstly decisive and yet flexible leadership and secondly an 
understanding of the fundamental political differences and objectives of any 
given conflict. 
          
           Each case study demonstrated flexible leadership to be crucial and every 
bit as important as the civil-military structure in which it was displayed. Flexible 
leadership impacts on any political or military contest, however it proved more 
important when command relationships were constantly evolving and political 
groupings re-aligning. In the fight for both loyalty and resources in the Border 
States the political contest was between Southern Unionism and Southern 
Nationalism. In all case studies even a modest analysis of the struggle between 
the two strands of southern ideology shows their impact on both command 
organisation and decision as well as on political objectives. Huntington failed to 
recognise the possibility of ideological overlap in a region of pivotal importance 
to the United States development. 
           
          In ‘The Soldier and the State’ Huntington uses historical analysis of different 
types of ideology to identify the different types of civil-military relationship. 
Ideologically what we see in the Border and Middle slave states is a competition 
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between the two sub-branches of what was becoming the minority if still 
intellectually senior branch of American Liberalism. 
           
          Huntington may have benefitted from exploring this regional ideological 
contest in his analysis. An analysis should then show the conflict in the Border 
States to be an ideological struggle both more complex and more important to 
both the outcome of the war and the workings of civil-military relationships. In 
such a situation tradition has been shown wanting in terms of effective civil-
military relations in unforeseen circumstances. In fact tradition proved a 
vulnerability which could be exploited by pragmatists willing to be flexible.  
          
          Throughout this thesis the characteristics of the struggle for the Border 
States have been emphasised in differing ways directly affecting the functioning 
of civil-military relationships. All four case studies have highlighted different 
circumstances in both states requiring different approaches to achieve and to 
help shape changing political objectives at the regional level. These case studies 
have also demonstrated how important regional political objectives were to the 
conduct of the war at the national level. Each chapter has also discussed how 
achieving success depended on getting civil-military relationships and command 
structures to reflect the de facto political situation in each state, not just that of 
tradition or military preference.  
          
          Constant failure by the Confederacy to recognise the requirement of 
flexibility of structure in complex conflict has been highlighted and has proven to 
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be equally instructive. It should also be noted that while the United States, as 
discussed by Huntington, evolved a system of civil-military relations designed to 
repel an external threat, which had not materialised for over forty years, the 
Confederacy had the advantage of knowing precisely who the opponent would 
be, although not how large or how persistent. 
           
          That the Confederacy would initially choose a system modelled almost 
exactly on that of its very probable opponent is an instructive area for civil-
military relations theory, although that decision was a clear expression of 
conservatism and the ideological result of a ‘States’ Rights’ agenda. The 
subsequent failure in many respects of Confederate civil-military relations should 
be a lesson for what can happen if a liberalist-federal system is not correctly 
tailored to the task in hand, as this thesis has demonstrated throughout. 
          
          The period of 1860-1862 in the Border States is important because it 
demonstrates actual functioning civil-military relations in a period of 
fundamental political transformation. This thesis has demonstrated that even 
though the peace was ‘uncertain’ in the Border States there was no unified 
clamour for Civil War amongst the population and therefore civil-military 
structures need to reflect this; once again overlooked by Huntington. 
 
          This thesis has returned a number of times to a concept ignored by 
Huntington in his observations on mid-nineteenth century American civil-military 
relations, the concept of divided loyalties and legitimacy within an established 
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liberal polity. Huntington identified the conservative South as being one of only 
two exceptions to the dominant liberal ideology;602 however this Southern 
culture lived side by side with national liberal ideology in the Border States. How 
then can such a situation in 1861 Kentucky and Missouri where quasi-secession 
and unconstitutionality reign, where the future of the Union is constantly at 
stake, ever fit into a generalised theoretical framework? 
           
          Huntington’s citing of Lincoln and the Civil War in general as strengthening 
the Presidential role in civil-military relations603 has been tested more thoroughly 
in this thesis by examining both the role of the Confederacy and key Border 
states. Observing both Lincoln’s and Davis’ attempts to balance constitutionality 
and political objective in the struggle for Border State loyalty shows a contest 
between two viewpoints of civil-military relations with initially ideology the area 
of conflict. 
           
          Huntington recognised Lincoln’s unconstitutional actions as being justified 
at the time and subsequently by the ‘Commander-in-Chief’ clause and recognised 
Lincoln’s many ‘political’ uses of this “forgotten clause”604, the Emancipation 
Proclamation being the prime example. However with both this clause, and the 
actions of the Congressional Committee for the Conduct of the War, Huntington 
overlooked their impact on the more complex and politically delicate Border 
States which did a great deal to establish the pattern of the war both militarily 
and politically.    
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          This thesis has repeatedly argued Huntington’s failure to devote more 
space to the Confederacy’s generally poor record on civil-military relations was 
an omission. Having cited Jefferson Davis’ 1855 conflict with General Winfield 
Scott while the former served as Secretary of War, 605 Huntington may well also 
have noted Davis’ actions as Commander-in-Chief can be explained in many ways 
by his understanding and experience of peacetime civil-military relations. 
       
           This thesis has compared flexibility and the adherence to an administrative 
ideal in the realm of functioning civil-military relations during the fight for the 
Border States. These occurrences pose questions for theoretical analysis because 
of their historical importance. The conflict in Missouri and Kentucky was of 
course just the sort of situation which enabled Lincoln to exercise those inferred 
and actual powers present in the Constitution in a manner Huntington observed 
he displayed in other situations during the conflict. However as this thesis has 
constantly argued the stakes were much higher in these two states, adding 
weight to the importance of the civil-military relationships adopted and to any 
decisions made. 
           
          This thesis has argued that there is a wider utility for this examination of 
complex conflict, what may seem to be unique but unimportant occurrences may 
in fact be much more pivotal. While periods of quasi independence experienced 
by Kentucky, Missouri and Tennessee and their relationship with both 
protagonists during the civil war were situations never encountered again by the 
United States, variants of such a scenario can be found in other multi-sided civil 
392 
 
wars or complex conflict. Civil wars in Spain, Russia and China display many of 
these characteristics. 
           
           By 1865 the question of secession was of course also settled, as indeed as 
Huntington points out, so was essentially the general pattern of civil-military 
relationships in the United States until the outbreak of World War II.606 However 
that of course does not mean to say that a similar situation could not or has not 
occurred in another country. The separatist issue is of course not uncommon in a 
civil war situation, the Russian Civil War arguably the best example, but the legal 
complexities alone of the Border State conflict suggests that this sort of dispute 
may require its own theoretical sub-framework, however difficult it may be to 
construct. 
           
          Any theoretical framework considering complex civil war would have to 
allow for situations where the established chain of command was unable to 
respond to a minority yet loyal grouping backing the government in a region of 
otherwise uncertain support. It would have to all for the actions of various 
regional leaders, whatever their approach. It would have to consider was this 
loyal yet minority or regional grouping pivotal to the course of a given conflict? 
And any theoretical framework would have to assess regional influence in the 







           
          This thesis has argued, with detailed historical example in each of four case 
studies, the Civil War struggle for the Border States poses serious questions for 
the civil-military relations theories of Samuel P. Huntington and to civil-military 
relations theory in general. This argument has been justified by the importance 
Huntington placed throughout his career on the role of the Civil War in the 
development of the United States and to that nation’s civil-military relations. 
          
           As discussed in the Literature Review Samuel P. Huntington has been both 
criticised and supported throughout the development of the discipline of civil-
military relations as well as providing inspiration for new theoretical approaches 
and wider study of the Civil War. This thesis however has sought to address a 
narrow definition of conflict, a complex civil war, and not to offer a wider theory. 
It has sought to argue when historic example is used to develop a theoretical 
framework then that framework can and should be tested fully with all key areas 
of that historical example.     
          
          Huntington’s desire to subordinate and reorder history where necessary to 
better fit theory is only broadly acceptable if his specific historical examples fit 
well into theoretical analysis. This thesis has argued that for the American Civil 
War this is not always the case. There were of course no detailed tests against his 
other historical turning points which marked the evolution of America’s tradition 
and pattern of civil-military relationships leading to the proscription of an ideal 
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system of civil-military relations. However as in the eyes of Huntington it was the 
defining event in the history of his nation the Civil War can stand alone as a most 
vigorous test.607  
           
          This thesis has argued specific historical detail is important in assessing 
areas of civil-military relations theory. This thesis has further argued that at 
times an accomplished or decisive leader, either military or civilian, can or may 
be required to overshadow, ignore, manipulate or replace any system of civil-
military relations or indeed adopt a combination of these. This thesis has also 
demonstrated when the political disagreement at the centre of conflict is 
seemingly straightforward on a national level it can very often be much more 
complex at a regional or local level. When this regional complexity is present a 
fully effective framework for civil-military relations is difficult. However within 
this difficulty a number of key factors stand out; factors which would be either 
absent or much less important in international, as opposed to intra-national, 
conflict. 
          
          In wars between nations a given region may have a strategic value or great 
resources but it would be rare to have to worry about it actively joining the other 
side, if of course it was not already an internationally disputed province.608 If that 
was the case then it would be anticipated that it would be a potential for conflict 
and plans made ready. The struggle for the Border States had not been 
anticipated, it threw up situations unforeseen and without any logical provision 
in the Constitution of the United States. 
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            The clash between the North and South and the tensions over slavery 
were steadily brought to the surface in the mid-nineteenth century United States 
so eventual conflict was really no surprise. However, like many civil wars, the 
dividing line was not as readily defined and it is in this that difficulties for 
theoretical examinations lie, and in this that effective understanding of civil-
military relations in complex conflicts too lie.        
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